


**THE
COMPLETE WORKS
OF
SWAMI
PRATYAGATMANANDA SARASWATI**

BIRTH CENTENARY PUBLICATION

VOLUME I



Swami Pratyagatmananda Saraswati
27 August 1881 - 20 October 1973

SCL, KOLKATA



25457

INDIA HER CULT AND EDUCATION


SWAMI
PRATYAGATMANANDA SARASWATI
(Professor Pramathanath Mukhopadhyaya)



SARANAM ASRAM

First Published
Series One : 1912
Series Two : 1914
Series Three : 1915

© SARANAM ASRAM



Published by
Saranam Asram
Chanduli, Burdwan.
77 Jatin Das Road, Calcutta 29
18/2 Dover Lane, Calcutta 29

Printed by
Monimohan Coomer
Satabdi Press Private Limited
80 Acharya Jagadish Bose Road, Calcutta 14

CONTENTS

Foreward	
SERIES I : INDIA : HER CULT AND EDUCATION	1
II : APPROACHES TO TRUTH	83
III : THE PATENT WONDER	381
Appendix	569
Bibliography	571

FOREWORD

Prof. Pramathanath Mukhopadhyaya, who later in life turned into a recluse and came to be known as Swami Pratyagatmananda Saraswati, was one of the brightest luminaries of nineteenth century Bengal, who shed his light on various aspects of life : political, historical, philosophical as well as mystical. The first nationalist resurgence of India, which had its roots in Bengal, drew this brilliant young man when he had just completed his academic career and he decided to dedicate himself to the service of the motherland by holding up the ancient ideal of education and culture through his mighty pen. Equally at home in Sanskrit, English and Bengali, with a style all his own, he made a rich contribution to the various newspapers, periodicals, journals and also wrote voluminous books, being invited to deliver lectures by the University of Calcutta and other learned societies. Even to the last day of his life, his luminous pen was as active as ever and when he passed away at the ripe old age of ninety-four, he left a priceless treasure to posterity, which is worth cherishing for its eternal value. It is gratifying to learn that his admirers and devotees have come forward to publish his complete works on the occasion of his birth-centenary, which falls this year and have thereby saved this valuable heritage from being lost.

A colleague of Sri Aurobindo in the National Council of Education (from which, in later years, the present Jadavpur University took its birth) and also a colleague of Ramendrasundar Trivedi in the Ripon College (now known as Surendranath College) as well as a collaborator with Arthur Avalon (a pseudonym of Sir John Woodroffe, a judge of the Calcutta High Court), Pramathanath developed, very early in life, a wide philosophical outlook, which sought to synthesize the modern scientific spirit of enquiry with the ancient intuitive method of approach to reality. He firmly believed that what the ancient Rishis have left for us has a deep scientific basis and it is for us to explore it

with the help of modern science. It is this belief that led him to interpret the age-old Vedanta through modern mathematical terms and symbols and in this he was absolutely unique and original. Though it is extremely difficult to appreciate and admire his way of approach to truth unless one is equally proficient like him in both modern science as well as the ancient lore, yet confirmations and corroborations are pouring in to justify what this original and daring thinker, with his unerring intuition, tried to formulate and articulate in his inimitable style. He has attempted all through his life, to make patent all that is latent in 'the wonder that is India'. In this he was a true nationalist, to the core of his being. This led him not only to the cults of Veda and Vedanta but also to the untrodden, neglected and despised cults of the Tantras.

Here also he made rich original contributions. Later in life when he took the ochre robe and withdrew himself in his own inmost sanctuary, his one and sole pre-occupation was to discover the rationale of Mantras and Tantras. On the pattern of the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, he wrote in Sanskrit his *Japa-Sūtram*, in four *adhyāyas* (chapters) and four *pādas* (sections) and an exhaustive commentary thereon in Bengali, which have been published in six big volumes, running to more than two thousand pages. This may be considered as his *magnum opus*, in which is reflected his poetical genius, literary talent as well as his philosophical insight. All this came to him spontaneously through his life-long *sādhana*, ardent spiritual discipline, unblemished purity of character, saintly temperament and lofty wisdom. Whoever came in touch with his magnetic personality immediately felt that what came out from his lips or his pen had its roots in his own inner experience and here was a living embodiment of the ancient Rishi of India. Though he has left his mortal frame, his words are still living and vibrant and one can bathe in them to get refreshed and inspired with a new outlook of life.

The first of this centenary volume of his complete works consists of three books in English, which were published in a series about seventy years back. The first, 'India : Her Cult and Education' was published by the author himself in 1912, the

second in the series, 'Approaches to Truth' as well as the third, 'The Patent Wonder' were published by P. S. Basu in 1914 and 1915 respectively. A second edition of the last book, minus the Sanskrit portion, was published by Ganesh & Company, Madras in 1973. There is a proposal to publish all his works in English, Bengali as well as Sanskrit serially and chronologically in this way and we all wish this laudable venture a success.

Thanks are particularly due to Srimati Asima Goswami, who has taken upon herself the difficult and arduous task of collecting all the works of late Swamiji and, arranging to get them printed serially. The Satabdi Press has extended its hand of co-operation and sincerest thanks are due to them for doing this difficult job of printing, both in English and Devanagari, so neatly and quickly.

May we all benefit by this invaluable treasure.

Calcutta
Janmastami
2 September,

GOBINDAGOPAL MUKHOPADHYAYA

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The compilation of this volume would have been impossible without the information and help rendered by Sri Bijoykumar Bhattacharya of Kalanabagram, Burdwan and the very kind co-operation of Sri Purnachandra Addy, Secretary Tilak Sadharan Pathagar, Bhandarhati, Hooghly. We express our gratefulness to them.

Our warmest regards to Dr. Gobindagopal Mukhopadhyaya for his most valuable guidance and encouragement at every stage.

We are thankful to Sri Subimal Lahiri and Sri Amitkumar Sen for rendering their valuable assistance with regard to the production and very kindly seeing the book through the press.

We express our sincerest thanks to Sri Hironmay Bagchi for his invaluable suggestion, opinion and co-operation whenever we needed them.

Lastly we would like to record our grateful appreciation of the most patient co-operation shown by the Satabdi Press Private Limited and all its staff.

PUBLISHER

INDIA : HER CULT AND EDUCATION

SERIES I

INDIA : HER CULT AND EDUCATION

It is a characteristic sign of the age that many of us have been inspired with a nervous dread for ideals. With many of us life is a continual flux, an aimless and thoughtless roving, with no calm centre of philosophy, with no definite point of reference. We apparently forget that the practice of life is an absurd acting where there is no theory of life behind it, that we cannot afford to lose consciously all touch with the theory if we must make the practice charged with a meaning and purpose. Man is a rational animal, and it is in the nature of man to look before and after ; his present is a point in which his past and his future do meet in a sense. He works from ideas, his living is selective and purposive. But the calm centre of philosophy is not an idea in the ordinary sense but an ideal, a definite conception of what life in its individual and collective aspects ought to be, a distinct notion of the nature and conditions of life's self-fulfilment. In the application of the ideal to actual life one may have to climb down considerably to begin with, to make the ideal assert itself with increasingly stronger emphasis as the actual forces to reckon with are gradually tamed ; one may even find it necessary to set up secondary and proximate ideals for immediate use keeping the primary and ultimate as a far off destiny to be slowly but steadily approached. It is a world of compromise in which man lives, moves and has his being, so that the noblest ideals on which he may set his heart may not always be ready for use at a moment's notice. But while all this is perfectly true, can we really be blind to the supreme importance of the primary and ultimate in the economy of human affairs, can we forget that the lower must ever take its direction and impetus from the higher, that the part must live in and through the whole, that all the little shiftings and provisional adjustments which mark the gradual process of ideas in life can weave no consistent and harmonious scheme of life if

they are not controlled by a presiding unity of direction, shaped, collected and drilled by a pervading harmony of final purpose ?

The interdependence of ideas and ideals must never be overlooked. Ideas bridge over the necessary gulf between the ideal and the actual—an ideal must be a possible and practicable one before it can descend into the realm of the actual, and it is for the ideas of practical wisdom to determine the exact conditions and limitations to which the ideal must subject itself in order to be translated into a possible and practicable scheme of action. Thus : Religion may be an attempt to realize in life the dreams of high philosophy, to make the two extremes of the ideal and actual meet in the evolution of human life, to awaken the spirit of man into a lively recognition of a forgotten divinity in the confusion of animal cares and in the dust raised by petty struggles. The system of institutions which make religion express the gradual evolution of an ideal, none bearing a relation of absolute suitability, each bearing a relation of relative suitability, to it. To find the exact conditions and limitations of the suitability of an institution for the ideal is the problem of problems before religious practical wisdom. In politics this is statesmanship.

The dissociation of the ideal from the actual is surely fraught with disastrous results, unless it forms one's special aim to dream the ideal in its native purity and grandeur and to leave the actual severely alone so that it may appear on the horizon of vision in its true colours and proportions. The interest is essentially scientific. The world can forgive its Platos and Sankaras. We can almost pardon a man who rises on the wings of thought and faith into calm, sparkling ether to stand face to face with the very mystery of existence, a visionary who appears to perch on the cool hills like the immortal gods oblivious of mankind and whom apparently nothing short of the crack of doom will shake from sweet oblivion. He may perhaps live freedom, light and immortality while the poor, little planet at his feet sees but a Nature blown into being out of dust and returning speedily and inevitably to dust again ; he may perhaps feel secure amid the eternal verities while yet the eye of mortal

science cannot pierce through the gathering gloom of facts and truth slips from the faltering grasp of old metaphysics. Even such an insular idealism may not be without its indirect and far-reaching uses : the soul of a prophet has ever dwelt apart like a star, but the queer world of ours has loved its prophets desperately and suffered for their sake tremendously. Well ; but for the purposes of the actual affairs of life we require to possess the ideals in a practicable shape, to know the exact conditions which while making the ideal conform to the actual will yet enable it to conquer and elevate the actual. Three things stand out in clear outlines in this rather hasty introductory discussion :

(1) In any scheme of action the place of the final purpose or ideal is unique.

(2) The problem of practical wisdom in all spheres of activity is to give such a shape to the ideal by assigning the exact conditions and limitations as will enable it to absorb the actual and elevate it. For this it may be necessary to set up secondary ideals—schemes or institutions that will express the ideal with increasingly greater breadth and intensity. The relation of these to one another must be of the nature of organic co-ordination.

(3) The direction and protection of the secondary ideals must accordingly have a double reference—the distant shadowy ideal to which we are moving and the stern realities of the actual from which and through which we are toiling.

Now, having cleared the ground a little, let me ask : what is the ideal that we must have in view in thinking about a scheme of national education of India? Surely we have nothing to lose if we begin by giving as wide a latitude as we can to the ideal we are conceiving of, for the transition from a general solution to a special is both natural and easy while that from a sectional solution to a complete is at best an uphill work which may dissuade the intellect from making efforts of a more ambitious nature. Suppose we take as our ideal the economic sufficiency of India : now this may necessarily involve many elements of a consummation which we do not ordinarily cover

by the idea 'economic', e.g., economic sufficiency may be found to be an abstraction without political autonomy of some form; in a thorough-going analysis it may be found to imply a comprehensive system of mass-education in India, and certainly also the eradication of some of our social evils. The system of forces which shape and control the affairs of men cannot lack all co-ordination in any scheme of distribution; the virtues and vices of men have so beautiful an organic interdependence among them that it may be practically impossible to change or affect any one of them without inducing corresponding changes or affections in all the rest. There are no insular forces, no purely one-sided affairs, no absolute actions and reactions, in social dynamics. The economic forces are not out of touch with the political and social ones, and surely in the realm of forces if anywhere touch is stress and stress is interaction. Thus economic sufficiency, properly understood and carried to its logical limits, may imply an almost complete scheme of national self-fulfilment: the laws of co-relation are not less exacting in the affairs of men than in the processes of nature. But the proper understanding and the logical limits will compel one to soar much above purely economic considerations, to stand squarely upon a vast and complex assemblage of forces in which the economic certainly have a place and function but in which there is no close bureaucracy, no monopoly. Such a conception is really a conception of the entire nature, trend and destiny of a nation's life; hence in the evolution of ideas the economic ideal is swallowed up by the national, the sectional is placed in its proper subordination to the complete, the part is conquered and taken up by the whole. But this evolution of ideas, this proper understanding, is not always a ready-made fact. Man's notions about economic sufficiency are rarely so clear and settled as to enable him to see in an unsophisticated survey what lies beneath their surface, he can seldom command the philosophic generosity which while making the fragment appear in its true perspective will in the same act invest it with unmistakable suggestions of the complete background. Do, for example,

some of the more advanced states of Europe and America possess economic self-sufficiency? At first thought we are tempted to answer, yes—an emphatic yes. But does a state really possess economic self-sufficiency, material contentment—which is perpetually in the vortex of a most cruel and most ungracious war, the economic war of capital and labour, of individualism and socialism; a state in which the microscopic few must feed illimitably fat on the physical and moral ruins of God's innocent, hard-working millions, in which the silver spoon must necessarily be given a preference preposterously out of all proportion to its intrinsic value over the honest, ungrudging spade? The average of hundreds of dollars per head is a mischievous myth, so long as the distance between big dollars and small, between the swelling multi-millions and vanishing half-a-penny, remains so great that the few may rob the fair earth of all her blessings which they have not especially helped into existence, while the many are driven progressively from stress to poverty, from poverty to physical and moral destitution. Well, such a picture as this is not calculated to inspire one with much love for the Western economic institutions: already the world has had too many of its Alexanders and Caesars, Napoleons to cultivate anew a liking for their far less interesting and far more exacting bank-captain editions of these days. This so-called economic solvency may be laudable when compared with the chronic starvation of modern India—any economic footing may be laudable compared with it; in her economic evolution India may even have to wade through all this mire; but let us not delude ourselves into thinking that the true economic self-sufficiency is anything like what we find in the modern states of Europe and America. *The material contentment of a state must be conceived as the maximum material prosperity with a minimum of inequity of distribution among its units and with a minimum friction with the other factors of maximum felicity.* Now, properly conceived, this ideal is only a cognate aspect of the complete ideal of national self-fulfilment. Not only here is no conflict between the two ideals; but the one

appears to express what the other implies, differing perhaps in their way of emphasis but not certainly in their full import and bearing. But this proper conception, let me repeat, is possible only when we have a clear conception of each and of their mutual relation ; so that in aiming at a sectional solution which is to be not worse than no solution we cannot shut our eyes to the nature and conditions of the last consummation that we may devoutly wish for.

Let us therefore pitch our ideal high, let it by all means be an ideal worthy of a life's love and seeking, of a nation's patriotic devotion. We may actually require a progressive scheme of ways and means for the realization of such an ideal, the immediate object of our national endeavour may lack all the fascination and grandeur of those looming in the shadowy distance but let not the ideal itself be shorn of its native glory, the power which it exercises over the imagination and which influences the springs of some of our noblest sentiments. While it is the highest order of statesmanship to give a cool, practical shape to the visionary ideals of a nation, to regulate the motions of our planet in accordance with the sublime music of the spheres, it is certainly no part of such statesmanship to forget that imagination has no less an important function in the march of human history than in the evolution of human science and that sentiments have often decided and struck where reason has only wavered and hesitated, that at any rate these have often rushed in where cool logic has feared to tread. Imagination and sentiment are no less important factors of national consciousness than reason and commonsense : so that an ideal that does not draw all the factors and receive all the feeders is not a power that can move, and it is lame statesmanship that will not respect the organic interdependence of these factors in the constitution of the social mind.

An analysis of the social mind will readily bring out its two prominent factors—sense and interest. Under sense I should place not only all that it knows and believes consistently with its science but the instrument of its conceptions and judgements—its culture and its logical sense. Under interest I must place not

only all that it feels and desires, its instinctive beliefs and intuitive hopes, its passions and prejudices, but also the present and active expressions and dispositions of the social mind. This brief sketch of the elements of the social mind may perhaps be allowed to go unchallenged ; it will also be readily perceived that none of these are static factors—that they are members of a moving and growing system of force ; while the growth of culture is abundantly clear the development of the logical sense is not particularly obscure ; the characteristic feelings and desire of a race are certainly slow to change but nevertheless they do change surely and systematically ; even old passions and prejudices may wear off and give place to new ; a race may almost throw overboard its immemorial articles of faith and may well nigh cut off its moorings from its time-honoured traditional past. But while change is the order of things, no process of things is all change and no permanence. For a given age or epoch a system of forces, be it social or individual, must be conceived as having a relative permanence—a resultant scheme of faith and culture, logic and aesthetic, institutions and dispositions, which supplies a more or less settled basis for a further process of reconstruction. The world is a synthesis of to be and not to be, and the social world is certainly not a fiat of divine ultra-legalism.

But perhaps two queries have to be answered before we shall be allowed to pass on to a conception of the ideal of national education. (1) Assuming that reason can direct and discipline the feelings and instincts natural in the breast of man, why should not the evolution of social life, so far at least as it is amenable to our direction, be wrenched completely from the hands of faith and blind instincts and committed solely to the charge of cool logic ? At this late hour of the day when Science is so justly proud of her laurels and reason is so apparently conscious of its powers and so keenly jealous of its rights, is it either proper or profitable to play into the hands of wild, irrational forces which however helpful in the earlier and more precarious stages of our evolution, however persuasive even in this advanced era of enlightenment, can hardly have any justification

now for usurping the supreme control of affairs? Let society march fearlessly on to the consummation of its reason's purest ideals; let its judgements be dispassionate, let its ideas be cool and collected, let the assemblage of forces have its fanatics and rioters reduced to a minimum of distracting influence. Now, surely this is a dream that may set aglow the philosopher's brow in his cool, sequestered vale of contemplation; with a touch of his magical wand he would fain conjure the fair earth to rise straight into a sort of Platonic heaven from which all passions have fled, where Idea reigns supreme and no discordant note is struck in the sublime harmony of pure dialectics. But does not all Nature seem to have conspired against any such easy-going idealism? First, a society in which reason is to be the sole law of movement, where the philosopher is to be the sole guide and friend, the wise Ulysses who will find it practicable to put wax into the ears of his faithful crew to keep them away from the sirens, is a society that yet exists in the lap of the gods. Surely Nature's Artist has dipped his brush in some of those colors which exist for the poet, the lunatic and the lover; and can the cold philosopher with all his pious indignation efface the actual from the canvas and substitute the ideal at once so that the observer may rise one fine morning to see a world coolly reasoning and calculating with an eye luminous in the assurance of its perception and a brain with not the faintest ruffle of an intoxication? As at present constituted, the actual social order is very largely under the sway of instincts and sentiments, and though in the distant ideal they may conceivably lose all their original influence, they surely cannot be hunted down to violent death, nay, even they cannot ever with impunity be trifled with. So it is that while a purely sentimental solution of the social problem is bad, a merely logical solution is worse. The correspondence between reason and sentiment is close but not complete. They act and react upon each other but the law of the one is not wholly or even mainly the law of the other. Man feels where perhaps he sees no reason why he should: man doubts and reasons where perhaps his faith and feeling would fain keep him devoutly

silent. A complete correspondence may be the dream of the social philosopher and the goal of the social architect, but it is as far removed from the actual state of things as the millenium itself. Secondly, the instincts and feelings are not quite so wild a rabble of forces as they may be suspected to be. The bare fact that they have stood the test of natural selection is a sufficient guarantee for the importance of their place in the economy of social evolution ; factors that Nature herself has selected, preserved and developed with scrupulous care cannot be mere hollow playthings, for Nature at any rate will have none of our wild-goose chases. The verdict of reason is to be received with care because reason is paradoxically both narrow and dogmatic : has not the evolutionary science of today already discovered a meaning in the apparently irrational instincts of the living, a law in the apparently unmeasured dance of the feelings ? If Science has grown wise today, may not she grow wiser tomorrow ? The rule of instincts and sentiments is rather to be trusted because these being themselves products of a long and arduous process of evolution must become the condition and guarantee of any further course of evolution. Thirdly, we cannot simply do without the element of interest in any scheme of social movement. Knowledge is power, but perhaps it is not a power that can move. It moves by shifting and awakening interest, by drawing upon the sources of motive power, but not primarily by and through itself. The instincts and feelings supply the whole motive power, the *vis viva*, which reason may direct and control but not replace and represent. The material must already be there before the architect can fashion it ; the forces must already be there before the operator can harness them. In technical language, sense and interest, reason and impulse, may respectively be regarded as the **formal** and **material** conditions of movement. A concrete and practical ideal of movement must embrace and co-ordinate both.

(2) The idea of a social mind requires perhaps a little elucidation. Society is an aggregate of a vast number of thinking units, the mind of society is just these units taken all together, so that it is hardly proper to speak of the social mind, its factors

and functions, in the general. These units again in any civilized society bear all possible varieties of character, each such society having various types of thought and interest fairly represented by its component units. All conceivable extremes meet in the cauldron of social affairs, orthodoxy and liberalism, faith and scepticism, spirituality and materialism, the forces of war and peace, of progress and stability, of anabolism and catabolism, and what not. So in a comprehensive survey, humanity seems to bear a nearly uniform character and possess a nearly uniform mode of evolution in all civilized societies, the differences being largely of detail and expression, indeed mostly being mythical differences incidental to partial surveys and restricted readings. Can we say, for example, from a broad and impartial reading of history, that the dominant note in Hindu civilization and culture is spirituality and other-worldliness while that in modern European civilization is materialism and mundanity? Do we not, on the contrary, find that mundanity and other-worldliness, Gold and God, have fairly evenly divided the entire civilized man between themselves; that even the people beyond the seas may not after all be damned samaritans having no cares above their belly and even the mild, enervated Hindus may not characteristically be a race of dreamy lotus-eaters? The martyr and the prophet, the philosopher and the savant, the reformer and the patriot, the soldier and the statesman, the poet and the artist have surely all conspired to build for Europe her proud and dominant civilization—a civilization that cannot lack at least the saving grace of moral and rational romanticism. Blind orthodoxy would of course like to put the whole world into her little melting pot and bid it run into a monotonous flow after her own fashion, but the bounty of Nature has made the course of human history rich with numerous varieties of thought and interest, though, on the whole, nearly uniform in all ages and parts of the civilized globe. What then can we mean when we say that the Hindu has a social mind which Europe has not, and *vice versa*?

While deferring my consideration of the last point, I must observe that this can hardly be a correct reading of actual

society and history. Human psychology is practically the same in its essential features all over the world and throughout history, so that the forces and institutions in various societies must have at least an irreducible minimum of common character which seeming differences may more or less conceal or obscure but never altogether obliterate. The universe is a flowering miracle in which the many in departing from the one cannot but keep their roots and centres in the one—the giant system of heavenly bodies as well as the pigmy worlds of electrons, the infinitely rich forms into which Nature's fauna and flora have blossomed forth, indeed the entire constitution of Nature and History will illustrate this basic law of evolution. Certainly we cannot expect to lose ourselves amid utter, downright differences, in dark yawning chasms, in searching for a philosophical interpretation of history, in diving for the deeper roots of the various social types that may at last commingle and co-originate. But if we are not permitted to keep the many leaving the one, we are not permitted either to invert the business—the many are as securely planted in the one as the one in the many, the one and the many are really the aspects of a single whole pulse of process which abstract reflection may take asunder for its own purposes but which indissolubly blend together in the live real. The many social types are not certainly without their irreducible minimum of common character ; but certainly too there do exist or rather come to exist enormous and vital differences which render societies into distinct types, each also with an irreducible minimum of specific character. I will not thrust upon my reader the highly obtruse conception of an original social continuum, a primordial motherstuff of social life gradually differentiating and integrating into a co-ordinated system of social types, though I am persuaded that this is the only tenable hypothesis of social being and becoming which reason has to advance: the primordial mother-stuff-would as assuredly make the budding types depart from one another and itself as co-essential with one another and itself. Compare for a moment the types to travelling eddies in a stream, each taking its birth

from the same mother fluid through the operation of practically the same kind of laws but how jealously guarding its distinctive limits, how obstinately unaccommodating to a sister eddy !

But let me pass on. Let us take as our starting datum a homogeneous assemblage of thinking and feeling units as the germinal protoplasm of the social organism—or if this is too palpably a mythical hypothesis—let us begin with a few groups of thinking and feeling units, a number of original societies, in which, however the units may differ and collide, the average and the resultant is practically uniform. Each group may conceivably yield a whole-tone or resultant character having a minimum of difference from that of another, the units A B C of one and X Y Z of another may produce practically the same total result R. The likelihood of R being uniform will be the greater the less the units of the one group differ from those of the other in points of magnitude and direction—two nearly uniform societies will have for all practical purposes nearly uniform resultant activities. Let me take a typical case. The Indo-European families of the Aryan stock would undeniably afford such a case. The original Aryan stock must have been a starting basis which presented very essential ties of natural affinity among the units that descended and lived together : they must have been the products of the same institutions of society. The assemblage of conditions were assuredly such as would reduce their differences to a minimum or raise their likeness to a maximum. Now, suppose different groups of this society of homogeneous units break loose from one another, and seeking different direction of activity and expansion migrate to different geographical areas. We may fashion for ourselves societies of homogeneous units to suit our pet hypotheses, but this surely is a business for which we cannot expect to find encouragement from Nature. The different geographical areas that Nature has spread for the habitation of her million species of children are certainly not homogeneous physical media making for their fusion, smoothing off their jeering angularities and burying all the wealth of their specific characters. They serve the purpose of differentiation.

and not confusion, of diversion into ever fresh varieties and not usually reversion to a dead level of homogeneity. They must accentuate differences where they already exist and create differences where there are none. A conditional free-trade and a conditional protection are necessarily the cult of Nature's economy. Strife is the father of things. Advanced scientific thought has discovered a rich vein of wisdom in the uncouth enigmas of the ancients. An all-round equilibrium of forces means a dead, statical universe in which any play of forces, any flow of life, is a clear impossibility. This is a basic principle of universal extension. In the narrow world of life and society we are certainly not exempted from the unsparing operation of this law. An all-round equilibrium of forces in the living kingdom means perfect sterility and death, in society it means absolute inertia and stagnation. If Darwin's Struggle for Existence and Natural Selection show us the one half of the business of evolution, Romans' Isolation undoubtedly shows us the other half. In order that two species A and B may leap out of the motherstock X, it is essential not only that there should originate, somehow, variations in X in the directions of A and B, variations favourable and proper for selection, but also that the budding varieties should be isolated as widely as possible from each other so that they may not neutralise each other by cross and other means. Nature must somehow wall off the one from the other though not absolutely; to profit by the polarity and contrast from without each must also rise to a life open to all the winds that may blow, not cut off from the broader currents of Life all round. To find a proper mean between isolation and co-operation was undoubtedly a most delicate problem before Nature's God; such is also the problem before social stewardship. Nature's God has solved it and heroically too, as all natural history will plainly show: has man, the vain spoilt child of Nature, yet been able to find a solution in devising a scheme of social machinery in so far at least as it in him lies? We shall wait and see.

In the meanwhile we cannot suffer the grim philosophy of isolation to be entirely lost upon us. Now, the different

geographical areas meet to a certain extent Nature's demand for isolation—to a considerable extent I should say. The enveloping system or the environment has undoubtedly an important contribution in the total process of evolution, and different geographical areas present, of course, different enveloping systems. Suppose the families of the Aryan stock migrate and settle last in India and Scandinavia respectively. They may conceivably bear an uniform character and possess uniform institutions to start with ; but the widely different enveloping systems of the two areas will admirably serve Nature's purpose of isolation, will differentiate as ages roll on the original Aryan continuum into individual types of races : the distance of space and time means much more than merely geographical and historical distance. And what should we think will be the nature and magnitude of such distance when the forces of isolation are allowed to do their work practically unhampered for a period of at least six thousand years in two diametrically opposite parts of the globe:—India where eternal hills with snow-clad peaks have stood sponsor to the birth of history, green plains and arid deserts, dark primeval forests and wave-splashed hospitable coasts have set off to its best advantage her fatal gift of beauty, where plenty and comfort are Nature's own favour rather than fruits of Art's hard labour, where noble and heroic rivers have warbled and danced to the tune of the soul's first hymns, where cool, shady valleys have thrilled with the glow of the soul's first inspiration and beatitude, a country which the God of evolution appears to have marked out and planned for first realizing the supreme marvel of His creative dream, man-god. Scandinavia where rugged hills and perpetual snows, broken coasts and icy-waves, unmelting fogs and frozen rivers, piercing blasts and long arctic nights, the aurora and mother Nature's barren austerity have undoubtedly all conspired to exercise or even strain man's activities of living which vented themselves in daring raids and bold piracies, to kindle his fancy and awaken his interest in the pressing system around which expressed themselves in a noble mythology of Odin and Thor—indeed noble enough to draw even a Carlyle's homage. If there

was ever a country which was happily adapted to make life flow **inwards**, sentiment run deep, thought and imagination soar high, it was India. Where soft gentle solicitations of Nature serve to soothe and lull, it was no wonder that the cult of Maya would rise and settle for good ; where majestic woods in secluded valleys bathe their floral crowns in the peeping effulgence of a picturesque sunrise and in the departing glory of a sublime sunset, and where clear starry heaven looks on with an expression of infinite pity at the weary process of our vain little planet and delivers with a still, thrilling voice the message from an unseen beyond, it was no wonder that a philosophy of spiritual vision and other-worldliness would be born; where the smiling fields and pregnant woods, the easy springs and rivers that seem to carry the milk of natural kindness from door to door, all make the exertion of man a luxury and visit the negligence of man with abundance, it was no wonder that the gospel of beatific peace and simple contentment would hold a race under a spell. Do we not, on the other hand, detect amid the conditions of the other country the germ and promise of a race whose life must flow **outwards** for the very sake of self-preservation? There, if anywhere, adaptation is perpetual warfare with Nature, so that living cannot but be virile and emphatic: where Nature seldom touches without drawing blood, a cult of Maya and other-worldliness are surely slow to take root; where to sit idle means starvation a gospel of peace and contentment will be late in making its appeal go home. The outward flow of life and interest, grimly practical to begin with, will inevitably bring in its train a knowledge and theory of Enveloping Order on empirical lines, the practical interest in Nature will beget Science. That was undoubtedly a chosen nursery ground for an expensive and practical, non-phlegmatic and non-mystical race. It may sound as a riddle but it is true nevertheless that the geography of a country holds in a certain fashion the key to the history of its people. The forces of time and space, working in concert, will impart to each race a typical character or individuality: *individuality meaning, of course, not absolute possession and exclusion of certain virtues*

but certain emphasis and relaxation, domination and subordination, essentiality and accidentality, of them ; the idea is entirely relative. A comparison between the ape-man and the man-ape may be instructive. One may not be prepared to go the whole length with Wallace and cross swords with Darwin to say that the appearance of the latter into the arena of life was a fact *sui generis* and required divine intervention, that it was a finishing touch given by the Painter's own brush ; morphologically and functionally the descent of man is certainly not abrupt nearer home, in the mind, the ascent of man is most assuredly remarkable. And what is this remarkable departure really ? Shall we suppose, Darwin and Romanes, Spencer and Huxley, notwithstanding, that the fire of reason was stolen from heaven by a lucky Prometheus for the edification—and possibly also embarrassment—of man and man alone ? Perhaps no. It is at best only a question of readjustment ; reason is not born in the cortex of the human brain, but it is here that it feels power and makes it felt, the master and the slave change places with each other. The ghost of the physicist's billiard ball still lives in the brain, but there is a masterful Prospero that knows how to keep the wild Ariel in his place. The individuality of man lies in this. But I will not sally further into this borderland of exact science ; the hint is sufficient to indicate that the individuality of a race is not a close monopoly of certain characteristics ; rigidly defined, it is *the traits of an original continuum thrown into a novel and relatively permanent scheme of co-ordination.*

I have indulged in a bit of high-flown writing but I daresay not wholly quitted the *terra firma* of scientific ground. We have seen how thoroughly geographical distribution serves the purpose of isolation and individualisation, how a race originally homogeneous with another grows into a distinct type under the modifying influence of a different environment. We may profitably note also that such individualisation goes apace through history by the gradual accumulation of differentiation in the original stuff: each modification effected becomes a relatively permanent footing for a further process of modification to start, and then there is also a composition and co-ordination of these slight

modifications. Nature is necessarily conservative: she never of course runs a same stream for us in which we can twice bathe, but evidently also she will find her work impossible without relatively stable bases and comparatively secure results. So far I have assumed homogeneous starting bases of social evolution and apparently left the process of differentiation entirely to the account of the environment. But possibly this is a case of double or plural causation; can the variations wholly and satisfactorily be accounted for by the environment usual? Even Darwin himself was inclined to trace some at least of the variations to the spontaneity of the organism itself and subsequently, Weismannism seems to have made the claim of spontaneity stronger than ever. The Teutonic and the Indian branches of the Aryan stock might possibly diverge geographically not in perfect amity and with easy conscience, but perhaps because they had already diverged psychologically and potentially, they migrated to different areas not with their accounts evenly adjusted, as equivalent social units drifting in a non-homogeneous system of geographical configuration, but possibly as potential types each with an original sin of concealed awaiting and seeking environments that might develop them into actually distinct races. Spontaneity or impact, the forces of Nature do certainly conspire to transform apparently homogeneous groups into progressively distinct races. Clear-sighted history is not slow to perceive the affinities and idiosyncrasies of races, the continuous undercurrent of common life beneath wide differences of ideas and institutions as well as the novel features and expressions which life necessarily and readily assume in nature and history. Analytic history may take partial phases and side issues for narrow inspection but such phases and issues torn off from their natural affinities are abstractions and not real things: while it is good for history to catch the fundamental common notes of Aryanism in the apparently diverse national anthems of the Indian and Teutonic races, it can scarcely be said to be able to tell also the special emphases and combinations of the notes in the two which render each into a distinct harmony, break the dull monotony

of the mother bass into a rich and supremely gratifying gamut of life's melody.

To guide our fingers unerringly on the pulse of history, past and present, we require a philosophical method, a method that will ensure the presentation and interpretation of facts in their proper places, proportions and bearings. For example, a generous and competent critic has described the Hindus as a race of philosophers : now, do we or do we not deserve this high compliment? India was undoubtedly the home of noble systems of philosophy, but so was also Greece and so has also been Germany; a Gautama and a Sankara might discuss philosophy with an Aristotle and a Plato, with a Mill and a Hegel; the soil of India has indeed proved fertile for the growth of stately systems of thought, but have not some of the other countries proved at least equally so? But a race of philosophers is not a race that has produced philosophy, good, bad and indifferent, but a race that has philosophy running through the essential fibres of its being, down perhaps to the lowest strata of its society, a race that *lives* philosophy and not simply *produces* it. We are certainly a race of thinkers if one can show that, apart from a Vyasa and a Sankara, the simple tillers of the soil and hewers of the wood, the half-starved millions going about in filth and rags, are permeated with a bias for philosophising, saying or doing things, consciously or semi-consciously, which indicate beyond doubt that the distinctions of the real and unreal, the abiding and fleeting, the yonder and beyond have in some fashion a footing even in their blood, that they have eyes to see through the dust of the actual and passing. They may see truths, or half-truths or untruths, but immemorial habit is there to look for something behind and beyond, to feel that the so-called actual is not all or even the better of existence. Now, can so much be said about the Hindu millions that we see around us? This is a question which no student of Indian philosophies alone will be competent to answer : the historian must be perfectly at home with the dumb millions themselves, present in their trial and sufferings, in their solace and contentment,

in the thousand and one institutions through which their life flows to a destiny which apparently no one can divine but with regard to which *they* have no serious misgivings. So history that is inspired with the high purpose of interpreting and generalising will wreck itself if it does not proceed on broad and sound lines: bad history is immeasurably worse than no history.

We have traced the development of races into distinct types; but are we not so far playing this drama of Hamlet with the part of Hamlet completely left out? Is it wisdom or common sense to make biology and sociology run parallel lines, though the world's greatest savants may themselves have set us an example? The most prominent figure in the drama of man's life is his reason; this reason is a factor of growing importance, and though perhaps born of cosmic forces soon grows into a Novel Might fighting its parents and gradually laying them prostrate at its feet. Now, Nature may plan for isolation and division and behind our backs: we have seen that the environment is assuredly such a scheme. But is not reason, with its uniform laws and similar ends an equalising force, a born leveller pulling down Nature's barriers and making up the differences of history?

Suppose the people who inhabited the Baltic borders and those who lived in the valley of Ganges thought out a similar goal of national aspiration and endeavour; and suppose also the goal was this: Knowledge is power and the *sine qua non* of happiness; knowledge is compatible with a settled and virile order of society, with civilisation; let us therefore combine to select and encourage those forces that make for this consummation. We cannot overlook the fact that with the development of reason a novel form of selection is added to the natural, supplementing or superseding it, which may be called rational selection in contrast with the other, which, as some of the best authorities tell us, is largely ultra-rational or alogical. Consciously encouraging or inhibiting the controllable forces of our nature and environment with a view to furthering an end conceived by us as desirable: this is rational

selection. Now, this desirable end and logical selection may conceivably be similar with two races inhabiting two widely isolated geographical areas, and for the matter of that, with the two interesting peoples we have taken to serve as our models. The set of circumstances which is to impart to the one its distinctive shape and character is, *ex-hypothesi*, different from what is to work for the other; Nature has laid an elaborately planned machinery for their division and differentiation. But now, with the dawning of reason's ideals and stirring of reason's own forces, two similar and domineering factors are introduced into the two sets of circumstances, elements of convergence and fusion seeking to neutralise the existing elements of divergence and division, veritable angles of peace breathing harmony into a world of clashing interests and bloody strifes. Thus the Baltic borders may leave their natural piracies for lofting ideals and occupations and even the Gangetic valley may learn to season its dreamy other-worldliness by a leaven of sterner elements required by cosmic justice. Reason is essentially a factor of compensation: Nature divides, reason unites; Nature revels in creating distinctions, reason in overcoming them; Nature's motto is strife, reason's love.

Now, this contention, substantially true though it is, will not detract from the force of the considerations advanced before in support of the individualisation of races. Reason compensates, but not at once and not altogether super-naturally. Reason rules, but is not a despot without limitations of authority. Reason is an apt pupil in Nature's School. The enveloping order, which man has to know, count with and conquer, must determine in a very substantial measure the process of his reason. Ordinarily at any rate he reasons to live and not lives to reason, and ordinarily too life is a successful adaptation to the environment. Hence, the development and the findings of reason can hardly be behind the back of Nature, independent of the forces playing around us, without constant reference to the demands of the situation. So that the Baltic border and Gangetic valley will each give a special impetus and direction to the intellect of man, the special conditions of

life will largely influence the springs of thought and interest. This circumstantiality of reason, the subtle correspondences which chain the wings of man's proud, soaring intellect to the gross and mundane system below must never be clouded by too hazy an idealism. Again, reason is not a faculty blown into the cortex of the human brain, full-grown on the knees of the gods, ideal in conception and perfect in execution, a born ruler of things. The evolution of reason, even above the human level, is a long and risky journey, each secure advance made clearing its perception and each sure footing obtained augmenting its consciousness of power, the unending course and the unforgiving environment ever laying down the conditions of its progress, spreading the scenes of its triumph. The intellect is dynamical and not statical. This innate plasticity and relativity of reason will induce it largely to take on the stamp and individuality of the environment: to transcend Nature's reason, reason necessarily descends into Nature: *hence the soul of the Gangetic valley is not the soul of the Baltic border*. Thus, the one has reasoned, rightly or wrongly, how to make life a stepping stone to immortality, developed a social order subservient to this end and thrilling in its every limb with an yearning after it and also to plunge the piers of such a subservient order into the solid rock of first principles so that ages may come and go but it will stand a supreme marvel of human contrivance, an immemorial pathway across the dark abyss of death. The other has reasoned, rightly or wrongly, how to make life enjoyable, to develop a polity and civilization adapted to this end, not perhaps with its wistful gaze turned perpetually to the unseen, not perhaps with its science ceaselessly knocking its brains against the barred temple of mysticism. The one has primarily thought of *that* life and provided for its reception: the other has primarily thought of *this* life and provided for its enjoyment. But of this more in another place.

Before I have done with the part of reason, as a compensating and equalising factor, I must touch one or two points more. In the higher altitudes, when reason has

flown somewhat above natural aptitudes and cares, when there arises a Kant or a Hegel, who awaits the light from beyond to flash upon his anxious brow, a Tyndall or a Kelvin who searches among the atoms themselves for more living corpuscles of reality, a more assured earnest of persistence, will not the soul of the West dream of an ideal akin to the ideal of the East, and if it does, will not there be born forthwith an angel of peace and harmony presiding over the destinies of the two races, reducing their clashing individualities and drawing their bosoms together so as to make them beat in unison again as indeed they did while the races were yet fondly clinging to the knees of their pre-historic Aryan mother? I may answer yes, but cannot part with my individuality at once: the dreams of a Rousseau culminated in a bloody revolution, but distances are not annihilated, distinctions are not dead, in Europe. I will not belittle the attraction, the shaping influence, of a distant ideal, but I will not charge it with an impossible mission—the individuality of a race may soften and melt in time, but surely cannot be spirited away by the touch of any magic wand available for us. Lastly, it should not be forgotten that reason does not as yet hold all the strings of racial evolution in its hands, not even perhaps the main strings. It is a business still planned and directed to a very considerable extent from below and possibly also from above, and is this not an warning for the vain reason of man to make its pretension modest and judgements cautious? Reason's ideals do not quite fit in with Nature's plans: reason may yearn after universal brotherhood, but Nature assuredly does not—to divide and grow is Nature's Philosophy. Now, social evolution will necessarily follow the line of least resistance—the human reason cutting through an essentially conservative natural order, assisted or controlled possibly by a suprahuman reason. Hence, we are safe in the conclusion that the individuality of a race will persist considerably longer than reason may wish; there is undoubtedly a dynamic even behind an individuality, and persistence is the basic law of force; besides, reason is not always a sworn enemy of individualities, in all moderate

altitudes at any rate reason can conceivably be *pre-individualistic* as well it can be *anti-individualistic*. Will not history bear me out?

I would certainly not enter into this academic discussion were it not my purpose to bring out incidentally some important first principles of social evolution, which, as I hope to make it abundantly clear presently, must be constantly before our mind's eye while we are aiming at a conception of the ideal of national education and especially the translation of that ideal into practice.

(1) An all-round equilibrium of forces means the return of universe to Primeval Night. For constructive evolution we must have unequal tensions, polarities and divisions. This law applies not only to the affairs of inert matter and motion but also to those of life and society. Ask the cool-headed physicist how this great moving Order can come to its day of doom, and he will unhesitatingly point his finger to this quarter. Ask the clear-brained biologist how Nature pulsating with life can stop cold and dead, and he will return his ready answer. Do sociology and evolutionary psychology, does history not join this universal chorus of response?

(2) Hence, under the operation of certain ground principles, life divides, multiplies, grows and co-ordinates. Recall for a moment how an apparently homogeneous cell divides itself and by dividing grows. Subject to the law of nutrition, the cell must divide, as Weismann has conclusively shown. The analogy of the cell must of course not be carried too far in the affairs of society, but we are perfectly within our rights to apply it to this extent : An original social continuum will also divide itself, subject to the operation of certain laws of which the law of social nutrition is certainly one ; and to the clear-sighted evolutionist such division is not always an evil to be complained of ; it is rather a condition and guarantee of evolution. United we stand and divided we fall : well, Nature and commonsense very often invert each other's maxims.

(3) The divided limbs or varieties are already pregnant with germs of mutual differences : they are already perhaps

individual races in embryo. But even assuming them as homogeneous to start with, we do not find much encouragement to preserve their homogeneity long : Nature, in pursuance of her impulse of constructive evolution, presses and provides for their isolation. There is perhaps also a tendency deep-seated in the heart of society to eject or cast off its divided limbs away from one another : co-essentials, like balls charged with the same kind of electricity, may possibly repel one another. But however this may happen, it happens. The races are isolated, and thus placed fairly in the way of differential evolution.

(4) Ignoring the potential stresses, we see that the environment, of which geography is an important part, of a race is admirably fitted for the work of isolation and differentiation. It is the most powerful differential co-efficient of racial evolution. Examples I have given already. The enveloping order, even working alone, will impart to a race a special character or individuality which means not absolute possession or exclusion of the given traits ABC, but a novel and relatively permanent scheme of their combination : thus, while one race is *Abc*, another is *aBc* and a third is *abC*, and so on ; the big and the small letters of course speaking for themselves. Races are curves of life referred to the same co-ordinates but each with an equation of its own. Thus individuality is not a parasitic growth that can be operated away leaving the original stuff intact. It lives in the resultant expression of a social system.

(5) The individuality of a race, having articulated itself, will have a tendency to persist, for there is undoubtedly a dynamic behind it. Ages will accentuate it, history will consecrate it. Thus individuality becomes an inveterate social habit laying its stamp on culture and civilization, ideas and institutions. The habit of the social organism can be changed materially only by changing the total system of forces behind it substantially. Given markedly contrasted environments and long ages of special history, two race-varieties will naturally develop into two race-species. Recall the biological distinction of variety and species. Between one variety and another the curve is low so that they may cross and be fruitful ; between one

species and another the curve is sharp, so that they neither readily cross, nor doing this will they bear fruit. How much special geography and history is necessary to render two sister races into such race-species? The Darwinian will require time and space to transform a natural brother of the wolf to be the faithful guardian of the flock.

(6) Reason may be an integral co-efficient, a compensating and equalising force, in social evolution; but it is not there alone, not without the usual halter round its neck. I need not repeat what I have said before. Reason may be *anti-individualistic* in theory but *pro-individualistic* in practice; may warmly hug in its bosom the purest ideals of equality, fraternity and liberty, but in cool statesmanship it is, alas, all compromise and makeshift! The line of least resistance is necessarily the line of evolutions and even revolutions, the law of social dynamics in short. So reason, even if it wishes to compromise or merge the idea or individuality of a race, and usher in millennium, cannot at once fly in the face of this individuality; it must move along with it and plant its engines upon the basis of it in order it may hope ultimately to lay it in the dust. An individuality or habit of the social organism may not be worth persevering in, but at any rate it must not be left out of account trifled with in any sane scheme of national reconstruction. This is an imperative demand of law of least resistance and movement. Cutting against the grain of social order, firmly and hoary with ages, attempting to strangle pronounced individualities, is a business not merely painfully arduous but horribly suicidal as leading, if successful, not surely to millennium but bottomless perdition. Fortunately, however, every live society is richly provided with a natural resistance against such veiled nihilism. Reason may occasionally afford the luxury of a flight with waxed feathers, but let it not fly too near the sun: social construction is an up-hill work in which the intellect of man will do best to crawl and climb, march and halt, never however allowing its vision to wander away from the tall, majestic cliff towering above the zone of storms and clouds: this is sane idealism.

(7) An individuality is not bad as such. Even a society of saints cannot be without its characteristic habit. Concrete existence is necessarily individual. Reason, therefore, in its treatment of individualities should be both wise and generous. What sort of individuality is to be devoutly wished for? Does this racial individuality (a) fully satisfy, or (b) systemetically lead to, or (c) militate against my cherished ideal? These amongst others are the questions which reason ought to put to itself. Individualities may have to be mended or ended, but the occasion can never arise for summary treatment. (i) If it is a racial character fully in consonance with my highest ideal—as fully of course as the conditions of mundance existence would permit it to be—I must simply go upon my knees before it. It will be my interest or even my religion to keep undefiled the springs of such a racial ideal character. (ii) If it is a great and noble character—nearly perhaps—buried under a swoon, groaning under accumulated inertia, arrested and stupefied by mighty enchantment, I must concentrate my efforts to break the spell and shake the inertia, but never compromising or merging the character itself, never imitating, never relaxing, though ever profiting by the polarity and contrast from without, letting the outer provoke the inner but not mould it. In a case like this, evolution is **progressive restoration** or **going back**. (iii) If it is a character, vigorous but not yet full-grown, limited by grave imperfections but not cherishing them, restive but yearning after an untold peace, groping in the dark but not in mad confusion, with a troubled soul but not damned, with a stormy heart but not misplaced, I must hold the reins firmly and consult the oracle of experience and history for guidance. In a case like this, evolution is **progressive construction** or **going ahead**. (iv) Lastly, is there ever a character so essentially untenable that reason may also be called upon to play the role of Natural Selection so as to ruthlessly give it a short shift, consummate weaklings having no right or business to clog the wheels of evolution, natural or social?

So reason must carefully determine its *methods* of treatment, its *code of procedure*.

This body of seven principles with corollaries will be sufficient and portable equipment for the central attack I am about to commence. My principles, I am sure, are not airy nothings, yet I will seek to give to each a local habitation and a name. (1) **Is the law of Process.** (2) **Is the law of Social Division.** (3) **Is the law of Isolation or Differential Co-efficient.** (4) **Is the law of the Equation of Social individuality.** (5) **Is the law of Social persistence illustrated in race-variety and race-species.** (6) **Is the law of Rational Direction or integral co-efficient.** (7) **Is the law of Rational method.**

I have attempted throughout to steer clear of the usual Scylla and Charybdis of perilous extremes in moving to a conception of the process of social evolution : it is hardly allowable, laying aside the barren controversy of freewill and determinism, to set down the process wholly to reason's responsible work ; nor can it be said that it is a ceremony wholly planned and executed by ultra-human forces, reason being an on-looker but never suffered to become a meddler. The part played by man's reason and will ought never to be obscured. Now, what must be the far-off divine event to which reason is to adjust a nation's life to move ? In opening a discussion on this point I may drift perilously near metaphysics, the serbonian bog where generations whole have sunk, and may not altogether resist the temptation to take a leap myself. Hence I should profitably confine myself to obvious first principles to which no sane exception can be taken. The *summum bonum* of life, whether individual or collective, is maximum happiness. The race may not be a mere collection of its individual units ; it may possibly have a law or an end with which any of its units may not consciously identify themselves. But here, in this untiring demand* for maximum happiness, the race and the unit meet. And how can they do otherwise ? Happiness is the index of life, is life lived in consciousness : the sage of old **upanishad** and the savant of modern enlightenment vie with each other in emphasising their recognition of this great truth. Thus life's demand for happiness is really a demand for itself : life craves for more life :

life must live and expand itself. In the unconscious level this spontaneity expresses itself as a stress for growth and propagation, in the conscious level as a bid for happiness. Is this not an extension of the Law of Persistence, an illustration of the fundamental Fact — Will-to-be ? The passion of a race to grow to the fulness of its stature, to make its life overflow, and its insatiable thirst for maximum felicity are two aspects of the same primordial fact : self-fulfilment and self-satisfaction and happiness cannot be divorced from each other. Life fulfils as well satisfies itself by a more and more *intensive*, *extensive* and *protensive* living : history is to note the advances and retreats, the cycles and epochs, the stages and landmarks in this process of living. If it is not criminal to speak of institutions individually, I may say that in religion and literature we have a measure of intensive living, in the political and social order extensive living, and in morality protensive or persistent living. It is hardly, however, allowable to refer various phases of life to various institutions each taken in isolation ; the phases like the institutions are organic to one another. The important thing to note here is the three cognate phases of *intensiveness*, *extensiveness* and *protensiveness* or persistence of life's flow and satisfaction. The maximum satisfaction is a quantity involving, and expressed in terms of, these three dimensions.

Great **intensity** of life will make its expressions deep-toned ; its thoughts, feelings and interests will have a pronounced character of *inwardness* ; the inner and not the outer so much, the idea and not the vehicle of its expression so much, the roots and not the ramifications so much, the cause and not the consequences so much, will engage its thoughts, bind its interests and evoke its feelings. True intensive satisfaction is that which arises from life's flowing on into itself : life looking into its own depths, life setting its own house in order, exploring the sources of its power and inspiration. And is this rank mysticism ? The monad-world is as old as philosophy, the germ-world is as old as science ; and is not the savant already being initiated into the mysteries of an intra-atomic world, the infinitesimal system of revolving ions ? And if an atom can carry a whole world

within itself, may not living cell or society carry one too? If admittedly even an atom has a thought too deep for philosophy, may not a society have an idea, character or history deep enough to steep its loftiest thoughts and rich enough to entertain its most imperious feelings? Is it science or commonsense to look upon the enveloping order as representing all that is worth reckoning in life's evolution, and the living thing itself as a poor passive no-body born to receive and obey, feel and respond, but never rising to rule and return, choose and call? Is life an ill-fated Prometheus bound unconditionally to hard rock with the vulture of cosmic justice perpetually eating into its very vitals? The reply of science is decisive. The essence of life is spontaneity. If anything in the universe has a real *inner* to balance an invading *outer*, it is the mysterious germ of life; if anything has a real *depth* from which to conjure up a Power that can command the forces *around* it, it is, again the subtle fire stolen from heaven. My glass will not of course yet reveal anything particularly remarkable in the constitution of physical basis of life; but all the science and agnosticism of a Huxley will not avail to efface the hidden architect, whatever that be, working with its impalpable tools chiselling and fashioning the minute structureless protoplasm, in concert with the outer elements, into a veritable miracle of natural art, for example, an oak or a featherless biped! And what is possible for an unpretentious speck of protoplasm to possess, will indeed not be impossible for a race or society with a history behind it to possess too. A race has an *inner* to balance an *outer*, its home store of provisions, its own garrison of forces; it has its character and individuality, it has its traditions and habits: these constitute the depth or intensity of a race. And surely there is nothing to prevent it from looking into its own depth, inspecting its own magazine, framing and meeting questions like these: what is the nature and law of my being? What is my special history? What are the home sources of my strength and weakness? Is it possible to set my house in such an order as will fortify it against all ordinary ravages of geography and history? Now, this is life

in its intensive aspect. The primary thing for a follower of the healing art is to know a constitution thoroughly and utilise the knowledge to its best advantage ; the primary thing for a social mind is also to know its own constitution thoroughly and make the knowledge a source of power and an instrument for doing good. *This self-knowledge and self-fortification, this self-science and self-art, this self-theory and self-practice, of a race is undeniably a foremost condition of its fulfilment and satisfaction.*

Extensivity or expansion of life will make it overflow, pervade and invade : **pervasion** and **invasion** are the two aspects of overflowing. A race is an idea but it has also a local habitation and a name, a more or less articulated form or body ; the various actual institutions into which the idea has expressed itself, its social and political order, its religion, literature, art and history, in fact the vast complicated system of forms which we call the body of the race, may be pervaded by the life of the race, each may bear the stamp of the idea, each may feel and subscribe to its life's creed. The limbs of the body social may have any quality of co-ordination obtaining them, good, bad or indifferent ; life may flow extravagantly in a few limbs and miserly in all the rest ; the idea may be clear and emphatic in some, vague and uncertain in others, or conceivably the head, the heart, the hands and feet may severally be governed by ideas that do not harmonise ; a race of half-philosophy and half-philistinism, half-despotism and half-slavery, of capital and labour, of sages and ignorant masses may not quite be an unnameable and unthinkable non-entity. The life of a race is said to be pervasive, when its limbs and institutions each have a just, not necessarily equal, share of a common harmonious life, proportionate to the requirements of its place and function in the system ; when each points to the same central idea and subscribes in its own manner to the same creed, all being mutually dependent, none staying away, clashing or revolting. A proportionate distribution of life and a harmonious combination for the realization of the idea : this is pervasive expansion. Invasive expansion is flowing over the enveloping order, rushing against the institutions

of other races and societies. A noble Greek culture rose from its ashes to invade the life and culture of a half civilized Europe and brought in an era of renascence ; the gospel of Indian spirituality and mysticism crossed in the shape of a Buddhistic faith the snowy Himalayas and blue sunny oceans to invade strange peoples ; the thought in the brain of Newton or Darwin soon catches the imagination of man and conquers the world ; and if we are not very much mistaken, Indian spirituality and mysticism will in the fulness of time again cross the forbidden sea to breathe harmony and peace into the troubled soul of an overdone West. Now, all this is invasive expansion in a superior plane, **invasion in spirit**. But when a domineering race bent upon founding an empire or spreading its markets thrusts itself upon other races invading their political rights and economic centres and vantage grounds, we have an illustration of invasion in an inferior plane, **invasion in matter**. I have briefly dwelt upon the two aspects of invasive overflow.

Protensity or persistence of life will require the satisfaction of the conditions of equilibrium in a world of which Proteus seems to be the presiding deity. Not absolute equilibrium which means death, but relative or moving equilibrium ; a race moving with the times, but ever preserving the main pillars of its constitution substantially in tact, with an essentially continuous history, the main springs of its inspiration never drying, the main roots of its genius never being dead. Protensity does not exclude but necessarily implies adaptation, does not reject but necessarily demands movement : an order that has ceased to adapt cannot continue to live, a system that has refused to move has chosen to be a matter of past history. But on the other hand protensity is wholly inconsistent with surrender, with an evacuation of strategic points and strongholds : the idea must neither be merged nor compromised, the vital roots must be snapped nor weakened. The soul of India with all its mysticism is not dead ; but the beauty of Greece and the power of Rome, the antiquity of Egypt and the wealth of Tyre and Carthage could not save them ; Greece and Rome have lived in a fashion in a new culture

and civilization, but not in actual institutions, not with an essentially unbroken history ; old Egypt is dead even as her mummies and Carthage has left an interest hardly beyond a few pages of ancient history. Shall we pause to ask why ? The real centres of protensity are deep-seated, so that death begins from within. The political and economic dependence of a race may be an index of weakened vitality, but not necessarily spells the death of a race. A race that has lost its idea and completely surrendered the constitution of its being is really dead ; old China and Japan will be dead indeed if they come, under the circumstances of present-day life and in their new love for strange ideals, to largely disavow the ideals of the East, though new nations in old names may stride with flashing arms and jingling purse. The conditions of persistence are the conditions of life—*life in spirit* and *life in form* ; to persist, life must live in both.

Protensity is really the synthesis of the ideas of intensity and extensity. Intensity is life flowing *in*, extensity is life flowing *out* and protensity is life *flowing on*. Intensity carries to forces and ideas, extensity to forms and institutions, protensity to the mutual correspondence of these, to order and stability. Intensity aiming at self-knowledge and self-possession necessarily passes through other-knowledge and other-possession and culminates in the knowledge and grasp of the Truth beyond the antithesis of self and other : thus it implies the co-operation of the other two dimensions ; **race-depth** without **race-breadth** and **race-projection** is an abstraction. Extensity also presupposes intensity : a race not knowing and possessing itself cannot know and possess its enveloping order, can expand itself to no tenable purpose. In spite of this interdependence and co-operation, intensity and extensity, concentration and expansion, are to a certain extent naturally antithetic to each other, *in* and *out* are undeniably unfriendly directions. In the wide field of history I need not grope for examples. The problem before a race is to reconcile its depth and breadth, its density and velocity, to find a harmonious maximum of thought and action, science and art, self-regard and other-regard, freedom and restraint, so

that its life's continuity may be ensured in a world of unwelcome surprises and rude awakenings. And what is the *sine qua non* of such a reconciliation? How can a race combine the greatest depth of thought and resourcefulness with the greatest latitude of pervasive and invasive expansion, with a most collected and articulated social order and a most far-reaching influence so that the result may be an assured continuity of its existence and its life's fullest satisfaction? It will be an ideal race that will find a solution to this momentous problem.

In the meanwhile let us look into the question a little more deeply. If a solution is to be found, it must be sought in this direction: *Maximum persistence of life is compatible only with maximum freedom.* It is in the very nature of life's spontaneity to flow in all directions, or as it happens, in the lines of least resistance; it is not any extraneous necessity that moves it to flow *in, out and on*, to assume the three dimensions of process we have been so far describing. On the other hand, it is extraneous necessity, the circumstances of corporeal existence, and not its own nature, that places all the limitations in the way of its spontaneous radiation. The conditions of matter will not permit it to assume its full and proper proportions at once: these relax and give way by degrees, as life, their prisoner, strives and presses against its prison bars: it is a heroic, long-drawn resurrection of life from the mysterious, and perhaps voluntary, grave of its pristine power and glory. Flow and radiation connote freedom: in the actualities of the world, alas, it is an awfully conditional freedom; freedom it can never lose absolutely, but neither can it hold it absolutely: Nature countenances not absolutism. Hence the problem of life is to gain as complete a mastery over the conditions of its limitation as will be consistent with its greatest self-assertion, to remove the blocks in its intensive extensive and progressive flow as cleanly as will best satisfy the requirements of its autonomy. Satisfaction is the index of unimpeded activity, of easy natural flow, as Spencer would tell us. Hence freedom and satisfaction, freedom and maximum life-depth and life-breath are identical.

In order to attack the problem successfully life must know the ways and means of its freedom : Given the limitations of physical existence, how shall I flow *along* the limitations so that I may end by *transcending* them largely or as completely as will suit my purpose ? What are the lines and where is the light ?

Matter is the home of necessity, life and spirit the home of autonomy. Ask science and not metaphysics. Science has found Nature to be a vast machine, with unrelenting and unswerving natural laws, in which stern Necessity reigns supreme. But has she not also found life to be a fact *sui generis*, a power that works in a way not altogether conformable to the plan of physical nature, a force that develops a plant in a direction opposite to that of gravitation, combines, posits and moves the grains of matter in a fashion that speaks emphatically of a mysterious spontaneity, a factor whose appearance into and disappearance from the body have successfully withstood all attempts at materialistic reduction ? Where does life come from ? From life itself. It was already an impossible task to deduce life from dead matter ; but now the truth is slowly dawning upon the savant's mind that it is an inversion of reality to attempt to induce matter to swallow up life, that it is in reality life that has swallowed up matter—life pervades all matter, the material particle is really a living corpuscle with a low curve of response. And could Nature's God keep a stranger surprise in store for the savant ? Consider again the disappearance of life, death. Is it a return of the poor eccentric child to the lap of Material Necessity whence it leapt out somehow ? Can science hope to prove this ? Is not the enquirer already feeling his way to the universal mother-stuff of life into which the apparently dying spark returns, an ocean that receives back in its bosom the weary wave that has run its race of life ? Life comes from life and goes back to life again. The life-history of the spirit is more marvellous still. The brain-molecules have been commissioned to do the impossible, to secrete the impalpable fluid of sensibility, to light the glow of consciousness in the dark cells and labyrinths of the cortex. The phosphorus-philosopher would fain make poor consciousness:

an onlooker at its own birth and funeral. But does he not lack all the support of sober science? Howsoever born, the spirit is born to rule: the motions of the brain, and through them the motions of the enveloping system, are made constantly to feel the autonomous power of a Fact *sui generis*. Nature's epic would assuredly lack all beauty and pathos, all its interest and sweetness, all basis of freedom and all promise of immortality, if her Poet were to conceive it in a strain that would leave no place for life and spirit to join and subscribe, inspire and elevate.

Ask commonsense. A given portion of matter cannot be present in one place without being necessarily absent in all other places; it cannot be possessed by one without being dispossessed by all others; in transference, the source whence it comes must lose it in order that something else may gain it; if one place has more of it, another must have less of it. These are elementary restrictions of material existence. If I am to give a few pieces of gold to you I must part with them; one of you cannot possess all without wholly keeping back and depriving others; the more one scrambles, the more one is likely to get; and so on. All forms of material wealth, power and comfort are subject to these elementary restrictions. Hence all the ungracious scramble for gold and power, all the fierce struggle for existence and enjoyment which has made the history of this tiny planet a history of bloodshed and rapine, of obstinate clinging to power and persistent raids upon it, of grasping and swelling capital and starving, discontented labour, of economic drain and tariff-walls, of scientific frontiers and engines of destruction. Now, look at the other picture. A spiritual treasure, knowledge, sympathy and love, does not leave its source in moving from one place to another: the gift enriches him who accepts it without making the giver a loser in the least; in giving my knowledge to the world I may possess the whole of it and advance upon it, indeed each man may make it his own without requiring his fellowmen to disown it. This is the glory of spiritual life and its gifts: the contrast is striking between the melancholy meanness of matter and magnificent generosity of spirit. The

more material an existence the more bound it must be: the more spiritual the freer and livelier.

Well ; but Nature does not appear to have yet realized her dream of perfection : the best possible world is not necessarily the ideal. The spirit, as we know, is imprisoned in matter and striving hard and ever for freedom. Hence even spiritual existence as we find it, man's knowledge and love, is in a sense material ; many of its circumstances of evolution and expansion are undoubtedly material. Man's instruments of knowing and communicating his knowledge, the circumstances of his loving and being loved, are largely material. To make them more and more independent of matter is to make them progressively purer and freer. Knowledge is free in proportion it draws upon the spirit's own resources of knowing and can safely dispense with material conditions ; love is free in proportion it flows from its own nature and refuses to be influenced by the distractions of matter, baser passions and prejudices. Scientific knowledge is freer and mightier than popular knowledge because it comes not through the refracting media of popular idols and idiosyncrasies ; clear visioned philosophy is purer and mightier than science because she falls back more unreservedly upon the spirit's own resources of thought and reflection ; mysticism ought to be even freer and mightier than philosophy because she claims to have discovered and bathed in the deeper currents of spiritual life and known how to work the occult and enchanted springs of social experience. Love bids for freedom and glory as it gradually exceeds the limits of family, clan, nation and creed and culminates in the angelic sweetness of Christ or Chaitanya.

But I am here to bury mysticism perhaps and not to praise it. A nation proud of its democratic political institutions, with an august Mother of parliaments beheading and deposing kings at the altar of *vox populi*, may yet fall far short of real freedom which is rightly and securedly placed in spiritual autonomy : a nation is free in proportion as it has been able to subordinate the material circumstances of its life to progressively purer spirituality ; in any rational scheme

of subordination, however, free political life will not fail to choose its own important place and function—political autonomy comes from the inevitable overflow of spiritual autonomy, is an indispensable condition of it, but it is not its main current, not the sum and substance of true autonomy. Spiritual autonomy again is not the same thing as social license, *free-thinkerism* : license is the worst form of material slavery, the so-called free-thinker is the most miserable, playing of animal caprices—it is vain and delusive freedom that will pretend to be blind to the despotism of the heart, the unrestricted sway of instincts, passions and prejudices and reveal only in eccentric movements. It is not the autonomy of the storm and the boisterous bay, but of the calm, majestic self-possession of God's universe itself : not the autonomy of chaotic uproar but the autonomy of celestial music : not the fury of madness but the eloquence of genius : not the glare of a Parsian conflagration but the lucidity and brightness and repose of a Vedic dawn : not the ego of the Arch-Seducer but the sacrifice of the Arch-Redeemer of man. True autonomy lies in the material nature being controlled by and adapted to the spiritual nature, not in doing what one chooses to do, but in choosing what one *ought* to do, not so much in linking and doing as in choosing and forbearing. In settling the relations between the individual and society, we cannot of course leave the former absolutely cabined and cooped up, but neither can we make him an wild erratic animal obeying no rule but that of its whims, caring not primarily for justice but expediency and opportunism, checked not by reason and love but by blind self-interest and fear of retaliation. A sociologist may think of granting to the individual, freedom limited only by the similar freedom of his peers : but this concession in a proper and final analysis will, I am sure, be found to imply a demand for utmost spirituality. I have nothing to complain against Europe. She is rapidly passing through experimental schemes of social and political life, the sanity and breadth of her ideas being proportional to the extent of her evolution, the more she sees the wiser she grows. The problem of society is to find a just,

golden mean between liberty and order, right and duty, assertion and denial.

This brings me to the **Path of Spiritual Autonomy—it is, briefly, progressively fuller affirmation through denial.** The spirit must deny itself in the lower phases in order that it may affirm itself in both the higher and lower : to be free it must obey order, to have rights it must have duties, to rule it must serve. In walking along this path it must beware of two dismal extremes, the bottomless perdition of gross materiality and the thin air of abstract spirituality : if gross materiality is low, abstract spirituality is absurd. The half-foolish, the half-knavish world should note. Spirituality to be a real principle of life must not count without matter, trifle with it, or play second fiddle to it. The subjugation and adaption of matter is a long and serious business ; the spirit, a born prince though it be, must move on cautions and practicable lines, not certainly with a light heart and an air of sneering contempt. Spirituality is not the cult of contemptuous ignorance of matter, a way of talking and doing as if matter were a false bogey and myth, but a calm judicious treatment of matter with a view to its conversion or re-baptism. The lost Sheep of Israel must come back at last : matter, as sound philosophy tells us, is an eject or reflex of the spirit into which it must be absorbed and incorporated again, not at once, but through a long and difficult process of discipline, education and redemption. The secret of its education the spirit is slow to find out, the means of its discipline the spirit is late in devising and commanding.

Life must be lived in matter in such a fashion that it may rise to master it at last : the conditions of possible spirituality are (a) recognition of matter, (b) co-ordination of matter and (c) conquest and conversion of matter. In its primary presentation, matter is an alien order to be obeyed or borne with, in its final representation it is a submissive vehicle of life's expression—the interval between the two is long and eventful like history itself. Civilisation and culture, in all their aspects and institutions, should express inspired idealistic materiality and palpable pervasive spirituality, should plan their programmes in such a way that

they may increasingly make for greatest spirituality, each pointing to loftiest ideals, each concerting according to its place and function, none disregarding the irreducible minima of their material conditions of existence and growth. This is **concrete concentric spirituality** or **ideocentric redeemed materiality** : like the poet's bird it is true to the kindred points of heaven and home. Excessive spirituality is bad if it means impracticable and impatient spirituality, too much for a given system or institution to contain : Vedantism in its prior forms may be good for certain institutions and bad for others, though these others too must have it in appropriate forms and measures, if it is at all good to have it. Vedantism may be premature for Europe if her soul is not ready to receive it, if her civilisation and culture are not yet adapted to express it. But if it means profusion of spiritual life we see at once that it implies comprehensive freedom, the absence of inertia and stagnation, the beauty of co-ordination, in short, the high-water of all that is true, good and beautiful. Will anybody now seriously lay the guilt of India's long political swoon, her abject economic destitution, her unyielding social deadlocks, her stiff and almost fossilized culture, at the door of the so-called excessive spirituality of her people ? Excessive spirituality, as we have seen, will have none of it. Yet even people, who ought to know better, are apparently never tired of repeating this cant of too much spirituality, the diagnosis is not only wrong but mischievous, for it serves as a convenient peg to hang on a good many absurdities of swine philosophy and social reform of these days.

To sum up : Out of this hurried but sifting analysis the true and desirable ideal of life, individual and national, has emerged at last. *This is concrete and co-ordinating spirituality attaining its maximum dimensions through stages that may be broadly described as through-matter, against-matter and over-matter* ; its dimension being intensity, extensity and protensity. Such spirituality is *true* because it holds the secret of indefinite, I will not say infinite, persistence : it is *desirable* because it is identical with full autonomy and unrestricted felicity : it is *concrete* because it keeps company with, educates

and even obeys matter in order that it may at last own and conform it : it is *concentric* because it delights in establishing co-ordination or in reducing eccentricities in the ideas and institutions of a race. Its supreme synthesis is not nebulous confusion, its government is not unaccommodating autocracy. The individuality of a race is to be judged by the standard of such immanent-transcendent idealism, by such in-and-beyond spirituality.

In the foregoing analysis I always feared lest I should be swamped by too much metaphysics and in the following sketch of Hindu civilisation I am afraid I shall have to deal largely in broad generalities, which, within my present limits, I can hardly expect to be able to prove. In the absence of my credentials it is likely I shall be taken as a late dogmatiser. A civilisation that seems to have been the first to start in the race of evolution and still continues substantially in tact, anxiously waiting for a new cycle of glorious life, has undoubtedly acquired—let us wash our hands clean of the hypothesis of original sin—a character and left behind a history such as will invite the closest attention of a band of broad-minded thinkers and savants. So long our history has been at the mercy of the so-called oriental scholars ; the critical acumen and untiring zeal which these brought to bear upon their onerous task have unearthed many treasures of no mean value and closed historical circuits of no slight importance. Theirs has not been a thankless task ; they have their zealous followers and warm admirers on this side of the hemisphere too. But let me be frank before attempting a sketch on general lines myself. There are histories and histories : a history that will aim at a faithful reconstruction of the past and a philosophical interpretation of a civilisation, will require the services of thinkers and savants, broad-minded and impartial, thoroughly at home with their patients, able to interpret the cycles and epochs, ideas and institutions, consistently with the general laws of natural and racial evolution, pertinently to the special laws of race-characters. It is a task noble enough to draw the master mind of a Hegel and a Spencer ; serious and delicate enough to require the wise

grasp and judicious balance of a Darwin's brain. But this is perhaps a large order.

I may briefly indicate my own sources of the data of Indian History :

(1) The foremost among these are the Indian sages or Sadhus—and the race is not quite extinct like the Dodo—who represent, the better class of them of course, all that is best and highest in Hindu enlightenment and influence, the undefiled sources of spiritual wisdom, the silent repositories of spiritual power. They have kept in their lonely retreats and noiseless ways the sacred sacrificial Fire ever burning on the altar of spiritual realisation, have trimmed and preserved the sacred Lamp of Ancient Illumination committed to their charge. They are the apostles and professors of realistic mysticism, they are still the guide, friend and philosopher of the Hindu household where they are justly worshipped as gods in fleshly tenements. One must go and seek them out in their caves and sit at their feet to understand these marvellous people, the secret of their enormous influence and the source of their colossal knowledge. In body they may be naked but in soul they hold the key, the open sesame, to man's noblest treasure ; they may lie in dust and ashes, but undoubtedly they are kings among men. Gilded crown and temporal power, vain science and proud philosophy, are laid low at their feet when their shadows fall across the threshold of the cottage-door and palace-gate. In them the ideal of intensive, extensive and protensive living seems to have incarnated itself. Being seers themselves they are the privileged interpreters of Hindu civilization and culture, for whatever Hinduism may be, it is pre-eminently **a cult of experimental realization**, its basis being not dubious dialectics or mere theoretical assent playing fast and loose itself, but actual living experience, *not hypothesis but experiment*. To understand them is to understand the gist of Hindu individuality, the Hindu civilization in its crowning phases. An appreciation of Hinduism—I am using the word in its widest sense—is impossible without an appreciation of its living, undefiled fountain-heads and actual, inspiring models. To them belongs the privilege to clear up

what all other sources have clouded and confounded, to cut all hopeless gordian knots of an essentially mystical civilization, to correct or even gainsay what all other sources have said. Living in splendid isolation they yet represent the forces of first initiation, supreme direction and unquestioned censorship. But with this slight, though by no means irreverent, notice I must part for the present with these mighty builders and guardian angels of my race and civilisation. The other sources need not detain me long.

(2) The vast body of literature and tradition growing out of the immemorial living-stock of the Vedas. Hindu philosophy, mythology, science and art, the only real history my race possesses, constitutes the next source. The field is wide but not smooth and safe : historical deadlocks arrest us almost at every turn, historical breaks yawn to engulf us almost at every stage and historical contradictions threaten to demolish our steadily co-ordinating results almost at every parting of ways. Our hope lies in patient research and exercise of a robust critical acumen, but chiefly as I have said in the cheering and guided light which the exalted stars of our race-culture—the high-priests of our race-cult—have to shed on our obscure, difficult path. A history of India will be dead and mutilated if it will leave all touch with the main centres of our race-vitality, a discordant jargon if not ministering to the abiding tones of our culture harmony. These oracles at any rate do not deal in enigmas.

(3) The actual life of the dumb millions around me, their village homes, fields and pasture-lands, the easy noiseless tenor of their way, their suffering and resignation, hopes and fears, ideas and beliefs, constitute my next source. To these I must add the actual institutions through which such life may be flowing. A critical study of the actual life and institutions of the people, their moorings in the past, their movements in the present and their tendencies in the future, is undoubtedly an important basis of historical construction. It will not do to approach the people with European prejudices, with the historical stock-in-trade of a strange civilization, the foreign

standards of race-criticism. The people may have no political clubs and newspaper literacy, they may have no inkling of factory-science and labour rights, yet they may not be barbarians. Race-organisation need not be founded on the fourth state, safeguarded by clubs, to be tenable and efficient ; race-evolution need not be carried on within the factory-walls, between grinding labor and calculating capital, to be successful ; race-history need not march with pointed bayonets and quick-firing guns, thundering dreadnaughts and infernal mines, to win its proudest laurels. There may be other standards and methods, better or worse, I will not pause to discuss. Even while I am scribbling these wretched lines I hear the low-born, illiterate, simple villager feelingly singing songs that tell of our deepest thoughts and cares, talking untutored metaphysics that will put to shame the brightest of my European idols, with calm resignation and yearning after something beyond the shadows : and while I see and hear all this can I doubt that metaphysics is in the blood of these people, that whatever may be the aetiology of their present miserable condition they are pre-eminently a spiritual and ultra-mundane race, with their heart pitched high above in a zone of perpetual light though their bodies may groan under a load of stupor and humiliation ? In my enthusiasm for the heart I cannot forget the disgrace and pains of the flesh ; but if the flesh is to be redeemed I cannot bury the heart along with it in the same grave ; if the pulse has sunk in the limbs, let us look for it in the heart so that we may restore it to the limbs again. The life of the people and their institutions ought to be studied with a broad sympathetic mind, in the light that the first two sources may shed on us. The seer is the distant beacon-light, the pole-star of loftiest idealism ; the vessel is manned by a toiling crew—the people ; the pilot must have the faithful chart by his side—the literature and traditions.

(4) The research of the oriental scholars, the facts gleaned by the so-called critical method indeed all the accumulated external evidences and comparative notices of good merit and honest purpose that we can lay our hands on, constitute my next source.

(5) Lastly, the broader currents of life and ideas that are now sweeping over the civilised world must be allowed to impinge on us with proper safeguards in order that we may shake off the accumulated lethargy of centuries, break the enchanted spell that has held us for a period of thousand years. Such polarity or contrast from without is, I conceive, essential for our regeneration ; the seer does not stand in need of it, but the race undoubtedly does. The race will know what it is and what it ought to be in contrast with what it is not and ought not to be. As, however, this is an aspect of the question on which I have dwelt at some length in another place,* I shall only quote a few lines of what I have said there. "Synthesis for the Hindu is not progressive construction but progressive restoration. This is impossible without a bracing atmosphere of polarisation, contrast. It is the contrast of Spinoza, Kant and Hegel that is clearing his vision of the old Vedanta and Sankara : he realizes what Vedanta is by seeing what it is not but what perhaps comes perilously near it. The contrast of Darwinism brings into relief his nebulous notions about Kapilism. The spiritualism and psychic research of modern Europe and America make instinct with life the dry bones of his belief in the occult and unseen. The polarity of the empirical positivism of the West brings into prominence his own transcendental positivism. Western science with her out-door method of induction has helped him to appreciate his own sublime science of Yoga with its mystic, in-door method of spiritual intuition. European art and literature have opened his eyes to the inwardness and beauty of his own. The faint echoes in the far-off shores and climes have awakened him to the rehearsal of the celestial music in his own solitudes and combinations. He understands his own Reign of Divine Law—I fight shy of the word Theocracy—by being treated to the democracies of the West. The greedy, insatiable Imperialism and Industrialism of Europe have served as a contrast to the peaceful plain-living and high-thinking of his race. The social institutions and problems of Europe have also made

* "The place of Hindu Philosophy in the Cultural History of the world" : *Humanity and Hindu Literature*, Vol. 1, No. 2.

his shady household graves give up their dead. This is the Hindu's indebtedness to his age."

Now, having finished this long preliminary canvas-work, I proceed to depict in outlines the essential features of Hindu character and individuality. I hope to be excused for the extreme meagreness of my present treatment.

The dominant feature of Hindu character around which all other features arrange themselves and are co-ordinated is its *concrete concentric spirituality*, and other-worldliness and transcendentalism*not absurdly fighting shy of this world and this experience but fully recognising, co-ordinating and inspiring it. The Hindu is gazing at a far-off beyond, but he has his feet securely planted on the firm solid earth beneath ; his life is a pilgrimage whose destiny is the abode of the True, Good and Beautiful itself, but he has not forgotten to amply provide himself with the thousand and one requirements of the pilgrim's progress. Indeed this concreteness, this co-ordinating and redeeming grasp of the actual and material, constitutes the speciality of his idealism. His scheme of evolution is vast as evolution itself ; everything has its given place and function, from the noblest to the meanest ; the entire scheme being a progressively unfolding harmony, consummating in beatific peace, not Buddhistic Nirvana. Here, if anywhere, we find an immemorial institution providing for life's education and fulfilment in all its stages, in all its phases ; the grossest forces must be treated and harnessed in the service of the purest, the purest must move among the grossest, redeem them and be profited by them ; everywhere is spread a tissue of beautiful interdependence, every part pulsating essentially with the same life, each having its proper place and function in the total harmony, each contributing its share to the last consummation, each passing on in due course to a higher life, but never scrambling, each seeing itself in the perspective of an eternal life and therefore not raging and fuming to blow up the accursed order.

Three things are to be noted ; (1) the pervading and presiding life of lofty spirituality ; (2) a system elaborate as

life and evolution itself, adapted in all its limbs and phases to this high purpose, a system of *concrete pan-spirituality*; and (3) the conditions of the actual are so treated as to progressively make for the actualisation of the ideal : not *ignoring* the actual but *educating*, not kicking at the passing and the pressing but enlightening it to see and take its place in the calm abiding. A sectional view, a piecemeal study of such a system, in the absence of a broader conception, will fling us into a veritable chaos of jarring elements and warring institutions, where Primeval Night reigns supreme, a melancholy confusion of little sense and much nonsense which critical scrutiny will leave but worse confounded. The tissue must be studied in its organic entirety or not studied at all. Let us not take an isolated limb of the live real system and hold it up to the ridicule of an uncharitable world—a world, by the by, not certainly overflowing with Christian virtues and give ourselves the credit of having exposed the Hindu and our own Mother ! Abstraction is the besetting evil of passing criticism, and with abstraction in his eyes the critic will discover abstraction in whatever he may stumble upon. The Hindu is a dealer in cobweb and moonshine for he has not understood the secrets of modern trade-guilds and ways of modern statecraft and diplomacy, for he has been dreaming Vedanta while the wide world about him is founding empires with the boom of canons and forging fetters of gold for the glorification of an immortal Christ ! Yet curiously the cobweb and the moonshine have lived for several thousands of years—and not certainly in the stagnant backwater of the sweeping political and social life of the world—while a Greece and a Rome, the prototypes of a far less “romantic” later civilization, has gone over to a country from whose bourne no traveller returns, and while modern Europe with all the circumstances of pomp and power is nervous as if she is standing on the crater of a live volcano, when every war threatens to mean dire destruction and every lull of peace is weird and ominous in which the very fall of a leaf may be heard ! However man may brag and swear, Nature has quite other standards of judging races and quite other codes to grant them their leases of life. The political

serfdom and abject poverty of the Hindu are certainly and without their *ratio sufficiens* ; grave is his distemper and serious are its symptoms ; but his heart, his soul, his being—is it dead or damned ? Is it a swoon that under wise care will pass one day leaving him none the worse for the swoon, or is it a slow decay and death speaking of an essential untenableness in the law of his being ?

RELIGION

In the religion of the Hindu the same pervading and co-ordinating spirituality is seen. Religion is broad as evolution itself, having like evolution an almost endless variety of forms and phases. Life in progressing from the dust of animal existence to the empyrean of pure spirituality must necessarily pass through all this variety of forms. An uniform, cut and dry scripture is not adapted to the actualities of life ; life is moving and not statical, life's religion should also be moving and not statical ; life is grovelling in the dust, so religion cannot ignore the dust ; life is yearning after an unknown freedom and immortality, and religion should provide for its satisfaction if it can ; life's ascent is difficult and slow, requiring a sure footing and a leading course at every step, and religion, that is not to be an unreal abstraction, must provide an elaborate, co-ordinated scheme of means and methods progressively adapted to the ends and requirements of this **ascent**.

The *first* thing to note about Hindu religion in its all-embracing **comprehensiveness**. It is a religion of profound intensity, for it has its soul planted in the deepest spiritual experiences of man ; it is a religion of vast extensity, for it not only embraces and provides for this life in all its conceivable phases—everything from the hewing of the wood to the ruling of an empire being a *dharma*, nothing whatever being secular, for the Hindu—but life in all the infinitude of its destiny. Thus : (a) all conceivable activities of a given life are covered ; (b) all different forms of life, high and low spiritual and material, are provided for ; and (c) all stages of a given life

in its career through eternity, recurring cycles of births and rebirths, all imaginable positions in the universal configuration of living units are taken into account. Briefly, its thought about *a* moving unit of life and *all* moving units is a universe that knows no bounds and through a history that has no absolute beginning and no absolute end. And like the universe itself its thought is a *system*, like history itself its thought is a *method*. It is and yet it is not fetishism, a worship of stock and stone ; it is and yet it is not the calm contemplation of the Vedantic nameless and formless one ; it is and yet it is not a doctrine of pessimism, asceticism and self-mortification ; it is and yet it is not a message of fraternity, equality and liberty ; it respects restrictions and removes them ; it recognises distinctions and strives to efface them. The restrictions are Nature's and it cannot ignore them though it must educate life to overgrow them ; the distinctions are not its creations but Nature's and it cannot wish them away though it must plan to elevate life above them. Man, Nature's erratic child, requires a progressive, graduated scheme of lessons, theoretical and practical, for his education, whether intellectual, emotional or technical ; we are not slow to recognise this principle in making a system of secular education ; but in assisting the evolution of religious life which receives tributes from all quarters of human nature, has to contain and co-ordinate them all so that it may fulfil itself at last in the limitless ocean of eternal life. We apparently take leave not only of science but commonsense, and are apt to talk as if religion were a cut and dry, round and perfect, supernatural curiosity which must be bid for and possessed all at once or not at all.

The second point to note is this graduated **co-ordination** and harmonisation of the vastly various limbs of the religious systems, sects and creeds, injunctions, permissive and prohibitive, general and special, the gross and pure, the simple and the subtle, the play of emotions and their arrest, the sweetest romance of Vaisnavism and serenest loftiness of Sankarism, the observance of distinctive rites and going beyond them, the busy hairsplitting of ritualism and the free composure of renunciation, mysticism and commonplaces, indeed all conceivable forms of ideas and

institutions have not met and concerted in this wonderful system, the life and final purpose of which is the realisation of the mightiest ideal man has ever dreamt of. Take one in isolation and it is dead and stiff; review it in its proper perspective and natural setting and it will reveal and represent the whole from a given standpoint of place and history. The Spirit is travelling on to the formless One from a *nature-given* datum of form; and its passage necessarily lies through properly *adjusted* forms; the end is unity and equality, but having to begin amid natural distinctions and inequalities, it has necessarily to pass through these judiciously *treated* and *co-ordinated*; it has its heart placed in undying love and untold bliss, but born amid an order of which strife is undeniably the presiding genius, it must fulfil itself in and through strife wisely *planned* or even divinely *inspired*; *mukti* or freedom is its goal, but Nature has held the Spirit in her iron grip, hemmed it in by an order which obeys no rule but that of necessity leaving perhaps only a precarious margin for the exercise of its sacred birthright, hence the Spirit must move along with the order, live according to Nature as the Stoics would propose, Huxley and evolution notwithstanding, in order that it may exceed this order at last in the majesty of its divinity.

The *third* point to note is its **pervasive spirituality**. All the limbs of this giant system down to the meanest that have participated are permeated with a distinct tone of spirituality: there is the idol and its worshipper and the one is suggestive of the purest ideal and the other is alive to and appreciative of the same; this is one example out of many. The Hindu has spirituality running through every fibre of his being: this was his original make-up, this has been his special history and this shall be his message to a confounded world. Christianity has swept, drawn and elevated by a sort of *action in distans*, but it has hardly thoroughly permeated the lives and institutions of Christian race of to-day as it ought to have. But all this is by the way. For the present I care to call attention to the salient features of Hinduism which, whatever their worth intrinsic or relative, will perhaps be perceived by at least those who have honestly sought

to approach the question from the various standpoints I indicated at the beginning of this sketch.

Two corollaries should not, however, be overlooked. First, the flow of Hindu life which is co-extensive with his *dharma* (a more suitable term than religion) has a certain unmistakable **inwardness**, a feature that has earned for the Hindu the compliment that he is a born philosopher ; he cannot, of course, dispense with the forms and garbs of things and their natural dispositions, but he is always emphatically after the soul of things, the centre, the beyond, the formless and dimensionless ; his way may not be the way of the man of science—the inwardness that leads to metaphysics and mysticism is not that which leads to physics and so-called positivism. The one is a pilgrimage into the infinitude of the absolute one, the other is a progress into the infinitude of co-ordinated multiplicity. But the natural bent of his life's flow—can it be mistaken ? Second, his **other-worldliness**, his anxiety to see and ensure his existence in the background of the infinite and eternal. What is my place and destiny in the boundless universe, the myriads of worlds which my senses introduce to me and those that are revealed to the inner eye of mysticism ? What is my life in a vast, rushing history, what are cycles of births and re-births in an ever-continuous sweep of evolution,—the macrocosmic life which with its prodigious cycles of evolutions and involutions out to be the original or facsimile of the microcosmic ? This *infinity and eternity bias* cannot possibly be missed in the Hindu. Naturally enough, a race that has its heart and soul dedicated to the eternal has lived and persisted while many of the other great races are given to appear too literally in the role of the brief candle.

The *fourth* point to note is that the Hindu's is essentially and frankly a religion of **experimental realization**. No tenet, no article of the faith is to be admitted on credit ; every so-called dogma is founded on experimental demonstration, none rests on mere hypothesis or theoretic assent. *The Hindu has built on direct first-hand knowledge, not of course ordinary empirical knowledge always, but special experience attainable by special, carefully thought-out means and methods of experimental demonstration :*

no one who has not tried these means and methods himself has the right to question their validity any more than a man who has never seen an experiment in life has the right to shake his head dictatorially when fairy science has given him a truth that appears to be stranger than fiction. This system of special experimental revelations together with its paraphernalia of means and methods constitutes Hindu mysticism ; unseen and unimagined world open up to the mystic's vision as he presses the key in the proper places and ways. Its method is the Cartesian methodical doubt or doubting till doubt is dead : faith and unquestioning belief have undoubtedly their place in this system—a place apparently of boldest prominence perhaps—but only as provisional and collateral aids of experimental demonstration, not certainly as ends in themselves. I need not, of course, believe beforehand in the result of the experiment, but I must at least believe that it is worth my while to try the experiment myself : Hinduism is a demonstrative religion in which doubt and belief necessarily chase, even play hide and seek with each other, till all limitations have not been swept away in the final consummation of truth, all lingering shades of a long, anxious night have not disappeared in the genial, radiant flood of the settled dawn, all murmurs of smothered dissent and all whispers of sneaking doubt are not hushed in the last trance of beatific and enlightened peace.

The *fifth* point to note is the broad **catholicity**, peaceful **innocuousness** of Hindu spirituality. In marking these fundamental notes of my *dharma* I am perhaps creating much uneasiness in the minds of my Western critics and their apt pupils nearer home ; their ideas of Hindu religion—I do not know upon what good authority they pose as privileged interpreters of the oldest and most difficult religion of the earth—will, I am afraid cross nearly at every point my own ideas. But I must really prefer to follow my own gospel leaving my critics to follow theirs. The religion into which a man is born is the best for *him*. A Christian and an Islamite, a Buddhist and a Hindu, need not hurl ungenerously epithets at one another. Fire and brimstone need not be invoked on the honest unbeliever. The

life of humanity in its sublime march to the limitless and fathomless ocean of joyous in its immortality, may spread itself into countless routes of flow, all of which may meet at last, some sooner and others later ; Hinduism represents some of the oldest, deepest and broadest channels, but does not certainly claim to have drained off the fluid of life leaving the rest of the world in bleak, dry wilderness. Though resting its soul in the absolute, Hinduism would not countenance any practical religion that claims to possess absolute suitability for all forms and stages of life : there is no royal road to perfection. A given life at a given stage of its evolution will have but one correct religion, as a given patient in a given state of his health will have but one correct prescription ; but life is long and its stages are many ; the art, the pharmacopoeia of life is long too and its applications various. Even within the fold of Hinduism itself, each man has his own proper *dharma*, and though participating in a co-essential spiritual-stuff, he cannot exchange, under a given combination of circumstances, his *dharma* for that of his brother. He is not an immobile, inelastic unit however ; he is moving and tracing the curve of life in accordance with the equation of his *karma* on a dark slate wide as limitless time and space. He is not shut out from a higher or even the highest life : but everything must come in its proper place and time ; the drama of life-history must not lack its essential unities. Such is the catholicity of the Hindu. Another phase, closely connected with the above, is that Hinduism is never on the war-path. It is *invasive* but not in the way the proselytizing religions of the world are : it invades not to supplant but to assimilate, and its history will abundantly show that it has ended great rival religions by mending and absorbing them ; keenly alive to the sacredness of its own birth-right it respects the birth-rights of other religions. In the spiritual struggle for existence, only one religion shall live and that mine : this is not the Hindu's foreign politics. So long as man and history remain what they are, the education and religion of the world must be federal and not exclusively despotic, with perhaps a presiding cult of supreme spirituality but not certainly an uncharitable tyranny of a new-world pharisaism. Well ; but

religion is too dreary a topic to detain busy people long now-a-days : I must pass on. Religion does not pay, indeed.

MYTHOLOGY

The central feature of Hindu mythology—I will not object to such nomenclature by the arrogant culture of to-day—is its **realism-cum-symbolism**. An analysis that will reduce it either to pure symbolism or to mere dreamy, fanciful realism will be sadly inadequate. Its realism is not dreamy but mystical ; the so-called myths being the actual special experiences culled by the exact science of Hindu mysticism ; the romance of gods and goddesses, their interest in the flow of human history, was not altogether *conceived* in imagination in the childhood of the race but *perceived* in occult experiences of giant minds, too seriously sifting the appearances and analogies of things, too warmly longing after the nameless and formless one, to think of amusing themselves with the freaks of an unbridled fancy. *The myths are in their substantial part genuine special experiences obtained and always obtainable by special methods and capable of special experimental demonstration.* Culture will never miss an opportunity to throw mud at the Indian *sadhus* ; but anyone who has seen the better types of them knows that these alleged special experiences and experimental proofs are not wholly dead, so that the basis of Hindu mythology still endures. The comfortable assurance of commonsense culture very often proves to be hide-bound, air-tight dogmatism. Well ; but wherein lies its symbolism ? Hindu philosophy under the inspiration of Hindu mysticism has always distinguished between the appearance and ground of things, both being objects of *positive* knowledge though not of the same *kind*. Thus there is the apparently real and transcendently real, nay, a veritable hierarchy of realities leading from the grossly sensuous to the absolutely spiritual through intermediate stages of increasing refinement. The savant's glass leads a step inwards ; his atoms and corpuscles, if verified, will lead a further step ; his ether a still further step ; but having

proceeded so far who will dare to cry halt ? The astral and krmic planes may have their turns next, if one has only the eye to see them. Thus the eye of mysticism will open up ever fresh worlds foiled as it were one within another till Nature is at the end of her resources. Now, a given perception in a given plane may be real in its place and compared with the facts below ; but it may be only a symbol or suggestion which may tell of a fuller and higher truth above. I see a god in occult vision and so far it is real ; but this may suggest or lead to a more exalted truth in relation to which therefore it is a symbol. In short, a meaning and its symbol are but the two aspects of the same timeless and changeless *Fact*. The gods of the Hindu pantheon are each a genuine mystical experience and have each a meaning. Shall I take an example ? One of the prominent gods of the pantheon is Vishnu. Now, a Hindu believes, and there are apparently very good reasons for his belief, the Vishnu is a reality resting on the spiritual experiences of many who have sought him, experiences that a layman, who has never broken a lance, has no right to dub as hallucinations. There are many who have *seen* him, and fulfilling the proper conditions *anyone* may see him. The meaning which the deity expresses seems to be this. Brahman or Absolute appears to human understanding as God having infinite attributes ; this creating, preserving and destroying Divinity is symbolised by the Vishnu of Hindu mysticism ; the four hands holding the club, the wheel, the lotus and the conch-shell respectively are emblematic of the three grand processes of creation, preservation and destruction. The lotus beautifully expresses the Hindu idea of creation—it is a radiation or emanation from a centre of Force, it is in the nature of an unfolding, it is a scheme of systems within systems. The spreading of the cosmic order and its preservation require Time and Space ; the wheel is an apt symbol of Time especially in the eyes of the Hindu who is a staunch believer in the law of cycles ; the conch-shell with its spiral form and deep-toned sound represents Ether and Space ; the club of course stands for the idea of destruction ; and so on. These are not later interpretations of an originally meaningless imagery. I hold no brief for Hindu mythology ; I have simply

presented it in a form in which a Hindu would wish it to go. European culture would hardly be in a position to accept such interpretations. It has its own pet theories. But when science is already feeling her way into an unseen universe, and Psychic Research has already outgrown the stage of contemptuous *let-alone*, Europe should profitably think of putting her own house in order ; a new era of ultra-common science is slowly dawning upon her history, soon she would be called upon to exchange her narrow empiricism for an wider and possibly surer one. In the mean-while she should keep her windows open to all the light, dim perhaps but suggestive, remote perhaps but re-assuring, that may come from the East : the sun has risen from the East, and shall again rise from the East. If this new knowledge of Europe and America come to anything, it will mean a drastic revision of their estimates of Eastern ideas and institutions. The pervasive *spirituality* of Hindu mythology, its *system* and its *elasticity* should not be lightly passed over. The mystic it gradually leads home, from the symbol to its meaning, from the radiation to its centre. The plain man who has largely to draw upon his imagination in following and subscribing to it, is taught to turn his imagination inwards also, to make it an enquiring, penetrating and foreshadowing imagination. It is a scheme that negotiates the truth of Sense and the truth of Reason. It is an institution to help and educate the spirit in one of the most difficult stages of its pilgrimage.

PHILOSOPHY

This has received an uncommonly large measure of attention recently. I shall be content to lay stress on a few points only. *First*, Hindu Philosophy has always drawn its inspiration from mysticism, especially as embodied in the Upanishads. This does not indeed dim the glory of philosophy, for philosophy too must build on the solid rock of experience, and experience need not be confined within the limits that Western positivism has set down for it : the Upanishads are amongst the profoundest and therefore

the most enduring experiences of man. Such experience alone can move where reason will bring us to dialectical deadlocks ; the seer alone can save where the philosopher will fling us into hopeless antinomies. Every conceptual truth has the misfortune "to be confined to mere presumption and counter-presumption", and it is from mystical experience that any really "decisive thunderbolts of facts" can come. In experience lies the last hope of philosophy. Western Philosophy would indignantly sunder any suspected unholy alliance with dogmatism, and relying on its own resources it would fain go down to agnosticism and nihilism if it must. But after we have buried dogmatism for good, let it be remarked that it is a word that has conveniently covered too many sins of a new-fangled philosophy which while treating with scant courtesy the authority of traditions would apparently make capital out of its own self-constituted authority. Mysticism is not dogmatism : it is the self-defence of the soul against the inevitable dogmatism of a theorizing science and philosophy.

Second, its **dynamical** conception of reality and experience. Reality is one and unchangeable, but its shades and reflections in the understanding of man are many, and as the understanding is gradually unfolding, its reflex-realities must need be various. These various reflex-realities, with their corresponding experiences, account for the apparently divergent systems of philosophy, all of which really converge in the home of mysticism, the Upanishads. They are progressively adapted schemes of approach, landmarks in the history of speculative evolution. From the common-sense presentation of Nyaya and Vaisheshika to the profound mysticism of Vedanta, the evolution is long. All being nursed on the Vedas and all conspiring to make life free and immortal, there is no real conflict among these so-called independent schools of thought. This pragmatic, practical tone of the schools do not, however, detract from their value as acute, thorough-going, courageous systems. There is no unholy alliance with anything to bind and gag commonsense, there is no dark conspiracy to deliver up the proud birth-right of reason to faith and religion. Subject only to the conditions of correct experience, common, scientific or mystical, the reason will be supreme.

Third, reviewing the whole thing from its base to its crowning structure one cannot be struck with its thorough *mysticopositivism*, its pervading tone of spiritual life beyond bondage, sorrow and death, and its happy blending of faith and culture. *It is not a philosophy of all-fleeting, all matter, all-nothing, all-unknowable, all-sorrow and all-necessity.* None of these ideas have seriously taken root in the soil of India, though of course her Tree of knowledge will show all these features in their proper places and proportions. Unlike Europe, India has a subtle centre of co-inherence and convergence, the Ancient Light of mystical experience : unlike Europe too, she has saved her faith, and with it her soul, consistently with a most searching and uncompromising *empiricism*.

SCIENCE

The same domination of spirit and subordination of matter as before. Matter is the eject or radiation of the spirit, under proper treatment it is reabsorbed by the spirit again. Hence the laws of matter are really the laws of the spirit, the conditions of its radiation ; matter lives in the spirit and out of it, it can be studied and known in the spirit and out of it. The second is the *out-door* method of inductive investigation so zealously followed and profitably cultivated by the West : to know and master Nature we must go out and meet her on own ground ; Europe *has* gone out and met her on her own ground with magnificent success as all the world knows. The first is the *in-door* method of spiritual intuition or introspection so courageously and systematically followed by the Hindu. The prototype of the outer is the inner, so that we need only focus our thought on the inner, the Me, to know the outer, the so-called **not-me**. This home method is at once surer, deeper and far less distracting than the other method. The universe is in me : even a grain of sand has the whole universe squeezed into its tiny self, and why should not the spirit, the start and the finish and the measure of all that comes to be, contain it too ? It need only know the secret of focussing

and concentrating attention sufficiently intensely to compel the watchful, unseen custodian at home to give up the mysterious key, the wonderful lamp. The secret it has discovered as Yoga, the Sadhus and the whole civilization will testify. Yoga, which is being foreshadowed in the new psychic knowledge of the West, is a system for awakening the spirit to a consciousness of its own vast potentialities and educating it slowly to possess its unsuspected sources of knowledge, power and happiness. The Baconian method of science was a revolt against the old and effete method of reflection which had nearly paralysed the intellectual life of the world. True ; but this exploded method was only a degenerate fossil, a dying echo, of the great method we are eulogising.

The inward flow of Hindu life and thought would be wholly inconsistent with the pursuit of any method that would necessarily and considerably drift life and thought *outwards*. A parading science would not be in keeping with the Hindu's philosophy and religion. It would be a discordant note in the sublime harmony of his life's evolution. It would be a divergent force in a system where all other forces beautifully converge. Man stands at the fatal parting of ways : if he must ply his interest emphatically in one direction, he must choose to find bankruptcy in the opposite : to flow out profusely life must decide not to flow in profusely, to live in matter largely it must choose to take on the stamp of matter largely. This is Nature's Law of Compensation. Well, the Hindu has decided to remain at home, explore its chambers, and take the legacy : Europe has decided to go out, storm the enveloping order, and carry the spoils. European science bears the stamp of European life : it is aggressive, sanguine and brilliant, earnest and promising, trumpeting and dictating ; but it lacks inner confidence in itself, is not inwardly satisfied with itself, is secretly nervous and unhappy. For Europe it is a necessary but transitional phase of evolution leading to a higher and stabler one.

Hindu science is thrilling with the inspiration of Hindu life : it is intensive, calm and collected, co-ordinating with faith and philosophy though upon its own unblemished right ; its message

like that of faith is hope and immortality, power and peace, light and liberty. Europe goes to conquer but soon returns a captive groaning under the nightmare of natural necessity : she goes out to feast, but returns with a burning thirst in her heart, Nature refuses to admit her into her secret apartments where live fountains may flow in joyous abundance : she is hunting after peace but is unwittingly hunting it down in the very quest. Even the late leader of science, Prof. Huxley, could not lightly dismiss this vulture of unrest eating away into the liver of the present-day Prometheus. Finality and repose are not to be sought perhaps in that way. The outer contains perhaps only the reflex and sham sources of knowledge, power and peace : the real sources are at home. The world will yield up its secrets more readily and securely to the searching eye of the spirit looking calmly into its own depths, (not empty as Yoga will show you inspite of the *tabula rasa* and the test of it), than to microscopes and spectroscopes. The microscope may be a small thing in itself, but is it not the entire European civilisation in monad, in embryo? You cannot get a good microscope without accepting all the elaborate circumstances of its engineering : a civilisation has to evolve a microscope and can evolve it only by running substantially on European lives. Civilisation is organic, it lives incarnate in its every screw. You cannot engraft on a screw without engendering a screw-civilisation. That is why the Hindu has refused to avail himself of nearly all external aids and decided to fall back upon the spirit's own resources as unreservedly as he can. Every external aid, however necessary, is *ipso facto* an internal limitation. The **Psychoscope**, if I may coin the word, has served his ends admirably well. No one who has studied the wonderful fabric of Hindu culture and civilisation can think for one moment that this home-method has been either barren or fantastic. This fabric in its every feature will show how rich, how deep the Hindu's scientific knowledge was ; there was no institution which was without its deep-laid scientific basis, no tenet that would be afraid to take up the challenge of the latest conclusions of modern science. The Hindus evidently have known much real science all of which cannot be

supposed to have been empirically obtained. How did they know what a Newton and Darwin, a Kelvin and Crookes, an Weismann and Madam Curie are knocking their brains hard to know ? And if we are not very much mistaken in our reading of European history, the age is not far distant when the discredited indoor method will rise from its unmerited grave, stouter than ever, to become the official method of science, which will soon lay down in unfeigned disappointment her much-vaunted and more-exacting weapons of knowledge, dismiss her overmastering external allies and settle down in peace, back in the lap of her mother, the mystical East, to the utter confusion of the *Novum Organum* and its following. The electron, the radium, the ultra-ordinary rays, the wireless message and the hypnotism are not quite obscure sign-posts pointing to a new world of scientific interest and destiny. These ideas borne on the crest of the advancing wave herald the dawn of a vastly glorious future renaissance. The Hindu science true to the eternal pole star of Truth should not permit herself to be distracted by the passing brilliancies of shooting stars.

ART

The Hindu has shown the same inwardness in his doing as in his knowing. In art, the problem before the Hindu has been this : How shall I live *through* matter that I may live *out* of it at last ? I must have arts, useful and fine, for the sake of life-struggle, in willing and feeling to be : but I must will and feel in a way that may systematically further the ends of life-victory, self-possessed being through an awfully stormy and dubious becoming. No expression of the Will or the Feeling must be suffered to betray the traveller from his stern course of self-realisation ; each shall remind him of his mission on earth and none shall entice his heart away from it ; each shall have only a barely necessary character of outwardness, an irreducible minimum of material form, a home-bound flow of actuality, none shall be too much distracting, too much burdening and too much drifting. Let art be conceived in spirit and express

in pliable matter, let it fill the inner and flow over into the outer, let it touch the actual so as to transform it into the ideal. The outward is bewildering and it must beware of it : the matter is binding and enslaving and it must know how to elude it ; the actual is desperately rushing and it must manage to keep its feet, look on and ahead. Art must descend but only to gather momentum for nobler ascent ; it must be moulded in matter but not to be petrified into its likeness ; it must move with the actual but not run itself down to be carried and dashed. This is how the Hindu has solved the problem of art. This is spiritual co-ordination of the Hindu art. In the useful arts, the material and the actual have been treated and fashioned so as to make them useful to the ends of spiritual life : the problem evidently is to make the satisfaction of the material and actual conditions of life consistent with an increasingly fuller satisfaction of the spirit, to model the useful arts after a pattern that religion and philosophy may approve, a pattern rich in its suggestiveness and faithful in its service of the True, the Good and the Beautiful. It is the devoted service of the ideal, the patient control of the unruly passion which constitutes the true usefulness of an art : an art turned away from truth and possessing no intrinsic beauty can neither be Good nor useful : the useful and the fine may differ in their way of emphasis, but must not differ in spirit and purpose. The useful is the *good-front* with a background of the true and beautiful : the fine is the *beautiful-front* with a background of the true and good. The spirit is the home of the true, good and beautiful : matter, the echo of the spirit, contains the echo. Hence an ideal art must co-ordinate a *maximum of spirit-kinetic* with a *minimum of matter-kinetic*. Hence also we must aim at securing the utmost simplicity of material expression and utmost elevation of spiritual. This the Hindu has aimed at in planning and developing his arts and industries : art has been rendered in such a way as to assist and not to embrace plain-living and high-thinking, to safeguard and not attack the vital roots of the social constitution, autonomy and peace, to further and not imperil the objects of morality and religion. The Hindu has been content with simple implements and modes of work

and could never complacently think of a civilisation which, like the one now booming around us, would render its arts and industries into awfully laborious and complicated technical monstrosities which makes life an ungodly race and wealth a crushing burden, comfort and enjoyment the be-all and end-all, religion and peace the idle dream of the old-world rhapsodist. Multiply the wants and the means of their satisfaction : let each craving for enjoyment be stifled for a while in its material satisfaction and then burst into a storm of passions wilder than ever : let each want be burnt down to ashes and then, even while the flattering function is laid to the soul, rise like the fabled Phoenix stouter than ever : the cup of peace is indeed brought to the lips of the poor Tantalus of the present-day but the coveted fluid ever refuses to wet them and allay his thirst. Is this not the melancholy spectacle, the grim tragedy, to which one is being treated in these days of vain glory and sham power ? When will Europe note the solemn warning that has been thrilling across wide seas and lands ever since the mystical East saw the Light and discovered the hidden sources of Power, and her own sweet redeemer spilt his life-blood on the cross to give to the naughty world one of its noblest lessons on humility and love ? Her cumbrous work-shops are forging fetters for holding him in them her groaning wheels, her hissing boilers, her rolling straps are accomplishing with marvellous expedition the dark plan which the fallen angels must have hatched in their infernal pandemonium for undoing the acme of God's creation, man ! Who will say that this picture is overcoloured ? Europe is not without her hope, however ; this mad industrialism in her blood is possibly a passing distemper which will leave her soberer and not completely exhausted ; when the tempest and waves have ceased howling she will at last catch a calm familiar voice calling from the horizon of the rising sun to a safe haven of rest.

The Hindu has remained firm by the side of the simple handloom, the simple spade and the easiest means of locomotion. In warfare he will not swerve an inch from the principles of religious justice ; the appalling curse of mills and factories he foresaw and would never bring upon his head ; the criminal folly of

letting loose the wild passions so that they may dash ever more furiously for their satisfaction was not consistent with the spiritual wisdom of the Hindu. His healing art is *nature-fed* and *spirituality-laden* ; the druggist's bottle and the surgeon's knife can be consistent only with a chemical and mechanical civilisation which *he* could never bid for. The European would call the Hindu's a stunted and stagnant civilisation, but the Hindu has striven from ages immemorial to develop a civilisation of the greatest *spirit-assertion* and severest *matter-control*, and what the foreigner has taken to be the weakness and shame of self-mutilation is really the strength and glory of self-discipline. Let not the sublime burden of Indian history, vast and mighty as it is, be lost upon us in the sorry tale of the last few chapters of our hypnotic trance and prostration. The tale is sickening, but let us never forget that it is but a small tragic act introduced into the drama of Hindu history to make the future appear as a full revival of the past and not simply as a weary, monotonous continuity. If the life of the oldest living civilisation is chequered, it is no wonder. The spirit that has inspired the evolution of Hindu Art is the spirit of Light and Love, Justice and Sacrifice.

In the fine arts, it is the beauty of Truth and Goodness. Beauty *in sea* and not its formal refractions, that is primarily loved and sought. The Hindu has not the Greek eye to love and worship beauty in the mere forms and mere changes : forms and changes are beautiful because rising and tossing on the bosom of the infinite, unfathomable ocean of Reality they are radiant with the glow of the *formless* One and lively with the echoes of the still, deathless music of the *changeless* One. In drama, which we have Hegel's own authority to consider as the highest effort of the genius of poetry, the beauty that charms and draws the Hindu is the beauty of real and abiding reflected into infinite shades of sweetness in the emotions of a feeling heart, in the tranquil loveliness and solemn grandeur of a prolific Nature, and in the mighty onrush and dramatic recoils of a colossal history. Apparently a Shakespeare paints the heart while a Kalidasa paints Nature : but the heart the one paints is moulded from Nature's clay, and the Nature the other paints is but the glow and music

of the Heart Divine. Shakespeare is the world's, Kalidasa is the heaven's poet. The one is the bard of the soul's crucifixion, the other of the soul's resurrection : the one wears the crown of the world's tragedy, the other is invested with the majesty of Life's Communion.

Indian music is intensive, extensive and protensive like Indian spirituality : it calms and concentrates more than it excites and diverts : it broadens and inspires more than it quickens and stimulates. Deep as the sea, wild as the storm, serene as the sky, lovely as the floral spring, playful as the mountain rill, joyous as sunshine and melancholy as the dusky cloud, the tunes of Indian music express the Hindu in the sublime grandeur of his Eternity-yearning, in the sweet poetry of his Light-and-Beauty-worship, in his worldly pessimism and other-worldly hope, in his best and lowest moods. The pervasive co-ordination of the tunes in a nicely graduated scale leading up to the tune of divine ecstasy touching all conceivable chords of interest and feeling, elevating and harmonising all touched, never wayward, never erratic, suggesting and telling of man's destiny, love, suffering and hope, is most truly remarkable. Each tune has a life and spirit : no Mozart can compose it—it is not a happy combination of notes any more than life is a combination of corpuscles : like life it informs itself and is not made. It is a growth and overflow and not collocation and compilation. The Hindu lives in his tune, his nameless and formless One and his earthly hopes and fears live in it. European music, I am not competent to speak on it though, is like European life virile and swift, foaming and dashing, stimulating and diverting, lovely as the fair earth, troubled as the soul of the world, more compositional, than evolutionary, more of an art than of a life, more awake and sprightly than dreamy and mystical. The Hindu's Muse has her home in the unseen beyond from which she travels abroad. Europe's Muse dwells in the autumn leaves, winter frosts and gay loveliness of the spring-summer and is not particularly given to crying for the moon. But I must pass on.

Indian painting, sculpture and architecture may express themselves occasionally in huge and rude workmanship, in

unfashioned masses of canvas, stock and stone, but not always and necessarily as Hegel would think. Their massiveness and rudeness undoubtedly suggest the infinite and eternal beyond human comprehension: they symbolise the basic truth of Hinduism that the forms and dimensions that we impose on the nameless and formless one serve but to conceal and not express IT: so that every temple we build, every painting we draw and every image we fashion should point to the changeless One beyond all measure and past all dimension on which is fixed our last hope. Every feature in a serious workmanship is alive with a deep mystical significance too: but I am not going to press that point just now. Pure inaccessible Vedantism is not the whole creed of India: it is, of course, its crown of glory, the pole-star of lofty idealism to guide, shape and elevate the necessary actual and material of life and history: but whither shall we turn in the noble gallery of pagan and christian art to find parallels of the Puranic gods and goddesses, angels and man-gods, conceived in the sweetest aroma of loveliness, depicted in the choicest shades of beauty and inspired in the richest keys of the heart's emotion? My description fails, but I can imagine nothing lovelier and purer, nothing loftier and heartier. Vedantism does not reject Love and rock-bind the springs of our sweetest emotions: philosophy has not prevented the Hindu from being a feeling and romantic race.

SOCIETY AND HISTORY

Hindu society is the Hindu Idea in bone and flesh, and history is the idea in movement. The one shows in visible forms his being, the other shows in sweeping process his becoming. The one is the depth-dimension and the other the length-dimension of the stream of Life: the two together make the live real—the eternal Fact of life. Hence the basis of Hindu society is *realistic idealism*, the motive power behind Hindu history is *spiritual automobility*. How can the body social be made as nearly as possible a perfect scheme for the realisation of

the ideal, each limb being disciplined and educated to obey the heart and the brain where the Interest and the Idea are seated, and each being redeemed in the very act of co-ordination by a life which never rules the inert matter without inviting it to share its glory of freedom, which never touches without communicating itself? This is the problem before a self-conscious and self-possessed society.

First, the *pervading* spirituality of the social constitution in which the forces are so arranged that the resultant trend cannot be other than servant to the race-ideal, expressing it with purity and vigour and reacting upon the concurrent forces themselves so as to redeem them in the very act of co-ordination. Each social limb is charged with this common life and purpose : the activities of an individual and the functions of an institution, the relation which binds one individual to another and one institution to another, must all have the stamp of this common life and purpose, all have allegiance to the immanent end of social evolution. They find the justification of their existence in such co-ordination and allegiance, and this ceases when they make for disintegration and divergence : society claims the right to lop off its proudest limbs should they cease actually or incipiently, to exist *for* it. In every society we have institutions living kindred lives and playing ministering parts as also others, carrying in their bosom, forces of distraction and dissipation : the anabolic and catabolic forces in their ceaseless wrestling make and unmake history. A stable yet progressive social order represents, of course, the assured victory of the forces of convergence and construction ; the more compact a social order, the happier is the allegiance of the contributory forces to the race-idea ; society becomes an assemblage of greatest *ideal* homogeneity, or what is the same thing, least ideal diversity. Ideal homogeneity does not eliminate differentiation of limbs and functions in the social organism, it is not unaccommodating to a confederacy of *sub*-ideals tending to the harmony of the paramount end. It is not a colourless identity : it is a golden mean between social tyranny and individual nihilism, a joining together in holy wedlock of the duties and rights of man.

Thus a society resting on a spiritual basis and moving to a spiritual end *need not* throw overboard economic and political ideas and institutions ; but it cannot, in the interest of self-preservation, hand over the supreme control of affairs to economic and political forces, cannot lodge its vital centres in them, stand or entertain them as other than pliant *accessories* and instruments of its spiritual life. It is the place of the centre of cohesion and control that makes all the difference between a spiritual or philosophical civilization and a political or commercial one. The ascent of life is from the thralldom of matter to autonomy of spirit : hence a purely metaphysical civilization is a chimera while a purely physical civilization is death. The many aspects of the world-culture show the struggling Man in his various states of self-assertion, so that in any type of society, however conceived, all imaginable forces may meet and wrestle : economic, political and religious. Indeed it is an unsufferable abstraction to take any particular set of co-ordinating forces out of the living tissue and label it as political or economic or religious. Society is not a protozoon so that you can expect to find its component limbs fall away from one another in clear and safe independence : the higher the evolution of life the closer the interdependence of the differentiated structures and functions. Hence politics is not a segment of society which has only condescended to keep the house together with other independent segments, but is the entire social life in a special light, emphasis and bearing. In the social harmony, all notes may come and mingle, but they must come in their proper places and mingle in their proper proportions ; it is given only to a few to rule and see that the rest fall in with and obey. The place of the emphasis of social life may vary of course.

A society, spiritual in conception, *cannot* certainly do without forces of economic stability and political order ; it must produce its own programme of industry and commerce, home and international politics. But the forces must not be revolutionary and the programme must not be calculated to lead to its own bankruptcy. Its politics ought to be its religion in a particular application, with its House of Commons never

stooping to borrow the atmosphere of the Stock Exchange, with its cabinet walls never accepting the motto of wretched jingoism. Its economics ought to take its gospel from the Geeta and Sermon on the Mount and reject wholly the inspiration from Mammon and the business of which poor Tantalus is the picture and symbol. In such submission, politics may have to recall her prancing proconsuls and curtail her wide empire, economics may have to pull down the dismal mills and factories, relax the horrible strain of ungodly competition and settle back as completely in the state of Nature as will ensure the free-living, high thinking and full enjoying of the race. Such a society may not complacently don a thin veil of democracy to disguise the ugly autocracy of the almighty dollar but would rather prefer the plain autocracy of brain and character, the despotism of love and sacrifice which really means the spiritual autonomy of society : the dollar may be a power but it is not primarily a spiritual power ; it robs the many of their divine birth-right but enriches not the real sources of freedom and peace in its possessor. In such a society the supreme centres of cohesion and control, of education and inspiration, cannot lie in the dollars ; its basis cannot be laid amid the forces of material gain and unjust distribution ; it can never think of a constitution and course that will lead to the crucifixion of humanity on the cross of gold. The seers and prophets, the lovers and redeemers of man will rule and no money despot, no apostle of the mailed fist will dare show much of himself : a society whose gospel is love and peace cannot feel much enthusiastic over a two keels to one standard and would strain its every nerve to bring the ruinously mad evolution of international armaments to a standstill so that it can minimise the necessity for the dreadful peace programmes of those perfect *cordiale ententes* which historical irony has called the calm balance of power. To cry for peace and prepare for war, to demand an equitable distribution of social good and prepare for this by the interminable throes of strikes and counter-strikes which bring suffering and starvation to millions of innocent homes, show the helplessness and untenableness of a civilization that has built upon a basis other than spiritual,

and is passing through a phase of evolution that has hardly yet brought the forces of Light and Love to the front and invested them with the commission of supreme command. These forces of light and love, wisdom and sacrifice, will legislate for the Hindu directly and not simply be content to indirectly influence the brute uncultured forces of greed and gratification as indeed they must in any dynamical syndicate in which they may be present. The centre of forces will lie in the higher levels of spiritual excellence: the *Brahmin* who is supposed to be the level of greatest spirit-kinetic and least matter-kinetic is the law-giver and the law-dispenser of the Hindu; the very constitution of society makes him primarily and directly the ruler but not the enjoyer of things, the dispenser but not the devourer of social duties and rights. The *sannyasin* who has made the secluded cave his home and temple, the withering leaves and uninviting rock his bed of roses, is the star of the first magnitude in the Indian firmament before which diadems and sceptres pale into meek humility; his word is law and his wandering is the triumphal march of spiritual greatness. Shall we ask, what is the secret of this tremendous power which nothing temporal, nothing lower, will dare emulate? The answer is, he is the crowning result of a process of special evolution which a spirituality constituted society has adopted for itself, the visible, concreted ideal pointing to the struggling pilgrims the temple of the last ought-to-be, the logical evolution of the forces which have made the Brahmin what he is. It is the *direct* ascendancy of the spiritual forces and not merely their *indirect* influence, the moulding of the whole social order in conformity with this noble plan, the beautiful co-ordination and ready allegiance of the materialistic forces in such social order and the gradual education and elevation of these latter, that constitutes the speciality of Hindu Society.

The Hindu has consciously and systematically essayed to marry the practice of his society to its philosophy: mist and clouds do not gather too thickly around this oldest monument of human effort and divine inspiration. The soul is the centre of a radiation which is the universe itself; it is the Reality that

appears as the world ; it is the Beauty that Nature herself displays the Music that informs itself in the sublime epic of creation ; it is the Love that stresses and thrills and rebounds in every corpuscle of Nature's own being ; it is the Freedom and the Immortality that have the heart of the world in its profoundest dreams ; it is the Peace and Beautitude that has inspired History and impelled the stream of Evolution in their most persistent yearnings ! Nature is the Soul's own looking-glass, and in this the Soul reflects itself : the Centre is reflected and caught in its own radiation : the Source makes an eject of itself in its own emanation : hence the *reflex-soul*, the *eject-soul*, the vast tissues of centres acting and reacting upon one another through Nature and History. The Soul in creating limits, imprisons and contradicts itself : life is essentially a going back, a reconciliation, a grand resurrection : Man is an immortal Christ sacrificing himself on the cross of history to live again in a timeless and changeless Resurrection ! Here we have the reality, the appearance and the destiny of life. Society is a necessary institution through which this awful pilgrimage may fulfil itself : Society can have no other rational basis, no other *raison d'être*. In his construction and construction is certainly an important factor of social evolution—the Hindu has primarily and directly endeavoured to make the practice of life in all its phases and all its bearings true to its philosophy : the Hindu has consistently refused to sell his birthright for a mess of pottage : throughout the entire system and its process runs his unflinching devotion to his paramount ideal like an elixir of life itself. The Hindu has not loved and sought the material and mundane : he has only cut his way through them, and redeemed them by a final act of spiritualization. His is not a doctrine of *laissez faire*, spiritual or material.

A philosophical reading of the forces of social evolution, a reading between the lines of history, cannot fail to bring out the three important factors—the factors of divine inspiration and direction noiselessly working behind the affairs of Nature and Man, of human reason and will steadily gaining in strength and decision, and of ceaseless and ruthless pressure of the environ-

ment—the enveloping order. I propose to call these factors the *a*-Stress, the *B*-Stress and *r*-Stress respectively. The fatalism of the Hindu is notorious, but his social philosophy has not believed either in the all-importance of the environment—the rock-bound natural necessity of social growth—or in the callous autocracy of a host of Olympic gods designing history and secretly manipulating the leading strings of earthly affairs. No other society seems to have suffered the reason and will to assert themselves in racial construction with stronger emphasis and to greater purpose. No other society seems to have lived to evolve a civilization more philosophical, more in touch with the eternal sources of man's light, love and peace. European civilization with all its vigour and promise is not perhaps a fully self-conscious and self-possessed force : it is pressing for light and love, but its pressure is as yet a blind stress which does not know the nature, the direction and the magnitude of its goal : the oracle of mysticism it has discredited, but its science is not yet fit to supply the lack of faith and think out a tolerable workable scheme of social movement. What is the form of social existence that will be best conducive to the *summum bonum* of the human race ? This is a problem which it has not dared look in the face, for it has not commanded and focussed light enough to reveal the deep-laid sources of the *summum bonum* itself. What is the real good of man and what are the systematic ways and means of approach ? But even European History is groping, feeling its way, moving—to glory and blessedness, let us hope. I have always thought the motive power behind this process is direction from *above*, the *a*-Stress, in short. An unseen hand is surely leading this restive, erratic child to an altitude where it may see and provide for itself, learn to discern the folly of its past ways and love the wisdom and glory of self-sacrifice and self-fulfilment. Indeed, the Christian civilisation will redeem itself by being *truly whole-heartedly* Christian.

The *physics* of Hindu Society is not less sound than its *metaphysics*. The Hindu has found out the matter, measured it and adapted it to his own End. From the Spirit's point of view it is conquest and not *adaptation* : the Spirit cannot think of

adapting itself to its own echo, reflex, eject. Only it must *know* the business and *work* it boldly through. The Hindu's grasp of matter is not weak or uncertain, however : its treatment is not *spiriting away* in a summary manner, but steadily growing *inspiration*. The conquest of matter is far easier through self-purification and self-fortification than through ceaseless *self-thrusting* and *self-dashing*. Matter's way to conquer is to allure the Self out of its invulnerable stronghold and engage it in a never-ending warfare with passing bubbles and airy nothings. The Spirit's way to conquer is to make the home its castle and temple, to keep communion with the Source of all power, knowledge and bliss, fulfil itself to overflowing and flooding the alien universe around with its redeeming glow, music and love. Matter is tamed the moment it feels that it cannot provoke and *use* the Spirit : it gives itself up the moment it finds that it cannot induce the Spirit to *give way*. Yet this self-purification and self-fortification is an idle shibboleth so long as the informed Spirit has not the safety and security of its material form : to live in matter it must keep together and conciliate the forces of matter : to outgrow and conquer the form it must live and move *through* it, and to a certain extent, even *according* to it. The environment—the *r-Stress* is a factor that cannot certainly be trifled with. Hence, even a metaphysical civilisation cannot do without a sound physical basis : a race-soul longing and striving after a supernatural state cannot afford to lose or neglect a thorough-going natural science and art. The Hindu has not reared his noble social edifice upon a mass of melting clouds : the scientific and natural basis of his society is not the loose gravel of old-world prejudice and antiquated dogma, but a solid body of profoundest truths that the high priests of Nature are fore-conceiving in their serenest divinations. Europe is now slowly waking to an "eugenic consciousness" too long her social struggles have been fought on purely sentimental and doctrinaire grounds : dogma and sentiment have determined the character and decide the fate of institutions which ought to be deep-laid amid the verities of science and ought never to be touched behind the back of

science. Darwin and Dalton have lived in vain if sentiment is still to rule the world : anthropology, ethnology and sociology in general have at last arisen to claim an office and function that have been so long denied to science. The natural history of sentiments is instructive : sentiments we are certainly not to throw completely overboard. If man has erred so long he has erred in excellent company but it is time to learn that while sentiment is good, science is better, that in social construction which aims at maximum efficiency, persistence and satisfaction we cannot afford to build and raise upon a basis of pious hopes and utopian sentiments alone.

The struggle for existence is a grimly earnest affair, a condition of evolution and progress ; but even this affords no excuse for the materialisation of a culture and civilisation : the planes of existences, individual as well as collective, are many, so that struggle, the basic condition of evolution, need not inevitably find its most essential fuel in the forces of matter ; the sense of the battle may be shifted considerably from the planes of dust to serener altitudes without necessarily exceeding the bounds of practicability, with infinitely greater chances of honourable, peaceful progress, with a vanishing residuum of the horrible curse of a godless civilisation. If races must struggle, they may struggle for Light and Love, and not for an empire and a market ; and though it may be frequently a bare necessity with an youthful civilization to confine its struggle mainly within the bounds of these profane interests, it does not follow that the only reasonable or practicable measure of progress is the annual budget of the Exchequer and the estimates of the Admiralty. The Hindu has withdrawn largely from the struggle in the outer in order that he may throw himself heart and soul into the more momentous struggle in the inner, the struggle of spiritual life : his care abroad has been to *be*, his end in himself has been to rise. Hence the Hindu solution of the problem of adaptation is remarkable. In adapting himself to his enveloping order his principle has always been to *reduce the necessity for adaptation to a minimum, to outgrow and keep off adaptation as much as possible*. How can the vital centres of a race civilization be so

completely strengthened and fortified that they may become considerably independent of the environment, very much less liable to be shaken and affected by the changes, the distracting influences from without ? This problem he has essayed to solve by systematically reducing the *susceptibility* of his constitution, by developing a system tempered to the changes of the wind and weather. The European plan of going out and ceaselessly dancing to the tune of the environment, being perpetually drawn into the vortex of endless acting and reacting, is certainly not the wisest or at any rate the only plan of adaptation. The Hindu has sought to discover the secret of *safe* and *peaceful* independence of the environment : his *sannyasin* who has completely *let alone* the outer, so that he himself may be let alone to rise to the higher altitudes of his self-fulfilment, is the living, visible model of his society and civilization. And this solution is in keeping with his philosophy and religion. The Hindu has ever believed in the home sources of knowledge, power and bliss : the growth of the self is not a continual robbing and borrowing of the external forces so that life is necessarily a breathless running and chasing and storming, but it is an evolution, a realization by the self of its own vast potentialities, an awakening, a recognizing. The external forces may serve mainly to keep up healthy warmth and excitement of vitality : they may not shape and mould, but only assist and subserve : they may be acceptable as allies and safe as foes. The Hindu society is a noble monument of this monumentous achievement : it has evolved a constitution that can almost defy, in the plenitude of its native strength, the dashing waves of ages, and carry on almost unconcernedly its own proper law of life : indeed its very safety lies in this philosophic indifference to the environment, in keeping to itself, cool and collected, never betraying its soul, its history and its mission. Should the Hindu himself be drawn into the vortex of mad adaptation, give up the stronghold of his power and life, accept a life of strutting and fretting, the dark curtain would assuredly fall over his history : he must never forget that his adaptation is peculiar, it is progressive self-fulfilment. His Seers have not solved for only a special

chapter of the world's history : the solution is general, for the Hindu at any rate. Fidelity to the law of his own being is still the secret of his successful adaptation, and therefore of life.

Hindu Economics and Hindu Politics have drawn their inspiration from Hindu philosophy and religion : the production and distribution of material wealth must be consistent with the conditions of maximum spiritual well-being, with the principles of love, equity and peace. In Politics, the Hindu cannot think complacently of the complete divorce of politics from religion in which apparently the political philosopher of the West sees all the promise and guarantee of its greatness ; it is certainly founded upon *community of interest*, but interest not necessarily and chiefly profane. Like the universe itself it is not democracy : his politics being his religion, the Hindu will neither countenance the government of the mob nor the government of the rod : his government is the Reign of Divine Law—the rule of Wisdom and Sacrifice—an aristocracy of Love and Light which could reconcile the peaceful autonomy of the village communities with the divine right of holy kings, a system that could evolve kings who would literally and avowedly live for the people and find in such living the highest satisfaction of their being, and a people who would feel it their interest and religion to live for their kings : the constitution of society, the love and wisdom of the guardians of society and above all the moulding influence of religion contained in themselves the possibility or even the necessity of this happy union. The aristocracy of brain, character and spirituality with its severe self-denying ordinances long saved the constitution from degenerating into the usual extremes of mob-rule, despotism and oligarchy. It was a self-adjusting and self-correcting machinery which found the surest means of its self-fulfilment in its wonderful religion, discipline and organic inter-dependence of the limbs.

Secondly, one of the most engaging problems of man and history has been the settlement of the relation between the individual and society, the rights and duties of man. Now a correct, appreciative reading of Hindu history cannot fail to

impress upon us the fact that the Hindu has laid his emphasis on the *duties* of man, while Europe has perhaps laid it upon the *rights*. The Hindu has asked : What is my duty ? Europe has asked : What is my right ? We cannot of course have duties and rights without their necessary mutual implication ; but the stand-point of appreciating and conceiving them and the emphasis of adjusting and settling them may not be uniform with every race and age of history. The Hindu's social and political construction is not primarily a *defining and compounding of rights but duties or dharma*. The Hindu's social and political history is not primarily an evolution of rights between man and man, institution and institution, but an evolution of duties : right has its eye on the *self* and its belongings, *duty* has its eye on the *other* and its service : right is the principle of prudence and selfish justice, duty is the principle of love and cosmic justice : the one is the force of ejection and differentiation, the other is the force of attraction and integration. The Hindu's religion and philosophy, however, have beautifully bridged over the fatal gulf between the rights and duties of man. The Hindu believes and this faith has been the vital breath of his nostrils—that the wisest method to *claim* the right of the self is to *deny* it in all the ordinary planes of material existence and enjoyment, that every sacrifice of the so-called right becomes a pavement for the former step of the Right Supreme, that there is no real right without duty. The self is the greatest obstacle to the fulfilment of the real Self—the house is divided against itself ; hence man can best claim and secure his right by forgetting and denying it in the lower planes, claiming and securing only as much as it is his duty to claim and secure, not certainly out of weakness and inertia but out of real strength born of growing and consolidating spiritual autonomy. Here is the key to the solution of many of the riddles of Hindu civilization.

Thirdly, for a proper appreciation of the spirit and forms of Hindu civilization it is essential that one remembers some of the ground principles on which it is founded :

(a) **The conservation of social energy** is the first condition of social efficiency : a living society cannot afford to show a net

loss of power. Its problem is to adjust the storage and expenditure of power in such a way as to evade the two extremes of stagnation and dissipation. A high-pressure civilization may expend itself at last, while a cautious and peaceful civilization may live to see history making and unmaking itself many a time.

(b) The Hindu claims to have found out the real sources of power, and therefore the true conditions of efficiency and secrets of persistence. The Spirit is the only energy that man can really command : to open up the deeper veins of this energy is at once the surest guarantee of conservation and provision against unprofitable dissipation. Control the self so as to educate it : educate the self so as to make it possess the sources of power it carries in its own bosom : let it not be deluded by any false hope of power and satisfaction *outside* itself.

(c) The self in its reality is the substance behind all fleeting shadows. It is the eternal abode of Truth. Autonomy and Bliss : the world is but a world of hypnotic suggestion. The joyous abode of immortality is not absolutely beyond the pale of possible knowledge : beautitude is not beyond the stretch of possible experience. A definite scheme of approach is there for him who will venture to *try* it. Society cannot afford to fling it out of the range of its practical politics—this message of Hope and this provision for Eternal Life.

(d) The Hindu will never consent to regrade life otherwise than in the perspective of endless history : he can never take it in a piecemeal, isolated survey, painfully bound within the poor limits of a birth and death, a brief interpolation into the music of Nature's life. Life is a link in a chain that stretches immeasurably beyond the impenetrable fog that gathers around an entrance and an exit : the rolling cycle of births and re-births weaves a vast, continuous tissue of life-history. This is not Hindu metaphysics but Hindu mysticism and commonsense. The Hindu can never live for an hour, he can never build for a day. Such reading of the actual and passing in the setting of eternal life explains much that is otherwise obscure in his culture and civilization. His immortality, again, is modelled

after the pattern of Comteian or even Buddhistic immortality : history is perhaps repeating itself in the latest empiricism of James and his following, but Hindu's immortality is a possession all his own.

(e) In social evolution we must admit a *principle of change* : even the Hindu must *move*, and his movement may have no uniform acceleration. But in social movement he has always put these three questions to himself : *When* shall I move ? *How* shall I move ? *Whither* shall I move ? A self-conscious and self-possessed society can never consent to move without finding out the *object*, the *method* and *pilot* of its movement : it can never permit history to take care of itself.

(f) There is no unmixed good or evil in this world of compromise. A scheme of earthly evolution is never perfect. Kipling's East and West may be each good in its way. I am planning a scheme of movement, however, and in reviewing it we should employ the test of **Social Economy Or Parsimony** : How much storage and expenditure of energy, in what manner and what direction, is most serviceable on the whole and in the long run ?

Hindu History is vast and colossal like Hindu life. The Hindu has fanformed his history to the rhythm of the universe itself, he has attuned his evolution to the very music of the spheres. He has measured not by decades and centuries but cycles such as the world-process itself might accept as befitting its colossal vastness. Planting his interest essentially in the eternal verities of existence and wedding his imagination indissolubly to the unbounded sweep of world-evolution, he has been no lover and noter of the temporal and the passing, the iridescent air-bubbles merry in the sunshine and swept by the passing wind. Races wearing short clothes are playing with shells and pebbles on the beach of an unexplored rolling "deep" : in all earnestness they are building and demolishing their little castles and homes of sand and pebbles ; man lives with a zest such as the immortals themselves will envy, man judges with a decisiveness such as the oracles themselves will emulate. But the Hindu, the elder of the races, has

withdrawn himself often from this folly of small play, stood at the wave-splashed margin of the sea, moved by a strange yearning, anxiously receiving message and drawing inspiration from eternity itself.

(1) The Hindu has found out the **Law of Cycle**, has felt the rhythmic, pulsation of history. The world-process rolls in rhythmic, cyclic movement : the advancing ages do not only piece together discrete fragments of history, they mark the passing and recurring and reintegrating pulse of a mighty process of becoming. Like day and night, like the season and like the prodigious cycles of world-evolution themselves, history stretches itself on in rhythmic pulsations of ages of action, ages of reaction and ages of synthesis.

(2) Hence the Hindu cannot afford to let himself be drowned in the clamour of passing scenes, the stray episodes of history. The rush of the world-process is bewildering, the suggestions and temptations of current history are formidable. Man must not miss the truth in the flight of appearances, the spirit and law in the confusion of forms and processes. This is **Historic Illusion**.

(3) The brief striking episodes and the apparently discrete ages of history, the urgency and excitement of the material and the grossness and immediateness of the actual must not be suffered to hypnotise and enslave the imagination. Let the imagination be colossal, bold and sweeping like the world-process itself : let the bard and the minstrel have a soul worthy of their Epic, true to the eloquence of their Song. This is **Historic Imagination**.

(4) The **Historic Brain** would require a constant and careful exercise of a robust logical sense. Let it remember above all that there may be dogmatism in avoiding dogmatism and that empiric reason is not the last tribunal of historic justice.

(5) This brings us to the mystic eye of spiritual intuition—the unquestionable oracle of historic truth : **Historic Vision**.

MORPHOLOGY AND ÆTIOLOGY

One word about the nature and cause of Hindu degeneration. Current ideas and even well-meant criticism have hardly laid bare the real fact and guessed the real cause. Yet no problem is more profoundly important in the sphere of philosophical history and national or even cosmopolitan practice. A scientific morphology of Hindu depression, a philosophical version of this grave distemper must emerge at last out of this confused medley of ideas and theories. Is it a religious or political or economic depression? It is the inefficiency of an old and effete civilization, or deeper still, is it a falling off in the standard of national character? Now evidently there is an element of irrefragable truth in every one of these suggestions: but I have to advance a suggestion of my own. *It is increased inertia, a swoon, a lull arresting the main springs of its racial energy, a state of Socioplasm in which society relaxes itself and goes to sleep.* The whole malady with its various complications can be summed up in this. The Hindu has not disintegrated, he has recoiled; his history has not ended, it is passing through an inevitable period of contraction, and all the depression and confusion that racial contraction means. The *socioplasm* is however a necessary basis of racial recuperation and revival. Ransack history to discover the cause: it lies deeper than the strata of ordinary research. Trace back the chain of causation as far as you like, you will be caught in a hopeless vortex of cyclic reasoning. Suppose you sum up your conclusion thus: Here there was a change in the character and circumstances of the race which caused inefficiency and all the rest of it. But why was there this change for the worse? The antecedent assemblage of conditions would not justify the change. The race had presumably possessed an unimpeachable character and an efficient constitution, it has perhaps reached the zenith of its glory and excellence: and what gave it the first impetus in the downward direction? The very first step in the transition from power to decadence and *vice versa* is the mystery of mysteries which the historical brain leaves only confounded. The

environment cannot explain the whole, the heart of this mystery. The *first incipient fall* of the angel, man and greatness cannot possibly be otherwise explained than by a direct application of the Law of Cycle, assumption of divine ordination and guidance. The inevitable cycle has brought on, as indeed it did again and again in the irrevocable past and will again and again in the unimaginable future, this dark night of socioplasm, this age of prostration in India.

CONCLUSION

Only another word in conclusion. The inevitable cycle has not, however rendered the free exercise of the brain and the nerve impossible. History is not a cold machine unfolding and rolling up a vast scroll of divine pre-ordination : Nature is not a mightily whirl in which life is perpetually doomed to be caught, dragged and drowned, carried in the relentless sweep of the ions and corpuscles, the suns and stars. *The Hindu has flown his thoughts and cares to an altitude where even the light of the milky way will not dare to peep : let him therefore beware how he moves amid the dust and mire of the gross world beneath. His path is laid over Infinity itself : let him therefore beware how he gives and takes, changes and conserves, adapts and fulfils. His goal is fixed in Eternity itself : let him therefore beware how he educates and provides himself, rises above the temptations, outgrows the limitations and answers the solicitations of the uneasy world around him.*

The Hindu has not only to move amid the dust of a stormy world but even to *adapt* the patrician dignity of his spiritual life to the demands of the plebian dust : he may have to be a nation amongst other nations, even an asset amongst other assets. But he cannot relax and expand himself so much and in such wise that the dust may swamp and choke him into its likeness : he cannot exactly be a nation of big, crushing dollars, he cannot exactly be a power living and sheltering itself behind its naval estimates. Let not the huge phantom of a so-called national

necessity completely overwhelm us : let not the noble hand of patriotism that would efface the sham from over the brow of the dear old land do violence in its blindness and nervousness to the calm, contemplative soul resting amid a mass of noiselessly recuperating and reorganising forces of a resurrection cycle, a reincarnating history. Complete self-fulfilment is undoubtedly the distant goal ; but the Hindu's way of adaptation and progress is not exactly to be the beaten track followed by the other semi-conscious races of the world : the way is to strengthen the strategic points of his social constitution so that it *may largely outgrow the necessity for adaptation* : the stages in the way must be such as these : **Self-awakening** in the bracing atmosphere of keen polarity and contact brought on by his present cycle ; **Self-education** and **Self-concentration** by falling back upon the home sources and methods of life-culture, providing only an *irreducible minimum of inter-racial safeguard* ; and **Self-fulfilment** and **Self-expansion** over a world which after its cycles of *Hellenisation, Romanization and Teutonization* now restlessly awaits a new cycle of *Indo-Aryanization*. In *taking* let the Hindu not forget what he has to *give*, in *changing* let him remember what he has to *conserve*, in *adapting* let him think how he has to *fulfil* himself and redeem others. History has brought him before the altar of Humanity : whatever he may do, let him not demean himself in the dust, for the new *Yajna* of universal spiritual renaissance may find in him its God-appointed High-priest.

INDIA : HER CULT AND EDUCATION

SERIES II

APPROACHES TO TRUTH

PREFACE

The present essay represents a sustained effort of reflection on the problem of Fact. Within the present compass, however, it has not been possible to give more than a rough outline of the Theory of Fact. The deeper foundations have not been sufficiently laid bare and examined, and many of the essential bearings have not been fully and clearly indicated and discussed. I have aimed at giving merely a rude framework of a system and this, I venture to hope, can be gathered in the following pages. In developing this system I have relied almost exclusively on intuitive reflection, and I have constantly appealed to my reader to experiment for himself to see if the deliverances of his own reflection should tally with those of mine. The reader therefore should be prepared for this demand on himself.

I need offer no preliminary remarks as to how this Theory of Fact has started and gradually assumed definite features. I have consciously set no models before myself in working out this system : I have rather attempted to face my problem with a mind who first meditates on the problem of existence : I have generally suffered no thinker to stand between myself and my object of thought. My method of treatment is constructive rather than critical. The references to great thinkers and systems are for the most part illustrative. The last conclusions to which I have been brought are, however, substantially identical, as will become more and more apparent as this Theory is followed up in future volumes, with those implied in the Upanishads. I am alone responsible for the method, the classification, the notations and the equations. These constitute the peculiar feature of this essay.

The frequent use of mathematical and scientific forms need not scare away lay readers. Except in one or two places which have been put within brackets there is really no advanced mathematics and the scientific forms employed are also generally of an elementary character. Mathematical and scientific readers, on the other hand, should not take me to task for perverting

the instruments and methods of exact science from their proper and established usage. I have employed these instruments and methods providing a sufficient safeguard of definitions and interpretations in nearly every case.

No one can be more keenly conscious of the many essential defects of the present essay than the writer himself. *First*, the Theory can be hardly expected to be placed on a sound and satisfactory basis without two or three supplementary volumes. *Secondly*, many of the promises involved in the body of this essay it has not been possible to redeem in this volume, and also many important issues have been raised which can be only very meagrely dealt with within the present scope. *Lastly*, relying almost exclusively on self-intuition I have had to emphasise my central ideas in several places and connexions even at the risk of verbosity and repetition. There is also a pretty long list of typographical and other errors. The list is not, however, an exhaustive one.

In conclusion, I desire to convey my grateful thanks to my friend and pupil S_j. Purnasashi Bose, B. Sc., for the constant service he has rendered to me in bringing out this—a service which I deem invaluable. My best thanks are also due to S_j. Suresh Chandra Chandra and S_j. Sailesh Chandra Chakrabarty.

PANCHABATI VILLA,
Manicktola, Calcutta.

June, 1914.

P. N. M.

1. *Fact as Continuum*

Existence for me at any moment is a tissue of continuous, undivided experience. It is a single pulse of Fact : not a configuration of distinct points, not a synthesis of separate elements. I may be wide awake, and the objective world may wholly or largely occupy me : I am witnessing, for example, the sullen array of a mass of clouds on the horizon. In the actual Fact of the moment—in the present pulse of existence,—all antitheses lie concealed, all theoretical distinctions are lost : me and not-me are confounded together, the subjective does not oppose the objective, feeling has not drawn itself apart from fact. I *am* the mass of clouds for the time being : the scene and its witness do *not* as yet sharply divide existence between themselves. The mass of clouds need not indeed exist at any moment for me as an absolutely homogeneous tissue, a fact presenting no internal diversity of features : it need not be a simple fact in the sense of being a barren, monotonous something. On the contrary, there may be endless varieties imbedded in that single tissue of fact, varieties of form, light and shade, and colour. While I am looking at the cloud, many of these features are certainly there in my perceptual fact of the moment, but they lie imbedded and swept together in a peculiar fashion : the cloud as it exists now for me is a 'complex' no doubt, but not a synthetic 'manifold' ; it is a continuum but not a configuration ; the oneness and continuity of the fact do not appear as over and above the separate points and features of the fact themselves ; the whole does not exist as the composition of the parts ; it is a complex unity and not a totality. Indeed it is a phenomenon in which the whole does not draw itself apart in contrast with its parts : a relation of the two aspects of a thing—the whole-aspect and the parts-aspect—which is readily appreciable in feeling, but not capable, from the very nature of the case, of verbal description. Thus the position of normal perception in regard to an objective fact is this :

The whole exists but is not differentiated in thought from the parts. The parts, or many of them, exist, but not differentiated in thought from the whole : what exists to my thought

may indeed develop into a whole *and* parts included in it : it is a primary stuff for all sorts of differentiations to begin ; but in the concrete fact of the moment I know nothing of a whole in relation to its parts—though the fact is undoubtedly one-in-many, I am actually attending to neither one-in-relation-to-many, nor many in-relation-to-one, and hence am not conscious of the distinction of one and many at all. So that the fact for me at this moment is either an indescribable 'unity' or an indescribable 'manifold' : if a name is to be given, I may propose this : **Undifferentiated complex continuum** or **Fact-Stuff**.

But are not the points and features in the fact-stuff itself sufficiently clearly discriminated from one another ? Undoubtedly ; without discrimination of some sort, the thing would not appear to me as a 'complex' at all. The different positions and features are discriminated, but in a peculiar way ; at a given moment it is a simultaneous discrimination of positions and features :—my attention seizing upon a number of varieties at once and not moving from point to point and feature to feature successively ; it is again a discrimination which is not expressible by a number of explicit judgements such as A is other than B, B is other than C, and so on. Thus, though a given point A is perhaps discriminated from all other points, it is not yet the subject or the object of an explicit act of judgement. It cannot be called nascent discrimination indeed, for each point or feature stands out boldly from the background so that its individuality can never be missed : shall we call it intuitive discrimination—a way of putting the thing which of course explains nothing, but which indicates nevertheless that the native constitution of a first-hand fact cannot be portrayed in the colours and symbols that may exist for analysis and reflections ?

While I am looking at the cloud, only some parts of the object are prominent in my mind : there are parts in it which have the greatest vividness and definiteness, *viz.*, the parts occupying the 'focus' of my attentive gaze ; but the whole content of my knowledge at this moment is not exhausted by these parts of strongest emphasis. Beyond these parts extends the outlying field of comparative inattention—perceptual zones which lose in

vividness and definiteness in proportion as they are removed from the centre of clearest apprehension. Let us call the psychic tone of two features in a total object of perception t and t' , and let us denote their distance from the focus of attention by d and d' respectively ; the other things being equal, we may say that $t : t' :: \frac{1}{d} : \frac{1}{d'}$. We have not materials ready at hand yet to apply the law of inverse square.

The reason for the above ratio is not far to seek. Subjective attention being one of the factors whose variations determine the variations in intensity, definiteness etc. of a fact for the mind, we may represent the relation between a fact (x) and the subjective attention bearing on it (a) by this equation (omitting the other factors) : $x = \phi(a)$. Clearly the different values of x will depend, among other things, upon the values of a . Taking the attending Ego as our origin, and Time and Space as our co-ordinate axes, we can almost graphically represent the curve of a perceptual fact ; or, we may propose other co-ordinates. Suppose the Ego's given point of view be 0 (origin), the amounts of attention put forth by the Ego be represented by the ordinate, and the distances from the given point of view by the abscissa. There may be yet other ways of representing and illustrating a phenomenon. The values of x depend upon those of a ; but the value of a in respect of a particular point depends, among other things, on the distance of that point from the point of view where for the time being a is being focussed. We may represent this relation also by another equation $a = \phi(d)$, where d stands for the distance of a particular point from the focus of attention. So that combining the two equations we get a third :-

$$x = \phi\{\phi(d)\}$$

This shows that the psychic tone of a point in a complex continuum of fact must depend upon its distance from the focus where attention is concentrated for the while. Attention varies from no attention (0) at the farthest limit of the field of view to greatest or right attention at the focus (say, $\frac{\pi}{2}$) : there are

points beyond which we do not attend, and one or more where we most attend. Attention, again, varies not by leaps and bounds, but by infinitesimal increments. Hence if a is $= \phi(d)$ at the farthest limit of the field, at the *next* nearer zone of the field it is $= \phi(d+h)$. And, therefore, regarding $d+rh$ as a variable a , we can represent the total amount of attention engaged in the field by this expression :

$$\left[\int_0^{\frac{\pi}{2}} \phi(a) da. \right]$$

This calculation of attention and psychic tone would be premature at this stage, were it not my purpose to get a picture of the fact-whole in precise outline. The almost imperceptible shading off of attention, and therefore of psychic tone, from the focus to the farthest limit of evanescence, is a circumstance that we cannot afford to lose sight of in understanding the relation in which, in normal and natural perception a sectional object stands to the entire object—the fact-part to the fact-whole. So far as normal and natural perception goes, the fact-whole is the one undivided fact before us : the more prominent parts are indeed in some way discriminated from the obscurer parts—the picture is certainly not a homogeneous whole for me.—but I do not certainly too oppose the one set to the other as separate terms of thought, have no thought of a centre of concentration *as distinguished from* the outlying margin of gradual diffusion : for me the two aspects co-exist, but not as terms of actual judgment ; as intuitive associates but not as logical correlatives. A Fact is a picture or a melody which the soul grasps as a whole and not piecemeal : it is a whole rich with colours and shades, tunes and breaks : but to the eye and ear of the soul neither the one nor the other is a *composition* of these : each is a pregnant whole of infinite promise—study and analysis may conjure up all conceivable things and relations out of it, but to intuition it is a standing perplexity of a whole, differentiated yet not differentiated, a confusion of aspects or categories which logical thought must sharply distinguish from one another. A Fact is a contradiction in itself—it is neither a simple whole,

nor a simple sum of parts, nor again a whole discriminated in thought from the parts : it is a whole-together-with-the parts where the logical relation of whole and part has not yet emerged in thought at all : there is apprehension but no judgment. I understand logic, but I do not understand Fact, though I live it, and even *be* it.

2. *Subject and Object fused together in the Fact-Stuff.*

The treatment of the fact-stuff is not complete yet, but to the consideration of the remaining two points I will devote a separate section. The Fact-stuff or the concrete fact of the moment is not merely an objective whole in which differentiations appear without being expressed in explicit acts of judgment : it is a stuff in which even the subject and object lie lumped together without logical discrimination, and it requires subsequent analysis to bring each into prominence relatively to the other. The subject is attending, he is bringing his mental context of the moment to bear upon the situation ; and this attention and subjective touch cannot but superimpose an inner construction upon the outer structure, whether these correspond to Kantian 'form' and 'matter' or not. There is no mysticism about such double nature of the fact-whole : it is clear to immediate perception. Will it be a full and adequate description of the cloud at which I am looking to produce a catalogue of merely its 'objective' characters ? Is it not an integral tissue into which my mental background and 'fringe' of the moment, my organic sensations—to name only the prominent factors—are curiously woven together ? To name the objective features alone is to set up an arbitrary wall of partition between two abstract segments of one concrete, natural whole. The concrete fact of the moment is a curious confusion of 'objective' features and 'subjective' affections and reactions, in which differences exist without logical distinctions. As hinted before, subsequent reflection may proceed to differentiate and integrate in all possible manners this presented fact-stuff, may rescue subjective elements in their confusion

with objective, stow apart feelings and processes into classes, and build psychology : but keeping the idea of 'confusion' sufficiently clear of the idea of dead, barren homogeneity, we may safely assert that the logical distinction of 'subjective' and 'objective' is not less impertinent to the nature of the concrete fact-whole than are the distinctions of 'whole and part', 'many and one'. This tissue of subjective and objective threads woven together into an actual, though a logical whole, will perhaps receive the recognition it merits after the appeal has been laid courageously at the door of unsophisticated intuition : curiously the recognition of Science has been the tardier the nearer home a truth goes to the warm precincts of life. In all normal tissues of perception in which the attention does not settle with too marked an emphasis on the outer features, whenever, that is to say, my sense-perception is easy and not disturbed by a too much concentration of tone at some points and a too slight diffusion over the rest, it is accurate psychology to note that a mass of my somatic sensations, particularly what Prof. James has called cephalic sensations, form as it were a starting zone of a peculiar 'warmth and intimacy' from and around which spread other successive belts or zones constituting in their intuitively discriminated—not logically—wholeness the complex objective picture. If, however, too keen an interest is awakened at the outskirts, and consequently, too busy an engagement of attention there, the starting basis of cephalic sensations may be very much obscured, its prominence very considerably put out : the converse may also conceivably be the case on some occasions—a too high prominence of the subjective nucleus at the expense of the outlying fields : but in all cases, whether normal or extreme, a mass of body-sensations do enter as a necessary datum into the constitution of a perceptual whole—and of every thought for the matter of that—which, whatever its fluctuations of intensity and definiteness, is never without them. This mass of body-feelings constitute the fundamental note which ushers, pervades and supports all Life's Song ; this is an origin from which extend the dimensions of attentive function, the direction and the magnitude of attention, so that the

quantitative constitution of a mental fact may be represented by an appropriate Cartesian graph.

[By 'quantitative constitution' of a fact I mean those features of a fact, *e.g.*, relative intensity, definiteness, etc., which admit of a quantitative comparison : for example, if I_1 and I_2 be the intensities of any two parts of a mental whole, their relative values can be indicated by differences of curvatures. Suppose the point P is at the focus of my attention ; if I represent the direction of P by a straight line OP , the direction of some other point of perceptual field, P , may be represented by another line OP , making an angle O with OP ; similarly the direction, with respect to the attention of the moment, of any point P^n may be represented in relation to the given straight line OP , if the vectorial angle θ be given. Now, clearly, attention varies inversely as the magnitude of the angle θ ; the remoter a point is from the focus, the less is the attention that it receives ; previously we have represented this relation by the equation $a=\phi(d)$, now we may represent it by $a=\phi(\theta)$. So far we have assumed the attentive energy put forth by the subject to remain constant, this remaining constant, the bestowal of attention on any point in a perceptual field (shall we say ideational field also?) is determined by the last equation. But attention is not a constant magnitude. The focus of attention without being shifted, the subject may vary his attentive energy : he may attend more intently or less even to the focus : the amounts of attention engaged at different moments need not be, and as a matter of fact, are not equal. Suppose we represent these various amounts by varying circular measurements of subjective activity : the maximum amount of attention at the disposal of the subject being denoted by a constant, $\frac{\pi}{2}$ (but is there a constant maximum for all subjects and for all circumstances ? We shall wait and see.), any attentive activity may be denoted by a fraction of this constant, say $\frac{\pi}{2n}$ where n is a finite positive integer. Hence the actual bestowal of attention on any point is determined not only by the equation $a=\phi(\theta)$, but by another, *viz.*,

$a = \phi \left(\frac{\pi}{2n} \right)$. Multiplying together the two equations and extracting square-roots we have,

$$a = \pm \sqrt{\phi(\theta)\bar{\phi}} \left(\frac{\pi}{2n} \right)$$

We shall see later on if any meaning can be attached to the double sign. In the meanwhile, let us represent this relation more simply by the equation $a = \phi(x, y)$. The value of a varies as the two variables, x and y , which we may, in the light of the foregoing explanation, call the direction-variable, and the magnitude-variable. The one may be regarded to remain constant while the other undergoes variation; the total amount of attention engaged remaining constant, the direction of a point P in the field may be supposed to vary; again, the direction of P remaining constant, the subject may go on increasing or decreasing his attention. Hence, taking differentiation, the relation between a and x and y may be represented by the following equation :

$$da = \frac{da}{dx} dx + \frac{da}{dy} dy.$$

That is to say, the total increment of actual attention is the sum of its partial increments, arising from the differentials of each of the variables, direction and magnitude, taken separately].

It is granted that a mass of subjective feelings—the chief among these being the cephalic—is interwoven into the texture of an objective fact as it is perceived by us : at the moment of actual feeling these home contributions are not indeed logically discriminated from the alien matters, but they are nevertheless there, and certainly not as unconscious or subconscious elements : also as already described before, the home *plus* alien factors constitute neither a simple manifold, nor a simple unity, nor again a logical unity in difference, nor even a continuum in which the home and alien factors have put on their respective badges or labels. To intuition such constitution is patent enough, but to understanding it is unutterable and inscrutable. Reason can say perhaps what it is not : intuition alone can reveal what it is.

The next question that we put to ourselves is this : What is the place of Time, Co-existence and Succession, in the constitution of the Fact-stuff? While I am intently gazing at the cloud, am I at all conscious of a present, a past and a future : do I actually think that this is a fact that has succeeded another in my mental life, that it is one that is changing *while* I am gazing at it, and it will be succeeded by another fact in the flow? Not at all ; unless it be the special case in which flow or succession is itself the theme of my study. In all normal, ordinary perceptions, there is no thought of time-dimensions at all ; it is analysis and abstraction to cut up a concrete fact-whole into successive fragments and to represent it as a series in time. It is certainly not 'radical empiricism' to split up thought into time-sections, to conceive of a series of pulses of thought where there exists, to immediate feeling, a single stretch of thought. If for five minutes I am looking at the cloud and have no explicit thought of time-relations, I must regard my cloud of five minute's duration as a single fact, and *not* as a series. It is a series to analysis and study, but not one to feeling. If for the whole of this afternoon I have not once thought of Time, my mental life, both perceptual and ideational, of this period must be taken as a single stretch of Fact-stuff : the series, the flow, stream lives in the psychologist, and not ordinarily in the fact. Nay more ; if a dog or a savage, has run his whole race of life without ever pausing to *think* of Time, his life-history is but one fact, and not series to him : it would be a series if he woke up a psychologist one fine morning ; but one need not be a psychologist to live and even to feel.

I will go even farther than this. When time-relations do enter my thought and I am distinctly conceiving my experience as a flow or a process of evolution, the experience is a single tissue of fact and not a series : the circumstance that it is conceived as a series does not make *it* a series : in its presentation the whole experience is a curious confusion of a variety of strange elements : the subjective and objective factors are there without being logically discriminated, time-relations may be there but not being logically discriminated either, and not

therefore constituting the experience to be a presented series : all are lumped together, all features and relations are interwoven together, and it is to the eye of representative conception that the affair assumes the aspect of a change in time. Suppose I feel thus : A after B, B after C, C after D, and so on. Is the actual experience as presented to me a series consisting of the terms A after B, &c. ? Do new facts continuously appear and disappear, and is the experience intuitively presentable as a sum ? Does not the entire experience, consisting as it does of a number of terms, come home to my intuition as a single stretch of fact which conception must take to pieces but which in itself refuses to accommodate all logical categories ?

The interest in life is more usually a practical than a theoretical one, and it is only at intervals that I pull myself up from the warm tissue of facts, hold the probing and dissecting knife and turn a cold psychologist. It is only at these rare moments that life yields itself up to logical construction, things and relations fall apart from one another, and facts appear arranged in the perspective of history, of a temporal scheme. During the whole of this morning such occasions have but rarely come, and though writing at my desk now I recall the past and necessarily conceive it as a flow, in the warm experience itself there was surely nothing to suggest such a construction, and my impression of it is this : The experience in question is undoubtedly a fact in time, if we mean by this absolute, objective time; in my psychological review at the present moment it is undoubtedly and necessarily a fact in time, a flow, or even perhaps a series. But in itself, so long as it is warm and immediately served, my soul is full of the feast spread before it. I *am* the experience and not a measurer of it, my life is simply one Fact and not a conscious summation and composition of discrete fragments ; time is a form that yet lies idle in the armoury of logic, the subject is not yet a nucleus that has pronounced itself out of the confused whole of the experience mass.

But a last and a more formidable question still remains. While all elements lie huddled together in the original mass of experience, do not the Subject, the Ego, sufficiently clearly

distinguish itself from the mass which it regards as its Objects? I am not enquiring about the subjective affections which are certainly interwoven into the tissue of experience-whole; but is there not a self-distinguishing Subject—while all are lost in the general confusion, do I not myself stand aloof as an onlooker, an witness and is not this circumstance the very possibility of the 'objectivity' of the experience? In this way, at any rate, it may be claimed that experience is a logical duality, a conscious and articulate subject-object-interaction. But is it a logical duality yet, an articulate subject-object-stress? Logical duality is certainly necessary to make an 'Object' of the given experience, but is it necessary that an experience must become a full-fledged 'Object' in order to be experienced? Experience itself is neither, ordinarily at any rate, objective or subjective: this logical distinction is not at all pertinent to its intuitive nature. So that alleged logical necessity for a self-distinguishing subject vanishes; if experience is not yet an 'object', why must we drag in a 'Subject' to do an hypothetical office that is wholly premature in intuition? This *a priori* ground apart, the actual constitution of this fact itself has nothing to show that even this logical distinction of subject and object has a place in it. While I am witnessing the stealthy process of the cloud, I have become the cloud, and am not certainly a subject discriminating myself from the cloud; at a given moment of perception my entire attentive consciousness is taken up by one fact and not two. I think it is experimentally impossible to attend to, and become aware of both the attended object and the attending subject at one and the same point of time. Actual experiment seems to prove conclusively that while I am attending to O (object), the subject, S, has retired to the background of consciousness: parts of O itself have indeed various shades of attention and awareness cast over them, but the attending subject, S, seems to retire completely from the field for the moment: here at any rate the law of physical impenetrability wholly applies O can occupy consciousness at any moment only by displacing S for that moment and *vice versa*. My consciousness at any moment can be represented

by either of the two equations $C = O$, or $C = S$, but not certainly by the equation $C = O + S$. O and S must have each the whole of my attentive consciousness or not at all. How then does the familiar relation of subject and object emerge into consciousness at all? How do I come to know that there is the Ego attending to and apprehending its objects? For such knowledge two distinct operations have to be gone through; attention or consciousness must oscillate between S and O , as it actually does in immediate perception; there must then succeed a new thought—conceptual and **not** perceptual—which embraces S and O both, and regards the one in relation to the other. **Oscillation** is the rule of immediate feeling, as unprejudiced experiment will, I believe, conclusively show. When I am regarding the cloud for some time, and have not my attention bound too exclusively and jealously by the spectacle, my consciousness seems to oscillate, more or less rapidly, between the attending self in me and the cloud: now it is *wholly* the object, then it is *wholly* the subject, and then it springs back to the object; the entire process is positively an oscillation. Simple, natural feeling is thus essentially a unity: life can play but one part at a time: duality or plurality is an after-thought: Fact is one, though universe may be a 'pluralistic' scheme.

Thought-oscillation is a topic to which I will presently return. So far my study of the concrete fact of perception has disclosed these features:

To intuition Fact is a curiously complex one, and not a manifold, a synthesis: even while the fact is being conceived as an actual configuration of distinct points or features, the thought is one and not a sum-thought of a many and a sum is a unity and a whole, the idea of a configuration is not a configuration, the thought of a series is not a series.

In the *first* place, a fact may present a differentiation of parts and features within itself, but these parts and features though apprehended in the presentation of the fact are certainly not expressed either as subjects or objects of actual judgements: the whole is taken not as the correlate of its parts

nor are the parts taken constituting the whole : both co-exist in the thought without being thought as a *both*: 'forms' and 'categories' meet in the fact without surprizing or recognizing one another. Does not the meanest thing in the universe thus carry a thought too deep already for philosophy?

In the *second* place, the differentiation of a vivid zone in perception from outlying zones of vanishing psychic tone, the seizing upon merely the crest of the wave of fact as distinguished from the wave as a whole, the noting of the definite outlines of a picture in contrast with a more or less blurred background, is a feat which is immature in warm, actual feeling : a zone, crest or picture so differentiated is a sectional object that has become cold and abstract : in the warm living tissue of feeling the field, wave or the picture exists in its immediate entireness, and not as a composite phenomenon in which different kinds and degrees of tone are logically discriminated : if at the present moment the sky presents to me a certain aspect, I cannot break up this whole aspect into discrete parts of varying quality and vividness, and regard my total object of the moment as the synthesis of these partial objects. In life which is selective and pragmatic, I may think and speak of an object as though it were equivalent to those portions of a feeling-continuum upon which my attentive effort has been most expanded, and which therefore stand out in boldest relief : the whole does not interest me, only a part perhaps does : thought therefore selects the part which it likes and requires and fancies *this* is the whole object for it : the natural setting and background of this little, partial, pragmatic object it silently ignores and wisely too. But the natural setting, the larger and fuller object exists, whether or not I would like to recognise its overlapping or even sustaining presence : Nature cannot fashion existence to suit my pigmy purposes. So it is a convenient illusion to forget the whole, and to live snug and complacent in a little slice : but the fact is the whole and not the slice : at any moment I am considerably vaster and deeper than what I require and persuade myself to be : thought is an wave whose lighted crest alone appears to dazzle and arrest my introspection : life is lavish of its presents though I would fain build a

little worm-world to live in and regard existence far too easily. This is how reality and creation are mistaken for each other : the partial, abstract, pragmatic object silently steps into the place of the entire, concrete, real object : I look almost aghast when I am told that my actual fact is wider and deeper than what I myself believe it to be : the fuller acquaintance of the fact puzzles or even astounds me : truth really appears as stranger than fiction. But all the same, I must scrupulously cling to the native constitution of the fact when it is my very purpose to know it as it comes, and lay aside for a moment all practical motives for its manipulation. Now, in its native constitution, the obscurer vistas of a perceptual field, the outskirts of a fact as distinguished from the central positions, do not certainly draw themselves apart in thought and become a term of logical discrimination : the consciousness of the moment is entire and not parcelled out among a multitude of configured points.

In the *third* place, the simplicity of a given experience is not impaired by the fact that analysis may reveal in its constitution several elements which have a subjective character along with others that are regarded as objective. That massive organic sensations, and particularly cephalic sensations, enter as constituent factors into the given experience, is a fact that ought to be patent to clear inspection : the given experience is undoubtedly a mass into which these feelings pour themselves, and the so-called objective features lie blended together with the so-called subjective : the discrimination of features wearing different badges is an after-thought. As before, a sectional, abstract experience is tacitly allowed to displace the entire, concrete experience of the moment : experience is made to order, is fashioned according to practical ends. Life is ordinarily swayed by such ends, and is not particularly solicitous about truths *as* they come : even facts are to me as I want them to be, I *know* as I *wish* to.

In the *fourth* place, the given experience is a fact that may involve both the dimensions of Space and Time : it is a configuration and it is also perhaps a series : but as we have seen, an experience regarding a configuration and a series need not be, and actually is not, a configuration and a series itself. The

Thought of 'A' after B' is not a thought of B followed by a thought of A, nor is the thought 'A together with B' a thought of A by the side of a thought of B : all this is now accepted psychology. I will go farther than this : When I am looking at a patch of cloud, my object is undoubtedly an extended something, and extension is certainly an aspect of my experience ; but do I actually discriminate this extension as a separate term or element of thought ? While undoubtedly experiencing Space directly, do I explicitly make either a logical object or subject of Space ? No ; Space is there without, however, drawing itself apart in thought ; into the same continuous mass it is blown as contains in logical confusion all conceivable matters for future elaboration and classification : on the bosom of the same mother-stuff they lie asleep, oblivious of each other's presence, to wake up in the light of Reason possibly as friends or foes ! Time again is lost even more completely than Space in the slumber of birth on the lap of experience. A patch of cloud is nothing if it is not an extended something ; Space is immediately given in *sense-experientiae*. But where is Time in my perception of the cloud ? At a given moment there is surely no thought of moment—I do not take my experience in time directions at all : the fact is not woven into a temporal scheme yet. A flood of genial sunshine has burst forth upon Nature, and my cloud is now swimming on the celestial flood like an angel on wings regarding with silent awe the Creator's masterpiece—the Earth ! Now, where is Time in this enchanting sight ? The fact no doubt exists in Time, and in reviewing and reproducing the fact I have no doubt dealt in tenses too ; but in the warm living experience as it comes and lasts, am I not completely lost—is not my whole being taken up by the scene before me—and *am* I not the scene for the moment ? The fact possesses me, I have not sufficiently roused myself to possess the fact and fashion it to my ends : the first possession is too unpremeditated and too complete to allow my own forces to bestir themselves—the forces of Understanding, that is to say, logical forms and categories. Time is nowhere in this first possession, it appears in the reaction of the self. Such absorp-

tion of my being in the Fact, the whole fact as it lives and not a mere cross-section of it, is not very happily expressed by calling the fact a 'presentation': a fact is my being actually lived: in the original its nature is unspeakably apprehensible. Even when my experience relates to a change in Time, a progress, a flow, the immediate experience is not a fact explicitly embodying a thought of time; feeling changes but it usually changes without ever thinking of time—though idea of Time is as much necessary for a conception of the change as the idea of Space is for an act of spatial imagination. As I have suggested before, the plan of cutting up the flow and stretch of mental life into temporal and spatial points and tracts is nothing short of an outrage on the 'original' of experience: life works and mind thinks precisely upon such an outrage, but the original, the stuff, is for me a continuous mass of thinking, feeling and active awareness, and while Philosophy is lost in her reverie of mental atoms, their configurations and displacements, existence glides smoothly and unconcernedly on, and when rubbing my eyes I regard it with a steadfast and courageous look, it is all unutterable mystery.

In the *fifth* place, the fact is not yet opposed to a self-distinguishing Subject: the original is neither subject nor object of any judgement simultaneous with it: it is not an object yet, it is simply a fact. The unity of the fact is not destroyed by the introduction of the logical polarity of Subject and Object: even then thought oscillates between the two poles—now it is *wholly* the one and then it is *wholly* the other.

The unity, simplicity, massiveness and mystery of a given experience or fact-stuff are the characters that we now recognise: the fact-stuff is the datum from and upon which our thought's construction begins. There are three broad landmarks in this constructive work. In the meanwhile we note that the immediately given Fact, the original and concrete as distinguished from the treated and conceived facts, comes nearer to the Absolute, if there be any than any of our precious, imperious notions and conceptions.

Truth is at home with Experience. (1).

3. *Treatment of the Fact-Stuff*

The important distinction between the concrete fact-whole and that part of the whole which particularly receives most regard and therefore attains to greatest prominence, has been already noted. At some portions of the experience-continuum, there is a concentration of psychic tone, while over the rest the diffusion of consciousness is slight. These latter tracts are not actually below the threshold of consciousness, however. They are integral parts of the total experience quite as well as the favoured zone: the nucleus alone is not certainly the concrete experience of the moment. If we graphically represent a fact by a curve, the favoured zone or the tract of strongest psychic relief will have to be represented by the maximum positions of the curve. [Thus: Let the extensity or massiveness of an experience be represented by the axis of x , and the psychic tone of the experience by the axis of y . Then, appropriately, we regard our experience as a curve represented by the equation $y = \phi(x)$; Assuming the curve to be continuous within certain assigned limits, we see that any increment or change in x (say, Δx), will occasion a corresponding increment (say, Δy) in the dependent variable, y . Psychologically interpreted, any point or feature in a massive experience has its own definite place in the mass: the relative positions of all points in the experience are definitely given, so that if we graphically represent the *mass* of an experience, its extensity that is to say, by a straight line simply (this is an abstract representation though—a line having a single spatial dimension, and a mass of experience having at least more than one dimension) different points of the given experience will have their different abscissae along this line. Now, since the psychic tone of a point in the experience-continuum depends, among other things, upon the relative position of that point in the continuum, we see how any value assigned to x will determine the value of y , and also how an increment in the value of x will occasion a corresponding increment in the value of y . If P be any point in the continuum whose relative position is represented by x -length measured from an origin, the psychic tone of P will have a value corres-

ponding to x , and may be represented by y -length measured from the origin. The ratio of the corresponding changes in the value of x and y will be, according to the usual notation, $\frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x}$ or $\frac{\phi(x+\Delta x)-\phi(x)}{\Delta x}$. And we have the true and precise measure of the rapidity with which psychic tone $\{y$ or $\phi(x)\}$ varies when the relative position of a given point in the continuum is made to vary from an assigned value, by taking the limit of the ratio, or by reducing Δx to an infinitely small value, by $\frac{dy}{dx}$, that is to say. Now suppose x increases continuously, and in consequence of this increase $\phi(x)$ also increases through any finite interval however small, and this increase of $\phi(x)$ or psychic tone continues until $x=a$, or a point in the continuum of experience reaches a certain relative position; but after this position of x , the psychic tone decreases; the value $x=a$, represents the limit where psychic tone ceases to increase further and begins to decrease; then, $\phi(a)$ will have to be regarded as the maximum value of $\phi(x)$. In other words, $y=\phi(a)$, where a is a certain value assigned to x , gives us a point of maximum psychic tone in the given continuum of experience]

What we have so far regarded as a mathematical point may in our case be a small zone or tract of strongest emphasis. This small tract is marked off from the rest of the field by a much greater concentration of vividness or tone over it; it is a part of the whole which really interests me at the moment. It is that part of the given whole which I require to accept and possess, the rest, though undoubtedly given in the experience, I dismiss with hardly any notice. Thus my knowledge is essentially practical and selective, it refuses to be encumbered with massiveness of concrete experience; experience is too large for its ends. It is these favoured tracts of experiences, the features of greatest interest and tone, which come up as materials for ideational processes. How much wealth of living experience is silently buried and lost! I fancy I am regarding a particular rock while the experience of the moment has really ushered a whole landscape into my consciousness: everything except the rock in the

sublime landscape has now retreated to the wilderness and is not the least cared for. The magnificence of clear, starry heavens may dwindle down at a given instant to the shy, twinkling lustre of an obscure star in my attentive and searching look. The tranquil majesty of a sunny sea may shrink in my regard to the weird flutter of the wings of a solitary sea-gull against the pensive azure sky. Do I not often similarly localize and specify in a vague massive subjective mood with which my whole being is for a moment completely overcast? When, for example, a profound unrest has seized upon me, where is its full import and bearing, as I proceed to define, name, classify and explain it? Experience, whether emotional or presentative, immediate or ideational, bursts in my soul like a flood of music surging in unmeasured sweep: I cannot refuse it admittance. I cannot even mistake it—it is here and there and everywhere, and it has cast my being into its own mould for a while. But I think and act as though a few prominent notes in the music were all: I assume for my object not the concrete whole experience of the moment, but only that portion of it which happens to bind my interest and engage my focus of attention. Thus, the practical object is silently allowed to displace the real object, not indeed in actual experience but in idea and speech. I say 'I see a rock', or 'I hear a note', or 'I have an headache': all this may be a convenient and practical way of putting things. But such conceptions or descriptions do not go home to living mass of experience itself: to get at it I must keep back motives. To live in the light of truth I must come out and surrender myself, and must not pretend to study it through an aperture in the soul's window. We have thus far known the first natural treatment of the fact-stuff: I may call it practical or **pragmatic fact**.

Experience, as I pretend to know it, is a chosen and self-determined fact. (2).

The treatment of the fact-stuff after this first stage is readily recognised. Here we have first the exploration and differentiation of the experience-continuum by movements of attention—the vaguely apprehended field is made to yield definite presentations by the incidence of the search-light of attention upon diffe-

rent portions of it successively. Such progressive rising and sinking of points in the continuum, the appearance and disappearance of different features on the summit of highest psychic tone, constitute what we may call the differentiation of the given stuff. It is the resolution of the fact-stuff into a multitude of pragmatic facts. If $P_1, P_2, P_3 \dots$ are the points which successively thus emerge into clearest consciousness, the experience, E , is not ordinarily taken as $P_1 + P_2 + P_3 \dots$. At a given instant, experience does not lose its unity and massiveness by such differentiation. At each point of time, experience is integral with its emphasis or accentuation laid on a particular point, P_1 , or P_2 , or P_3 . When I am exploring the starry firmament with unaided vision or with the telescope, now I have an experience of a considerable tract of celestial space with my consciousness concentrating at a particular star, and then a massive celestial view also with its emphasis shifted to another star, and so on. At no time, therefore, the mass or whole really ceases to exist : never is the pragmatic, chosen fact complete and sufficient by itself. If we represent an experience emphasised at P_1 by the symbol $[E]_{t_1}^{P_1}$, where t_1 stands for a given instant, then our successive experiences are clearly

$$[E]_{t_1}^{P_1}, [E]_{t_2}^{P_2}, [E]_{t_3}^{P_3}, \dots [E]_{t_n}^{P_n};$$

experience should not be ordinarily expressed by the equation $E = SP_n$, or the sum of the points that have been differentiated; nor can it be proper to represent experience by the following equation :

$Et_n = P_1 + P_2 + P_3 + \dots + P_n$ + the mass not yet differentiated. That is to say, experience at the n th moment of differentiation is not equivalent to the sum of the successively emphasised points plus the mass which still remains untreated or undifferentiated. The emphasis of a moment is practically complete at one point, so that there is little or no division of strongest emphasis among the points in a mass; hence, we cannot express an experience as the sum of several especially emphasised points, as we wanted to do in the last equation. n different points might have been differentiated in n different moments; but certainly all

these points do not retain their emphasis at the *nth*. instant ; as one point rises another sets-while the present point is ascendant, the past points have sunk more or less completely. Therefore, at each instant, experience is an undivided mass with its strongest stress laid on a small tract or feature, even though the experience may have been already treated for some time. I do not suggest, however, that a previous emphasis or emphasised point has nothing to do with a subsequent emphasis or emphasised point, that it does not matter whether an experience is being treated for the first time or has already been treated for some successive instants. Let us put the question more definitely :

Let the experience of the moment t_n be $[E]_{t_n}^P$ where P_n is the especially emphasised point ; now, will this experience be what it is if it has not $[E]_{t_{n-1}}^{P_{n-1}}$ & C, as its forerunners ? Is an experi-

ence independent of its antecedent states or forms ? I have one form of experience *after* several forms : I have a view of the firmament especially emphasised at the star Sirius after I have already searched the heavens for other bodies. I turn to it *after* I have already seen others : would my experience now—when especially referred to Sirius—be what it actually is if I were to *begin* my study of the heavens-to-night with Sirius ? Certainly not ; a subsequent experience is undoubtedly affected or tinged by a previous one : experiences are not dealt out to us, cut and dry and hide-bound. That a previous experience should penetrate and fuse in some way into a subsequent experience is indeed a condition that seems to be required by brain-dynamics ; psychology may pretend to fashion for us cut and dry, discrete mental facts, but in the highly unstable brain centres molecular commotions cannot be made to appear and disappear at a moment's notice, and irrespectively of the laws of motion and persistence. As it is, a future fact in appearing can never expect to find the stage completely deserted, lulled into profound stillness ; the stage is lively with the unmistakable echoes of the scene just played out, the present is full of the romance of the past. But the echoes of the past mingle with the thrills of the

music that now holds the stage, the romance of the by-gone settles as a halo about the living present. The past though projecting itself into the present, cannot keep itself distinct from the present : my experience now is quite as undivided a mass as it would be if it knew not a past at all. So experience, though undoubtedly tinged with the complexion of the past, does not consciously discriminate between what it brings itself and what it owes to its usherer, the legacy of the past. Experience is a whole whatever complexion it may take on and however diversely it may be constituted. We note, however, that the growth of experiences, each undivided and massive in itself, by the shifting of emphasis successively on different points by movements of attention, constitutes what I should call the *perceptual* treatment of experience. The original experience with a given pragmatic fact, and the successive experiences, each with its own pragmatic nucleus, developed by attentive movements, give us the two stages of this *primary* or *perceptual* treatment.

There is one aspect of perceptual treatment which should not, however, be overlooked. A fullgrown perception seems undeniably to involve thought-oscillation. There appears to be little or no oscillation in the original continuum. As I look at the mass of sombre clouds that linger over Heaven's brow like a pale cast of thought, my feeling of the moment appears to be quite lulled by the enchantment of its object : it is calm and complacent like the scene it enjoys. For a moment there is no unrest in the bosom of the feeling, no stir and flutter of exploring attention : immediate experience of a given instant is a state of mental equilibrium ; for one moment the algebraic sum of all tensions is evanescent. All ordinary experience is a phase in a process of change—such at least is the construction which the thinker necessarily puts upon it : each point or phase in the flow, therefore, is preceded by movements of feelings and ideas and is succeeded by them ; but each palpably definite point or phase represents a position of momentary rest, a 'substantive part' in the ceaseless flux and transition of mental life, a place where the perpetual wanderer halts and takes breath and a moment's respite. Like a restless bird flying from tree to tree and branch

to branch, thought perches for a while on a given experience ; and it is those portions of the continuum, upon which thought has rested thus for a little while in its endless migration, that constitute the 'substantive' parts of experience floating in the relatively impalpable but continuous fluid of mental life. Thus my cloud now represents in my life-history a stage of momentary rest, a temporary satisfaction of thought's eternal quest. If I may be permitted to employ such scientific terms as 'disturbance' and 'displacement' in this connexion, I may say that experience in time, essentially in the nature of a disturbance, involves the displacement of the attention-focus or regard-point over a given continuum : this is no less true when I am startled in my reverie by a clap of thunder than when I am following with rapt interest the silver lining of a brooding sable cloud : there is no more essential breach of continuity in the first case than in the second. But this displacement, it must be noted, has no uniform rate and manner ; it is only a displacement from *one* given place to *another*, where each has sufficient duration and definiteness to be looked upon as an individual centre of regard, a place of tolerable substantive coherence and mental pause. The centre of regard, the substantive part, of a given experience should not, however, be mistaken for the whole experience of that moment : the whole experience is larger than its substantive part. Now, where do we feel the displacement of regard ? First, within a given field of experience, my regard may move from part to part and feature to feature : each substantive part in it presupposes a previous displacement of regard and becomes the starting point of a subsequent displacement : each, however, is a place of momentary rest. It is not the point only on which my thought reposes for a moment, but the whole experience especially emphasised at the point at that moment. Using the old symbols I may say that what my regard momentarily rests on is $[E]_1^{P_1}$ or $[E]_2^{P_2}$, etc., and not simply P_1 or P_2 , etc. There is displacement from the former whole to the latter. It is by such displacements that the given experience-stuff, E , is elaborated or as I have put it, perceptually treated. When E becomes an object of regard for some time,⁽¹⁾

this displacement may take the definite form of an oscillation : oscillation of regard between the thinking subject and the object apprehended, and between the different points P_1, P_2, \dots of the object itself (note that E or experience-whole is a mass in which the subjective and objective elements are both included.) : the oscillation is *within* the given experience. The angle and period of oscillation are not constant features : there are moments in my life-history when my regard seems to move with leaps and bounds over a given continuum, and when the displacement is brisk ; there are moments also when thought appears to slide up and down a minute arc, and when displacement is slow and dull. Thus though E may grow through such oscillation, any concrete, coherent state of it, say, $[F]_{t_n}^{P_n}$, is statical. By 'concrete state' I mean a mass of experience especially emphasised at a given point at a given moment ; also an experience especially concerning a change of emphasis from one point to another : the feeling of object as well as the feeling of process or transition. By adding the epithet 'coherent' I seek to distinguish the former from the latter ; though to describe a coherent experience—an experience coherent about a nucleus and to mark it down as statical are practically the same operation.

Secondly, if we represent the total experiences of two moments when they are substantially different—e. g. the vision of a cloud and the thought of the famous soliloquy in Hamlet—by E_a and E_b , there is a clear feeling of displacement when my regard moves from the one to the other. In the flow of mental life it is these fairly articulate and collected experiences, E_a, E_b, \dots , which are taken as mental facts, or rather the pragmatic facts within them that are so taken. The transition from one to the other, the extremely delicate phenomenon of the one's fall and the other's rise, is not without its equivalent in feeling : the process affects us as the object does ; we feel the displacement as we feel the momentary pause after it. But the object concerns us while the process usually does not ; hence the pragmatic thought takes experience piecemeal, and regards the facts of mental life as discrete. But feeling is continuous ; life is not

an addition of separate facts, but a flow with no uniform motion, however. Like a point moving and describing a continuous curve my regard travels, with frequent stops, with a varying rate of displacement. It may skip over a few objective points, may with one leap proceed from P_m to P_n in a given continuum, but this leap is yet a subjective affection, is a distinct, thought not logically discriminated, feeling-quantity : so that, in the period when I am concerned with P_m and P_n , my total subjective state cannot be expressed by either of the following equations :

$$S(\text{total state}) = P_m + P_n,$$

$$S = [E]_{t_m}^{P_m} + [E]_{t_n}^{P_n}.$$

If α be the nature as well as directed magnitude (vector quantity) of the feeling incidental to the transition from P_m to P_n , then we have $S = [E]_{t_m}^{P_m} + \alpha + [E]_{t_n}^{P_n}$.

Even this is, however, experience as represented in reflection the summation and equation pertain to my *idea* of experience and not to the given fact of consciousness. It will be profitable to sum up at this stage the results we have so far got regarding thought-displacement (or thought-oscillation which is a special and interesting form of it).

4. Fact Quiescence

I have represented a given, direct experience, a perceptual fact, by the symbol $[e]_{t_n}^{P_n}$. It is a mass of single experience especially emphasised at the point or feature P_n at the moment t_n . Clearly such a fact need not be confined to sense-experiences alone : the cloud I am looking at, the emotion that I may feel, or even the idea that I may conceive may all, under certain conditions, be direct experiences : an idea is an indirect experience in relation to an impression, but it is direct when our interest and reference do not go farther than the idea itself. Now, I wish to note the

peculiar repose or quiescence of direct experience. Assuming this experience to be an experience of the *first order*—and assumption consisting with its description as fact-stuff—I may simplify the symbol as e_1 . All thought starts from e_1 , and has a tendency to culminate in e_1 . Experience of the first order is the destiny and satisfaction of all mental life : conscious life is an endless striving after the actual and real. Ideas play between one impression and another : the flash of lightning passes from one cloud to another. Ideas press forward to materialize themselves, bid for and are satisfied in their objects, problems hunt about for their solutions, and hopes and queries grope for their fulfilment. Now, what appears to distinguish e_1 from experiences of subsequent orders is mainly its calm and repose and their unrest and tension.

The repose and tension of a mental fact are simple feelings and matters for direct introspection : there is a fact which appears to be momentarily satisfied with itself, it may forthwith become a new centre of psychic disturbance, a new basis for mental elaboration ; but for a moment it is a place where my regard pauses, and at least a considerable part of the stress and tension of mental life is removed. When I compare an idea with its impression, a hope with its fulfilment, a motive with its satisfaction, a question with its answer, I think I feel the repose and quiescence of one fact as distinguished from the stress and tension of another. Let me assume that there is a level or plane in mental life where all tensions vanish or become infinitely small : by 'tension' I refer to the peculiar agitation which characterizes an idea pressing for an impression—when the idea itself is the object of my regard, it is a quiescent fact—it is a distinct state of conscious disturbance. Let me assume also that all mental facts which are removed from this level of evanescent tensions, have tendencies to this level in the ratio of their distances from it. Thus if T be the tendency of a mental fact to the quiescent level, and R its distance from it, we have its tension expressed by the equation $T=f(R)$. Now, what is the distance of a mental fact from the quiescent level ? Suppose I have a bare consciousness of *this* or *that* without any

further determination : a kind of awareness with which we are familiar and which is expressible only by such ejaculations as 'lo !'. In such awareness there is evidently a relaxation of tensions which is not ordinarily approached in normal experience ; perhaps the relaxation is still more complete in the space of time when I am *just* going to sleep, when I am in the interesting borderland between waking and sleeping, when most of the sense-impressions have vanished and dreams have not yet appeared, a similar experience also possesses me when I am *just* going to be awake, in the twilight between the retreating night of sleep and the dawning day of wakefulness, when the cobweb of dreams has disappeared, and the solicitations of the external world are not yet answered. I shall not pause to enquire whether the removal of tensions in these experiences is absolutely complete or not, or whether the algebraic sum of the tensions is zero or not. In the sequel I shall have occasion to return to the absolute case or cases. Meanwhile, it is clear that in the experiences *immediately* preceding and succeeding sleep we have the nearest approximation—barring of course possible cases of still closer approximation in pathological and other abnormal experiences—to the state of absolute removal of tensions. Thus if we denote the experience of absolute relaxation, the hypothetical state, by the symbol e_0 or e simply, these last-named states may be represented by e_1 ,—so that I now put a somewhat different construction on this symbol (I have used it recently for any given, direct experience). Next compare this e_1 , with the bare consciousness of *this* or *that*. We miss in this the complete or almost complete relaxation of e . There is here indeed a minimum of determination ; but even this slight determination of 'this' or 'that' certainly induces a distinct consciousness of tension : to determine consciousness or awareness by any mode or form whatever is to put a strain upon it. Should there be any such state as mere consciousness or pure awareness, without any determination, we might expect it to be a state of complete quiescence, a condition of no strain or tension. Put the slightest construction upon it, make it even a consciousness of bare *this* or *that*, and you introduce a feeling of strain or tension. Every

determination or form makes experience a *directed* magnitude, a vector, if I may be permitted to say so : consciousness or attention assumes a direction, a special reference ; and surely it is not possible to direct and refer in a special way without inducing a characteristic feeling of strain or tension. Whoever has attended has known this characteristic feeling : whether the conditions be physiological or psychological, the feeling is unmistakable.

I may compare pure consciousness—if of course this is not mythical—and even e_1 to an equipotential surface of electrical distribution. There is no difference of potentials between any two points, A and B, over this surface : it is a stretch of consciousness in which there is apparently no sensible diversity of features, no preference, no differential incidence of subjective regard. Like the equipotential surface, such consciousness is also quiescent. To have a flow over this surface, we must have a difference of potentials between any two points, A and B, represented by $V_A - V_B$; similarly, to have a reference, a direction, a movement of attention, I must have determination or determinations in my total experience of the moment, in the given mass of consciousness. For this at least a single determination must be there : this will have a psychic potential higher than the rest of the mass—the whole mass is undoubtedly larger than the determination or determinations that may there be in it ; $[e]_{t_n}^{P_n}$ is larger than P_n ; consciousness or attention—I am using the terms indifferently for the present—is evenly distributed when experience is homogeneous, without determination ; the result is repose and no tension ; if however the slightest stress or emphasis is laid on any point in the mass, its psychic homogeneity goes, and with it the impartial distribution of attention ; and there is induced a peculiar feeling of tendency, of direction and reference, briefly, a consciousness of commotion and disturbance which is the more pronounced the higher goes up the psychic potential (if I may use this suggestive expression) of a point in the mass relatively to the rest of the mass. Pressure in Hydrostatics and temperature in Thermodynamics play the

same part as potential in Electricity ; we might therefore go in for this instructive analogy to the other sciences. All the same, to keep pace with the scientific conception of Potential, I may define my **Psychic Potential** thus :

It is the feeling of tension that would be experienced by the Subject in bringing an unit of attention (as attention is a variable quantity, or even a vector quantity, I may pertinently speak of an unit) from a state of experience where the potential is zero—or to avoid the word 'potential' in the definition—from a pure consciousness of bare existence to the point, feature or state whose potential we are defining.

I will devote a future section to this psychic Potential. In the meanwhile, it is instructive to compare, with subsequent phases of experience in point of repose and quiescence. Whenever experience is a directed magnitude, with a particular reference and determination, it is a consciousness of tendency and disturbance : this is a fundamental proposition of the science of experience of which clear introspection ought to establish. Further : the more is an experience removed from the level of least or no tension—let us assume e_1 for the present to be such a level—the greater is the consciousness of tendency and disturbance accompanying it : this law does not apparently quite consist with the law of *inverse* square which governs the behaviour of physical forces. Now, the varying order of disturbance is sufficiently clearly indicated in our normal experience. Thus : Taking the experience of *just* falling asleep and *just* awaking as the starting level of minimum of *tension* and disturbance, the bare consciousness of *this* or *that* comes next in descending order of quiescence or ascending order of disturbance. Next comes any steady sense-experience, e.g., my experience as I am gazing intently at the cloud. When experience involves continuous movement of regard, as when I am following with eye a moving object, or exploring a given field, or noting a changing feeling, it becomes farther removed from the state of quiescence, and shows of course greater disturbance and tension. A mental image or picture is on the whole an experience of still greater *tension*, though the fact is not quite

apparent to reflection. Is an unsteady sense-experience like the one just described more quiescent than the calm, abiding image, for example, the image of the face of a departed friend ? Is the experience of an anxious, breathless chase more peaceful than the forming, settling image of a Sorting Demon in the brain of a Clark Maxwell, or the image of the Ocean of primordial nebula in the mind of a Kant ?

A full discussion over this question I must now defer ; but I may be allowed to indicate that a direct experience, an experience bound up with the apprehension of reality, appears to possess, in spite of all commotion within itself, a character of abiding quiescence to which no indirect, second-hand experience, not connected with the perception of reality, can lay claim, however calm and collected it may be within itself. As we shall see, it is the peculiar quiescence of the former which makes it a ready index of reality, and it is the peculiar unrest and tension of the latter which makes it an equally ready disclaimer of reality. I do not allude merely to the relative permanence and independence of the former—characters well-recognised in the science of Mind. However tranquil an aspect an idea may wear, it is secretly nervous and fatally moved by an yearning. Somehow I cannot close with an idea : it is perhaps too thin to sustain my interest : I must press forward to denser stuff. An idea carries with it a consciousness of something wanting, something that remains to be told and given. Like an echo and a shade it awakens in the mind an enquiry, an yearning after something more, and thus fills it with a consciousness of incompleteness and tension. An idea is a symbol that longs for its meaning in fact, a problem that awaits its solution in the verities of existence. This inward reference of an idea to something beyond itself, this fatal disposition of a thought to body itself forth, accounts for the note of tension which marks its appearance and permeates its history. On the other hand, however restive a perceptual fact may appear to be, it is certainly not haunted by this sense of dissatisfaction with its own birth-right, not moved by a tendency to a level of existence beyond its own. A perception also may suggest an enquiry and present a problem : the answer and solu-

tion may have to be found through a long-drawn array of conjectures, ideas and theories ; but a perception need not seek to justify its own existence ; it is there in its own right, to hold its own against a whole world of ideas and theories that may seek to demolish it ; one may require to enquire about its conditions and consequences, or even may have suspicions as to its objective truth—theories too have oftentimes dared to question and revise facts ; but none the less, a perception is a consciousness of a *plane of existence*, final and secure, lays claim to a birth-right which is unquestionably of the first order. The perception itself may be a truth, or untruth, or half-truth ; but its level of existence is final ; nothing which is not of the same order of existence, or is believed to lead to and culminate in an experience of the same order, is permitted to cross swords with it : perception is opposed, corrected, or upset by another perception, actual or possible. Its level is the level of decisiveness and quiescence : an idea may be true or false ; it may be truer than a given perception ; but its level of existence *as an idea*, its status, is not final and absolute. Perceptual status is absolute in the sense that it is there in its own right and need not refer to anything beyond itself for its bare existence. I am not satisfied with my idea as such, unless it be the special case of an idea being an end in itself ; I am satisfied with my perception as such, unless it be the special case of a perception which I propose to interrogate and study. The truth is that the perceptual level is essentially the level of satisfaction, consummation of both interest and motive. I need not dilate further on this distinction which, vital as it is in theory and in practice, is patent to clear introspection. With this distinction in mind I can see readily how a moving perception is quieter than a standing idea : it is quiet and abiding in a sense in which an idea as such is not.

In later sections I shall have occasion to go deeper, if possible, to the foundations of this quiescent level, but in the meanwhile I wish to dispel the apparent ambiguity that has so far been allowed to gather round the words 'tension' and 'disturbance'. We all understand the peculiar tension and disturbance of an idea as compared with an impression : but when

we compare one perception with another, as the consciousness of existence with no determination and reference with the consciousness of *this* or *that*, we know a feeling of tension which is not apparently of the same *kind* as what marks out an idea from an impression. Two perceptions belong to the same level of existence, and consequently to the same zone of quiescence and satisfaction, as perceptions, if not as truths. An idea and an impression, as we have just seen, do not belong to the same level. Now, the tension of an idea in relation to an impression, is incidental to this difference of level between them : there is tension because there is difference of potentials between the two. But does a perception as perception carry reference to another perception as perception ? Does my experience of the cloud essentially require another experience as a support to rest on and as a destiny to tend to ? All the ideas of life are symbols that require to be translated into such facts of immediate experience : but what such facts themselves require to be translated into ? A state finds its significance in the drama of real Life around it : but where is this drama itself to derive its significance from ? Is the tension of directed attention of the same kind as the tension of an idea to a fact, an enquiry to a result, a motive to an object ?

The world of sense may be merely the echo and suggestion of a Platonic Heaven of ideal archetypes : thus a sense-perception as a copy may have an essential reference to its ideal pattern : the truth that I see or hear may be but a fleeting shadow of the truth that lives eternally in pure thought. But the truth of pure thought is not an idea in the ordinary psychological sense, not a consciousness of mediateness and reference : like an idea it is not mediate between a fact and a fact and referring to both : like fact itself it is immediate and ultimate. Now, let me ask this : Does a truth of sense-perception differ from a truth of Platonic pure thought in level ? Does the latter truth carry with it a sense of greater depth, security and immediateness than the former ? I do not refer to their relative scientific values ; I refer to the psychological character of the belief which accompanies each apart from any question as to the place of either among the verities of existence. To explain my meaning : In the dim twi-

light of the evening I mistake a rope, laid across my walk, for a snake. The rope-snake is an illusion : it is nowhere amid the verities. But so long as it is not challenged and found out, does not the rope-snake appear to possess a manner of existence at least as immediate and interesting as the tall trees with their cloaks of deepening gloom, the pale heaven awaiting in solemn suspense, the first message of a solitary star, and the lingering echoes of a distant pastoral song ? Apart from scientific values, one perception would thus appear to go as deeply home to us as another : perceptions as perceptions would appear to carry a belief of immediateness and reality of the same order.

I shall enquire later on as to whether there may not be different orders or levels of *felt* immediateness and reality among perceptions themselves. Perhaps the belief of immediateness and reality, security and quiescence, apart from all scientific interests of comparison, classification and explanation, is not strictly uniform throughout the whole range of our perceptions : perhaps perceptions have intrinsic differences in this accompanying tone of belief : they may perhaps be ranged accordingly in different grades of felt and believed reality. I shall have occasion to point out the distinction between a logical gradation of belief in facts and a psychological gradation of belief in them. Perhaps it will be possible to show in the sequel that every perception of a determinate direction and form necessarily involves an ideal construction or structure, is a 'presentative-representative' complex : so that every normal perception is a mixed product and not pure perception at all : by 'pure perception' I mean the consciousness, if possible, of bare existence, with no determination and direction, not even the simplest determination of *this* or *that* : the level of conscious life where the potential is zero or infinity, the plane of absolute quiescence and truth. Now, since every directed perception involves a representative element, presupposes the backing of a psychic disposition, I may pertinently say that it is not *exactly* on the same level with pure perception, or e_1 which comes nearest to it, the level of quiescence is not the same : if e_1 is the level of no tension, the directed perception is the level of *some* tension. Suppose I call this latter perception e_2 ; since

every e_1 is a 'presentative-representative' complex floating in a fluid of pure perception (a conception to be explained and followed up later on), it involves two distinct elements, the element of pure perception (say, P) and an element of directed, determined feeling backed by psychic dispositions and involving a representative structure (say, R, R'). In my perception of the cloud, for example, there is the pure consciousness of objective existence—I differentiate it here not of course on the assumption that this is not an abstraction—there is the presentative feeling of colour, light and shade, and shape backed and determined by psychic dispositions; and there is the representative structure without which this experience would not be a perception of cloud at all. The experience of the moment is not indeed a *sum* of these elements; but in analysis it will be presentable as a sum. Thus: $e_2 = P + R + R'$, where R and R', stand respectively for the presentative and representative elements in the given experience. Now, let us assume that the feeling of tension in P is zero, or $T_P = 0$; then, since R is a directed and determined feeling it will have a positive tension, or in other words, $T_R = a$. This difference of tension between P and R is due, at least, to the direction and determination of attentive consciousness in R, if not to any difference of *level* between them. But R' is an *ideal* element besides being a directed and determined one like R; therefore the tension of R' will be due partly to its special direction and determination and partly to its difference of level (since an ideal element is not on the same level of existence as perceptual or presentative); thus $T_{R'} = a' + b$. Hence the total tension of $e_2 = a + a' + b$. Of the three components of the total tension, a and a' belong to the same kind, as both are due to special directions and determinations of consciousness; the tension b is of another kind, as it is due to the difference of level between R' on the one hand and P and R on the other. It is the aggregate tension that is felt of course in actual experience, but as this tension is a variable quantity involving both direction and magnitude, it may quite naturally have components involving also both direction and magnitude: to say that when I feel the tension of e_2 it is equivalent to the feeling of

three component tensions of two kinds, is no outrage on psychology : I do not of course feel the total tension as a synthesis or composition of tensions at all ; but that need not prevent the total tension from having a composition and internal diversity.

The difficulty, however, seems to be this : Generally an idea is characterised by a peculiar feeling of tension because its level of existence, its potential, is not the same as that of an impression : the feeling of directed attention, the tension of the e_2 kind, may also be there in it. But when idea appears in the company of a perceptual feeling when it is simply the representative element of the 'presentative-representative' whole, does it not forsake its own level and share the status of the perceptual whole? Surely an idea loses its character as an idea when it supplements the presentative elements in my perception of the cloud ; 'the touch of truth is the touch of life', and does not the touch of perception rob an idea of its restive and mediate nature, and make the representative structure of distance, solidity, flavour and taste of an apple which I see from a distance, assume the immediate and quiescent character of the colour, light and shade, and surface which are alone perhaps presented to be? If so, b -tension is a mythical component in the above equation $e_2 = a + a' + b$. By supposition, b is a tension due to difference of level between R' and R ; But if R'' 's association with R in the perceptual mass makes it kin, then there is no real difference of potential between them, and consequently, no resulting tension, b .

The sequel will show perhaps whether this difficulty is decisive or can be overcome. Here I will briefly say this. That the status of a presentative fact is not affected by the contribution of representative elements into its structure, is a proposition that does not appear to be strictly true. Apart from the element of pure perception, P , a given experience, e_2 , is partly presentative and partly representative, is presentable in analysis as a sum of R and R' . When not in conjunction in the make-up of a fact-whole there is clearly a difference in level between R and R' ; they do not belong to the same order of facts. When however, they are associated in the same direct experience, does

not the comparatively low calibre of R' sensibly affect the pristine purity of R ? Does not R in adopting R' into its fold and status compromise its own virile blood? Let me take an extreme case first. The rope-snake of an illusion is also partly an immediate feeling and partly a supplementing idea : there is the direct impression of a black, thin, longish object, and there is also a supply of representative factors which must be there in order to dress up this object and make it appear a snake. Now, all is well so long as the experience is not suspected to be an illusion : but what is the possibility of its being suspected or known as an illusion at all? The direct, presentative element, the black, thin, longish object is safe and trustworthy in all cases unless of course my eyes have played false : this at any rate does not run the risk of being upset, no matter whether a rope or a snake comes to be installed upon it : it endures as the immediately given datum, whatever structure may be raised or demolished over it. Some sort of construction must indeed be put upon it, in order that it may pass as a full-fledged reality : a mere black, thin, longish *surface* is not a concrete object where perception can pause : some sort of supplementing is evidently essential. Thus we have the following paradox : The element which is necessary (R') to make a concrete reality of an immediately given datum of feeling (R), is the very possibility of the insecurity and revision of the total experience ($e_2 = R + R'$). Remove R' and you have a datum of immediate feeling absolutely safe and trustworthy, but no concrete object of perception ; contribute R' and you have forthwith a concrete object of perception, but the native virility of the datum has been impaired, and there has appeared a possibility of the experience being challenged, corrected and contradicted ; it is the ideal structure that is thus liable to be challenged, corrected and contradicted ; the datum endures through all vicissitudes of fortune. The representative element, however essential, would thus appear to be an element of insecurity. This is true, more or less, in all cases of normal experience. Now, the question is : Is there any lurking insecurity, or rather feeling of insecurity, while, an experience is not being challenged or suspected by

reason of the intermixture of presentative and representative elements in the whole? Logical insecurity is not the same as psychological or felt insecurity: it is evidently for unsophisticated introspection to say whether there is felt insecurity or not in a given experience. I myself feel there is a distinct weakening of the sense of security by the admixture of ideas with a given datum of feeling: the ideas keep up an appearance of security on the strength of the belief that they stand for *possible* feelings. Now *possible* feelings may well pull on with actual feelings, but it is nevertheless a far cry between them. Hence ideas as representing possible feelings may be admitted to the status of actual feelings in the total experience and share the general security of direct knowledge; but the suffrage of possible feelings is never exactly equivalent in experience to the suffrage of actual feelings; there cannot but be fall in the sense of security by reason of the intermixture of the actual and possible. And I submit that this fall is a fact of feeling. The equality of level between the presentative and representative elements in the given experience, e_2 , would thus appear to be approximate rather than exact; hence, b in the above equation is not a fictitious tension.

There is another point which we should note in passing. The 'presentative-representative' complex may come to exist in two ways: with the stress laid on the presentative half, in which case the experience will be perceptual; or with the stress laid on the representative half, in which case the experience will be conceptual or ideational. Even what is regarded as an idea is not there without a more or less strong presentative injection: pure idea like pure perception would appear as an abstraction. There is generally a large contribution of organic and particularly cephalic sensations, feeling of attention, in the make-up of what popularly passes as an idea: the idea is only a section of a total experience which may involve, besides the presentative elements just mentioned, even vague and confused sensations of objective sights, sounds and smells, which is also therefore a 'presentative-representative' complex with the characteristic that the subjective emphasis is here laid on the representative

side. It would appear, however, that it is not merely the difference of emphasis that makes an impression an impression, and an idea an idea. A perception is accepted and necessarily accepted as a 'presentative-representative' complex : an idea is not ; it is merely the idea while its setting in actual feelings is tacitly ignored. However that may be, the following general law will perhaps be admitted :

An idea gains in assurance by being associated with an immediate feeling in a mass of experience, though it gains by reducing the security of the experience *such as it would possess if it consisted of actual feelings alone* : on the other hand, a feeling loses in vigour and assurance by being associated with an idea, particularly if the emphasis of subjective life is being laid on the *idea* for the time being. Briefly, there is always a clear difference of level between an impression and an idea, however they be mixed up with each other : and this difference induces a feeling of tension in any experience in which they may co-exist.

So far I have been able to carry the order of quiescence only a very little way. I will devote the next section to a systematic study of the meaning of quiescence.

5. *Meaning of Quiescence*

I define absolute quiescence as a state of consciousness of pure existence, with no special subjective direction and reference, with no difference of level and potential between one part of the experience and another. As I have hinted already, experience will show special subjective direction and reference if it assumes the least form or determination such as *this* or *that* : to have no difference of level or potential, experience must be strictly *homogeneous*, that is to say, must not involve the least ideal or representative structure. As it is one of the special objects of this essay to study this consciousness of absolute quiescence—the *Brahman* of the Upanishads—the Home of Final Truth—I will certainly not lightly dismiss it in the sequel : but here I purpose it rather as a mathematical possibility than as a veritable reality.

Absolute quiescence in mental life is *possible* in the consciousness of *pure* being : whether our consciousness is, or can be, ever actually a consciousness of pure being is another question. Let me use the notation Q for quiescence absolute. Whether this Q is or is not a positive experience for us we do not yet care to know : in normal life we have enough experience of relative quiescence—an idea that I will explain presently—to know what it is like : in defining Q however whether absolute or relative, I have necessarily to indicate what it is *not*, I have to be content with a negative statement. While I am gazing at the cloud for some time my experience, apart from other elements, is partly a feeling of quiescence or repose, and partly one of tension or stress, if not actual displacement. When I am following with the eye a moving object, or noting even a rapidly changing feeling, a rushing train of ideas, my experience, apart from other elements, is partly also a feeling of pauses, and partly of course a feeling of stress and actual displacement : there must be fairly substantive, enduring parts even in a desparately rushing stream of consciousness—no matter whether we can bathe but once or more than once in the stream—in order that experience may be at all possible for us. We may have a feeling of transition between one substantive experience and another, as James claims for us : but this certainly does not imply that we have an immediate feeling of *mere* transition or change : experience is a whole which involves the consciousness of one substantive element, A, changing or passing on to another substantive element, B : it is $[e]_B^A$ on the analogy of the previous notations, where A and B stand for the limits of the given experience. A in becoming B in experience must allow consciousness to pause and crystallize enough at some places of the flow in order that one may actually follow and know the process, every place where attention is allowed to stop and gather itself together becomes a relatively stable and substantive part of the mass of experience. Now, in the two concrete cases that I have taken, I mark this vital difference : The cloud of quiescent attention is not an experience of absolute quiescence ; it involves both quiescence and stress ; but the former element predominates and imparts its tone to the whole

experience. The moving object or train of ideas also involves both the elements, but here the latter predominates and imparts its tone to the whole experience. Hence in both cases, quiescence and stress are *relative*. Denoting the element of **Stress** by the notation S , or adopting the usual inverse notation, Q^{-1} , I may say that the experience of quiescence and stress in a given case is determined by the ratio $\frac{Q}{S}$. In defining the Q of an experience, however, I find that I cannot do it positively, but that I must do it in terms of the relative value of its inverse, S , *i.e.*, the value of S as estimated by a certain standard of psychic disturbance—the standard by which we roughly feel and compare the stresses or tensions or displacements of several experiences. Thus supposing α to be such a standard of intuitive comparison, I may represent the S of a given experience by the equation $S = T\alpha$; so that in defining or describing the quiescence of the same experience I express it as though it were $(T\alpha)^{-1}$, though the quiescence like the stress is undoubtedly a matter of direct feeling.

6. *Experience as a Resultant*

To the treatment of the ratio $\frac{Q}{S}$ I will return later. In the meanwhile, I have not adopted the Herbartian psychology of mutually helping and inhibiting presentations. Experience is an inexpressible unity in difference, and however forces may wrestle and match together behind the scenes, facts apparently come single on the stage to play their parts : the stamp of unity is unmistakable even on the most chequered experiences of life : experience is never really a synthesis of presentations, it is a presentation always. In the foregoing paragraphs I may have treated feelings of tension as if they were complex feelings resulting from the composition of simple feelings ; and a moment ago I was apparently considering the feeling of quiescence and stress in a given experience as if it were a feeling of quiescence *as compared with* a feeling of stress. But this was not my meaning. A feeling may quite legitimately be treated

as one that would result if certain feelings conspired in a certain manner : an actual resultant motion may conveniently be treated as if it were composed of two or more separate motions. In the latter case it is not necessary for an actually moving object to have all these component motions distributively : the skylark that soars in the sky like 'an unembodied joy whose race is just begun' flies in the resultant direction produced by its moving wings : waves dash and winds blow as Nature's forces, conspire : the stars roll and the atoms flock together, part and dance as Nature's wholes, sums of resultants bid them, IT is an elementary law of dynamics that when a number of forces act on a body, the acceleration (or change of velocity) due to each is the same in direction and magnitude as if the other forces had not been in action. So that every actual displacement can be analysed and studied as a result produced by certain elementary displacements (which can appropriately be represented by a system of vectors) due respectively to certain forces acting on the moving body : a diagram of displacements or vectors will clearly exhibit how the actual transference stands in relation to the forces that have been operating on the body.

In the former case, is an experience, a feeling, capable of such treatment ? We have once for all committed ourselves to the view that experiences are one and simple in presentation : but can a given experience be regarded as a resultant of certain component forces ? Is the unity and simplicity of an experience inconsistent with its having a resultant character ? I think, no. Herbart would regard an actual experience as the resultant of mutually aiding and inhibiting presentations, and the presentations are essentially spiritual, not material, activities. James would regard an experience as a result that follows as a whole, not piecemeal, upon a definite resultant cerebral action : each pulse of nerve agitation is not accompanied by an atom of feeling, and an actual experience is not the sum of a number of such atoms of feeling : the summation or composition is no mental affair at all : experience is a fact that follows as a whole upon a total cerebral fact : it is a *result* nevertheless though the component forces in this case are cerebral, not spiritual,

activities. In general, the following views may be taken as to the nature of a given experience :

(1) As a synthesis or sum of certain elementary actual feelings ;

(2) As a synthesis of certain sub-conscious or quasi-conscious feelings ;

(3) As a result that follows as a whole upon a total brain-state : no composition 'above the level of consciousness ;

(4) As a result produced by the concurrence of certain spiritual dispositions. But what are these spiritual dispositions ? Are they actual feelings or subconscious ideas ? Or do the dispositions of the mind inhere in matter, and particularly in the brain ? Thus this view will be reducible to one of the three preceding views.

(5) As a resultant (synthetic) unity for conception or representation and as a simple (though differentiated) unity for intuition or presentation : I conceive my experience as a synthetic many, as a fact in consciousness that has resulted from the confluence of a number of simple, elementary feelings, e.g., my experience of a tree ; on the other hand, immediate intuition or actual feeling possesses inalienably a character in which all logical categories are lost. It will be advisable here to develop a little this last view.

I define representative experience as an experience that makes an object in thought of another experience. Thus if $[e]^p$ is our symbol for a given immediate experience, its corresponding representative thought will be symbolised by a cumbrous notation like this : $\{E\}_{t_m}^{[e]^p}$, where the index stands for the *thought* of the given experience. The interpretation of the symbol will be this : A representative experience is itself a presentative fact which is especially emphasised as image or *idea* of a given experience ; as a fact of experience it is evidently larger than the image or idea of the given experience : When I am thinking of a tree my entire experience of the moment is not equivalent to the thought of the tree ; again my experience of the moment is undoubtedly a presentative or immediate fact,

though its place of emphasis is an image or thought ; lastly, in mental life it is the place of emphasis that really counts : in perception the point or aspect emphasised is usually taken as *the* perceptual fact, so also in conception, it is the ideal place of emphasis that makes the whole experience of the moment a representative one.

It should be observed further that in the last symbol there is a difference in time (t) between the whole experience and the part (e) which is embraced by it in thought. The experience-whole is ever a present fact ; e' is also synchronous with it : it is the emphasised part which makes the whole a whole ; but e is never a fact present along with E . Ordinarily, however, I shall denote a representative experience by the simpler symbol Ee' .

It is clear also that the index of the complete symbol may itself be a complex idea instead of a simple one. It may be the idea of a sum, series or configuration of facts. In fact, the peculiarity of a representative experience lies in this. Intuition may be a configuration or a series as regarded by the psychologist, but it is not a configuration or a series to itself ; on the other hand, conception may, and often does, involve the thought of a configuration or a series : what is not possible in intuition becomes possible in representation : intuition is the **level of absorption**, idea is the level of excursion. To resort to notations again. In physical science 'configuration' is an order in space, and 'series' is an order in time : I shall use the former term in a somewhat extended sense to mean co-existence of points or facts or features, whether in space or in thought. In this sense, we see, every determinate experience may be regarded as a configuration ; but intuitive experience, though itself being a configuration, does not know itself as one such. It knows itself, appears to itself, as a configuration in representative thought : this is *contemplated* configuration. Now, this latter is essentially a sum of discrete elements. If e be a given experience-mass, an element of the experience may be represented by the usual notation $\delta e'$ (I confine myself to the case in which the mass is of one kind throughout). The idea of this element will then be $\delta e'$ or,

more correctly, $E\delta e'$. Hence the idea of the configured elements will be $S\delta e'$, where S stands for the operation of summation. If the constitution of the mass be not homogeneous, we shall have different elements such as $\delta e'_1$, $\delta e'_2$, $\delta e'_3$, and so on. The contemplated configuration will again be $S\delta e'$, where S stands for the same operation as before, $\delta e'$ serves as the type of the various elements. Therefore a representative experience which involves the thought of a configuration will be denoted by the symbol $\{E\}^{S\delta e'}$. It should be noted, however, that the operation S is not a quite simple summation in all cases of ideation.

Elements of ideas which are supposed to constitute a complex idea are never quite like discrete, independent atoms : in massing together they influence the constitutions and tones of one another, so that the operation $\delta e'_1 + \delta e'_2$ is not the same as $\delta e'_2 + \delta e'_1$: even the order of addition goes to determine the result of the process : order is essential in thought analysis and synthesis : the same is true in vector analysis, and indeed in all mathematical computations where the elements are processes and not simply statical numbers and space-determinations. Compare for a moment the mental rehearsal of a musical composition : how order seems to be the very soul of the thing ! The mental recapitulation of the features of a tree does not appear to depend much on the order of representation, but the order is not certainly immaterial.

The illustration of a musical composition has taken us surreptitiously to the thought of a series. As in the case of configuration, so in this case, the idea of a series must be carefully distinguished from a series of ideas. Every idea bears a two-fold character as already indicated ; it has reference to two distinct planes or levels of existence : the plane of the *given* and the plane of the *suggested*. I may also distinguish them as *categorical* and *conditional* planes. A fact that is, is : there can be no question or contingency about its bare *isness* : even the rope-snake of an illusion is in a distinct sense. A fact that is only thought of by me requires the fulfilment of certain conditions to become for me an actual, given fact of the first kind. In quaternions an

operator q is necessary for transforming a vector α into another vector β , so that we may have $q\alpha = \beta$. Similarly a certain operation is necessary for transforming a fact of the first plane or kind into a fact of the second plane or kind, that is to say, the idea of a fact into the perception of the fact. In our own symbols, $\rho e' = e$, where ρ stands for the necessary operation which will realize e' (the ideal part in representative experience) into e (presentative experience). But it should be also observed that $E^{e'}$ is a presentative experience as well, and this in a different sense. Let us denote two corresponding presentative and representative experience by e'_1 , and $E^{e'_1}$, respectively. Then the latter is representative so far as the reference is to the former ; but as its symbolical constitution shows it is presentative as well, *viz.*, so far as the reference is to the *flow* of experiences in mental life ; even an idea is a fact that has succeeded another fact in this flow, and though its precursor might have been of the stuff of which perceptions are made, the two belong to the same level of existence so long as the reference is to the flow of conscious life : as mere subjective states the rope-snake is as good as the Superdreadnaught. Nay, more ; an idea does not lose its title to immediate existence in comparison with an impression *as such*, it is hollow, thin air only by the side of the corresponding impression and its family. The fall of an apple is a genuine fact, and is determined by its proper assemblage of conditions, and has its place in the universal configuration and concatenation of phenomena ; the *illusion* of a rope-snake is also a fact as genuine and has as assumed a place in Nature's economy as the fall of the classical apple which has made the distant stars our kin. Thus an illusion and an idea are not merely subjective but cosmic facts : we call them hollow because we look to a part in them and ignore the whole : I have regarded them as conditional because certain operations must be gone through in order that their objects may be contradicted or realized—because, in short, my interest is pragmatic and not usually scientific. Suppose $f(e_1, c)$ represents a family of experiences (an idea to be developed later on), where c is the parameter of the family—that is to say, it is constant for the same experience but different for different

experiences, so that any particular member of the family may be specified by the particular value or meaning assigned to c . Then, E^c is representative and unsubstantial in comparison with $f(e_1, c)$, but it is presentative and substantial both in the subjective and cosmic series of facts, such as

$$\dots + f_s(e_1, c) + f_s(e_2, a) + f_s(e_3, b) + \dots$$

(1) Subjective series.

$$\dots + f_k(e_1, c) + f_k(e_2, a) + f_k(e_3, b) + \dots$$

(2) Cosmic series.

I have arranged the series in order of families.

Let me make a short appeal to reflection. Suppose while I am looking at a cloud I am thinking of Shelley or Kalidas : does the thought of the poet appear unsubstantial by the side of sense-perception? Not at all. So long as the idea is not challenged and referred to its object poet, there is no suspicion of unsubstantiality at all—indeed no question of actuality and hollowness is involved ; the thought is taken to be as much a fact as the cloud ; each is real. The hollowness of the thought appears only in reference to its object *not* directly in reference to the cloud and other experience. Even after the thought of hollowness has come, the idea of Shelley can be made to appear hollow by the side of the cloud only by subsuming the latter under the family of the former's object (the actual poet) or by extending the conception of the family so as to include the cloud and other sense-experiences. By such subsumption or extension what was a closed curve becomes a plane of infinite dimensions. I say this : My idea Shelley is unsubstantial by the side of the real Shelley and other objects intimately associated with Shelley (to which therefore my thought is carried in referring to the real poet, and which consequently may be regarded as the *family* of the object) ; now, real Shelley belongs to the same order or plane of experience as the cloud now before me ; Shelley and the cloud are in a sense akin ; *ergo*, the idea Shelley is unsubstantial by the side of the cloud before me. Note the indirectness which marks this way of thinking. *Directly*, an idea is believed to be hollow only by the side of its corresponding

impression and those intimately bound up with it. The corresponding impression and its family is as it were a closed curve which after taking in the cloud and other objects of sense-experience becomes a plane of infinite extent, *viz.*, the plane of given, categorical experience—self-satisfied, quiescent fact. An idea is then believed to be hollow in reference to *this* plane. Now, look at this idea from the viewpoint of mental and cosmic life, and its hollowness goes. The scheme of the universe regarded as a configuration and concatenation of *phenomena* knows nothing of impostors : the wildest dream that man has ever dreamt has *occurred* with as good a title as any of the best attested events in the world's history : we dub it a phantom because we are pragmatic and would want it to serve a particular end, to do office for another order of occurrences ; but we often forget that if a dream cannot be made to play the role of broad day-light experience, neither can the latter be an equivalent substitute for the former : each is real in its own place and way, and if in history dreams and theories have unceasingly pressed for their realization, the so-called realized facts have also often received their momentum and drawn their inspiration from the thin air and the cobweb.

In intuition proper there is no *thought* either of configuration or series : I must pull myself up now and then to perceive a given stretch of intuitive experience as a series of successive pulses of feeling : in itself it is a continuity the nature of which is intuitively given but not logically presentable. It does not even think of itself as a continuity or a unity : there is no articulate thought of either. Intuition is dumb (3) : I cannot think and talk of it without putting an ideal construction upon it, without projecting my own shadow into it : this appears to be the irrefragable truth in Kantianism : Understanding makes Nature,

When I think I am *having* a series of feelings, my experience is certainly a double affair. My consciousness seems to oscillate between two distinct planes in an experience of this kind—the intuitive plane and the ideal. Let me resort to symbols. Suppose an experience of the intuitive plane is

represented by simple e , and an experience of the representative plane by e' (not the entire experience which is E'). Suppose we express continuity by the notation $[E]_{e_n}^{e_1}$ which indicates that a given experience E is continuous between the limits e_1 and e_n : observe that in such experience there is no thought of series.

I propose to enlarge upon the idea of psychic continuity in a more fitting place. In the meanwhile, I cannot pass on without calling attention to some of the salient features of this continuity. In the first place I wish to emphasise the fact that *experience, as we know it, is essentially continuous*: there are apparently no gaps in the flow of mental life. I cannot imagine a condition of my existence in which I am absolutely without experience of *any* kind, a perfectly neutral zone in my life where one experience has ended but another has not yet begun. Life for me is always a life of experience of some sort: Life, like Nature, abhors vacuum—mental void, feeling-and-thought-nothing-ness. Let me distinguish such continuity of mental life as absolute: such continuity seems to pertain to the very essence of mental existence. Consciousness must continue, and continue even through states which have been unhappily described as 'unconscious': it is the only substance—I call it 'substance', James and his following notwithstanding—that refuses to be put out or limited by its own negation. This continuance which appears to be bound up with its essence, and is not subject to, and determined by, any reference external to itself, may properly be regarded as absolute. Where the reference is, however, to an object, condition, or agency external to itself, experience may be said to possess relative continuity. Of *relative* continuity I may notice here *three* important varieties. A given experience may be regarded as continuous with respect either to the level of intuition or to the level of ideation: while for some moments I am intently gazing at the cloud before me, without ever moving off into the realm of ideas, my experience for these moments is a perceptual continuum. Though perception may require the filling up and interpretation of the rude presentative framework by means of representative elements, a true perception

need not involve the actual shifting of the mind's stress from the 'given' to the 'recalled' half of the complex affair : however a perception may inform itself and grow, it does not allow, in a typical case, the emphasis of subjective regard to be transferred from itself ; it is this circumstance which makes the 'recalled' or suggested elements—I am adopting for one moment the language of atomistic psychology—to share the immediate character of the 'given' : the smell and the taste of an orange appear to be given as directly as the colour and shape which are alone perhaps presented to me as I am looking at it from a distance. Now, this is continuity of experience with respect to the plane of intuition. Similarly, experience may be continuous with respect to the plane of idea or thought also. An idea or thought is certainly not without its intuitive setting or background : it presupposes not only a previous intuition but is imbedded in a *present* intuition also. Symbolically the total experience of the moment when I am supposed to be occupied with an idea as distinguished from an impression is not e' but E' . So that we have a paradox : The experience of an idea is not an idea itself ; it is an intuition : and in this sense, all experience is intuition. We call it an idea in accordance with a particular distribution of the subjective regard.

We may also speak of the continuity of a given experience with reference to the unity of the dominant interest, or what practically comes to the same thing, to the unity of the attentive effort put forth : an experience may be said to be continuous during the time the subject has been actuated by *one* dominant interest, or while the attentive effort put forth by him has been one in a distinct sense. Observe that an experience continuous in this second sense may well be discontinuous in the first ; a study of Shakespeare's Julius Cæsar may actually yield me a pretty long series of impressions and ideas, and may even be interrupted from time to time by a thousand and one knocks of a world which must ever grind and toil heedless of the bard's lyre and the martyr's thorny crown : but it is continuous in this sense that it has been inspired by a single guiding

purpose and has been sustained by generally uniformly directed pulses of attentive effort. Lastly, I may perhaps pertinently speak of the continuity of an experience with reference to the unity of the object that is being experienced : experience is one in so far as its object is one : will not the last example of Julius Cæsar serve me here too ? I have purposely refrained from attempting a possible reduction of these three varieties of experience-continuity : do we require really more kinds or less ?

[I shall leave for the present this interesting topic of subjective continuity by indicating, if possible, a total or aggregate expression for my thought during, say, a part of this evening. For simplicity's sake, let me confine my experience for this period exclusively to the level of thought or idea : I have been only thinking or meditating, and not seeing and doing (it must be admitted however that this is not a correct representation of the fact). Suppose the total experience to be denoted by E . Now, evidently, E has been determined by *three* conditions : by a guiding dominant interest= x , say ; by its reference to a single, continuous object of thought= y , say ; and by its reference to a single level of conscious existence, *viz.*, the level of thought, by supposition,= z , say. I shall not dilate here on the nature and extent of this triple determination, but shall simply admit the equation $E=\phi(x, y, z)$. Clearly also, x or interest determines the experience within certain limits : thought is allowed to exercise and stretch itself within the bounds laid down by the interest in question : all thought outside these bounds is impertinent and promptly rejected ; no thought appears to be satisfied or complete *with respect to* this interest which falls short of these proper bounds. Let us call the limits a and b respectively : every pertinent thought must *at least touch* the interest in question, and no pertinent thought must *move away* from it ; and evidently, to simply touch an interest is not equivalent to not leaving it off, so that if the former act is a and the latter b , a is not= b . My thought has not only already touched but *pursued* an interest, exercised itself over it, before it can move away from it : explicit separation of thought from something presupposes a previous engagement

of thought with that thing : things must meet in order to part in thought. Thus I may propose as the lower limit of x the threshold where a thought merely touches or bears upon it *without* actually pursuing it ; and as the upper limit of x I may propose the line where a thought just leaves it or begins to move away from it *after* having pursued it. Given a stretch of experience, I can assign pretty accurately where a particular interest which has been operative begins and where it ends. I may also sensibly speak of the limits of the object of my evening's meditation. The unity and continuity of my object require the keeping of my thought within certain limits : no thought pertinent with respect to this object must fail to cross a given threshold and presume to transgress a given boundary : there is such a thing as thought-minimum with respect to this object as also such a thing as thought-maximum : thought in order to be pertinent must bear *at least* a certain character and direction, and must not overgrow a certain character and direction : I take here of course both 'character and direction' in their quantitative aspect. I cannot but leave my definitions of the limits extremely general for the present : let the limits of y be α and β . Lastly, in order that my thought of this evening may keep sufficiently close to the level of *idea* only, my subjective emphasis, which is never strictly constant in a place in ordinary experience, must move *within* certain limits : never during the course of this rapt meditation must my subjective emphasis leave the ideational level and settle on the perceptual. Thus, symbolically, if the stretch of meditation be $= E_1 e'_1 + E_2 e'_2 + E_3 e'_3 + \dots$ my emphasis must continue $(e'_1 + e'_2 + \dots)$, and must not seriously be transferred to the line of bases $(E_1 + E_2 + \dots)$. The emphasis, however, need not remain absolutely constant ; it may, and indeed does, oscillate, but the limits of oscillation must be such that the experience of the moment shall retain its general psychic character—shall be a mediative thought generally. Let the limits of z be p and q . Then, I may perhaps find a total expression for my meditative thought of this evening thus :

$$E = \phi(x, y, z);$$

∴ The total expression for $E = L^1 \cdot S\phi(x, y, z)$

$$\Delta x \Delta y \Delta z = \int_a^b \int_\alpha^\beta \int_p^q \phi(x, y, z) dx dy dz.$$

As usual, this expression stands for the result of the following operations: First integrate $\phi(x, y, z)$ or the experience in question with respect to z , considering x and y constant between the limit p and q : that is to say, first find an answer to the following question—*How much* experience have I on account of my subjective regard moving between limits p and q , assuming that both the factors of interest and object remain constant? Suppose during the period it is only the subjective emphasis that has moved between the proper limits, but the interest has remained absolutely one and statical, and so also has the object of my thought.' As a concrete illustration, I may take the following: For some moments my consciousness assumes the form of an image or idol; I am not thinking about the idol, but am having a statical image or rather a feature of an image before my mind's eye—the thought is statical and not dynamical, if I may be permitted to use this familiar distinction in the present connexion. Now, in this example, the determining interest of my thought is absolutely one and statical—unlike the interest which has inspired the study of Julius Cæsar or what has directed the writing of the present essay (in the latter cases *the* interest is only a chief among a multitude of subordinate and co-ordinated interests.) The object also may be taken as absolutely one and statical, assuming of course that it is taken up by a single act of imagination. But though both x and y are constant, subjective emphasis is slightly dynamical—there is, as reflection will readily show I believe, a feeble play of regard between the two levels of intuition and ideation. We may, therefore, fairly enquire: *How much thought* of the idol has been there on the *whole on account of* this fluctuating movement of regard alone? Secondly, I have to integrate the result obtained with respect to y between the limits α and β considering x as constant. Lastly, I must integrate this result with respect to x between the limits a and b . The interpretation of these two operations will be on lines similar to those of the first. For the purpose of such summation it is not necessary

that the limits of the three operations should be altogether independent of the variables : the limits of z may be functions of both x and y ; and the limits of y may be functions of z . Here too the psychological interpretation will be readily forthcoming. For instance, the limits of the unity of an object for experience may be functions of the Subject's interest in relation to it : the object is one *in so far as my interest is one.*]

This attempt to find a total expression for a given experience, involving as it does the conceptions of psychic continuity and limits, has been perhaps a little enlightening while we are about the form of experience $[E]_{e_n}^{e_1}$: an experience which is continuous between the limits e_1 and e_n . Suppose such an experience be represented by S_0 , a notation which I am about to explain. Let us also grant that the continuity in S_0 is a continuity with respect to intuition : the experience is a stretch of intuitive consciousness without any interpolation of ideas, e.g., I am being treated to a music and am absorbed by it for a few moments : for these few moments my subjective emphasis settles on the plane of the given, and does not play between what is actually given and what may be suggested by it—the associated ideas and memories, for instance. The continuity of S_0 refers, therefore, to the circumstance that the emphasis of subjective regard *continues* to move like a particle on the level of the given, without ever leaving it, that I am for the time being too full of the actual and immediate to sally forth into the domain of the ideal and remote. Let, thus, $S_0 = [E]_{e_n}^{e_1}$. We observe that S_0 is a *nascent* series, if I may be permitted to so characterise it. It involves no thought of series, no thought of time relations. While for some moments I have listened to a music and have been full of it, my experience has certainly not seemed to me a series, and no thought has been disengaged for these moments to contemplate, define, and if I may add, to idealize the experience. The experience is a *single* stretch of intuitive consciousness, with no palpable breaks of intuitive continuity. We may also observe that it possesses a peculiar but distinct character of quiescence, though here in the given plane of intuitive consciousness

there has evidently been a continuous *displacement* of subjective regard between the limits given above. Notes have thrilled, swelled and melted away in echoes, and my experience which has grasped all and enjoyed all must have essentially been an experience of displacement ; but it is quiescent in the sense in which an intuitive experience is quiescent, and it is so in a somewhat stronger key : by supposition there has been no movement of regard, no oscillation of emphasis between the subject enjoying and the object enjoyed, and no wavering between the given song and its suggestions : my regard has quietly reposed on the object.

Thus if the relative quiescence of the present experience be determined by the ratio, $\frac{Q}{S}$, we can roughly comprehend the magnitude of Q from these considerations : Suppose α, β, γ are the three components or factors of the stress of a given experience and hence let us suppose that $S = \alpha + \beta + \gamma$. The stress of an experience is partly determined by the following question : Is it, intuitive or ideational ? Let this determinant be α . Is it also partly determined by the following : Does the experience involve movement or oscillation of regard between the objective aspect of the experience-whole and the Subject, and if so, how much ? Let this determinant be β . Lastly, it is partly determined by this : Does the experience as it continues involve movement or oscillation of regard between the planes of intuition and idea—am I having, as I proceed, a stretch of pure intuitive experience or a mixture of intuitive pulses and ideal *projections* ? And if so, how much ? Let this determinant be γ . Now, from the ratio $\frac{Q}{S}$ we see at once that the relative quiescence of an experience $\left(= \frac{Q}{S} \right)$ will in magnitude be inversely proportional to S or to $\alpha + \beta + \gamma$. If S be zero, the quiescence of an experience, is infinite : *an experience of absolutely no stress is an experience of infinite quiescence*. In all normal experiences, however, S cannot be made to vanish altogether, though it can be reduced to a minimum : no experience

is without stress which is an experience of *directed* attention, which, in other words, takes on any determination whatever. In our example we may assume both β and γ to vanish, for apparently there is no play of regard between the subject and the object, and between the plane of the given and that of the suggested. But can α , the determinant of the relative quiescence of a stretch of intuitive consciousness, be supposed to vanish? No. My intuitive absorption in the song not only involves directed attention but even continuous displacement of attention: hence α is a positive quantity and not zero. But nevertheless relative quiescence (i.e. $\frac{Q}{S}$) in this case has a greater magnitude than in the case where all the three components of S are positive quantities.

I have essayed to study a given stretch of intuitive experience. It can aptly be represented by S with the meaning attached to it as above. But this will not be a suitable notation when I want to represent this fact: I think I am having a flow of experience—when I am listening to a song and am representing my experience to myself as a series. Here I have first S_0 or a stretch of intuitive experience in which my whole conscious existence is for a moment merged. But presently I wake myself up, as it were, from this intuitive trance of absorption and enjoyment, and contemplate the fact that had just ended: no such contemplation is possible alongside of the intuitive trance, I cannot feel and contemplate the feeling at one and the same time. In order that such thinking may be possible I must take consciousness a little aside, I must shift my emphasis of regard from the feeling to something which is not *co-planar* with it. Any one who has heard a song and while hearing mused over it, enjoyed a scene and while enjoying brooded over it, will readily see what co-planar experiences are like. Such a shifting of subjective emphasis means, according to our conceptions of psychic continuity, discontinuity in experience. It is a discontinuity arising from the *projection* of an experience of one plane upon another: it may be instructive here to recall the analogy of projection in Geometry. Thus after having a stretch

of intuitive experience I draw myself up to contemplate what the just expired fact in me has been. I may write down the following two equations as representing these two acts or states of my consciousness :

$$S_0 = [E]_{e_n}^{e_1} \dots (1).$$

$$\bar{S}_1 = [E] \{ [E']_{e_n}^{e_1} = e_1 + e_2 + \dots + e_n \} \dots (2).$$

This latter experience is a presentative experience with a representative index. All experience, if taken in its entirety, is presentative. Even the wildest dream and the haziest idea live and are imbedded in warm, actual experiences : the experience which involves the dream or the idea cannot be a dream or an idea itself : the merest fictions are not *thus* without their foundations in facts. The base of any experience is necessarily E or immediate feeling, whatever the index may be : this permanent basis of life and experience is necessarily without the ideal accent—it is E simply and not E'. **Intuition is an inalienable datum of life (4).**

In order that my consciousness may be S_1 , there must be, as we have seen, break of continuity after S_0 . But this discontinuity does not clearly affect the absolute continuity of mental life, nor even really what I have described as intuitive continuity or continuity with respect to the intuitive plane, if we remember that intuition is an inalienable basis of conscious life and that all experiences are, in a distinct sense, co-planar inasmuch as all experiences must live and flow in a permanent *plenum* of immediate consciousness. The discontinuity therefore affects the continuity of interest, or attention, or subjective emphasis. In passing from S_0 to S_1 clear, emphatic consciousness has moved off from the level of the given to that of the suggested : while the music surging before me has become confused and feeble, an idea or recollection perhaps has become prominent and insistent : while the scene on which my soul was feasting has become stale and blurred, the stealthy advance of a memory or a hope has made the chords of my consciousness thrill in overwhelming response. This indeed is one of the commonest incidents of conscious life : this shifting of light and shade to and from

between intuition and idea, this playing of life's accent between the actual and the ideal. Life is unmeaning without this play: the echoes wake and centre and reassure themselves in the song, the song softens, delivers, fulfils itself in the echoes. Shall I call this **Lateral discontinuity** in experience?

Now, what after this? My soul presently returns to the feast it left unfinished—after musing a little while aside, I again come to have a stretch of intuitive experience of the nature of S_0 . All the remarks which we thought it proper to make in regard to that S_0 will apply to this: it is a single, undivided mass of conscious existence, with my subjective emphasis bound to the level of the given, with my life and reality staring each other in the face, and not sulking and musing aside. Thus I have a third phenomenon—

$$S_0^2 = [E]_{e_r}^{e_m} \dots\dots\dots (3)$$

It is an experience continuous between the limits e_m and e_r with respect to the level of intuition and incidence of emphasis. I do not suggest that this experience—the base E and the limits are altogether independent of the previous two stretches of experience, S_0^1 and S_1 . Nevertheless this is a new phenomenon: the sequel will show how in normal life we can have neither an absolutely independent nor an absolutely new phenomenon.

But presently I wake up from this new dose of intuitive absorption, become eccentric so to say and slide into a fresh mood of representative thought. Feeling partly withdraws and thought largely possesses me: the music again has become a sort of agreeable noise, I am moving again amid the shades of the departed or the looming visions of the unborn. Without such recurring lapses into reviewing moods and foreshadowing abstractions, my experience of the song, though in itself a continuous series perhaps, would not be presentable to myself as one. Feeling as feeling is self-sufficient: it delivers itself immediately. Feeling is not self-sufficient as constructive knowledge. In order that I may have constructive knowledge or knowledge in relation to a system, knowledge with reference to an order, I must somehow

raise myself above pure feeling and regard it from aside : for this it is not of course necessary that I should cease to feel—which is impossible—but that I should *think more and feel less*. Experience is a curve with two principal foci, if I may say so : the focus of presentative emphasis or concentration and the focus of representative emphasis or concentration. Clear, illuminating consciousness plays between these two foci : now it is warm feeling with a slight fringe of thought perhaps, and then it is brightening thought, retrospective or prospective, with a shy residuum of retreating feeling.

Let this fresh mood of abstraction be represented by the notation—

$$S_2 = [E] \{ [e']_{e_r}^{e_m} = e_m + \dots + e_r \} \dots \dots (4)$$

It is the representation of a previous stretch of intuitive consciousness as a series : it is a present fact which judges and interprets a past fact. The above presentation of the present fact is not strictly accurate, however. The actual complexity of the fact has not been fully unravelled : I have considerably minced matters. The present not only resolves, judges and interprets the past, but also anticipates more or less dimly the future. In listening to a song and musing aside a while I not only rehearse the experience that I have just enjoyed, but vaguely expect a further stretch of similar experience : this is generally the case unless I am positively aware that the tale has been all told. Suppose I represent continuity between a past fact and a future by the following notation—

$$e_r \curvearrowright e_{x-r} \text{ or, } e_r \text{ ————— } e_{x-r}$$

which means that I conceive or rehearse a past stretch of experience as a series up to the r th term where the past fact actually ended for me and I slid into a mood of reviewing abstraction, and I expect that experience to be continued down through the remaining $(x-r)$ terms. While I am just at the threshold of an unfamiliar song, my attitude is certainly one of wondering expectation : the magnitude of the series of the experience about to begin—I necessarily anticipate it as a series, though immediately

it is only a stretch—is simply x : I wonder how long the experience will last and how many pulses of substantive feeling it will mean for me. I begin if possible with a *tabularasa*, and lie wondering in wait for each successive wave of feeling as it comes and dashes past me, each being a new addition to, and a new subtraction from, the retrospective and prospective sides respectively of the curve of continuity. The past grows at the expense of the future: fact realizes itself by the slow decay of possibility and expectation.

In the above curve of continuity, the left-hand side stands for retrospective thought while the right-hand stands for prospective. Thus when I think that any—I know not what—song is *just* to begin, my experience, according to the above notation is $e_0 \quad e_x$. Successively I have—as I proceed to listen to it and mentally take stock of it from time to time—experiences involving continuities like these—

$$\begin{array}{cc} e_i & e_{x-i} \\ \hline e_r & e_{x-r} \\ \hline e_x & e_0. \end{array}$$

The large X of the last continuity shows that it is no longer a vaguely expected magnitude but a realized magnitude which I now conceive. It is thought of the continuity of a song which has *just* ended. I will not now dilate further on continuity: but it is clear that this notion of continuity has an undeniable place in the reviewing or judging facts S_1 and S_2 . In reviewing $[e]_{e_r}^{e_m}$ or the stretch of previous experience continuous between the limits e_m and e_r , I not only represent it as a series, *viz.*, $e_m + \dots + e_r$ as shown in the S_2 equation (4), but as a past series to be *followed* by a future series of perhaps indefinite magnitude. This introduces a new element of complexity in the above equations for S_1 and S_2 . However, in the light of the foregoing explanation, I may for the present substitute the following (using as before the *simpler and feasible* modification of the curve of continuity).

$$S_1 = [E] \left\{ (\overline{e'_n = S_n}) + S_{x-n} \right\},$$

Where E is the inalienable intuitive base, e'_n is the thought of a stretch of past experience continuous between e_1 and e_n , S_n is the representation of this last as series of a certain terms, $S_x - n$ is the thought of the expected series to follow, the dash overhead shows continuity.

I have now studied at some length the type of experience which is illustrated by a fact like this—I think I am having a series of feelings : I am listening to a music perhaps and am presenting my experience to myself a series. There are three important things to note : (1) Essential intuitive continuity of experience, but lateral discontinuity, involving oscillation of clearest consciousness between the potential intuitive series (S_0 etc.) and actual represented series (S_1 etc.) ; (2) The series, however, lives not in the entire experience of the moment—the judging and representing thought being not itself a series—but in the index, in the snug little ideal world imbedded in the whole experience of the moment : configuration and series, actually known as such, are ideal and not presentative features of experience. My notations have made this important point unmistakeably clear. The base, background or setting of every experience is necessarily E or intuitive consciousness : to avoid possible ambiguities let me call this inseparable element of all diate feeling, **thought-basis or thought-datum**. All conception or representative **thought** again is dependent upon this datum : pure conception or mere dream is a myth : and though ideas may be infinitely various, they must constitute the index and super-structure of consciousness and not its foundation and basis. I may be permitted to call this element of experience **thought-index**.

(3) It will also appear that the unity of experience is primary and not derivative or resultant. But primary for what?—For intuition. An experience as it is actually lived is one and not many, not in itself a presented configuration or a series. Pure intuitive fact is inscrutable. There can be no science of pure intuition. Intuition is the level of satisfaction and absorption ; (4) so long as I am in it, I am not distinguishable from it ; but science needs start with analysis, and abstraction. Intuition,

however, may well be a resultant of forces wrestling below the threshold of consciousness ; but in any case it does not know itself as a resultant, a 'synthetic manifold'. To know it as a configuration, a series, or a resultant, I must take consciousness a little aside as it were, allow my feeling to cool and shrink, and have what I have just called thought-index. Thus fact is a resultant only for conception : the index may well contain within itself a world of wonders, a veritable universe such as Green might look upon as a vast tissue of relations. Beneath the index flows the permanent substratum of inscrutable existence, infinitely rich in the variety and tone of its presentations, but hopelessly unaccommodating to Philosophy. But psychology, which must be representative or nothing at all, must either draw away and take to pieces things or completely disavow itself, may pertinently talk about the components of experience and their bearings just as dynamics may talk about the components of a physical force and directions and magnitudes. The concrete physical motion as it takes place in Nature is a unity and not a composition though of course it may be conceived and known as a composition. The concrete mental fact is one and not a synthesis though of course it may be conceived and known as a synthesis. It is to be distinctly understood that such components of the fact which exist necessarily for thought are not concrete feelings themselves, but are what I may call **feeling sections** or features of an experience regarded *as though* they were experiences themselves. For example, the feeling of stress which may accompany a given consciousness, is a simple, undivided feeling of a certain kind involving no explicit comparison, no clear ratio; but so remaining it is mute and, I may say, alogical. But thought must question and measure the facts that come to it : in this anxiety and capacity of thought is contained all the promise and possibility of science. A feeling of stress may be regarded by my thought as if it were a resultant compounded of the stresses α , β and γ , and bore a ratio to a certain standard of quiescence. Thought's constructions are certainly not arbitrary and fantastic, but these are none the less superimposed on the data of feeling where in the light of simple intuition they do not appear to press

themselves into evidence. Relentless radical empiricism will gag philosophy. But while Life glides in speechless awe, the waves of thought waking merrily in the breath of Heaven make of it a chequered and noisy play !

7. General Nature of Fact-operations

I have perhaps now somewhat prepared the ground for a philosophical definition of Fact. A Fact is an entire, concrete experience, including what I have called the base and the index of thought, necessarily intuitive, possessing therefore an essential tone of quiescence or satisfaction, involving no explicit thought either of configuration or of series and also no logical opposition of Subject and Object : it is concretely given, absorbing, dumb, alogical. This absolute, entire experience I shall henceforth denote by the symbol F . Now, it must have been abundantly clear from foregoing considerations that $F = E^{ef(x)}$, where the base stands for the inalienable intuitive datum and the index gives a general form (as I am going to explain presently) of the representative structure which may be put upon the datum. Do my base and index correspond, by the by, to Kantian 'matter' and 'form' of experience ? I shall not here pause for a reply. There are two points involved in this definition of Fact which are of immense philosophical importance :

(a) There is no fact which is not a form or mode of experience, which is an entity or process existing outside of consciousness. The so-called objective fact is *believed by me* to exist independently of my consciousness, though it cannot be known otherwise than as I perceive it and think of it, and though it appears scrupulously to stand or fall with my thought of it. But is this *belief* of the object's independence which is to prove its objectivity a fact outside or inside of my experience ? Surely the mental fact that I believe an object to exist out of my mind cannot *really make it exist out of my mind*. Yet this does not reduce us to Solipsism. The definition makes it quite clear that the logical distinction of Subject and Object is altogether foreign to the constitution of the Fact. Subjectivity or objectivity is only

an accident, however fruitful and momentous, of concrete experience, and does not belong to its native structure. Experience for me is not, *my* experience or experience actually involving the consciousness of me : the distinction of me and not-me is oftner lost than not in the normal experiences of life. As I have hinted before, to bring out this duality in thought, there must be oscillation of regard between the two, so that concrete experience is ordinarily monovalent, if I may say so. Thus it comes to this : It is psychologically incorrect to say, as we are commonly apt to say, that a given experience is *mine*, as though *me* were the inalienable datum upon which experiences waxed and waned ; it would be nearer truth to say, though usage will laugh at this way of putting things, about *the me of a given experience*. The *me* is simply a very much imposing and interesting feature in the concrete fulness of a given experience, and is by no means an absolutely inseparable feature. Let me resort to symbols for a moment. I have indicated the fact-index to be of the general form $ef(x)$, where the form of the function is unknown. When experience involves an explicit thought of Subject and Object, the index assumes a definite form to that extent. Suppose $me = s$, not- $me = o$, and the remainder of the representative structure—I call it broadly representative structure for the present—of the given experience $= r$. Then, the experience in question may be represented by $E^{ef(s, o, r)}$. Hence it is clear the whole experience cannot be fastened on either s or o ; or as I have put it, it is experience that owns me and not *me* that owns experience. So the suspicion of solipsism melts away.

(b) It will also appear that what we commonly call a physical or a mental fact is only a section of the concrete Fact as I have defined it. A physical fact, *e.g.*, the fall of an apple, will differ from a mental fact, *e.g.*, the thought of gravitation in my mind, in the mode and tone of experiences which they respectively induce in me. Both are experiences, though the former includes a belief that the fact is something else than the experience which knows it : they are however not experiences which, while being both intuitive in their concrete fulness, are of the same kind. Clearly, in the two cases, the intuitive bases, the

substrata of immediate feeling induced, differ. The indices also differ undoubtedly. Now, assuming that belief in the objectivity or subjectivity of a thing belongs to the index, I may distinguish the two facts as $E_a^{ef(\alpha, r)}$ and $E_b^{ef(\beta, r')}$, where the intuitive bases have been shown to be different, α and β stand for the different beliefs in the two cases, and r and r' for the remainders of the representative indices. I do not mean to suggest that the two facts are respectively taken as objective and subjective *because* of the α and β which severally attaches to them—that would be explaining the belief in objectivity or subjectivity by itself; possibly α and β are functions of a and b which characterize the bases—and, for aught we know, r and r' may also have a hand in the making of α and β ; the facts are labelled as objective and subjective *because* the substrata of immediate feeling in the two cases are materially different, and also perhaps *because* the element of the suggested in the one case (the one index) is materially different from that in the other case (the other index). In the light of these last remarks I have

$$F_1 = E_a^{ef[\phi(a, r), r]}, F_2 = E_b^{ef[\phi(b, r'), r']}.$$

I now pass on to a fuller consideration of the base and index of fact. In the first place, the base and the index are not at all distinguished in intuition. Here thought and feeling are fused together—I do not all discriminate the given from the suggested, the presented from the represented—and experience is certainly an undivided organic mass. I have called this F . In the second place, I have what I may call the reviewing or judging fact— F' . The reviewing fact is also a complete and concrete fact, though this and the fact reviewed or judged are necessarily different. Now, this reviewing fact may assume the form E_β^i , involving a recognition of the base element (β) and the index-element (i). It is a fact that knows another as dual in composition, as either an idea or thought imbedded in a substratum of immediate feeling, or as a mass of immediate feeling taking on an ideal or representative super-structure: thus the emphasis may be on the thought-element or on the feeling-element: the fact is taken either as E_β^i or as E_β^i , where I have expressed emphasis by an accent. In

either case, the experience knows another as one element *plus* another, as thought *and* feeling, as a presentative-representative complex. Let us briefly notice the four different cases in which F' may appear :

Case 1. Sense-experience : a picture, a song. Here the reviewing experience recognises of course an immediately given substratum of feeling that is to say, an element quiescent and self-sufficient—not necessarily and intrinsically bearing a reference to something beyond itself. This is the base, β' , clearly accentuated. But F' also recognises that the picture or the song as it exists for it is not complete or even significant without the fusion of a suggested factor : the picture is a picture only with an ideal structure put upon the given touches of colour and shade ; the song is a song only with the suggestive echoes which the tunes and breaks as caught by the ear awaken in the listener's mind. In the original fact F itself there was undoubtedly a confusion of these two elements, the given and the suggested ; for F also was a significant picture or an appreciated song. But there was no discriminative recognition of the two elements in F as there is in F' . F is characterised by elementary, intuitive homogeneity : so long as F lasts and I am completely merged in it, the picture and the song, with all their feelings and suggestions, appear as *all* given : the significance of the given touches of colour and shade the interpretation of the heard tunes and breaks is not gathered but found : there is as yet no thought of composition, there is only enjoyment and satisfaction.

Case II. Illusion : a rope-snake. When in the dim twilight a rope is mistaken for a snake, the concrete experience of the moment is undoubtedly F with all the characteristics that have been found in it. Even an illusion is a fact. The next pulse of experience which knows and judges the rope-snake as an illusion is also in its concrete fullness a fact, and ought to be denoted by F' . Clearly, in order that the illusion may be exposed, my thought must discriminate between what is immediately given, *e. g.*, a thin, black, longish object, and what is suggested and imposed, *e.g.*, life and other characteristic properties of the snake. In the original F , there was no such

discrimination : experience was all warm and self-satisfied. The duality of base and index necessarily emerges in the judging fact which, in the case of an illusion, not only distinguishes between them, but objectifies the one and regards the other as existing nowhere except in the imagination. The base of the fact F consists of two elements : the experience of the thin, black, longish object, and the emotional and organic feelings which gather round that experience. When F changes into F' , the former element of the base remains practically unchanged, but the latter element changes considerably : the emotion that possesses and pervades me when I am in the midst of an interesting hallucination not yet found out, cannot retain its ring of reality and earnestness when in a later pulse of experience the illusion is judged as such, or even when I can afford to be sufficiently cool and collected to look at a fact from aside, to be psychologically fit for stock-taking. The emotional basis of life is exceedingly unstable and volatile : not only does the emotional ring of a fact differ from that of a fiction, or rather, what is believed to be a fiction, but emotion commonly withdraws and cools considerably when its factual basis—the experience which it accompanies and tones—is being reviewed and scrutinized. Let us call these two elements of the base C and V —constant and variable respectively. Thus while V changes from F to F' and from F' to F'' , etc., C practically endures through all such vicissitudes of elaboration. Now, what about the index? The rope is a fact while the snake is a fiction. But the mere cognitive base of the experience—a thin, black, longish surface—would make neither a rope nor a snake. An index, an element of the suggested, is necessary to make the given sensation a fully endowed object. But the index that would dress up the given sensation into a snake cannot be the same as that would make it a rope : the V -part of the bases of the two experiences cannot also evidently be the same. Hence we are in a position to understand the following relations :

The reviewing fact which knows a rope and distinguishes between what is actually given and what is suggested and imposed $= F'_r = E^i_{\beta=C+V}$.

The reviewing fact which knows a rope-snake to be an illusion = $F'_s = E^I_{\gamma=C+V}$. r, s are the distinguishing marks which indicate that the former refers to rope and the latter to snake. It is to be noted that a so-called fact differs from a so-called fiction mainly on account of their characteristic indices. In F_s which is later found to be an illusion there is I instead of i . The v -parts are also different, but then it has to be observed that most of the emotional ring of a fact is an effect, a function, of its index : there is induced an emotion in me partly because of C but largely because of the suggestive halo, the lustre and meaning, which is allowed to gather round a given substratum of feeling. Generally, I may say therefore, that an error in perception such as the illusion of rope-snake arises from a *substitution of a wrong but more or less closely associated index and then objectification* : it would indeed be begging the question to offer this as a definition and explanation of error, but perhaps this may be safely allowed as a specific statement of error.

Case III. An immediate feeling of pleasure or pain. The actual experience is again F which later becomes in my review F' . This latter, by supposition, involves a recognition of a base and an index, a discrimination of what is immediately given from what is suggested. The base is clear, but what is the index ? No feeling ever appears in the mind as a solitary wayfarer to which the entire universe of mind is alien and apathetic. There are always dispositions and memories of past feelings to which the new-comer is more or less akin, and this makes every present feeling receive an impress and tone from the past acts of the drama of life. induces it to possess a romance, an interest, an import which no merely passing, unclaimed and isolated feeling could possess. The soul can never cry in the wilderness : unseen and unsuspected echoes linger and hover like angles on wings to hail, encourage and inspire every voice that is born amid the profound awe and grim earnestness of creation : feeling is the cry of the soul and it never comes without a context to usher and back it, without a store of ready suggestions to feed and fulfil it. Every present feeling of pleasure, like every present cognitive fact, is the last word the soul utters in its life's discourse so that,

it can have no significance without all that has gone before it. Thus it becomes possible to discriminate the base of a pleasurable or painful feeling from the index, between what I have now on account of the normal influence of the existing stimulus, and what I have on account of the lingering influence of past stimuli. It is no doubt possible to broadly distinguish the streams of the given and tributaries of the suggested in the slow process of feelings such as the charm of a landscape, the delight of a song, or the romance of a primrose : in surging and rushing feelings too, a like discrimination is possible. Two things are also to be observed in this connexion : The stress of the base and the index in feeling-facts is much more lively and apparent than in cognitive-facts. How profoundly is a given substratum of pleasure or pain changed by the contributions of memories and suggestions ! Again, we do not commonly recognise here any particularly durable part (C) in the base as we could do in cognitive facts.

Such splitting up of a mass of feeling into base and index is, it is needless to remind, conceptual. The whole experience F' which involves such an analysis and judgment of feeling, is itself a concrete fact. The experience that analyses and judges is not itself analysed and judged thereby : no self-analysis and self-criticism are possible in the life of the mind. An operation, analytic or synthetic, which is involved in a concrete experience, included within it, may be called an **immanent operation**. Now, every conscious operation that we know of, or can think of, is immanent : there is a concrete experience which includes the thought of the operation, but is not exhausted by this thought, is larger and more fundamental than the thought, is not therefore itself operated upon. Transcending absolutely the concrete fact, we can think of no operation whatever. The windows of experience must be shut so that we may have a system and a science : fling them wide open and the circling Mystery all round will press and close in : science and common sense will all be lost. What is this Mystery ? It is precisely the Fact. There is no transcendental logic, though there is transcendental life.

Case IV. An idea in the mind. The concrete experience

which particularly involves an idea is not an idea itself in the ordinary sense of the term : it is a quiescent, intuitive fact possessing as good a title as any recognised fact in mental life. We call it idea because we ignore the whole and look to a particularly favoured and emphasised part, because, in short, we mistake a pragmatic fact for the concrete fact. When, however, my interest lies in the whole and not in a section, as for example, when I am anxious to grasp and study the fact in its actual fullness, or to assign its place in the phenomenal life of the world, even the ordinary pragmatic interest goes, and the idea in the mind is readily dubbed as genuine an event as any over which the very life-blood of Science has been profusely spilt. Commonly my attention seizes upon a portion of the concrete fact, finds that this portion bears, necessarily and intrinsically, a reference to something beyond itself ; and that is therefore disturbed by a characteristic disquiet ; is temporarily interested in its antecedents and bearings, mistakes it for the whole fact of the moment, and calls it an idea. Now, what can be the base and the index of an idea ? The cephalic and organic sensations, the half-attended sounds, sights and smells which undoubtedly enter into the constitution of the entire experience of the moment, the unfailing, though fluctuating, emotional tone which attends every fact in life, constitute in their not-commonly-differentiated massiveness, the intuitive base or datum of an idea. Every pragmatic fact, whether an idea or a partial impression, must have a background, a setting, a basis, in order that it may stand, and this basis is always an immediately given substratum of feeling. But is this the whole element of the given in an idea-emphasised experience ? Is not the emphasised idea itself equally given ? Undoubtedly ; the idea is not only given along with the organic sensations and other elements of the intuitive background, but its ideal and remote character is not even scented in the original concrete experience which does not review, but only lives and passes away. So, if the idea itself is to be fastened to the base, what will remain for the index ? Even an idea soon gathers around itself a representative following : an idea in appearing finds a host of suggestions and associations and by these it is nursed, informed and

consummated. This host of suggestions might well be regarded as the index of an idea. It is clear therefore that the distinction 'given and suggested' does not always keep pace with the distinction 'intuitive and ideational'. In this last case, a given idea goes over to the base which we have so far reserved for intuition; again, when a given substratum of feeling suggests and induces in me another immediate feeling—that is to say, a feeling carrying, necessarily and intrinsically, a reference to something beyond itself—is this latter feeling to be regarded as belonging to the base or to the index? It should be observed, however, that the distinction of 'base and index' which I have introduced, though possibly a convenient and interesting one, pertains only to the view-point of the reviewing experience. If we settle to reserve the base for intuition, the idea in this last case, though given, will go up to the index; and the suggested and induced feeling of a given feeling, e.g. the delight which the *suggestions* of a song induce in me and which goes to augment the original delight produced by the melody, though suggested, will go down to the base.

Now, granting that the index is to be commonly reserved for idea, we may enquire as to what is precisely implied in such recognition of the index-element. It has become sufficiently clear by this time that an idea is known and judged as an idea in the reviewing Fact or F'. It may be the dominating element of a fact, but, so long as the fact has not turned back upon itself or reviewed itself, it is simply given, with, of course, an attendant feeling of stress but not recognised as representative in character. For such recognition, I must seize upon a part of the living mass, emphasise it driving temporarily the rest into the twilight of consciousness, note it as a rehearsal of, or a prelude to, an experience of another *order* (a circumstance which I may define as *factual reference*), therefore haunted by a sense of tension and anxiety and accompanied by a belief that this is a dependent, subjective fact. It presupposes (1) temporary relaxation of the total fact or F; (2) accentuation of a part; (3) recognition of this part as having factual reference, and hence dependence and stress.

The three striking features in the re-birth of the Fact, in F that is to say, taken in proper order, should be regarded as the prototypes of the three fundamental operations in Science. Relaxation of the whole and accentuation of a part is the circumstance that attends the birth of Philosophy in its widest sense : Life will do only with a whole accentuated or emphasised in a part. aspect or feature : but thought is possible only by an *abstraction* of the accentuated part from the whole in which it is imbedded : Thought must take things to pieces and fancy that it can regard each in some manner of isolation and combination. Factual reference is the basis, as we shall see later, of all analytical processes in Mathematics and Scientific Theory, e.g. the reference of a point to a fixed origin and planes in Cartesian Geometry, or simply to an origin in vector-analysis. Stress in the life of the Fact is the source and foundation of all kinds of agitation, whether physical, vital or psychical. Also, the conception of independent and dependent variable emerges primarily from the **polarisation of the fact** into feeling and thought, base and index. These however are only hints which I shall follow up as I proceed. I have just now regarded feeling and thought, base and index, as primary variables that have to set examples to other variables that we can think of. Now, let us look a little carefully into the nature of these *prototype-variables*.

Suppose we denote an absent fact, past or future, by the notation Ft , where t represents time. In the beginning of this essay I have been somewhat anxious to bring out the fact that in F proper there is involved no thought of time or t . Then, if i be the index, we have two relations : $i = \phi(Ft)$, $i = \phi(\beta)$, where β stands for the base. The index in F' is supposed by me to be a rehearsal of, or an introduction to, or to be otherwise determined by an absent fact ; it is also believed by me as determined by the given substratum of feeling in F' ; for the appearance of a given idea in the mind there must generally be a given assemblage of feeling or intuitive conditions, and to a given change in this mass of intuitive conditions there generally corresponds a certain change in the idea, thought or conception : the intuitive basis of the thought Hamlet cannot evidently be the same as that of a

breakfast. In this example, the thought of Hamlet is supposed to be determined by my previous acquaintance with Hamlet, and also by the total intuitive context of my life at the moment of the thought. Hence, coupling together the two relations we have, $i = \phi Ft, \beta'$. Now, this being clear let us consider somewhat in detail this instructive relation.

1. Clearly i is a dependent variable in relation to Ft , when t denotes past time. But how can i be supposed to be dependent variable in relation to it, when t denotes future time? Do we regard an anticipating idea as in any way dependent on the fact anticipated? Can the actual be believed to depend on the non-existent? Without opening a discussion on this point I may briefly answer that the dependence of i on a future fact may mean that a purpose or end or coming event shapes or otherwise determines a present idea in me : thus the ideal structure of my present experience will be very considerably determined by what I am going to do or have, though the purpose or the thought of the coming event may but very vaguely influence me : I may be hardly always conscious of the purpose or of the nature and circumstances of the approaching event. But is the purpose, however vaguely present, the thought of the approaching event, however imperfectly informed, a present or a future fact? And if admittedly a present fact, can ever Ft as a *future* fact influence me and my belongings? Again, does a past Ft fare better than a future one so far as this influence or *action at a distance* is concerned? Is action at a distance at all possible in living experience? Whatever may take place behind the scenes, something can be *known or conceived as* influencing my experience from a distance or from outside of it, as a past or future fact is believed to do, only by becoming a part of the experience itself. In other words, no experience can outrun itself : if it is F' , its index may be known as a dependent variable in relation to an Ft , but this Ft as known is *within* F' , though of course it is supposed to be something outside of it : Thus $F' = E_B$. $i = \phi(Ft)$. This circumstance I may call *temporal projection of the index of Fact*. The past, the present and the future are dissolved in the timeless given of Fact-stuff or F ; they meet in F' : thus the thought-index

may be 'the *present* ideal structure is partly determined by a *past* fact and partly by a *future*'. By such projection in F' , i which was simply given in the previous fact, becomes determined by reference to three temporal planes (which I shall take leave to call t , T and t' respectively), just as in science an external thing is determined by reference to three spatial planes. In accordance with the symbols just used, a past, a present and a future fact will be denoted respectively as $\dagger t$, FT , Ft' . The experience which knows a past, a present, or a future fact is itself a time-less given fact F , or becomes in reviewing itself a present fact.

Now, suppose we represent present time by a horizontal plane. Then, appropriately we can represent past time by a plane inclined at a certain angle to the first plane and projecting downwards and also future time by another inclined at a certain angle to the first and projecting upwards. Angle in the two cases will mean the quantities of attentive effort (say, θ and θ') that are respectively required to turn clear and vivid thought from the present level to past and future time as such ; it is clear from introspection that in directing my regard from present outlook to past or future as such, a definite partial rotation of the line of view-point is necessary, and this rotation undoubtedly induces a feeling of attentive effort which we may, if we choose, represent by an angle. The three planes may respectively be called T , t and t' as before. Now, every F' in its wholeness is a present fact and therefore appears in a line parallel to T ; but in its index there is commonly a reference to past and to future (e.g. an end in view or coming event) ; accordingly, this index can be resolved into two components one parallel to t and the other to t' . Thus we have three components : F' in its wholeness and particularly its base β is resolved parallel to T , and the index into two components parallel respectively to t and t' . Here I present in a crude manner a few of the elements of what I propose to call **Temporal Analysis of Fact** : I shall endeavour to follow up this suggestive subject in future.

2. How is Ft , past or future, supposed to be affected by i ? A past fact though supposed to determine the index of a present one is not supposed to be reacted upon by it : thus, in my

conception, while i is a dependent variable in relation to Ft , this latter is an independent variable in relation to the former. A future fact also, as a fact in the popular sense, is commonly believed by me as not liable to be affected by i : a coming event will be no respecter of my hopes and fears concerning it, or my ideas and calculations relating to it. In this sense, it has of course assured independence. But a future fact as a pulse of my life of experience cannot certainly be believed to be altogether independent of my present attitude regarding it : to a certain extent it is true indeed that I see or have a fact as I wish and am prepared to see and have it : the influence of a present fact is *prospective* in this sense that facts in my conscious life are ever in the making, and what I commonly accept as facts are only phases in a process which has possibly an endless before and an endless after : they are sections of an infinite concrete Fact. It is thus that I discriminate the cause from its consequences, the germ from the organism, the epochs of history in a mighty sweep of World-evolution.

3. The variation of i necessarily affects β , or the mass of intuitive feeling in which the suggested structure is grounded, and hence affects F' : but this resulting variation is not uniform throughout the mass of β . There is a particularly unstable part in the base (V), viz., the organic sensations and emotional tone ; and there is a relatively stable part (C) in it, e.g., the visual appearance of a landscape at which I am gazing, or the monotonous moan of a dove to which I am listening. The echoes or suggestions of a fact as they gather make themselves felt most on the organic and emotional tone, but do not very sensibly affect the given sights and sounds that are already there : smells and tastes are more or less affected because of their kinship with organic feelings. It has been observed before how readily and naturally β will affect i . The interaction or stress of β and i in the development of the Fact-stuff emerges then as our conclusion. There are no air-tight compartments in the Fact, and no conceived process in a Fact can be an one-sided affair. What has been so far called the reviewing Fact or F' may be better described as polarised Fact : β and i are the two poles ; the

development of a fact after polarisation is partly a result of the stress between the poles.

Consider for a moment the polarised fact in a slightly different aspect. $F' = E'$.

Case I. Can β be 0 or evanescent? Can the basis of given feeling ever altogether vanish in experience? No. The nature of this basis may of course alter: the organic sensations which necessarily accompany all conscious processes of an embodied spirit in normal and all known conditions may form no part in the conscious operations of a disembodied spirit, if one should exist, or of even an embodied spirit like ourselves in abnormal and unknown conditions; but in default of them some residual feeling, irreducible as we suppose, must remain. Experience, as we conceive or know, cannot be purged of its β and ever be an all *i*.

Case II. Can *i* be 0 or evanescent? Can an experience be *all* given and contain no element of the suggested or represented? Can I only feel without in the least recognising, remembering expecting or otherwise gathering and representing? *Ordinarily* not; though it should be observed in passing that in Fact-stuff or *F*, I only feel without discriminatingly recognising the base-element and the index-element. I have put down '*ordinarily*' in italics: in the sequel I may have occasion to discuss if such an experience as pure feeling or simple presentation is at all possible. I note however this: Since $i = \phi(\beta)$, $\phi(\beta) = 0$, if $i = 0$. Should this second equation be taken to mean that β also is 0? Not necessarily. Suppose there is a common independent variable (x) of which both β and i are functions, e.g., what I believe as an external object in sense-perception determines both the basis of immediate feeling in me and the ideal structure raised upon the basis. Thus, $i = f(x)$, $\beta = \phi(x)$. Then the ratio $\frac{i}{\beta} = \frac{f(x)}{\phi(x)}$. Now, suppose both the numerator and the denominator become = 0, when $x = a$; that is to say, let us imagine that for a certain value of the common determinant—whatever that be—of i and β , they both vanish and the ratio takes the

indeterminate form $\frac{0}{0}$. Such a value of x is, however, imaginary, for no actual value of x can β be supposed to vanish. But waving this objection let us consider the ratio of i and β when x is made $=a$. Here, by putting $x = \alpha + h$ and not α at once and then making h evanescent, we can find the true or *limiting* value of the ratio to be $\frac{f'(\alpha)}{\phi'(\alpha)}$, where the accent denoted as usual the first derived function or differential co-efficient.

1. If $\phi'(\alpha)$ be 0, but not $f'(\alpha)$, the true value of the ratio is ∞ . The differential co-efficient of a constant is Zero. So that where the base of a Fact is an absolute constant, and the index a variable, the index is an infinitely large quantity as compared with the base : if the base be unity, the index is infinity. Is this a real or an imaginary case ? We shall see.

2. If $f'(\alpha)$ be 0, but not $\phi'(\alpha)$, the true value of the ratio $\frac{f(\alpha)}{\phi(\alpha)}$ is clearly 0. Where the index is a constant, and the base a variable, their ratio or mutual relation is nothing. Properly interpreted this will mean that between a constant index and a variable base there can be no relation whatever.

3. If $f'(\alpha)$ be 0 and also $\phi'(\alpha)$ be 0, then we are thrown back again on the indeterminate form $\frac{0}{0}$. But here we can find the true or limiting value by differentiating $\frac{f'(\alpha)}{\phi'(\alpha)}$ further, until the derived functions of the numerator and the denominator do not both vanish. Thus the true value of $\frac{i}{\beta}$ is that of $\frac{f^{(n)}(\alpha)}{\phi^{(n)}(\alpha)}$. The interpretation of this case is important. When both the base and the index of a fact are constant, their mutual relation is indeterminate for conception. It is true of course that for a certain value of the base there is a certain value also of the index : the base and the index of a fact, as we ordinarily know them, must vary together and remain constant together. But so long as they remain constant in a fact, the fact is dumb and alogical : it is Fact-stuff. To polarise the fact, to look into the constitution of the fact, we must somehow vary the fact, both in its base and in

its power. If we attend to β , it is not only lighted up but sensibly changed, and i is also faded and changed by being cast into the shade of inattention. A similar change takes place when we attend to i . Thus though we believe that a constant base carries with it a constant index and *vice versa*, yet we can discriminate and compare them not as constants but as variables. They are mutually dependent variables; and it is only by abstraction that we can apply the principles of partial differentiation to a function involving the two variables i and β . Generally, the application of mathematics to the Science of Fact essentially presupposes abstraction.

I shall separately note three interesting sub-cases

Case III. If i be ∞ , the fact again takes an indeterminate form β^∞ . In the previous case where the index was supposed to 0, the fact assumed the form β^0 , which, apart from all discussion regarding the *ratio* of i and β , might be taken as equivalent to unity on the analogy of the accepted mathematical principle $a^0=1$. This analogy however, like any other analogy employed in the Fundamental Science, ought not to be assumed as proving it. The unity of the Fact from the evanescence of the index is established by direct reflection. Even a Fact-stuff is an undifferentiated *complex* continuum, not a synthetic manifold indeed, but a manifold alogically appearing as unity. Now, this being the constitution of a given fact, let us imagine the representative, suggested, ideal structure to be gradually removed; what becomes of the fact? The manifoldness of the fact also gradually crumbles away: the full-fledged orange that I am looking at soon ceases to be an orange and forthwith becomes an yellow surface. Is this yellow surface objectified and localised a pure presentation, not in any way backed and seasoned by the echoes of my past experiences, not in the least prejudiced by my hopes, interests and expectations? Hardly; but even assuming that it is very nearly a pure presentation, how much simplified the manifoldness, cumbrousness and complexity of my experience has become! In the *limit*, I may say, therefore, the complex unity

of a fact becomes simple unity when the gathered or representative index has become evanescent. Or,

$$\text{Lt } i=0 \ E_{\beta}^i = \text{unity.}$$

This principle underlies the mathematical principle that $\frac{a^m}{a^n} = a^{m-n}$, or that in division the powers are subtracted, and hence that $a^0 = 1$.

What are called acquired perceptions are hard to scare away in visual experiences, so that the verification of the above limit is hardly possible in those cases. But sitting up quietly in the dead of night amid darkness and stillness, and purging my mind of all thought, I have often listened to a soft, monotonous, continuous sound, in a state of complete abandon to and absorption in it. Here the index has been reduced to a minimum : how does the given substratum of feeling appear to me ? It is a simple, featureless unity, very much unlike the unity of a song. In a similar mood, gazing up into the clear, blue sky, or having nothing else to regard than perfect gloom shrouding me, I have experiences of a kind of simplicity to which the luxury and richness of my life's menu will not ordinarily allow me to approximate. To the simplicity of the two facts, *viz.*, just going to be asleep, and just going to be awake, we already have alluded.

Now, what will be the value of the limit $\text{Lt } i = \infty \ E_{\beta}^i$? *Infinitesimal* index has made a fact a simple unity ; *infinite* index will, I think, make it infinite. The index and the base have been discriminated in the polarised fact, and not in the Fact-stuff : these two are conceived as dividing the fact between them. In all ordinary experiences these two elements are recognised as finite. Now, in order that the index may be conceived as infinite, the base must be reduced to nothing ; for if it be something, that something will limit the index and thus make it finite. All must be the index, and nothing base ; but since intuition is an inalienable datum of experience, the all-and-infinite index will really be all-and-infinite base : the base will be *everything*. This is curious logic, but it must be true. The fact is that the opposition of index and base is gone when the index is supposed to

become infinite, and that the fact itself becomes an all-given infinity. The metaphysical consequence of this principle is momentous. Suppose we conceive an Universal Mind, analogous to Hegel's Realised Absolute or Green's Spiritual Principle in Nature, in which the infinite tissue of relations which we know as the world exists eternally realised. Can the opposition of 'given and suggested' exist amid the infinite richness of such a Mind? We cannot conceive. In the later sections we shall have fitter and ampler opportunities to dilate on the consequences of our principles; at present we shall be content with the principles themselves. Thus we have:

$$\text{Lt } i = \infty \quad E_{\beta}^i = \infty.$$

Case IV. If $i = c$ (constant), so is also β . For a given mass of intuitive feelings there is a certain index and can be no other; and *vice versa*. But as we have already observed, the base and the index can be discriminately known only as variables. They are constants only in pulses of Fact-stuff. Try to let alone either the base or the index undisturbed in the judging fact, and the eye of judgment is put out, polarisation is gone, and the fact at once reverts to dumb, allogical Fact-stuff. Thus we have:

$$\text{Lt } i = c \quad E_{\beta}^i = F.$$

Case V. Closely analogous to the preceding case is this last. When i is undefined—I do not say indeterminate—, when I do not point to any part of the Fact-whole as the zone of the suggested *defined* by the rest of the mass which I conceive as given, the base is also, from the very nature of the case, undefined. I do not allude to the *completion* of the process of their definition in the mass, which may take time and may never be an accomplished fact; I refer to the *beginning* of their mutual definition. Thus we have:

$$i = ? \text{ (undefined) } E_{\beta}^i = F' = F.$$

Before proceeding to the fundamental Law of Fact-operations, I shall do well perhaps to consider for a moment the various *orders* of Fact that have been so far brought to light.

I. In the beginning of this essay I have dwelt at some length on the nature of the Fact-stuff. Even what is a Reviewing

fact in relation to another fact analysed and reviewed, is in itself a Fact-stuff. A Fact in appearing can look before and after, but it can never transcend itself, or can in relation to *itself* be a reviewing Fact. We have, however :

Fact-stuff = $F = F_c$, where c denotes that the fact is concrete.

II. The reviewing, awakened or polarised fact has also received some measure of attention. Polarisation, as Maxwell conceives it, is the process by which an elementary portion of matter develops opposite properties on its two sides. Suppose E is an element of an experience-continuum ; polarisation is the process by which δE becomes $= i E \beta$, or E_{β}^i , where i and β , though mutually dependent, are assumed to be opposite in character. We shall not pause here to discuss in what sense and to what extent they are opposite. Under this head we have :

Polarised Fact = $F' = F_c$.

Ila. In Fact-analysis we have, as we shall presently see, not only *double* polarity appearing in the constitution of the fact, but triple or *triangular* polarity, in which an element of the continuum δ is broken up into a *base*, an *index*, and into a *co-efficient*. This co-efficient of a reviewing fact I have yet to define. A fact is conceived by me as including not only the elements of the given and the suggested—its complete nature is taken by me as exhausted not simply by what I do directly feel concerning it and actually ascribe to it—but an indefinitely larger and possible element outside of what are *actually* given and suggested. The belief that a fact is possibly larger than what it is directly thought to be is indeed *inside* and not outside the concrete fact. It is not an element added on to the fact F , but developed out of, and imbedded in, it. Nevertheless it is an especially interesting feature of the concrete reviewing fact, and deserves a special exhibition like the base-element and the index-element. Thus a fact is ordinarily taken by us as an amalgam of actual and possible, of definite and indefinite, or I might even say, of finite and infinite. In a certain sense, the finite is never complete and sufficient by itself ; it requires a plenum of infinite or, at any rate,

indefinite to vitalise, sustain and consummate it. Thus the infinite is immanent in the finite and transcends it : the tiniest fact is a twinkle in the eye of the Eternal Wonder, the faintest echo is a ripple in the ocean of Unfathomable Fulfilment. But poetry and metaphysics apart, every fact is believed by me to live and grow in a sustaining plenum of the possible : if it is an actual given *plus* an actual suggested, it is also a possible given *plus* a possible suggested ; at any stage of the fact-possession I do not believe that the tale has been all told, that I have and know all that is to be had and known regarding it, or even that I have and know it *as* a normal being under normal circumstances would have had or known it. This interesting and distinguishable element of the reviewing fact I propose to call its co-efficient, to be denoted by the prefix α . Thus the triangular polarity of a fact will be represented by the symbol $F' = \alpha F_{\beta}'$. The co-efficient will come up more prominently for future treatment.

Here, however, I cannot resist the temptation of noting one or two points touching the Fact-co-efficient. The co-efficient as I have conceived it is the pole of the possible in the constitution of the reviewing fact opposed to the base and the index which together constitute the pole of the actual : the given feeling is an actual element of the fact and so is the suggested idea : both are actual modes of consciousness. What is opposed to them as the pole of the possible is, on the other hand, not an actual state of consciousness ; I merely believe that the fact as I have it can grow, can suffer changes affecting both its mass and its configuration, but as to the nature or lines of its growth I have as yet no *actual* conception. If I have any actual conception, then the portion of the fact to the extent of that conception will go over perhaps to the index : in fact, my experience develops simply by such continued transference of feelings and ideas from the realm of the unknown and unsuspected possible to that of actual consciousness as represented by the base and the index. The suggested element of a fact may also be taken to mean a body of possible feeling—an idea is a possible feeling. But this is possible in a quite different sense. As an idea : every presentation in conscious life suffers the chance of being represented.

Nevertheless, both are actual states or conditions of consciousness in so far as they have been polarised into the base and the index of the reviewing fact. The co-efficient, on the other hand, though not being an actual state is necessarily supported by an actual state : the intuitive datum of life is unfailing, and the Primeval Night of an unknown possible can settle round a snug little fact only by securing an intuitive basis within it to hinge upon. Nothing can touch or belong to a fact without touching or forming a part of its basis : in any case, I must *believe in*, and have a sense of the unknown and possible within the limits of the fact itself, to have this third dimension or pole of the fact pronounced. Where the sense of the possible is evanescent the fact is known and taken complacently as it is actually found and defined in consciousness. I may also note some cases concerning the influence of the co-efficient on the fact.

(1) Clearly the three poles or dimensions, i , β and α are not mutually independent variables ; ordinarily at any rate, one dimension cannot be assumed to vary, keeping the other two constant. As before, the principles of Partial Differentiation apply to the concrete fact only after abstraction. We believe that for a given value of actual there is only a *certain* possible and no other regarding a fact, and *vice versa*. This belief underlies, as is clear, the principle of the Uniformity of Nature and particularly that of Universal Causation. If the actual structure of a fact has changed, the possible structure cannot be assumed to remain unchanged—'fact' indeed being taken in the full, concrete sense of the present essay, and not in the abstract, pragmatic sense of popular usage.

(2) When the co-efficient or δ is constant (c), the actual is also constant. But, the, in the reviewing fact the three poles cannot be attended to *clearly* all at once, and these being complex variables, one which necessarily changes upon being attended to dynamically influences the other two or changes them. This can be readily verified from actual experiment. Hence we are in a position to lay down and appreciate the following principle :

$$\text{Lt } \alpha = c \alpha E_{\beta}^i = F' = F.$$

(3) By definition α is indefinite or even unknown. To make it definite to a certain extent is to enrich the actual to *that* extent : but the unknown or α still remains. But suppose it is completely defined ; the $\alpha=0$. And if A be realised α which is distributed between β and i , we have :

$$\text{Lt } \alpha=0 \text{ } \alpha F_{\beta}^i=0 \text{ } F_{\beta}^i > A.$$

(4) Let us approach the last problem from another viewpoint. Suppose we gradually reduce the element of the possible in a reviewing fact, until at last this becomes evanescent. What becomes of the fact ? It is *all* actual (including of course both base and index) to which, as I conceive, no increment is possible : the limit of possibility has been reached, or possible and actual have become indetical. What does this complete exhaustion of the possible in the actual, of the unknown in the known, imply ? It may mean either of two things. That the actual fact for experience has become infinite, knowledge has become limitless, so that the field cannot be partitioned between actual and possible at all ; or that the fact has become a *pure* actual, to which as such, no possible can be fastened in conception. An example I must take to illustrate this distinction between *all* actual and *pure* actual. Suppose I have a feeling in my mind and I am interested in knowing the feeling actually as it is given. In intuition I know it of course ; but in reflection, though perhaps it is impossible to recall to life a fact once dead and cold, I fancy that I know it in a fashion. Now, if my interest is in the *statical* fact itself and *not* in its history or development or objective correspondence—if, that is to say, I disavow for one moment all interest in the *dynamical* fact—the fact is a pure actual. A feeling as feeling is final and unquestionable for the mind : it is not projected and referred to anything outside of itself, hence there can be in it no suspicion of objective reality or unreality. Provided I do not bother myself about the necessary fallibility of reflection in the portraiture of living experiences, and hence do not question the accuracy of the reviewing fact in relation to the fact reviewed, an experience *as* experience I take as ultimate. If I have seen a snake instead of the real rope in the dusk, the

snake and not the rope is the fact for my experience. So long as I take my stand squarely upon it and refuse to budge an inch, there can evidently be no question as to what my experience would really or *possibly* become. Securely planted in my own experience, for which as experience I am the last authority, I cannot be challenged and contradicted on any historical, practical or objective grounds. I call this experience, self-sufficient and secure, jealously limiting and guarding itself, *pure* actual. All actual I have taken to mean *infinitely* actual, not shutting out the possible which may well exist without being regarded, but swamping and swallowing up the possible. In ordinary experience we do not come near to this. We have, however :

$$\text{Lt } \alpha=0 \alpha E_{\beta}^i = F_{\beta}^i, \text{ or, } \infty.$$

(5) Lastly, when it is infinite, the fact may mean either of two things according as 'infinite' is taken to mean all-pervasive infinite, suffering no limitation whatever, either in magnitude or in direction ; or an infinite limited in one direction but unlimited in another or other directions (cf. the mathematical notions of $+\infty$ and $-\infty$).

(5a) When we take 'infinite' in the former sense, an infinite-co-efficient will render the fact itself infinite and *all* possible. But a fact all possible and no actual is an imaginary case. Substitute the world for the fact ; according to certain cosmological theories the manifested is reabsorbed into the unmanifested after one cycle of creation and so remains till a new cycle begins. Now, does the world become by such re-absorption all possible and no actual ? I merely raise the problem. The case, however, admits of two solutions :

$$\text{Lt } \alpha=\infty \alpha E_{\beta}^i = \infty F_{\beta}^i = \infty \times \text{unity} = \infty$$

or,

$$\text{Lt } \alpha=\infty \alpha F_{\beta}^i = \text{infinite possible} = \text{infinite actual.}$$

This latter solution requires elucidation. Polarity is relative, and to be maintained must presuppose *at least* two poles. One pole simply means no polarity at all : there can be no monopolar fact.

Hence when $\alpha=0$, E_{β}^i remains, for still there is the polarity of i and β , but when all is possible and actual $=0$, polarity is gone; so that possible as possible cannot remain; and since fact can never be conceived to be wholly emptied of the substance of the given, 'all possible' becomes equivalent to 'all actual' or to 'all intuitively given'.

The meaning of the saving unity was suggested by the analogy of the cosmological example. Does not the unity also limit the all-pervasive infinitude of the possible? Undoubtedly, if the unity is assumed to be something external to the *infinity*. I shall not, however, pause to discuss the metaphysical consequence of this principle.

(5b) If 'infinite' be taken in the latter sense, we have a simple case, *viz.*,

Lt $\alpha = \infty$ $\alpha E_{\beta}^i = F'$ itself; for, in all ordinary reviewing experiences, the extent of the possible is believed to be infinite, limited only by the circle of what are actually felt *and* represented in the experience.

III. **Pragmatic Fact** is the portion of the fact especially attended to and passing ordinarily for the concrete fact. The nature of the pragmatic fact I have already dwelt upon. It is to be noted, however, that the pragmatic fact is an abstract and not a concrete fact. Hence the materials of Science, starting with Psychology and ending with Pure Mathematics, are all necessarily Abstract. The purely concrete fact absolutely refuses to give sittings to the man of Science: Science begins with the polarised fact or F' which, however, may be looked upon as concrete so far as it goes. Thus we have:

Pragmatic Fact $= f_p = f_a$ (abstract).

IV. **Fact-sections** mean the elements and *relations* among elements into which F breaks up an experience. The fact-sections are obviously created by the successive movements of the regarding attention over a given continuum of experience: this is commonly called differentiation of the continuum. The reviewing fact is conceived to be these differentiated elements

again put together *plus*, of course, a necessary intuitive basis. Thus using the symbols d and S respectively for differentiation and integration, and putting f_s for fact-section, we have the obvious relation :

$$F = \alpha E_{\beta}^{F_t} = \int e d f_s,$$

which means that the reviewing fact *conceives* (hence the place in the index) a given previous fact as equivalent to a number of differentiated fact-sections integrated : an apple is thus believed to be a synthesis of a certain colour, a certain taste, a certain flavour, etc. But the index which includes this analytic and synthetic conception must have a substratum of immediate feeling to rest upon, in the reviewing fact ; commonly F_t as we have not re-presented to ourselves may not be *exactly* the same as that was presented to us, and hence that a future reviewing fact returning to it, F'' , may *possibly* represent it more faithfully, or at any rate, in a different manner. This circumstance has been indicated by the prefix α . It is the suggestion of later development contained in F' , *viz.*, that this may develop into F'' . Thus we have :

$$\text{Fact-section} = f_s = f_a.$$

V. **Fact-operation** is the conscious process or operation by which (1) F is changed into F' and (2) F' is changed into F'^{dn} , where dn means *n*th stage in the development of F' . To a fuller understanding of this I shall endeavour to come presently ; but in the meanwhile we have :

$$\text{Fact-operation} = f_o = f_a.$$

I shall perhaps be permitted to add two extra-ordinary cases.

VI. Where the index of a fact is zero, the fact is an absolute unity, admitting of no diversity either internal or external. Or, more correctly, with the evanescence of the index-pole, the base-pole also vanishes : the fact becomes an unpolarised fact of pure given. Such a fact is clearly beyond the antithesis of 'one and many'. But pure unity is the conception that perhaps comes nearest to the native inscrutability of the Fact : this is what we think when the veil shrouding Existence is *just*

uplifted. Now, what can be our co-efficient in such a fact? A fact absolutely one can have neither an index nor a co-efficient. *Absolute* unity I have defined to be 'unity presenting no internal or external diversity.'

VII. Where the index is infinite, the Fact itself is infinite. I have already distinguished between two kinds of infinitude; an infinity that suffers no limitation either in magnitude or in direction or in category may be called absolute infinitude. Space is *not* Time, it is *not* Matter, it is *not* Force, and so on: these are so many limitations to the infinitude of Space. It is nevertheless *Scalar* infinity, beyond all limitations of direction. But in mathematics we commonly distinguish between $+\infty$ and $-\infty$, where evidently infinitude is taken as directed magnitude. I might call this *Vector* infinity. Now, if the index is an absolute infinity, it is all-absorbing, and hence cannot maintain itself apart as a pole of index at all. So that the polarisation of the fact vanishes, and we have an infinite stretch of mere given intuitively known, but not conceived, as given. If it is a scalar infinity, admitting of a rival category or categories, we should have perhaps three piles of infinite capacity: we have an infinite presentation, with an infinite actual suggestion, and with a sense of infinite possibility. Is this a real or an imaginary case? I only raise an enquiry, but do not pause to meet it. When, lastly, the index is a vector infinity—when the mind is teeming with infinite suggestions in *one* line or direction, the Fact to which such an index is attached cannot itself be finite. Of the three aspects or poles of a fact, the two actual poles stand on a somewhat different footing in relation to the possible. The possible may be conceived to be infinite without necessarily making either the actual presentation or the actual representation infinite. The fact also remains a finite fact. But, on the other hand, infinitude of either the base or the index will make the fact itself infinite. Let me give names to these two last kinds of Fact: *Unitary Fact* (F_u) and *Infinite Fact* (F_i) respectively.

Adopting the suggestive distinction of *Scalar* and *Vector*, I may say at once that any concrete fact, F_o , is a scalar and not

a vector. A fact is analogous to an area or a volume to which the notion of direction does not apply. Taking 'direction' in a somewhat flexible sense I observe that f_p , f_s and f_o all imply direction of regard and emphasis and hence the altering of the potential of a point, feature or aspect in the given continuum. The given continuum is not itself an equipotential surface : the difference of potentials $V_A - V_B$, between any two points, A and B, is not zero. But with the incidence of regard over an element of the surface, its potential is changed. Suppose we denote a scalar fact as SF and a vector fact as VF. Then, can we define f_s as that which changes SF into VF? No. There is no miracle by which a fact can be made to cease to be a fact : f_p and f_s which have been regarded as directed magnitudes can never be isolated or taken apart from the concrete tissue of existence. So that f_o can only change SF into $SE_{\beta}^{i=VF}$. f_o itself cannot, however, be regarded as pure vector ; it is a process of experience by which F is changed into F', may be resolved into a scalar and a vector part. How, for example, can I turn from the intuition of a rose to an analytic conception of it? An operation is necessary which is partly intuitive and massive and scalar, and partly representative and directed and vector : there is an element in the operation which lacks any sign of direction and another element which possesses. Indeed fact-operation may be regarded and studied from two distinct standpoints. The operation by which F is changed into F' may itself be a complete and concrete fact ; or it may form a part of the reviewing experience itself : in the reviewing fact itself there may be a representation not only as to *what* the previous fact was but also as to *how* such a representation takes place : thus the reviewing fact may involve both the elements and the manner of representation. In this latter sense, f_o is an abstract segment of a fact. Commonly, however, there may be distinct reviewing facts, one concerned with the representation of a fact as it was, and the other concerned with the representation of the manner or way in which there has been a transition of experience from F to F' : this latter interest, we note, is generally scientific.

8. *General Law of Fact-operation.*

The fundamental equation of the Fact is :

$$F'_0 = U, \dots\dots\dots (1)$$

where the right-hand side means unthinkable or alogical. Clearly, Fact is not unknowable, for in its very essence it is experience in its concrete wholeness. Every concrete experience is unthinkable or logical as represented in a succeeding reviewing fact. The accent shows that a fact can think itself alogical not in presentation but representation.

The first derived equation of the thinkable Fact is :

$$F'_1 = I'_f, \dots\dots\dots (2)$$

where the right-hand side expresses the fact that F is thought as an unbounded continuum finitely determined and constituting a unity. This requires a bit of explanation. An experience is taken by me as bounded, limited and therefore finite, because I am swayed by a pragmatic interest and care to note only particular features in a continuum. But is the experience itself finite on that account? I think not. Every experience that comes to me, even that of a dew-drop or a particle of sand, appears not as exhausted in the special object of its regard, but as a continuum spreading itself without bounds. There are the outlying fields of comparative inattention, the massive organic sensations which constitute a larger whole in which the dew-drop or particle of sand is set; but perhaps even these outlying vistas of twilight and shade may be thought to be finite in extent. But I feel my concrete experience of the moment does not terminate with these: I feel that what I know as the dew-drop, the half-attended myriads of sounds, sights and smells which enrich my experience of the dew-drop, the organic sensations, emotions and ideal suggestions constitute only a *part* of the whole experience: the whole experience being distinctly felt as an infinite expanse of consciousness or awareness in which is distinguished a finite mass of especially determined feeling, e.g., dew-drop, cephalic feelings etc., constituting, however, in all the wealth of its variety a unity. In this respect, every experience may be compared to unbounded space in which, let us imagine, a rainbow has appeared. We need not ask the proud philosopher to tell us what the rainbow

may be : but do we not actually feel the hues of this celestial delight gradually fade and melt away as our attention moves from the central colours of the band to the borders and then to the surrounding space ? Who will say that my whole experience of the moment is exhausted by the colours of the rainbow ? I have an experience of space especially emphasised at a particular feature. What the rainbow is to the whole extent of space, my pragmatic finite fact is to the whole concrete experience of the moment : consciousness like space cannot be limited, though of course it can be determined. But these determinations of experience, cannot suppress or exhaust whole consciousness, as also space cannot be exhausted by the objects in it. As objects appear in space without setting bounds to its whole extent, so dew-drops and corpuscles, as well as the glories and terrors of the universe may live in consciousness without using it up. I need not try to explain this law of experience further here : a more proper occasion may arrive hereafter. I shall be content, however, to make an appeal to direct reflection. Waking up from the spell of absorption in the presented fact, do I not know my experience as an unbounded continuum—a limitless ocean of awareness—in which special determinations, as colour, sound, smell, and so on, may exist, as ripples do on the heart of the ocean, constituting in their manifoldness a unity ? If I can say yes, my first derived equation of Fact is understood : the infinite holds the finite not simply as a possibility, a co-efficient, but also as an actuality. Thus the infinite never leaves me for one minute : I actually live, move and have my being in the infinite. Before passing on to the next derived equation of Fact, let me guard against a misconception that may possibly arise with regard to the symbol in (2). What appear in the places of the index and the base do not however represent them.

$$F'_2 = Sed\lambda, \dots\dots\dots(3)$$

which means that a Fact is taken as the synthesis (S) of experience (e) differentiated with respect to λ which stands for a from to be determined presently. There was no *conceived*

analysis and synthesis of experience in the original fact. Strictly speaking also, the last two equations for I'' are not absolutely correct; for a fact which includes a thought either of $I \frac{f}{i}$ or of $Sed\lambda$ is certainly larger than the thought itself. The fact-whole cannot be equated to the fact-part. Agreeably with our foregoing symbols, the right-hand expressions not only in the second and third but also in the first equation ought to go up to the index of the concrete facts. But here we shall simplify matters somewhat by pardonable abstraction. The actual mystery of existence is unfathomable; the concrete fact is unrepresentable. There can evidently be no *equation* of the fact—whether the fact-stuff or the reviewing fact in its concrete fullness...; for equation presupposes judgment, and a fact, though involving judgment, or representation in one of its aspects, is itself always a presentation and no judgment, and it cannot be equated to a judgment. For the present, however, I shall put down a fact for what it is taken to be.

Suppose we take the distinguishing factor λ to be equivalent to the triangle of polarity discussed before, $\lambda = \Delta_{\alpha \beta}^i$. Then, adopting the above meaning of S we have

$$F' = \int e \, d\alpha \, di \, d\beta \dots \dots \dots (4)$$

which means that a fact is taken as the synthesis of elements of experience differentiated with respect to the three poles α , i , β .

Suppose again we take the discriminating factor α as equivalent to the polar triangle (p , q , r), which respectively stand for Subject, Object and Stress between them. Here evidently, the fact is thought as a synthesis of experience differentiated with respect to the three poles. It is an experience in which we have a thought of the subject acting on the object and the latter reacting on the former. 'Synthesis' in these equations should not, it may be observed, mean simple summation or integration.

So we may have a fact reflected in thought as various equations of the kinds illustrated above as we impart different values to the discriminating factor λ . The above equations, it should be noted, form the data of the Science of Mind. If however, we propose to give purely objective values to

λ we have equations introducing the Physical Science. Mathematics of a certain fundamental character plays and negotiates between them.

Suppose we represent α , β and i as three non-parallel planes. Then obviously a complete section of the *reflected* fact in (4) may be represented by a triangle having its three vertices on the three planes. Now, if the area of the triangle formed by joining *any* three points in a line be zero, the line cannot but be a right line. In the present case, if we have the area of the fact-triangle formed by joining three points in three planes equal to zero we have the following three cases.

(1) A right line touching two planes and also the third produced, if necessary. Interpreted : Experience involving actual feelings and suggestions and also thought of possibility, but *not* representing them as referred to three distinct poles or categories, if I may say so.

(2) Two of the planes may coincide, so that we are left with two planes only. In this case, we have a straight line touching two planes, or, an experience involving, for example, actual feelings and suggestions but no thought of possibility. Can there be here a conscious discrimination of the categories β and i ? Yes ; by such discrimination the fact will not cease to be a right line. We could not allow such discrimination in the first case, because of this law. To discriminate any two elements A and B in thought is to connect them together in thought as though by a right line ; let this be \overline{AB} . Let us next discriminate in thought between AC and CB ; then we have other two right lines *not wholly or partially* coinciding with the first or with each other. Hence the three elements cannot be in the same right line, or in other words, \overline{AB} , \overline{CA} and \overline{BC} will form sides of a triangle.

(3) Two planes may coincide with the third, so that we are left with only one plane. In this case, we have a straight line in *one* plane, which, interpreted in terms of our Science, means that we have, for example, an experience involving a thought of pure intuitive elements, and also a discrimination between any one such element and one other : it is an

experience represented as *only* intuitive in which an element of intuition A is discriminated from another B, and hence is connected with it by a right line or even perhaps by a vector \overline{AB} . The vector, however, should not be taken in the usual sense to mean transference from A in the direction of B. In the discriminative judgment 'A is other than B' there is indeed involved a transference or translation of regard from A to B and from B back to A, so that

$$\overline{AB} + \overline{BA} = 0.$$

In narrow inspection and scrutinizing regard, this translation of regard may assume the condition of oscillation but in order that judgment of the kind referred to may be at all possible, a new fact must come taking under its wings both A and B, and profiting by the oscillation of regard that has preceded it. Thus paradoxically things must meet in thought in order to differ and oppose. All this is now accepted psychology. In dealing with the vector, we have come unawares at a stage where the fundamental law of fact-operation stands revealed in its mystery and nakedness. For one moment, we have a continuum of experience especially emphasised as the aspect or element P_n , so that the fact is $E_{t_n}^{P_n}$, to reclaim a long deserted symbol of experience where also, it may be noticed in passing that, P_n and t_n do not stand for index and base but for quite other things. At the next moment, let us imagine, there is translation of regard from P_n to Q_m . It is patent to direct reflection what such translation of regard means in life : not that P_n is altogether blotted out and Q_m is abruptly ushered into existence, but that there is a falling off in the *tone* of the former and a proportionate rise in that of the latter : it is not a question of complete setting and rising, negation and affirmation, but one of waning and waxing, minimum and maximum. What after this? There may commonly be a reversion of the process by which regard is again brought back to its former place. This tendency of 'thought to flow *out* from a temporary centre of rest and then to return to it is, I conceive, fundamental. This pulsation, periodicity, flow and ebb in experience is the prototype

of all fact-operations : *it is the fundamental type to which all operations, mental or physical, can be reduced.*

I am coming to this fundamental law presently, but as an explanation of the discriminative judgment 'A is other than B' I offer this : There is a moment of rest after each act of translation from A to B and from B to A. Starting from A when I come to B, *I am* just at the bounding limit of an action going to be reversed : \overline{AB} has just ended and \overline{BA} is just to begin. At this point of time, there is absolutely no reason *why I* should go on in the direction \overline{AB} rather than in the direction \overline{BA} ; and *vice versa*. For this moment, therefore, I must pause and take breath. The fact here cannot, however, be $= 0$. This dead-point, this neutral zone is not evidently a position of utter barrenness. It is a position of experience where B is the actual focus favoured or emphasised, and A from where my regard has started and to which again it is just going to revert, is present in it *potentially*, or what is the same thing, ideally or suggestedly. Similarly when from B, my regard has returned to A, my emphasised experience is no doubt A, but B also exists in that experience potentially or suggestedly.

Now, what we call understanding or judgment expresses only such a dead-point or neutral zone in the fact-process. Fact cannot remain idle : it must ever flow. Such at least is the construction which thought puts upon the living fact. Fact is a continuum, my universe ; the continuum is ever moving, my universe is ever changing, but it is not a movement, a change purely and simply in one way ; again, this movement does not involve an actual translation of the concrete features of the continuum itself. It is the agitation that is propagated, and not the actual particles of the mass. Suppose we take two positions in the continuum, A and B, when my regard is passing on along the continuum the portion of the mass, A, receives, let us suppose, my attention first, and it sinks and my attention travels on to B. A which rose to the crest of the wave of vividness has now sunk, and B has risen to the place instead. Thus, we must not imagine that what is translated from A and B is the actual portion of the continuum at A. A concrete fact can live but

once, and there can evidently be no actual transference and resurrection of it. The movement of the wave of attention over a continuum of fact seems to me to be the model of wave-motion. However, that may be, let us imagine that there has been a translation from A to B, which as we have seen does not mean that the portion of concrete fact in the former position has actually moved on to the latter. Now, when my regard is in the latter position, there is, let us suppose, a turning back, a reflection, a reversion of the agitation. But, as in this, the forward sweep of agitation is not suspended, but, only exceeded, as in other words, the agitation recoils in spite of the forward flow which is continuous even while thought is apparently drifting backwards, the actual reverse agitation will be the resultant of two component tendencies. These two opposite component tendencies mingle in every normal movement of regard—the movement from A to B is as much a resultant as that from B to A : there is no absolute beginning of the processes in life, and hence no actual room for the pure positive (forward) component. But though the tendencies mingle in every actual process, their proportion of composition is not uniform : when the positive prevails over the negative, the process is progressive ahead. when the reverse, the process is retrogressive. The ratio of their combination may however be governed by a periodic law.

What will happen when the positive course is just completed and the negative is just to begin ? I have of course assumed that B is the position of the continuum where, under the operation of the periodic law, thought-agitation is made to recoil ; it should be observed, however, that the recoil of thought may not apparently begin until we have reached the position C farther off ; it may be questioned also as to whether there is *really* any periodic *law* governing this operation, though it may be freely admitted that the agitation in point does periodically return. We shall meet, if necessary, this objection in a more proper place ; but, here we readily perceive that at the position B where we have assumed our reflection to begin, the motion of *translation* gives place for a moment to a motion of *rotation*. This rotation means in actual experience that my regard appears

to rest on a certain position B of the continuum before darting back to A. Agreeably with the view here expounded every substantive past in the experience may be regarded as a position of rotational agitation of regard, a sort of eddy or vortex created by a certain disposition of the tendencies referred to before. Now, will this view stand to radical empiricism ?

Be that as it may, what is the empirical consequence of the fact when I have this rotation, eddy or vortex of attention at the position B ? First, B gains in tone and vividness, and becomes a substantive part of experience for a moment. Secondly, since B is, by supposition, just the position where the return sweep is to begin, A becomes *potential* here, which means in experience that A is suggested or ideally revived when attention rotates at B. We need not go into the dynamics of the process now ; but, it will be evident that when attention has returned to A and apparently resting on it, B will become potential there. I propose to give a somewhat wider latitude to the meaning of 'potential'. The expression 'A is potential at B' will mean *either* that A is actually suggested at B and therefore forms a part of the *index* of the fact at B, *or* that it imparts a tone to B as a part of its *co-efficient* ; in any case, a previous fact is sure to prejudice in some way a future fact, so that the fact 'B after A' cannot be equivalent to the fact B alone. But is there no *via media* between actually recalling a past fact and assigning it an undefined place in a vague sense of unbounded possibility ? Undoubtedly there is, if we only remember the following principles of perception and revival : What we call the perception of an object does not, in common sense, stand for a statical, fixed experience. Suppose, I am for some minutes looking continuously or from time to time to the same external object before me. Have I the same perception or identical perceptions for all this while ? Common sense which is pragmatic will have experiences shorn of all their irrelevant details, and will take them as identical facts when they are only more or less similar. But, the concrete facts for these successive moments can never be identical. Even if the objective stimulus were to remain the same for two consecutive moments t and t' , and other conditions of experience were also to remain

unchanged, the concrete experiences for these two moments could not be absolutely the same. As a consequence of this, I have, what is called, growing or dynamical experience, when I am supposed to be interested in one and the same object. My first acquaintance with an object gives me perhaps only a very hazy picture of it: I have perhaps a glimpse of only its most general features. The successive pulses of regard directed towards that object bring out the details more and more, and so the picture grows. Thus my experience concerning an object may begin with the haziest outlines and gradually develop into an articulate picture with a sense of ever endless possibilities of impressions and suggestions ringing in it. Suppose, thus an experience begins with Pt_i and ends with Pt_n . Now, which of these successive pulses of experience shall I put down as my experience of the object? What is true in the case of an impression is also true in the case of an idea. When I have an idea concerning an object and cherish it for some moments, are we to suppose that the ideal picture remains for all this time statically and unrelentingly the same? Does not idea too, whether memory or expectation, commonly begin to appear as a chaotic mist, and then gradually form itself into a veritable cosmos where the Muses love to sing and Philosophy is proud to dwell? The growth of the Fact is indeed the birth of the World, and undoubtedly the chaotic mist in experience in which perceptions and ideas are born has set lessons to the primordial nebula amidst which the chorus of the heavens is supposed to have slowly thrilled, awakened.

Hence when a fact A is potentially present in the apprehension of the fact B, we need not suppose that it must be present, if at all, as a completely given suggestion or as a distinctly pronounced possibility. As a matter of fact, A may gather round B as a soft, almost impalpable halo, exercising the influence of its presence as a sort of unsuspected guardian angel, not yet caring to disquiet the complacency of the favoured fact under its wings, not yet driving thought into an exhibition of logical categories. The statement, therefore, that 'A is present potentially in B' ought to be taken somewhat liberally. A may be present along with B as a rival term of a process of judgment; it may be there

as a pronounced but not sharply discriminated feature in the representative structure of B, as the smell of a rose only seen from a distance ; or, it may cluster round B as a sort of ideal mist, neither pronounced nor discriminated, but, none the less forming a part of the concrete experience of the moment.

Without pausing any longer over mere questions of detail, let me at once proceed to give in broad outlines the main features of the theory of Fact which it will be the task of this essay to establish and explain. I shall be very brief here.

(A) For me Existence means concrete, continuous experience. It is the Fact-Stuff which, though intuitively given, absolutely refuses to submit to a logical construction : it is life and no talk. Even the equation $F' = U$ cannot apply to it in its concreteness. The Fact-Stuff, however, is not unknowable on that account. On the contrary, its very essence lies in presentation in consciousness. It is allogical.

(B) Every Fact-Stuff (consistently with my principles I cannot even speak of it distributively) is immediately given as an infinite continuum. My experience regarding an obscure star for example, at any moment is not exhausted by the star, or portions of the firmament immediately surrounding it. It is an infinite consciousness or awareness especially emphasised as a star, and practically taken as exhausted by, and equivalent to, the star. Consciousness or awareness is always infinite in the sense that it necessarily extends *beyond* all limitations of Time and Space and all other categories of existence. Conceive any bounds, however large and wide, of Time and Space, and your awareness is necessarily and distinctly *felt* as extending beyond them : all limits exist *in* consciousness, and even determinations that are supposed to lie outside of consciousness are *in* it. The Fact-Stuff is a condition of this boundless awareness. This infinite continuum is ignored and mistaken, because my interest is commonly pragmatic : through ignorance therefore the Fact-Stuff appears as bound and contracted : but for the substitution of the pragmatic fact for the concrete fact, I would perpetually live in the infinite in thought as indeed I always live in it in feeling. The infinite forsakes me in my dream, it is inalienably

with me in reality. The relation that comes very near to the mystery of existence is given by the equation (2), *viz.* $F=I_1^f$. First waking up to itself the Fact-Stuff knows itself as an unspeakable wonder (U); next, it is revealed to itself as an infinite continuum sustaining finitely apprehended structure and thinking itself as a unity in the midst of a manifold (I_1^f). How did the seers of the Vedas conceive the *Brahman* for example?

(C) I need not dwell here on the polarized fact, but shall proceed at once to my theory of fact-operation. The theory, conception or thought about how fact operates cannot by itself be a whole concrete experience; it finds its place in the index of a polarized fact. Thus, in propounding any theory, good, bad or indifferent, I am necessarily confined to a snug, little dream-world: theories I must dismiss or subordinate when I must live the Fact itself. With this note of warning in mind, let me conceive an infinite continuum. Is this moving? Consciousness or awareness can indeed be supposed to move from point to point and feature to feature. But is this really a movement of awareness *as such*, or of the emphasis of awareness? There is not commonly an uniform distribution of the intensity of awareness over a field or continuum; so that awareness of a *certain* intensity is a directed quality and may be imagined to change its direction. Perhaps, it is not quite correct to speak about the intensity of awareness; and, though I fear I shall be accused of the vice of abstraction so obstinately ingrained in the Asiatic intellect, I make bold to say, in contravention to what I have said a moment ago, that what is variously distributed over a given continuum of fact is not consciousness which is scrupulously impartial, but what I have often before now vaguely described as psychic tone. This psychic tone with the involved question of the distribution of awareness over a field will come up for treatment in a later section. Let me maintain in the meanwhile what I am perhaps warranted in maintaining that what appears to *move* in the continuum is not awareness as such—the all-pervasive infinite, which excludes no category of existence whatever, could not be *known* as moving even if it were really moving—but *the sum of fact-sections* including the

pragmatic fact. It is, in other words, the index of the I_1^f which is known to move ; consciousness as such cannot be conceived as moving ; the concrete continuum or Fact cannot be in itself known as moving ; it is known as moving in reflexion (index).

(D) Philosophy has lately developed a tendency to look upon consciousness as a mere *function* of experience : the Philosophy of unconscious ideas and mind-stuff would even go so far as to regard it as a mere accident of mental process. I have however suggested it as a boundless *plenum*, a sort of universal spiritual ether, which sustains and illumines all experience and all processes in the continuum of experience. It is not something other than the Fact, but is the very element in which the Fact lives, moves and has its being. I shall not press this consideration at this stage. Let us rather take the continuum of experience as concretely given to us. Keep back all practical interests and special preferences and take the fact unreservedly as it comes. Does it appear as a bound and restricted phenomenon ? If so, how do we know it as such and what lies beyond its bounds ? I prefer my appeal direct to intuition. Nothing can be known as bounded whose bounds we do not in some way transgress in the very act of knowledge ; for example, it is impossible for me to conceive that the soul perishes with the body without my being an witness to the act of perishing in imagination, thus outliving the act at least ideally. Similarly, my continuum of experience exceeds all limiting definitions, however wide, that I may set to it : it is wider than my widest survey of it. Is it exhausted by the tiny star at which I am intently gazing now ? No. Will the addition of the surrounding strip of the sky make it complete ? No. What if I add my organic sensations ? The indistinctly apprehended sounds, odours and touches, the lurking memories and peeping hopes—will these make the story all told ? Not yet. What extends beyond these gradually fading zones of the continuum I cannot indeed say ; but, assuredly too, my actual experience does not terminate at the point upto which I can carry my account. Consciousness need not stop with my account. Now, this indefinitely extensive continuum of experience is ordinarily

always in a state of agitation, stress. Like the heart of an ocean, it is always uneasy. Analogous is the savant's conception of the ether : it is ever alive with the countless thrills of matter and life. The continuum of Fact to which nothing is foreign, which is my existence in all its dimensions and richness, is alive with the primordial agitation in which all matter, life and thought are born, live and decay. I call it 'primordial' because the physicist's agitation of matter and medium and the biologist's agitation of protoplasm which, if we could only respond to the invitation of Prof. Huxley, would render the noonday silence of a forest into the colossal music of a sea of life, are but consequences and illustrations of the stress in the concrete and comprehensive fact of experience of the Spirit.

(E) As a result of this primordial agitation or stress in the Fact we have, *first*, displacement of special imbedded feature in the continuum which means not that actual fact-sections move from certain positions of Time and Space to certain others, but that they spring into and pass out of existence. This will perhaps conflict with the idea of physical displacement: in physical continuum or medium objects and particles are supposed to move actually from certain positions to certain others. But, the discrepancy is only apparent. When in a medium a particle in the position A has been displaced to D through the intermediate positions B and C, it is only through pragmatism and abstraction that we believe that the particle as it was at A is identical with what it has successively been at the positions B, C and D. But, surely a real entity cannot remain identical or unchanged by exchanging one real configuration for another. True; but, has not *something* moved from the first position to the last? The Sophist's denial of motion altogether may be taken seriously or lightly; but, on my own part, I have no hesitation to confess that motion and displacement, as we commonly believe them to be, are a standing perplexity to me. It will perhaps be in keeping with radical empiricism to give the following account of displacement : Suppose, I am attending to a moving particle for a few minutes. Let A, B, C, D be the different positions of the particle.

Can I not say that it may be given continuum of experience for distinguishable, but, closely similar features have successively appeared and disappeared, and that, though not absolutely identical, they are practically believed to constitute but four different positions of one and the same particle? Of course such an account will not allow us a peep behind the scenes so as to enable us to see what precisely is the meaning of successive appearance and disappearance of distinguishable but very nearly identical features in a given continuum of fact. The categories 'distinguishable' and 'identical' mutually exclude. If A is distinguishable from B, it cannot be identical with it; if A is identical with B it cannot be known as other than B. It is again through pragmatism and abstraction that distinguishable things are taken as also sometimes identical, and *vice versa*. Be that as it may, I conceive the primordial agitation in the continuum as involving the appearance and disappearance of features or, as I have called them fact-sections. *Secondly*, it also involves the propagation of an wave of conscious activity which may be called regard or attention over the given continuum: this aspect of the agitations does not require, as I have already pointed out, the actual translation of the fact-sections of a continuum; but it means that as the wave passes, the hollow, the slope and the crest of the wave are occupied by successively different elements of the continuum. I shall not discuss here if we really require to break up the agitation into *two* such components, one involving the absolute appearance and disappearance of fact-sections, and the other involving the successive appearance and disappearance on the crest of the wave of regard of *given* fact-sections of a continuum. I have here put the two aspects apart because I conceive that the difference between them is readily understandable.

(F) Now, what can be the simplest expression so far as we can go of this primordial agitation? Let us imagine the continuum again. As new fact-sections are coming and going, the fact itself may be conceived as moving in a certain sense. It is like an World-stream gliding ever merrily on. The wave of regard or attention is also moving down-stream. With this picture fixed in

our mind can we not assign a fundamental law to which all this process, all this fact-operation, conforms? Primordial agitation in experience is, it should be readily perceived, only another expression for what I have so long described as fact-operation. Now, as dimly suggested before, the fundamental form of fact-operation is *pulsation, ebb and flow, periodic reversion*. The agitation has been resolved into two aspects: the agitation of birth and death of fact-sections, and the agitation of lighting and shading, emphasising and ignoring, toning and detoning of fact-sections. The one aspect explains the antithesis 'to be or not to be': the other aspect has to do office for the opposition 'to grow or to wither'. For example, a dimly attended feature in a continuum is quite as much as a fully attended one; nevertheless the distinction between the two features is a most interesting one; indeed life cares most not for the mere *kind* of having but for the *degree* or tone of having. Now, whether in the one aspect or the other, the agitation is not a pure, unmitigated rush in one way. It is in the nature of a stress in which action in one way is sought to be balanced by reaction in the opposite. Suppose we designate by the terms 'Strain' the change of form—using this word in a most comprehensive sense—which the continuum undergoes under the influence of a given agitation. But is the agitation or stress ever of a constant nature? The strain of a continuum is not always uniform, hence the stress behind it cannot be supposed to be uniform; again, the resultant stress of an experience is a matter of direct feeling and as such it is known as continuously changing. Now, by pulsation or periodic reversion I mean this that the stress and consequently the strain of a continuum has a tendency to assume periodically the same value. If u be a function of x , and if for the values of x , *viz.*, $x+a$, $x+2a$, $x+na$, or all values of x differing by a , u assumes the same value, then u is called a *periodic function* of x , a the *period* of the function. In our present case we do not know what a , the period, may be; but we do know that the stress (which name I apply to the total state of agitation of the continuum), and consequently also the strain (which name I give to actual configuration of the fact-sections in a continuum at any moment), has a *tendency* to

revert to the same values (what values I do not however pretend to know). This phenomenon I desire to call periodic reversion. Under certain definite and symmetrical conditions this phenomenon becomes what Kelvin and Tait have called Simple Harmonic Motion. Suppose we define the *elasticity* of the continuum at any moment by the ratio stress, where 'Strain' means the relative displacement of the features of a continuum under the influence of an agitation and 'Stress' means the tendency of the continuum to revert to its former state—the restoring tendency ; let this = e . Then, can we say that e has a tendency to assume periodically the same value ? Here we are speaking about the ratio of two magnitudes and not about the magnitudes themselves. But none the less I am inclined to think that the principle of pulsation or periodic reversion applies to the strain and stress of a continuum and therefore also to their ratio ; the fact has a tendency to possess the same elasticity periodically. In the above considerations, the terms 'Stress' and 'strain' have not been used in consistent senses throughout ; but I have given my definitions in each instance.

(G) The agitation has been described as a stress which implies that it is at least a double-sided affair. In its essence it is a sort of constraint, and hence cannot be a purely one-sided activity. A purely one-sided activity is metaphysical pure action to which Newton's physics of action and reaction does not apply. The state of constraint in the dielectric medium has indeed been made quite familiar to us by Faraday's curved lines of force and the Maxwell-Hertz theory of electric disturbance ; we now courageously apply this view to the study of the Fact itself. This indeed is not a physical interpretation of Philosophy : the continuum being the world of experience itself must set models to which the more or less abstract sciences of Mind, Matter and Magnitude must conform in their own way. Now, the state of agitation in the continuum presupposes that at every point of time there is *both* flow in one direction and flow in the reverse : at every moment there is a forward dash accompanied and conditioned by a backward swing, and it is the resultant of these two activities which determines the *actual* progress, one way or

the other of the continuum. Ever new features appear and are illumined and no appreciable thought is lost in comparison and recapitulation when the forward sweep greatly prevails: we merely skip from perception to perception or from idea to idea without much looking back, pausing to compare notes and take stock of experience: but, even in such cases, the backward reference of thought is not wholly in default: the present feelings and ideas are recognised and understood only in the subtle atmosphere of dimly suggested ideas. When the backward sweep prevails, we have not as before a continued presentation of new features, but, a representation of those that have been already presented in the continuum. Suppose, *first*, I have a continuum that appears to be extended in space: it is to be observed, by the bye, that Space, Time and other categories are inside and *not* outside of the continuum of Fact, so that I cannot properly speak of a concrete fact in space and time, but—I hope, usage will forbear laughing at me—space and time in fact. Now, what will backward sweep in *the* continuum mean? It *will* mean commonly that the regard-movement AB becomes reversed or BA. It is not the concrete fact that moves, but, a particular fact-section, *viz.*, attentive regard in relation to two other fact-sections *viz.*, A and B. At any rate, we think and believe that *this* moves. Again, my regard remaining constant in magnitude and direction, a fact-section A in the given continuum is altogether put out and a new one B appears. Suppose, we distinguish these two states of the fact by C_A and C_B . The latter is a later state. According to the view that we have preferred C_B will have a tendency to return to C_A : the periodic law, of any, relates not to the passion for going and returning as such but to the relative proportion of the passion for the one and that for the other: now, the one is waxing and the other waning, and then reverse becomes the other. Thus, *secondly*, if we imagine a continuum extended in time, the reversion from B to A will mean not the return of regard from one fact-section to another, both of which are however actually given in the continuum at the same instant: they are $E_{t_n}^A$ and $E_{t_n}^B$, where the indices do not stand for emphasised features, but, merely

presented features, whether prominent or obscure. It will mean the return of regard from a present feature to another which is believed to be not present along with it. As a matter of fact, however, two fact-sections can be regarded together only by being brought together in thought, though they may well differ in tone or virileness of existence and referred to different axes of Time. When C_B has a tendency to return thus to C_A , the latter becomes potential in the former ; this potential under certain conditions will mean the recalling of C_A in clear idea or even in explicit judgment.

(H.) Helmholtz showed that vortices cannot be produced in a homogeneous, frictionless and perfectly elastic substance, and that if they are produced anyhow they cannot be destroyed either : a foundation upon which Lord Kelvin reared up his fascinating vortex theory of atoms. The continuum of Fact is concrete existence of which the ether of the savant is only an abstraction : vortex and rotational movement *can* originate in the continuum and can be dissolved : we need not invoke supernatural agency either for the one phenomenon or the other in the continuum of experience. Now, what we ordinarily call a substantive part of experience, represents such a vortex and rotational movement in the continuum. The Primordial agitation in the continuum does not consist, as we have seen, in pure rush in one way periodically *followed* by a pure rush in the opposite : the flowing *on* and the turning *back* are simultaneous and ever continuous operations, though, of course, their relative strength is subject to periodic variations. Generally, the onward flow which introduces ever new features into consciousness prevails : the fact is always changing from C_A to C_B and from C_B to C_C and so on. Nevertheless, at each point of time, the restoring tendency is active. Though experience can never repeat itself, and a fact can live but once in consciousness, we need not suppose that the flow of existence is a pure, unrelenting dash in one direction : it is always flowing in one direction, *viz.*, in the direction of ever fresh appearances—we can never actually return to the self-same perception or idea ; but, also, there is always in varying degree a *tendency* to return in the continuum

of fact. What I have described as the prevalence of the backward sweep under the previous heading should not be taken to imply that old fact-sections actually re-appear, which is impossible, but, that new fact-sections appear more or less regarding or even representing old fact-sections. The new pulse of awareness refers back to, recognises, remembers or judges the previous pulse. To revert to previous symbols : When consciousness has moved from C_A to C_B , its activity will be determined by two conspiring tendencies. Let us represent this phenomenon by the equation $\alpha = \phi (+t, -t)$, where α stands for the resultant activity of the fact, and $+t$ and $-t$ for the two opposite tendencies alluded to before. Generally, the positive or forward tendency prevails, in consequence of which we have the progress of experience to ever new appearances. But, the negative or backward variable is never evanescent : this implies that the new appearances can never fail to be influenced by the context, the echoes and suggestions of the past : the new-comer is generally always a fact with an index. But, this halo or 'fringe' of suggestions may be vague or articulate, hardly appreciable or insistently pre-possessing : I may pass from fact to fact without any appreciable recognition or representation of those that have gone before : here, not only does $+t$ prevail, but $-t$ has been reduced nearly to minimum : while the positive tendency is ordinarily always greater than the negative, the latter is never ordinarily reduced to zero and also, there is periodicity attending the circumstances of the two tendencies : while the magnitude of the onward sweep is greater than that of the backward, the magnitude of neither is constant, but is subject to periodic variations. Suppose, X is the unknown cause of which both $+t$ and $-t'$ (let us substitute these for $+t$ and $-t$ respectively) are functions. Then, obviously, $\frac{dt}{dx}$ and $\frac{dt'}{dx}$ are respectively the true measures of the rate of rapidity with which the dependent variables change as x is supposed to change in any manner. Hence, the foregoing relation of the two tendencies can be aptly represented by the following obvious equation :

$$\frac{dt}{dx} - \frac{dt'}{dx} = \text{positive.}$$

That is to say, though t and t' both vary on account of an unknown cause or causes, the true rate of variation of the former always exceeds that of the latter. Hence, in the life of the *fact*, there can be no true return or repetition : every experience that comes is unique. On the other hand, in the equation $\alpha = \phi(t, t')$, the latter independent variable, t' , is never altogether evanescent. Therefore, we can never have an absolutely original fact in the life of experience—a fact which does not in some way refer back to or otherwise represent the past series of facts.

Again, the maximum and minimum values of the relapsing tendency, t' , are determined in general by the roots of the derived equation $\frac{dt'}{dx} = 0$; also, it can be readily shown that between two maximum values at least one minimum value must appear and that between two minimum values at least one maximum value must come. Here lie the germs of periodicity : the ebb and tide, the pulsation in the life of the fact. It should be observed however that the foregoing obvious principle of maxima and minima is not the cause and basis, but the consequence and expression of the primordial ebb and flow in fact. That two maximum or minimum positions of the curve must be connected by minimum or maximum positions, is a proposition that follows readily from the principle ; but let us ask the following two similar questions :

Why should there be *two* maximum or minimum positions of the curve at all ?

Also why should a curve pass at all from a decreasing to an increasing state and *vice versa*, and not become in all cases *infinitely* increasing or decreasing ?

These are metaphysical questions which can be set at rest only by looking into the foundations of the life of the fact. Alternation, periodicity, reciprocity are the ultimate propositions of this life which account for the reciprocal maxima and minima of calculation and the rhythms and harmonics of abstract analysis.

Now, suppose t' , the relapsing impulse, assumes a maximum value ; what will become of the resultant activity of the fact ?

In the face of a former equation we cannot indeed suppose that past facts in the history of experience will actually reappear : the forward trend still prevails on the whole, it will mean that experience will be mainly referring back, representing—remembering, judging, and so on—with its emphasis distinctly placed in its index.

Now, we have dealt at some length with the relative dispositions of the two tendencies. Clearly, what we have sometimes called a substantive part in experience is a travelling eddy in the continuum of conscious existence caused by a particular mutual disposition of the two tendencies. A substantive part, e.g., my relatively steady perception of the cloud, is not a statical fact—it is moving, changing and growing. It is my pragmatic interest that has taught me to take a perceptual object of some moments' duration as absolutely one, identical object. The experience is one and continuous no doubt ; but if on reflection I find it to a sum of any number of fact-sections, these fact-sections ought in no case to be regarded as absolutely identical. To take them as identical, to fancy that I am having the same pulses of experience for all this period, is a convenient abstraction of life which is grimly practical, is what I may call one of the commonest *illusions of pragmatism*. But though the fact is moving, it is also steady in an unmistakeable sense : to be and not to be are curiously swept together in the life of the fact, and of these two aspects of the process the pragmatic emphasis is laid almost always on the former : hence the illusion of a steady, statical perception. I have, however, likened a substantive part of experience to an eddy travelling downstream : I look at the eddy itself ; it strikes me as a centre of a certain unity, individuality, permanence and agitation ; does not my cloud also strike me in a similar manner ? Is not a substantive experience too regarded by me as one, individual, relatively permanent and in a condition of stress ? I look at the stream itself—the larger object of which the eddy is only a small, especially interesting feature ; it strikes me as a continuum bearing on its bosom a chequered agitation and following steadily one way. Verily, here I have the aptest symbol of Life. The

continuum is larger than what I may circumscribe as its substantive part, and I feel this continuum moving, carrying eddies and waves along with it. The eddy, as I have suggested more than once before, is called into existence by a certain mutual disposition of the two continuous but periodically variable tendencies

The eddy in the continuum of experience will naturally be the prototype and original of all kinds of eddies with which the universe has been stocked by human feeling or imagination. The vortices of Kelvin are certainly an improvement on the mathematical points of Boscovich : the atoms are supernaturally created, indestructible vortices in an abstract, all-pervading substance that has passed muster as ether. The ether, however, is only an *aspect* of the boundless continuum of fact which is man's universe itself : the ether is only *an* element of such a universe : the ocean minus its stress is under all ordinary circumstances an abstraction ; the ether *minus* its stress is also under all ordinary circumstances an abstraction ; and ether *plus* its stress constitutes in the eye of Science the physical universe which also is an abstraction—a grand fact-section and not the Fact—though one step less removed than mere ether. The ionic constitution of matter and the investigations of Sir William Crookes have robbed likewise the classical atoms of their inert and ultimate character. Moreover, we have also received the invitation of Huxley to hear the music of the noonday forest raised up by the rotation of protoplasm in the countless, microscopic vegetable cells of the wood.

What does 'movement' mean as attributed to the continuum of fact ? Obviously the conception of movement cannot be applied to the fact-stuff itself. To conceive that a fact moves I must go beyond it, make an object of it : nothing can be supposed to move which does not divide existence or experience with something *else*. Hence the entire experience which involves the thought of a moving object cannot itself be supposed to move. The moving fact is a fact-section and not fact-stuff : it is an element of experience and not the whole of experience. The dynamical view of fact which I have been lately expounding does not therefore touch the fact-stuff itself : there is no theory

of the fact-stuff. But though the fact-stuff can never be transcended and therefore thought about, the fact-sections or the elements of experience can undoubtedly be. Hence there becomes possible a Science of the Fact. We surely do not know whether the infinite ocean of awareness is itself moving or is at rest : but the waves and eddies—the fact-sections as I have called them—do move : they appear and disappear, wax and wane. Nay more : if we conceive the continuum as the sum of the fact-sections discriminated therein, we may say that even the continuum moves. The stupendous system of heavenly bodies is imagined as moving in infinite space : but can we imagine infinite space as itself moving ? No. Time is indeed conceived as flowing : but what is it really that flows ? To my thought, Time abstracted from all ordinary determinations is an infinitely extended scheme in which phenomena may appear : it is an order which makes phenomena appear as a series, just as Space is an order which makes them appear as a special kind of configuration. But I do not conceive either the one order or the other as essentially moving. If Space moves, it moves in an wider Space, and this again in a still wider, and so on. But what will infinite Space itself move in ? Similarly, the flow of Time pre-supposes Time, and this in order to flow will require Time again, so on. Hence the flow cannot pertain to Time at all : it is the phenomena which are thought to have a certain order or scheme of distribution which we have agreed to call temporal. This order or scheme as such does not move. Does the future as future become either present or past ? The future *object* may come and go : but does the aspect of the temporal scheme called future ever cease to be so ? Future, present and past are ultimately certain general attitudes of my experience : each means a certain direction and character of experience. These directions and characters of experience are unmistakeably distinct. At the present point of time, for example, each aspect of the temporal order, future, present or past, is distinctly given : none is merged or lost in the others : none can vanish leaving the others alone in the field. Time is always standing in my thought with all its aspects distinctly given : when a

phenomenon is presented in these aspects it is regarded by me as a flowing fact with a history.

I have already suggested Consciousness or Awareness as a boundless, permanent plenum in which modes or states appear and disappear, grow and wither. I cannot see my way to regarding it as a mere function of experience. In some of the later sections, it shall be treated with more becoming fulness. At this stage, I shall observe that Fact or Experience is an inconceivable abstraction apart from consciousness. The actual fact is conscious existence. Hence in dealing with fact or experience, I have made no separate mention of consciousness : the fact pre-supposes it, lives, moves and has its being in it. Now, at every moment, I am not infinite awareness merely, but, infinite awareness finitely determined or I_1^f according to our symbols. Thus, my fact is equivalent, in reflection or representation, to I_1^f . Now, can this infinite awareness finitely informed be conceived as moving ? No. The difficulties which overwhelmed us in the case of Time and Space will be here also even more formidably. Surely we cannot conceive consciousness *as such* as moving, though, of course, tones and determinations of consciousness can readily be known as changing and shifting. Any thing in consciousness, which is not also thought to be infinite, can be conceived as moving : but consciousness including its modes cannot : and is not this latter what we have so far called fact-stuff ? But, suppose, as suggested before, I give the name continuum to the totality of finite fact-sections or determinations, the sum of the modes—a sort of *Natura Naturata*. Now, can we not regard such a continuum as moving, although the life, entire fact may baffle all our computations and exceed all our categories ? Such a definition as this will lift our dynamical theory of experience from the quagmire of metaphysical confusion. Without some sort of abstraction, experience or fact is, as I have repeatedly urged, dumb, alogical and absorbing. No theory will dare to stare it in the face. Philosophy begins by cutting up the actual. Science is born in nescience.

The movement of the continuum should not be confounded with physical displacement or motion. This latter pre-supposes

both Time and Space : the movement of the totality of fact-sections or of individual fact-sections requires Time and Extensity. In mental life, we are familiar with the extensity of experiences : experiences are intuitively known by us as more extensive or less. This primordial extensity forms the basis of, but is not identical with Space. Space is a special manifestation of extensity. Hence physical displacement is only a special kind of fact-displacement.

9. *The Veil of the Fact.*

A substantive or relatively stable part of experience may be represented by either of the two symbols $[E]_{in}^{P_n}$ or I_1^f . Let us rather take the latter. Thus experience at any instant is an infinite consciousness which determines itself in a finite feature of features, and maintains a character of unity. Now, the question that arises is this : Why do we seize upon the finite feature of features, and apparently ignore the boundless plenum in which they appear ? Even in the realm of the features or fact-sections themselves, our interest is partial and selective : with respect to one or a few we are at home ; with respect to the rest we are not at home though they might knock at the gates of consciousness. All are above the threshold of consciousness, however. In becoming partial to a part or section we cannot really cease to live the whole in consciousness : the whole never sinks below the conscious level. But nevertheless the whole may sink down to a minimum tone of presentation. As the favoured section mounts up the curve of presentation, the entire presentation, though undoubtedly given, becomes apparently ignored. I fancy that the part is the whole experience at the instant : thus is born what I have called the pragmatic fact. I have already hinted that an experience of a given instant can be split up into three aspects : the infinite plenum of awareness (say, I), the sum of finite features or fact-sections (say, $S f_s$), and the selected and emphasised feature or the pragmatic fact (say, f_r). Then the fundamental fact to note in the life of experience is the apparent subsidence of the first in favour of the second, and the apparent

withdrawal of the second in favour of the third. Why should the whole wane in order that a part may wax in respect of tone of presentation? Why should a larger part sink to a minimum of presentation in order that a smaller part included within it may rise to a maximum?

Let us for one moment consider the bearing of this question on the view of fact-operation that we have so far preferred. Suppose I once address myself to the task of following as a whole my experience of the present instant, *eschewing* for a while all lay practical motives. I have surrendered as far as practicable all special preferences and partialities. As I gaze up in a mood of complete abandon into the clear, tranquil sky overhead, I undoubtedly feel my experience to be an unbounded presentation: there is the genial flood of morning sunshine to which no bounds I can set; there is the lively chorus of the birds and the rustling of the leaves—an experience of sounds to which also it will be arbitrary to assign any limits; there is a boundless presentation of smells too arising from leaves, flowers, blossoms and sundry other things; there are besides hovering echoes and shades of memories and suggestions; and we must not forget to mention the vague, massive, organic sensations which our fleshy existence is at every moment heir to. It may be poetry to express each of the various aspects of experience, sight, sound, smell, and so on, as a boundless continuum: but, will it not appear to unsophisticated reflection that each aspect of presentation is very much larger than I commonly take it to be: do I not see, hear, smell, recollect and otherwise feel enormously more than I commonly fancy that I do in a given moment of experience? But though I may have doubts as to the actual infinitude of the several *aspects* alluded to, I feel that I cannot doubt the limitlessness of the entire, concrete experience of the moment: this at any rate is unbounded, being my entire universe itself for the given moment. It is to be represented, as explained before, by the equation $E = I_1^f$.

Now, my universe of fact is ever moving. 'Movement' as before will have to be taken in the sense of the appearance of ever new fact-sections and the disappearance of the existing: the

existing order of things in this universe is continuously giving place to a new : the same sights, sounds and smells do not permanently remain. This movement, as I have also suggested before, is not a *simple* onward process : it is an onward process on the whole, but, at every instant, it is sought to be counter-balanced by a retreating sweep : at every instant there is a varying tendency for past presentations to reappear, and for existing presentations to withstand the fatal disposition to disappear. Now, since the onward dash generally prevails, past presentations can never actually reappear, but, nevertheless, they can become 'potential' in new presentations, in which case, we are to note two distinct varieties : Either the past may reappear in the present as a scarcely discriminated ideal halo with the accent of the moment laid decisively on the intuitive or presentative basis—in a case like this, the fact passes for a new phenomenon : or, the past may be given in the present as a distinct idea with the emphasis of the moment placed on the index rather than on the base of the fact—in a case like this, the fact passes for a revival or representation. What again is the disposition of experience when I feel that I am having identical or similar presentations for a few successive instants ? So-called identical or similar presentations will be explained partly by rotational strain in the continuum of experience as I have more than once suggested before, and partly perhaps by the action of Force or Forces pulling the wires of man's life of experience from behind the scenes. I am not quite sure, however, that this latter is not an unwarrantable suggestion. Up to the present juncture, I have given my account of the fact without ever having occasion to venture out on the debatable ground of the Unknowable or Inscrutable : the fact itself has been for us sufficiently inscrutable to satisfy our most insistent predilection for mysticism. But, do we really require to bring in the Unknowable from behind the scenes to account for similar experiences ? If we do, why shall we not invoke the same Mystery to set its seal on all other fundamental propositions of our creed of empiricism, viz., the movement of the continuum, the general prevalence of the positive movement and periodicity in the dispositions of its

two components ? But, while I must not be betrayed into metaphysics at this stage, I shall not mince matters either. Similarity as well as difference are categories of our existence which we cannot explain as derivatives from more ultimate roots ; though of course, we can within certain limits, find more or less precise statement for them. We cannot explain why similar pulses must come in the life of experience any more than we can explain why dissimilar or new presentations appear. The fact is there and we must accept it, though we may not feel our way to go behind it.

We have also supposed that existing presentations have a disposition to withstand the rush—the tendency to disappear. There is a certain inertia in a presentation which must be overcome before it can be made to vanish and give place to a new : this explains the *curve* of a phenomenon—the circumstance that it grows and decays. The fact *is* in a certain sense in ceasing to be : this is its *becoming*. Can the becoming of a fact be fully explained as purely a case of appearance of new fact-sections and disappearance of the existing ? Is the assumption of fact-inertia, or for the matter of that, fact-spontaneity a necessity ? If a growing fact is but a series of vanishing new presentations, what is it that constitutes its difference from an ordinary series ? I submit that in order adequately to explain the growing fact, we have to make two additional suppositions besides the movement of the continuum.

In the first place, we must concede to every presentation or section of presentation what I have called, a moment ago, inertia or spontaneity. But, are not inertia and spontaneity commonly accounted to be opposite virtues ? Yes, but, the opposites meet in the life of the fact. No fact can be charged with absolute inertia, and none can be charged with absolute spontaneity. A fact is inert in the sense that the circumstances of its history lie to a considerable extent outside of itself : it is partly determined by facts other than itself. Matter is only on aspect, an abstraction of the fact ; and in so far as the movement of the fact is determined by conditions supposed to lie outside of

itself, Newton's classical Laws of Motion apply. Again, a fact is spontaneous in the sense that to a certain extent, at least every fact is the author of its own history : its whole behaviour cannot adequately be explained by circumstances external to it alone. Philosophers have claimed spontaneity, even selective spontaneity, for the cells and centres of the organism : Leibnitz substituted for the inert atom of traditional physics his classical monad whose very essence he placed in activity : modern Pluralism too has invested its individual existences with spontaneity. But, the fact possesses the nature of both the atom and the monad. Life is only an aspect, an abstraction of the fact ; and, in so far as the behaviour of the fact resembles the behaviour of the organism, Newton's Laws of Motion do not apply. We need not dwell on this aspect of the question just now, but, we observe that the relative inertia or relative spontaneity which the fact possesses makes it obey and yet withstand the sweeping processes which we have so far assumed on the continuum. And I submit that this is one circumstance which makes the 'becoming' or growth of the fact possible.

In the second place, the growth of a fact in experience does not appear to me as possible unless we also recognise the following operation : *Veiling of the whole and accentuation of a part : unveiling of the whole and relaxation of the part : oscillation or alternation between these two aspects of the operation.* There is periodicity attending the circumstances of the inertia or spontaneity of the fact : if a fact has been growing for some time its inertia or spontaneity for this time may be represented by a curve with maximum and minimum positions. There is also periodicity—and even rhythm as I believe—attending the circumstances of the operation just alluded to. Suppose, I have at this moment a perception of a tree. In the concrete fact, the subject, the object, and all other elements which we may subsequently discriminate, *lie* blended together. Now, how does the phenomenon grow apace? The concrete fact is veiled for one moment, and a special fact-section rises into prominence and is apparently detached : This indeed does not mean that for the moment, the whole actually sinks below the level of

consciousness—let us adopt this convenient fiction of Herbartian psychology—and the part or feature alone absorbs my whole conscious being : this is impossible. Veiling refers only to a sort of detonation or blurring of the whole, and, not certainly to its effacement. On the other hand, the detachment of the part is only apparent : a part can never actually cease to live in the whole. As a particular fact-section is lighted up, the whole fact itself is thrown as it were into the shade. None the less, however, the whole continues to sustain the part as a vaguely apprehended background : it may subside but it cannot go : I can ignore it but not efface it. Thus, as I am perceiving the tree, the subject may temporarily press itself into notice and eclipse the whole fact of the moment ; yet, the whole fact of the moment cannot cease to be : the subject as engaged to a tree is not the same as the subject feeling its way through 'Creative Evolution.' Even the ignored, dimly apprehended environment of feelings vitally matters. But, if the tree of perception is to grow, the subject must not attend too much to himself. There must forthwith be a relapse of the whole and subsidence or relaxation of the just prominent part. After the whole has been unveiled for an instant and lighted up, it is again veiled and shaded, and the potential of another part, this time, the so-called object, let us suppose, goes up. In this way, the picture grows. Now, what is true of the tree of present perception is essentially true of the whole universe of fact which, by the bye, has been compared in the Vedas to a tree of infinite dimensions. There is a distinct sense in which my world of experience itself grows—I have myself previously supposed that it moves. If it grows, it must grow by just the same periodic veiling and unveiling of the whole and part as renders the growth of a plant or a crystal possible in knowledge. Experience, though never actually retreating behind or beyond the light of consciousness, lives and moves under a colossal veil : which, while making experience not unknowable, makes it unthinkable. What imagination will dare to lift this veil, what inspiration and vision will make

experience the full, concrete, actual existence *taken as such*? The veil renders the Fact pragmatic fact.

The meaning and metaphysics of the Veil I may go into in a future volume. But, two questions have to be met in this preliminary statement of the doctrine of Maya or the Veil of existence.

First, do we not in the development of an experience pass from one pragmatic fact to another, and from this to a third, and so on? Does the whole ever ordinarily become unveiled and lighted up in the progress of this development? The apparent movement is of course from one pragmatic fact to a second and from this to a third, and so on; the very circumstance that they are taken as pragmatic makes them the principally and selectively emphasised portions of the flowing continuum. These constitute no doubt the landmarks in the history of the process. But, the pragmatic portions do not make the flowing continuum any more than the landmarks make history. It is surely possible to read between the lines which at first alone appear to strike the eye. Suppose, I am occupied by a certain pragmatic fact for some time. Is the experience statical, motionless for this time? It need not be. While I think I am busy with a given pragmatic fact, I feel that there is from time to time an alternate veiling and unveiling of the concrete fact corresponding to and sustaining the pragmatic fact; there is periodic appearance and disappearance in explicit consciousness of f_o and f_e , to utilise our proposed symbols. We must pause to make an appeal to immediate consciousness to verify if this account tallies with actual experience or not. The mother and her child, the whole and the part, the indefinite and the definite, play hide and seek, fast and loose with one another. My one feeling is unerring on this point. For one moment, in a case like the foregoing, consciousness becomes contracted, concentrated in a focus, as it were, and this means the birth of the pragmatic fact; at the next moment, consciousness again expands, stretches itself, as it were, with an almost impartial distribution over a continuum. Such periodic contraction and expansion of the fact—if this physical description of a phenomenon not at all physical may

pass—is to me a matter of direct feeling. Again, when I am supposed to be passing briskly from one pragmatic to another, and from this to a third, and so on, the concrete whole is not wholly in abeyance : every now and then, during the passage of this drama, it is making itself supremely felt : very often the scenes find themselves merged in the acts, and the acts in the play itself : frequently has the whole gathered into its embrace the apparently stray and unruly parts. The importance of such an operation in the economy of knowledge is not slight. Unless the whole has opportunities of flashing itself from time to time on the mirror of consciousness, the significance of the parts themselves will be wholly or partially lost. No part is ever understood as a part which fails to exhibit its dependence on a whole ; and, if the part were to appropriate consciousness always and the whole never, how would the part exhibit its connection with the whole in experience at all ? Hence the supposed uninterrupted flow of experience from pragmatic parts to pragmatic parts without any brief interpolations of the whole or wholes, would really spell the *reductio ad absurdum* of human experience. I venture to think, moreover, that there is a fairly rhythmic law presiding over the veiling-operation of concrete existence. Here I shall merely suggest, however, that the rhythm of the veiling operation in us roughly corresponds with the rhythmic expansion and contraction of our organism in the respiratory process. It is a suggestion which I do not propose to follow up and work out at the present stage. I may have to return to it in dealing with the ways and means of mysticism.

Secondly, we address ourselves to a more serious question. How can the periodic veiling of the fact coupled with such movement as we have ascribed to it, and assisted by its essential character of spontaneity, explain the flow of experience in the boundless illumination of consciousness ? Movement and veiling, it must be noted, are the two grand aspects of the operation ; spontaneity and consciousness are the two fundamental expressions of existence. It would be advisable to carry on this investigation on more rigid lines.

To begin with, mathematical and physical 'whole and part'

must not be allowed to get mixed up with the 'whole and part' of the Science of Fact. The former whole can vanish without requiring its component parts vanish distributively also. The algebraic sum of some quantities may be equal to zero without any of the quantities being zero : the sum of a number of coplanar vectors forming a polygon may be equal to zero when these are taken in a certain order, but, that will not evidently make any of the vectors equal to zero. Mathematical physics will complacently act upon the equation $+e-e=0$, where the two factors stand for equal and opposite kinds of electricity. But, we ask : Can a fact-whole also vanish similarly without requiring any of its parts or components to vanish too ? The answer, it must be at once admitted, is negative. In experience, actual fact-sections cannot be supposed to cancel one another and show a net result of zero like quantities, vectors and forces in the mathematical and physical sciences. The fact-sections are elements of experience—presentations ; but, like Herbart's presentations, these cannot be supposed to eat up one another and vanish in the bargain.

But suppose we place a somewhat different construction on zero. Let this stand for not the vanishing or annihilation of the whole or the part but their maximum veiling, shading or ignorance. As we shall see, the veil or shade of existence is not a homogeneous and uniform feature. It is not merely a question of veiling and unveiling, but also ordinarily one of more or less veiling. Now, let us put down as equal to zero a whole which, without ceasing exist, has put on the thickest veil and is cast into the shadow of most ignorance. It is the case of my being almost completely absorbed in the pragmatic fact. So also, let us put down as equal to zero a part which, without being effaced, has sunk down almost completely to the level of the concrete, whole fact. This is perhaps the case when I lay aside all motives and abandon myself to the fact, the whole fact, as it possesses me. Clearly, both veiling and unveiling are operations which are continuous or gradual, and hence we may pertinently enquire as to what becomes of their objects *in the limit*. Thus we may

enquire about such limits as $Lt \quad W = 0, Lt \quad P = 0$, where W and P stand respectively for 'whole' and 'part'.

Again, what can the expression $W+P$ mean in our science? The sign of plus ought not to be interpreted in the ordinary mathematical sense. Indeed, mathematical limits and operations are all abstract, special cases of fact-limits and fact-operations. The expression will mean a whole in which a part is discriminated, or rather a judging thought which compares a whole with its part. The two aspects are brought together in thought, and such bringing together or collocation is the original of the mathematical operation of summation. For clearer distinction, we shall adopt the symbol W^p to denote a reviewing thought which merely discriminates between the whole-aspect and the part-aspect, but does not go the whole length of actually comparing them.

Bearing these *definitions* in mind we proceed to lay down the following as a fundamental equation of fact-development :

$$Lt \quad W = 0 \quad W^p + Lt \quad P = 0 \quad W^p + Lt \quad W' = 0$$

$$W^{p'} + Lt \quad P' = 0 \quad W^{p'} + Lt \quad W'' = 0 \quad W^{np''} + Lt \quad P'' = 0 \quad W^{np''} \text{ or,}$$

$$S \left(Lt \quad W'' = 0 \quad W^{np''} + Lt \quad P'' = 0 \quad W^{np''} \right)$$

$$= n \quad (W + P)$$

$$= n \quad W, \text{ or, } n \quad P.$$

This equation illustrates all the cardinal principles of fact-operation which we have been so far explaining. The first term of the left-hand expression denotes a pulse of fact in which the part is so much emphasised that the whole, without being effaced, is hidden under the thickest veil. For all practical purposes, though not really, this term is equivalent to the part, P , alone : I have so completely ignored W that I believe I have P only. Evidently, Zero in the term cannot be interpreted in ordinary mathematical sense, in which case the term itself would be reduced to zero. According to our principle, W is unveiled in the next pulse of experience and P goes into the shade as completely as would be consistent with its bare, tone-less existence in W . This aspect of the operation will be, for all practical purposes, a W . Next, according to the principle of movement, the old combination W^p changes into $W^{p'}$. To this

new combination also the principle of alternate veiling and unveiling applies, giving us as the next two pulses of experience P' and W' . W^{np} is the typical combination in the series. Again, the principle of spontaneity requires that any combination W^P will withstand with variable success both the veiling and the moving operations. Hence, in a typical case, $W'P'$ is not utterly different from, but more or less similar to, W^P which has preceded it. So at the end of the operation we believe that we have had n pulses of the logical combination $W+P$. The differences in the successive appearances of W and P we have ignored : we say we have had n identical or similar experiences concerning an object. Again, by a further application of the principle of veiling or ignorance the thought $n(W+P)$ is broken up into nW or nP : I think that I have had n successive pulses of the whole, or, n successive pragmatic facts. I may be in a mood either to accept the whole-aspect of the process and ignore the part-aspect, or to accept the pragmatic facts ignoring the wholes. The latter, however, is a more ordinary mood.

Suppose we have a Fact, A . Then, we have for the equation of the reviewing fact which represent A as an undifferentiated complex continuous or Fact-stuff the following :

$A_1 = F^u$, where u means unthinkable or alogical. The reviewing fact is also a concrete fact ; hence it involves a base and an index : it is an experience which includes the thought of another fact as unthinkable or alogical. Now, by the principle of veiling, we have, $A_1 = F^u = u$, putting $F=0$ of ignorance. In other words, it is the pragmatic representative index which passes for the reviewing fact. The experience which we call the reviewing fact is evidently larger than the representation of A as alogical, yet I take it as equivalent to this thought I say I have in the second moment a representative conception of A as an alogical phenomenon. But is this *all* that I have? Surely, I have ignored much.

Again, suppose a second reviewing fact following close upon A , comes. Let us have the following equation :

$$A_2 = FSe(\lambda, \phi F^u)d$$

A_2 is a Fact which thinks of another Fact, B , as a synthesis (s)

of experience (e) with respect to (d) a certain determinant factor λ and a certain function of A_1 (ϕF^u) which just preceded B. B is, by supposition, a fact subsequent to A_1 , hence in virtue of an indisputable psychological and cerebral law, B cannot but be influenced in some way by its forerunner : the forerunner A_1 has ceased to exist actually when B appears, but it has left behind itself a disposition (let us adopt this serviceable word for the present) which must be a certain function of A_1 . Again, B is supposed to be determinant not simply by a certain function of A_1 , but by a new determinant factor λ . In consequence of which B has become a distinct phenomenon. Thus I represent B as a synthesis of experience with respect to the two determinant factors, λ and ϕF^u .

Now, let us apply the principle of veiling. Put $F=0$ of ignorance in the above equation. We have, $A_2 = Se (\lambda, \phi F^u) d$; the presentative or intuitive base is ignored, or rather the representative part is complacently mistaken for the concrete whole. Next, let us put $\phi F^u = 0$, we have, $A_2 = Se \lambda d$; we have chosen to forget the contribution of A_1 in the making of B; we represent B as a synthesis of experience with respect to the determinant factor λ . Next put $e = 1$; in other words, let us suppose the experience in question to be a unity, dispensing therefore with the operation of synthesis. Like our zero unity also bears an interesting meaning of which the ordinary mathematical and physical meanings are, as I believe, abstractions. Experience can never be put $=0$; we can never ignore experience itself, though we can and do ignore parts, or features, or sections of experience. By putting it $=1$, we mean that we no longer intend to regard it as a synthesis of any operation or operations, that we take it as pure experience ignoring its synthetic or composite nature. According to this view, therefore, we must have, $e\lambda = \lambda$; or any construction put upon pure experience is equivalent to that construction or determination, a principle that underlies the mathematical principle $1 \times n = n$. It should be observed that the putting of 1 for e is really veiling or ignoring its synthetic nature. We have, however, $A_2 = \lambda$; in other words, A_2 conceives B as practically equivalent to the

determinant factor which constitutes it a distinct phenomenon. It is thus that a peculiar feature of a phenomenon passes for the phenomenon itself; the new or prominent member of an assemblage of conditions is ordinarily taken to be the cause.

Lastly, let us suppose we have the following reviewing fact :

$$A_3 = F \overline{\text{Se}(i, \beta', \alpha, \phi \lambda)} d.$$

This is a fact which involves the conception or representation of another fact as a synthesis of experience differentiated with respect to base, index and co-efficient. This becomes by the principle of veiling,

$$A_3 = \text{Se}(i, \overline{\beta', \alpha, \phi \lambda}) d, \text{ putting } F = 0.$$

The whole fact which involves a conception becomes thus equivalent to the conception itself : we have the miracle by which the whole can be equated to a part. In the representative thought there is a determinant factor $\phi \lambda$: the experience is taken at first as not equivalent to the thought of base, index and co-efficient alone. A_3 thinks of another fact as a polar triangle of a base, index and co-efficient determined by a proper assemblage of conditions : in thinking of the previous fact I also think that its attitude of polarity is conditioned by a certain, I know not what, factor. In fine, the reviewing fact may be the thought of polarity as an *effect* of a certain cause or determinant circumstances : the thought of the cause may of course range from a bare suspicion to fairly articulate conception. But in any case should not this last thought find a more proper place in one of the poles themselves? I shall not dispute the position that it may; the thought that includes the representation of A as an effect of B, also includes the representation of B as the cause of A; roughly, but not strictly, the thought of A as an effect of B is equivalent to the thought of B as the cause of A; but whatever the precise relation of the two aspects of the thought may be, each is perhaps of sufficiently vital importance in thought as well as in practice to require a separate exhibition. And indeed when I think of a fact as a polar triangle of the above pattern I commonly, though not necessarily, think of the triangle as an effect, and therefore as carrying reference to something—I need not have

a distinct conception of this something—as the cause. I have sought to distinguish this circumstance by noting separately $\phi\lambda$.

But presently by a further application of the law of Ignorance, this determinant factor is banished from the conception : this means not that I have next a thought of the polar triangle as an effect bearing no reference to a possible cause, which is impossible ; but that I cease to think of the polar triangle as an effect ; I take it complacently without apparent inquisitiveness. Thus I have,

$$A_3 = Se\ d(i, \beta, a), \text{ putting } \phi\lambda = 0.$$

How does now a fact appear in review ? It is an experience—synthetic as I take it—differentiated with respect to the three elements α , β and i . Next we have,

$$A_3 = (\alpha, \beta, i), \text{ putting } e = 1.$$

$$= \alpha, \text{ or } \beta, \text{ or } i,$$

by appropriately applying the principle of ignorance. Hence a continuum of experience is ultimately taken as equivalent to such very partial features as α , β and i .

We may also note in passing the very common and interesting case in which a concrete fact which involves the polar triangle (p, q, r), viz., Subject, Object and Stress between them, is believed to be either a subjective, or an objective, or an interactive fact. It is needless to remind at so late a stage that the so-called subjective, objective and interactive facts are only abstractions—or as we have called them fact-sections. A rose of perception is an objective fact because we have attended only to a special aspect of the entire concrete fact of the moment : surely what I believe to be the rose does not exhaust the entire experience that I have at the moment of perception. Take the entire fact as it has come, and objectivity is lost. Again, the thought of Tennyson's 'In Memoriam' is believed to be a subjective fact, because here also I have been interested in a fragment of the concrete experience of the moment only. The whole experience is neither subjective nor objective. Experience is commonly regarded as subjective because subject is perhaps the commonest and the most interesting pole which appears in it : the emotional basis of the

thought of me is peculiarly lively : while the objects of experience are in a continual flux, the subject apparently endures in-as-much as all objects, however various, can be referred to a Subject. But as I have already suggested before, the subject is no more an inseparable feature of experience than an object. Very often the polarity of Subject and Object is not at all in evidence in the life of experience : even when the polarity does appear, regard oscillates between the two poles ; and the experience which involves a thought of the two poles can evidently not itself be equated to either.

It is through the unfailing operation of the principle of veiling that Life judges and acts. Cognition and interest are almost invariably blended together in every concrete fact of consciousness : I feel and wish, with more or less emphasis, while I fancy that I am only thinking or knowing ; and certainly my feeling and wishing are not altogether without any influence upon my cognition. This influence generally determines to a very considerable extent the nature of what I think or know. A thought or knowledge may thus properly be regarded as a function of the emotional and conative prepossessions and expressions of the mind. The universe of experience is indeed too large for any of my ordinary interests of life : an infinity of features, emotive, cognitive and conative, are there in solution, as it were, in this universe. But I care not for all this infinite richness of my intuitive life. At a given moment a particular interest, say the writing of this essay, possesses me. This special interest behaves and operates in my actual universe of the moment as if it were a thread of special preferences dipped in the universal solution. All sorts of things are there in this solution, but my thread selects only some and rejects others, and accomplishes by such a selective operation what I look upon as my crystallized fact of the moment. The thread of interest gathers around itself a crystal, a pragmatic fact as I have often called it, and I fancy that this little crystal of my creation is my fact. How easily I seem to forget my universe—the general solution ! Thus the operation of interest in life is analogous to the process of crystallization : it essentially involves the ignorance of the whole

preference of a part. On the other hand, what I look upon as my interest is only a fact-section, and not my concrete fact at any time : it is only one aspect of the universe that I live. Briefly the facts and processes with which the science of the Mind has to deal are all fact-sections abstracted from the universe of experience by the habitual operation of the principle of veiling. Life as we conceive it becomes completely undone of its universe cannot be made to wear a veil and only its aspects made to appear, if while ever living in the whole truth we cannot apparently ignore and forget it : complete and perpetual abandonment to the whole truth would rob life of all its present interest and significance : complete absorption in the concrete whole without ignorance and accentuation would certainly not make life impossible, but it would be a kind of life altogether foreign to our conceptions. Let us for one moment conceive a Mind to which Existence stands unveiled wholly and once for all : there is no alternating play of light and shade, apprehension and ignorance, acceptance and disavowal in it. Now, what kind of consciousness is this ? Clearly it is a kind of conscious life in which the polarity of base, index and co-efficient, and that of subject, object and stress cannot exist ; for, polarity, as we have seen, presupposes oscillation of regard between the poles, and oscillation of regard presupposes ignorance and accentuation : I cannot alternately attend to the two poles or foci, A and B, of a given curve of experience, C, without inducing facts in me like C A B and C A B, where bold type represents alternate accentuation. If however this law of oscillation and alternate apprehension and ignorance should fail in the case of the supernatural life which we have imagined, it might be equivalent to a stretch of experience in which polarities of two, three, or n dimensions might exist ; but none the less it would be a kind of experience of which we should possess no manner of conception. I might, however, call this an *experience of unrelenting concrete* : not that any life, even that of the amoeba, can ever cease to be concrete, but that in thought and selection we are constantly apt to ignore and forget the concrete, and deal with abstract sections of the fact : *unrelenting concrete* would be an experience in

which this aptitude should not be in evidence : it is to live the whole *always*, both in intuition and in thought. We too live the whole always, both in intuition and *while* we are in thought, but in thought we generally care for, and fancy that we are having, facts which are but fact-sections. In putting down an equation of the unrelenting concrete we should have the following cases :

(1) In the previous fundamental equation involving W and P (whole and part), W should never be put equal to zero ; for, by supposition, W is unrelenting and cannot be ignored. On the other hand, P must ever be put equal to zero ; for, by supposition, P is never regarded in isolation the Part *as* part is never viewed or reviewed ; it is merged in the whole once for all. If the part exists at all, as perhaps it does in the continuum of the fact-stuff, it is not contemplated as a part. In the case in question we have the whole always including of course its parts, if any, but never a contemplation of the whole in relation to its parts, never the polarity or opposition of W and P. To take the part aside I must ignore the whole, and to live the whole complacently I must never take the part aside. I have already alluded to the degrees of veiling or ignorance ; but choosing to take ignorance in a qualitative rather than in a quantitative sense for the present, I observe that a life of unrelenting concrete is a life of fact-stuff pure and simple, involving no discriminating judgment, and not presuming to be a thinker. An experience involving judgment and science is indeed a concrete alogical fact in its entirety ; but still there is this vital difference between F and F' that while the latter involves within itself the mysterious operation of veiling and unveiling, the former apparently does not—at least it does not if we attach for the present only a qualitative value to the principle of ignorance. In the former the veil of existence is almost completely uplifted : we shall see to what extent the veil still remains : an enquiry about the extent of veiling will just now goad us into a consideration of the quantitative aspect of the veil. In the latter is not the veil more conspicuously drawn ? While not actually ceasing to be the concrete fact in F', do I not identify myself or my experience

with what is only a section of the concrete fact ? Now, such an identification is possible only through ignorance of the entire fact. It should be observed further that the putting of 0 for P in the combination W P does not mean that the part is cleanly annihilated from the whole, or that the whole is a stretch of experience in which the distinction of whole and part does not appear either logically or intuitively—the experience being a pure homogeneous continuum—; it means that the part has not separated itself in thought from the whole of experience : the part is given along with the whole, but the two aspects of the category do not surprise or challenge each other in thought.

(2) Does the equation $F' = I_1^f$ apply to the unrelenting concrete ? Recalling the meaning of the notation on the right-hand side we see it is an experience which while feeling itself infinite recognises finite determinations in itself, and yet conceives itself as a unity. Now, what does the recognition of finite determinations in an infinitely extended continuum precisely imply ? Does it not mean that the unbounded continuum has been emphasised at certain places only ? At any rate, this is the meaning that will suggest itself to our minds in the light of the interpretation we recently put upon I of the equation. Now, if the continuum involve preference and emphasis, does it not involve veiling or ignorance too ? Suppose I have a view of the sky at night emphasised at the star Sirius. Does not this experience involve ignorance of the whole concrete fact and accentuation of a part only, viz., Sirius ? In intuition of course, as previously suggested, the concrete whole stands wholly or almost wholly revealed : I have a vision of a particular star, but an experience of many things besides ; nay more ; all these other things together with the star are felt by me as appearing in a *plenum* of awareness to which as such I can assign no bounds whatever. But does the fact continue to wear this aspect in review ? In reflecting on the previous fact I may not actually put my experience as being equivalent to the vision of the star Sirius merely—though this is perhaps what ordinarily happens in the life of consciousness which is generally swayed by pragmatic ends : a pragmatic fact

is silently regarded as equivalent to the concrete whole of experience in which it has appeared. But assuming that I faithfully portray my previous experience in F' —as faithfully of course as is possible from the very nature of the case—do I ignore any aspect—whole or part—in F' ? Let us suppose that F' is a scrupulously faithful representation of F which has just gone before. Do I conceive that anything has been veiled or ignored in F itself? The conception, it is needless to remind, belongs to the reviewing fact. This is a question which, like most others in this fundamental Science, can be settled only by an appeal to direct reflection. Now, reflection seems to establish that my unrelenting concrete—which is my entire universe itself at any moment—is apparently an object all laid bare, a tale all told with nothing concealed. By supposition I have abandoned myself completely to my concrete experience. No fact-section has apparently been drawn apart, abstracted: and hence there is apparently no veiling, no ignorance.

But stay. Is the unrelenting concrete of the kind drawn above an existence all revealed, a fact all exposed? We have seen that in a distinct sense the unrelenting concrete is all laid bare: it is my universe, boundless as I feel it to be, and therefore appearing in full, keeping nothing back. There may be in such an experience a pregnant suggestion of still vaster possibilities: the world that I actually have may be believed to be but an earnest of a richer and fuller world. But it is easy to perceive that this suggestion and this belief are inside and not outside the world that I possess—they constitute only the co-efficient of our fact of experience. Let us for one moment waive the objection that such a world may involve the veiling of possibilities: can I say that as an *actual* world all laid bare to my regard and enjoyment it involves no ignorance, no incidence of the inscrutable Veil? Possibilities may be veiled in my universe, but as an actual can it not pass for the unrelenting concrete? I reply, No. Even the concrete experience of our ordinary acquaintance *does* involve the veil, and this it does in a special sense to be considered in the next section.

10. *The Veil as a variable*

It is clear to direct reflection that the veil of ignorance is not cast over the continuum of experience as a homogeneous circumstance throughout : veiling is evidently also a question of degree : there is ordinarily always a differential distribution of psychic tone over a field of experience. Now, this principle of differential distribution has to be read along with the principle of absolute veiling and unveiling in order that we may find an workable key to the analysis of conscious life. It is the curve, the shades of ignorance which now press themselves into own consideration. Having attended to the **Principle of the curve** we shall in the next place see if we can settle the relation between this combined principle of veiling and differential distribution and the principle of movement which we have explained in the preceding sections. As the principle of the curve appears to be of paramount importance we shall do well perhaps to study it in some manner of fulness.

How does the principle of the curve stand to logical contradiction? Logically, not-A is the contradiction of A, and *vice versa*. It is possible no doubt to transplant this logic of contradiction into the life of thought and action—into the world of concrete experience ; but such logic is not always available or serviceable. To have a feeling and not to have it, to do an action and not to do it, are simple cases to which our logic applies easily enough. But unfortunately for logic the concrete world is not an assemblage of mere A's and not-A's—life as well as in Nature positives do not pass unceremoniously and abruptly into negatives, but each set shades into the other through countless gradations. The music of our earth dies away into silence not abruptly, but through softer and softer echoes ; the splendour of a gorgeous sunset is shrouded in the sullen shadows of twilight not abruptly, but through paler and paler tones of colour. In the heart of man again a feeling does not rise and die away with the sudden brilliance of a shooting star. It is indeed the softer keys between a feeling and its opposite, between love and hatred, between faith and fear, between selfless devotion and impervious selfishness, that impart to the playing of life's drama all its

peculiar charm and significance. If man were left to choose between a few stereotyped, hard and fast positives and negatives, life would not be worth living, and man would be as much a logical automation in practice as according to Huxley he is in theory. To such softer keys, such finer shades and delicate links it is not easy to apply the hard logic of contradiction. A feeling is there—it is a positive fact. If it is not there, it is a negative fact, and we have logical contradiction. But if a softer key of the feeling be there, another mode of it, shall we say that this softer key, this another mode, is the contradiction of the original feeling? I do an act, you do the same act but only a grain less; shall we say that while I have done it you have not?

Even in such cases the position of logic is unassailable in a clear sense. For logic and logical psychology a feeling and a softer key of a feeling an act and a close approximation to an act, are different facts—as good positives and negatives as any—unimpeachable A's and not-A's. Indeed in the life of consciousness we cannot have absolutely identical facts; it is only by abstraction and veiling that common sense accepts as identical facts what are merely more or less similar. Two pulses of fact, ABC and ABD can evidently be looked upon as identical only by veiling the wholes in both cases and accentuating the parts AB: two letters in different configurations are taken by us to be the same because we ignore the configurations: two events happening in different times are believed by us to be repetitions because we ignore the times. If the concrete is allowed to stand unrelentingly revealed, life sinks down to the level of the alogical; we have the dumb, actual flow or stretch without any recognition of either distinct, or similar or identical pulses. The recognition of each of these categories presupposes more or less ignorance of the concrete. If similar pulses cannot be known as identical without ignoring distinctions, it is true also that any two pulses in the flow of life cannot be known as distinct without ignoring bases of resemblance. The operation of the veiling principle may be symbolically represented in the following manner: Suppose we have a given stretch of experience

$$F' = A B C D E B' C' D' F A \dots\dots\dots(1)$$

In this there is no recognition of distinct pulses. Now, applying the principle of alternate veiling and unveiling of whole and part we have $F' = (ABCD) + (EB'C'D') + \dots\dots\dots(2)$

The affair now assumes the aspect of a series consisting of distinct pulses of experience. Now, in the right-hand expression of (2), put 0 of ignorance for the elements A and E; in other words, let the whole pulses be veiled and the parts BCD and B'C'D' be accentuated; let us also ignore the dashes in the latter pulse. After these operations, we clearly see that the subject may fancy that he has two identical pulses experience.

To recognise one pulse as *other* than the other, the subject's attention has to be especially directed to the distinctive features in each: agreements have to be more or less concealed and discrepancies have to be more or less accentuated. No two pulses of experience can be discriminated as *two* distinct states in which the subject's regard has not preferentially settled on their discrepancies: an experience in which no discrepancies, not even those of time and space, appear and can be taken notice of, must be felt as a single, continuous stretch, and cannot be broken into pulses at all. Now, does the perception of distinction or otherness involve the veiling operation or not? To know A as other than B, I must have C_A and C_B —or a continuum of experience accentuated respectively at A and B. But the continuum is $C_{A'B}$ before the recognition of the two features or pulses, where the accent means emphasis. This is the whole. Now, this whole must be twice veiled and the parts C_A and C_B twice accentuated in order that there may be possible in me such a discriminative thought as ' C_A is other than C_B '. Again, C_A is a whole in relation to A, and so is C_B in relation to B. And these wholes must be veiled and the parts accentuated in order that there may be in me such a recognition as 'the pulse A is followed by *another* pulse B'. I have not here attempted a complete analysis of the discriminative recognitions referred to before: I have merely shown how in their essential features they illustrate the veil. I may also observe that in the perception of otherness common and similar features need not be *wholly* obscured: such a perception

is not a perception of utter, downright difference, as we shall see. But none the less it is necessary that the whole together with affinities must go under a veil, and that the part together with distinctions must press into relief : it is clear that the veil need not mean effacement and the relief need not mean thought-monopoly.

The perception of similarity appears to be a cross between those of identity and otherness. Without invoking the Hegelian dialectic on our head, we may say that the thought of sameness involves a minimum veil, and the thought of otherness or logical contradiction involves a maximum veil, and the categories of identity, similarity or likeness negotiate between these minimum and maximum, and are therefore in an ascending order as regards *quantity* of veiling. This is a question of enormous philosophical interest, and I shall not certainly lightly pass over it when the time for its treatment comes. Let us note in the meanwhile that F' in thinking of the concrete whole or F thinks that it is the *same* : what the concrete whole is, it is : it is taken unreservedly, with nothing kept back, and nothing mutilated. This circumstance I may perhaps aptly represent by the following equation :

$$F' = E^{F=F},$$

which evidently means that the reviewing fact may recognise a concrete whole as a concrete whole, a fact as the *same* as itself. Here is the Spirit's bold disavowal of the veil, a solicitude to look existence in the face. To recognise distinctions, similarities or even identities the Spirit must, as we have seen, play hide and seek with itself : it is only by recognising the concrete, the whole concrete and nothing but the concrete that I can keep nearest to the bosom of the mother-stuff from which by endless veiling and unveiling my universe has grown like a hypnotic dream. Refuse for one moment to take anything short of the given All, and you at once raise yourself above all antitheses and oppositions : oppositions presuppose poles discriminated in the whole—require what we have previously called the combination $W + P$. In mere W which does not relent and relax no P , though given, can be discriminated : to discriminate it we must ignore the whole in a

fashion. Now, how would such a fact accommodate the categories of identity, likeness and otherness ?

Logic and common sense do not always keep house together. To an abstract science like Logic mathematical precision is not criminal : it may deal with only round positives and round negatives. But surely life as well as science become impossible if we do not admit intermediate conceptions, crosses between pure A's and pure not-A's. Logic as we have seen is perfectly within her rights : similar or identical facts are *different* facts : twin stars of equal apparent size and brilliance are different stars and not the same, hence we may fairly say that if the one is A the other is not-A. But common sense and science cannot be content with such a summary way of putting things. The world is a ceaseless flux, and no facts, or rather fact-sections, in this flux are absolutely alike—neither subjective nor objective, to introduce provisionally this familiar distinction. And if none but identical facts are to be classified and given common names, if, that is to say, we have to choose between the categories of pure identicals and downright others, then we should make up our minds to go without any science. Science has mainly to build upon partial resemblances : identicals are rare and absolute likeness in the order of phenomenon is a non-entity.

That in the objective world no fact ever repeats itself is a proposition which everybody is perhaps ready to grant. The anxious precision of modern scientific analysis has not been in vain. Even the minutest features and changes in things cannot escape the notice of lynx-eyed Science : the savant discovers myriads of changes and an infinity of features where the common observer suspects none. Indeed, the telescope, the microscope, the spectroscope have revealed to the bewildered imagination of man an universe infinitely more stupendous than what his natural senses can introduce to him. 'We can never bathe twice in the same stream' said one of the sages of the past, and modern science equipped with its magnificent means and methods of analysis has proved the wisdom of the saying. We cannot live in the same universe for two consecutive moments.

If this is true of the world of objective phenomena, cannot the same thing be true of the world of subjective phenomena? Do not the macrocosm and the microcosm run on parallel lines? Are they not two aspects, segments, sections of our concrete Fact? I see a book on the table and have a perception. After a few minutes, I see the same book on the same table, and have another perception. Are the two perceptions absolutely alike mental facts? The very circumstance that they are taken as *two* facts implies that they are not absolutely alike. But let us waive this point. To careful introspection, possibly the two facts do differ in certain ordinary and inessential—for the pragmatic temper of the moment—respects; but the difference is ignored because it does not fall in with my pragmatic interest or possibly because some involuntary conditions keep certain features of the one and certain features of the other in the penumbra of semi-attention: in one word, because the concrete wholes are veiled and parts only are accentuated. But whatever the conditions of the difference may be, the difference is there. Even apart from this difference we have to take into account another circumstance in which the first impression of an object must differ from any subsequent one. The first time I see a book it is, let us assume, only a particular book for me. When I see it again, it is the same particular book *plus* something which was not in the first impression—a recognition of it as the same dear old object and of myself as the same dear old subject. If the first impression is x , and the sort of recognition of it I have just described y , the second impression must be (assuming that recollection does not fail us) $x + y$; and this on the hypothesis that x can repeat itself, which it cannot. For similar reasons, an impression and a memory of it, even if the memory is a true image of the impression, cannot be absolutely alike facts. The self cannot bathe twice in the same stream of consciousness. Scientific analysis has chased out of existence the myth of absolute likenesses, and introspection has made short work of the superstition that in the life of the Mind pulses of feeling repeat themselves. This being one of the unassailable positions of the Science of Fact, we put this: Shall we lend

countenance to absolute likeness, or in default of them, set our faces against all partial likenesses? If the full loaf cannot be had, shall we prefer to go without any loaf to accepting half a one? We are fairly on the horns of a dilemma. If a fact is to be considered an other fact when it very nearly resembles a given fact but not exactly, and if therefore on account of this otherness the two facts must not be brought together under a common category and name, we have no classification and no science. If partial likenesses are accepted in our schemes of knowledge, if, that is to say, we propose to build our classifications and scientific knowledge on partial resemblances of things recognising that absolute resemblances are not available, we have to compromise the pure blood of logical contradiction. A first impression of an object and a subsequent impression, an impression and a recollection, *are* in a clear sense different states. Nevertheless the common sense of humanity has been wiser than its logic. Common sense has decided that for the purposes of life and systematic knowledge it shall be open to the knower and thinker to accentuate certain features and ignore others. All fact-sections are born in a co-essential fact-stuff, so that they cannot but possess bases of affinity: we can conceive of no difference so utter and down-right as to spell the absolute negation of such bases of family resemblance. On the other hand too, the movement of the continuum, which for our present purpose means the sum of fact-sections, implies the continual appearance and disappearance of novel and therefore different features. Hence likeness-in-difference or difference-in-likeness are the categories that ordinarily always apply to the representation of experience: the place of emphasis is evidently different in the two cases.

Knowledge is progressive. To know a thing is not to know it all at once. From indefiniteness to definiteness knowledge moves. For one moment let us define truth as an ideal. Then, like an asymptote gradually approaching a curve but never actually meeting it, human science is gradually approaching the fullness of truth but is perhaps never destined to realize and embody it. Knowledge, empirical knowledge at any rate, is thus

an asymptotic approximation. Partial knowledge is therefore a necessity. We are bound to have different orders and grades of knowledge. For the inspired soul of the poet the meanest flower has thoughts too deep for philosophy ; and the tiny sparkling dew-drop on that grass or a small particle of sand on this paper has mysteries squeezed into its littleness which it may take half a dozen Tyndalls and Darwins to unravel in their lifetimes. This being the law of the evolution of human knowledge and in the face of the fact that man must needs have a science, is it prudent to persist in regarding the various grades and instalments of knowledge of a given fact as wholly different pieces of knowledge—uncompromising A's and not-A's—which must on no account be co-ordinated and organised ? A fuller knowledge of a thing cannot always be taken as a contradiction of a less full knowledge of it—not as a mere other with which the latter should never form an alliance. Man must not only distinguish but he must also co-ordinate. Observations have to be co-ordinated with observations, the former has to be co-ordinated with the latter, senses have to be co-ordinated with imagination and reasoning—without such co-ordination distinctions are dreary and differentiations are barren. Should the present be always pledged to belie the past, if differences were always to be looked upon as denials, surely man would have to go back to the amœba and learn his psychology anew from that primordial ancestor of his. But fortunately man's greatness is not going to be wrecked upon a life of mere others, mere pulses without assimilation and co-ordination. As we have to distinguish between a more and a less in our knowledge so we have to distinguish between a more and a less in our estimation of it as true or false. Living is thus not merely a question of *kinds* but also very prominently a question of *degrees*.

Knowing is selection. My world is not merely my idea but also my will. Even in our apparently passive acts of perception we select, we emphasise certain features and ignore others, we encourage certain bearings and connections and discourage others. Knowing is not always uniform partly because selection is not uniform. This view of the knower as an essentially

selective agent is steadily gaining ground in the well-informed quarters. Nature is mysteriously selective, the living tissues are selective and there is no sufficient reason why sentiency and reason should not be selective too. This is the Principle of Continuity. In a sense, Nature still abhors a vacuum. On the other hand, there are reasons why conscious life should be of a selective nature. Non-selective knowledge is perilous. Non-selective knowledge cannot consist with the ends of life.

Without meaning any injustice to the ultra-rational factors of human evolution, I want to emphasise for my immediate purpose the importance of intelligence in the history of human affairs. The progress of man must be attributed in a large measure to the speciality of his cerebral and intellectual development. In the struggle for existence man could never hope to win for himself the crown of victory if he did not possess a brain and intelligence more selective than those of his competitors. Perhaps it will not be unprofitable to look into the cerebral aspect of the question. The cerebral hemispheres of man are undoubtedly a system of tensions of a highly unstable character. This extreme delicacy and instability of the cerebral mechanism is at once a condition of man's power and glory, and a source of his danger and embarrassment. The dilemma again. Given a nervous tissue with but few and fixed possibilities of action like that of the lower animal, progress becomes very much hampered. The nervous system becomes a mechanism for a few stereotyped reflex activities : such a system may be well conceived to show spontaneity also, but its spontaneity will mainly be of an instinctive nature. *Ex hypothesi* the brain cannot depart from the narrow groove of its fatal possibilities. Given a nervous tissue extremely delicate and unstable, possibilities of advancement multiply no doubt, but with them also multiply possibilities of anarchical confusion—an unstable brain will as readily carry us to victory as to ruin. An accumulation of brute forces is no doubt the first condition of fighting power, but discipline is the second and an equally indispensable condition of success in any line. Now, where is this discipline of the forces represented by the brain? What is it that, 'loads the dice'—to borrow a happy

figure from Prof. James? If any and every current that ran into the brain were to throw it into a vortex of uncontrollable excitement, if in the life of the brain to touch were to excite and to excite were to goad into action, if there were absolutely nothing to exercise a salutary censorship—to inhibit and direct, to switch and augment—to be the guide, friend and philosopher of the blind, unruly forces—then, man would be completely undone and Nature would be driven to give up what is presumably her most edifying business. If there were any business which required to be most anxiously looked after, it was the affairs of the brain. Both the receipts and the disbursements—the in-going and the out-going currents—of the brain have to be supervised. The mystery that dwells in the hemispheres and does all this work is of course shy of public inspection. But all this work has to be done, and all this is being done. Cause or effect, the selection in the brain in the counterpart of selection in the mind: the brain is the will objectified as Schopenhauer might say. And from this it follows that a fact in the mind—I am now speaking in the abstract phraseology of psychology—is always a selected fact, a pragmatic fact; selected, in the first place, from among other fact-sections that solicit your favour, and in the next place, from among other forms of the same fact. Out of a limitless fund of actual and possible features I seize upon a few, accentuate a few and ignore the rest. The very same group of features may possibly be thrown into all conceivable permutations and combinations—a fact may take a new character and complexion each time a new selection, a new adjustment is made. Into the nature of the selective principle I would not lightly venture to pry. How does it relate to the Veil? Selection is essentially a synthesis of ignorance and preference, it presupposes veiling, but simple veiling does not express the full significance of selection. But whatever be the full significance and agent of selection, we understand it. Suppose a given continuum is differently treated in two moments: we have C_A and C_B . Shall we say that they contradict each other, and that if the one is true, the other is necessarily false? In a sense of course we may answer Yes. But

ordinarily shall we not say instead that the one is possibly a fuller, a truer fact than the other, and not its denial and opposite? We know what the reply of common sense and science will be. To say No is to plunge headlong into a veritable chaos of mutually clashing and jarring opposites, where no order appears, no system. Partial likeness is the very possibility of science. And what is partial likeness but a compromise between an other and a non-other, a hybrid conception in which two opposite notions, the same and not the same, are intercrossed? Life and science deal in such hybrids; they cannot stand the pure blood of Platonic archetypes.

Suppose we imagine a World-consciousness in which Facts are in the fullness of their bearings: the pole of the co-efficient is nothing, and that of the actual is everything. This is the infinite, quiescent concrete Fact to which it is clearly impossible to ascribe movement and also veiling in the ordinary sense. It is perhaps Green's 'Spiritual Principle in Nature' in which the infinite tissue of relations which we call the world remains eternally realized. Now, in what light shall we regard selection in relation to this statical, infinite concrete? What is an ordinary, pragmatic fact in this limitless ocean of existence?

Things are in the fullness of their bearings in the World-consciousness, and in the fulness of its bearings a thing is simply the whole system over again. A drop of dew cannot be understood fully without understanding the whole universe to which that drop belongs and to which it is correlated; to understand a ripple of a tone is to understand the song which awakens it; to understand a touch of beauty or pathos is to understand the pulsating hand and the throbbing heart of the master behind it. I believe that I know a thing gradually and partially: nothing is *all* actual for us; we conceive everything as growing in a limitless plenum of possibilities. We do not take our knowledge as the ideal, the consummation of knowledge: we do not accept our truth as an ultimatum. Hence our reality is dynamical, evolving. In the World-consciousness, we may suppose, the universe of fact is not only unbounded but also all actual: even *my* universe of fact is unbounded in a distinct sense, but it is

not without its co-efficient of possibilities. Hence reality for World-consciousness is quiescent, statical. We may conceive that this quiescent reality is being gradually and partially reproduced in us. From my own point of view, the distinction between finite and World-consciousness is a distinction without a difference : I have more than once suggested consciousness as an unbounded plenum in which the universe of fact grows, moves, is veiled and unveiled : consciousness as such is *never* finite. But though consciousness as such would not admit of any partition and classification, we may surely conceive *two* conditions of the universe of fact in it : the statical, quiescent universe which is all actual, and the restive, evolving universe which, though also unbounded in a sense, is taken by us as growing in a solution of possibilities. Now, I conceive that my universe of fact at any moment is a gradual and partial reproduction of a statical, quiescent universe. I am not eager to press this view of the growth of knowledge at this stage ; but I merely suggest that such a view may be quite naturally taken of the process. In order to assign the place of Selection in this process of the universe of fact, I will briefly add this : The gradual and partial reproduction of the Quiescent Real is essentially conceived by me as a selective operation—an operation determined to a certain extent at least by the interests, preferences, predispositions of a given Subject. The analogy of a thread of special preferences dipped in a universal solution has already served us and well ; but, we need not discuss the nature and place of these special preferences in the scheme of the operation. It is this circumstance, we may observe however, that builds a universe of fact for me at this moment which is not an exact copy of yours. Both you and I reproduce in a gradual and partial way the same Quiescent Real, but, our principles and instruments of reproduction are different, and hence we have more or less different results in the transaction. In a sense, I select my universe, am the author of my fact.

Suppose, we agree also to take the Quiescent Real as the last truth. My truth is therefore dynamical, evolving. Truth will thus have for me grades, degrees. A transitional, relative truth

is *not* the last truth : it is not-A. So far the principle of contradiction does apply. But, none the less a relative truth is a step to the absolute truth : it is *becoming* the absolute truth : it is the absolute in the making. Hence we cannot wholly dissociate the relative truth from the absolute : the former is the latter not yet consummated. Hence a transitional truth is a synthesis of truth and untruth. No piece of ordinary experience can wholly contradict the Truth, and none can wholly consummate the Truth. If we define the condition of falsity as that in which the Quiescent Real must be wholly out of touch, then no piece of knowledge can be labelled as false : even the false must live in a certain sense in the real. If we define the condition of truth as that in which the Quiescent Real is wholly given, then no piece of ordinary knowledge can be credited as true. Nevertheless, the logical sense of man has to deal in truths and falsities. These therefore are not quite uncompromising A's and not-A's. These are also largely matters for human choice. Though I cannot get at the Quiescent Real and set up *this* as my standard for ordinary estimations of true and false, I certainly believe that there is such a standard. At any stage, however, I select and fashion a provisional, relative standard to go by. If the final standard cannot be had, let us have a provisional and imperfect standard for the practical estimation of truths and falsities. I persuade myself that this provisional standard is only an approach to the final standard of truth. Now, the possession of this provisional standard at any time presupposes selection. It is again the mysterious assemblage of conditions—interests and predispositions—to which the selection of the provisional standard of judgment at any time must be, as I believe, referred. A rope-snake is an illusion while a block of stone in the immediate neighbourhood is a fact. What is the standard of judgment that I rely upon ? I only accept *a certain order* of experiences as true and *a certain other* as false. The snake stands for a certain order of experience : it is an aggregate of certain actual and possible sensations, to adopt the language of associationist psychology. The rope-snake of illusion is materially different from this aggregate of actual and possible

sensations : the latter I have selected as my standard of truth as regards a snake ; therefore, the rope-snake I reject as false. The account given here may indeed strike one as superficial, but the part played by selection in the economy of belief is not obscure. The question of vital importance is this : if there are all shades of approach to a given truth ranging from utter divergence to complete convergence or correspondence—from maximum not-A to minimum not-A—how shall we draw a line to indicate as to precisely where truth begins and falsity ends, and *vice versa* ? How much correspondence with A is consistent with something's being still regarded as not-A, and how much divergence from A is consistent with something's being still regarded as an A ? Let A in this problem be an accepted standard of truth. I am not enquiring about logical A and not-A which are perfectly safe in whichever way we may find a solution to the problem. A given thing and the very nearest approach to it *are* different things : and yet we should not forthwith label the one as true and the other as false. The question of truth is a question of maximum and minimum and apparently leaves room for selection. Hence from the viewpoint of commonsense the problem stated above is an appropriate and important one. It is patent to inspection that a given thing being A, nothing can be an absolute not-A, and nothing—no other thing—can be an absolute A. Bases of contact can be traced even amid utmost divergence, and lines of separation are discernible even in the midst of perfect amity and kinship. The correspondence between something and some other thing—one experience and another—is therefore only a question of *how much*. The question of truth and falsity which is commonly believed to be a question of correspondence is therefore essentially a question of *how much* also. Now, this *how much*, I venture to think, is a matter for selection. It is my interests and prepossessions which surely have a hand in the finding—if I must not say determining—of this quantity. This finding, I also think, requires the application of the Principle of Veiling. It behoves us to make this aspect of the question clear.

Knowledge is a sort of organic process; and it must have a

kind of metabolism of its own—all *grades* of truth co-ordinating into a mass of verified and verifiable knowledge, and all *grades* of falsity fusing together to form the refuse, the excreta of human knowledge ; the former is Science, the latter is Fiction ; between the two, however, no steady line of demarcation can be drawn : each shades off imperceptibly into the other. As in the life of the tissue so in experience anabolism and catabolism are two correlative processes, the one being helpless without the other. Truth is not commonly a statical fact given once for all ; round a nucleus, truth crystallizes itself, and the process goes on not simply by eliminating irrelevant atoms and configurations but by taking in the relevant ones. The process is as much one of refusal as one of acceptance. I have a given fact-section ; a new fact-section comes. I do not proceed forthwith to set them up as contradictories—earmark the one as true and the other as false. Judgment can usually afford to wait and see. A fact, however apparently insignificant, is organic in a prominent sense. As into the constitution of a living tissue only certain forms of matter are welcome and others are not—as it has its own appropriate food—so a universe of fact can admit into its constitution only certain presentations and not others ; these other presentations to which it is at any time ready to extend its hospitality constitute the appropriate food, so to say, of that fact at that moment. We suppose that the Subject is guided by his preferences—likes and dislikes : ever in knowing he cannot but *choose*, and in so far he chooses he vents his spontaneity. Now, according to our Science, the Subject is only an abstraction of the fact : what we ascribe to the Subject really inheres in the Fact : the Fact—my whole universe of any moment—chooses and is spontaneous. The fact is the prototype of the living tissue.

A universe of fact has its mysterious preferences, likes and dislikes. These together constitute what I may aptly call the **Habit of the Fact**. In virtue of this habit a fact will readily form alliance with some other facts and refuse to mess together with some others. Now what does this alliance as ascribed to the fact mean ? Alliance is quiescent association. The

rope-snake of an illusion cannot associate peacefully with my accepted world of a given moment. In the *whole* universe of fact at any moment any fact-section that appears is securely welcome: the whole fact knows of no impostors in it: in a sense, it is apparently impartial to whatever may be imbedded in its tissue. It is the unbounded all and at a given moment it has no actual presentation foreign to it—nothing therefore which it may be called upon either to admit or to turn out. We have seen already how from the stand-point of this all, there is no illusion, mutual challenge of fact and fiction. But suppose I select and accept for my universe at a given moment what is after all but a fact-section—*viz.*, the objective world: it is the whole veiled and the part accepted. This chosen universe is undoubtedly something that falls short of the All, and may have therefore actual presentations external to itself but embraced by the all—presentations which it may or may not like to associate with. This it must be noted, is not mere figure of speech. That section of my fact which I regard as objective certainly possesses a character on account of which it is so regarded and discriminated from the subjective; it has a habit which induces it to take up certain presentations into its own structure and refuse admittance to certain others. Any presentation—for some time I am using this word in a broad sense—cannot be fitted in with my objective world of a given moment: the presentation of an illusion, found out of course as such, cannot be accepted while that of a block of stone in the neighbourhood can readily be.

Again, the universe of fact may still narrow down. Suppose U_0 , U_1 , U_2 , etc. stand for different universes of fact in a descending order. Let U_0 represent the unrelenting concrete. Then we may suppose that as regards actual presentations it has apparently no partiality, no preferential habit. But there may be a co-efficient, a suggestion of possibilities in it: I may take it not only as an unbounded actual, but also as a halting stage in endless journey after still vaster possibilities. Now so far as these possibilities are concerned, I believe that it may form an alliance with some and refuse to piece together with

others. Even U_0 therefore may be imagined to possess a habit in relation to the realm of possibilities by which, in a sense, it is limited : we have seen previously how infinitude or limitlessness can be taken in different senses.

There is also a further sense in which U_0 may be supposed to indicate a habit. Commonly always, a fact involves a pragmatic nucleus, a preferential incidence of regard. If I am looking at the starry heavens now, does not my regard settle with greater emphasis on a particular star or cluster of stars? I cannot say that the whole is veiled *exactly*, but can say that it is thrown into relief in a particular small tract ; at any rate this is what I think when I pass the fact in review. Let us assume without question this phenomenon of accentuation. Now, let us ask this : why should the continuum be apparently concentrated in a particular spot and feature and thinly formed in its remaining parts? What makes life so lavish on a rose and so miserly on the bush against which it may be set? What makes me eager for a gentle murmur amid the fallen withering leaves of the vernal wood while from every atom of my universe a voice is rising and melting into the chorus of the heavens? Surely there is here preference of an unmistakable import. Why should an experience love to appear as a curve with maximum and minimum positions, and not in all cases as a homogeneous, impartial condition of awareness?

An aptitude and habit can thus fairly belong to U_0 —the unrelenting concrete as we are familiar with it. As an actual it may have a preference for some orders of possibility and not for others : within its own constitution it may bestow its emphasis on a particular place and feature and not, as we commonly think, on the others. Now, if preference has any necessary connexion with the veil, we must find the unrelenting concrete veiled. This is an amendment to the description that we have given before of its nature : did we not say before that for one moment the unrelenting concrete is a fact all displayed? All facts are always wholly displayed : a fact is essentially conscious existence, and however we may ignore the whole and favour parts and features in a stretch of fact, the

stretch itself never ceases to be felt and known. I have surely the entire universe when I fancy that I have merely a fact-section, a rose or a sparkling drop of morning dew. That veiling does not mean effacement is a point that I have already pressed into notice before. Veiling, therefore, is essentially a question of quantity, orders. We have accordingly to discriminate between a maximum veil and a minimum. When we took away the veil from over the unrelenting concrete we merely suggested, as the amending conception given above has shown, that the veil is cast over the unrelenting concrete with so very impalpable thinness that we hardly commonly suspect it : we feel apparently that we have all and nothing is kept back from us. But is this the whole thing that we feel or believe concerning it? Do we not also believe, more or less distinctly, that the world we have, though unbounded in one sense and direction, is limited in another, *viz.*, by possibilities? Do we not also believe that the whole we have, though undoubtedly all given is not in the same order and tone throughout, that in the continuum we have places and features that are more distinctly given and others that are given *less* distinctly? If we do, then the veil cannot be wholly transcended in the unrelenting concrete : here is merely a close approximation to the condition of perfect unveiling and openness.

Again, let us suppose that U_1 is that aspect of the unrelenting concrete which we commonly call our objective universe. Has not this U_1 its characteristic habit and aptitude? Can my objective universe accommodate anything and everything that comes to my consciousness? Why does my objective world accept only certain presentations and reject others? Why do I believe as objective the revelations of a spectrum, and dismiss as merely subjective my surmises and dream? Is this because my objective world is partial to a certain order of presentations? In the objective world itself presentations may not be all equally well received. The microscope may yield a materially different view of an object—different from what is presented by the unaided eye : here there are two presentations regarding what I believe to be one and the same object. Now, are these two

presentations equally accepted by the order of my objective experience? No: this order of experience is decidedly partial to one of the presentations. This is its habit and aptitude. Every aspect and segment of experience is predisposed to assimilate certain other segments of experience, and reject certain others.

Assimilation and quiescent association are expressions that require a bit of explanation. Suppose x is the sum of general conditions which determine the objectivity of a given aspect of experience: it is regarded as objective because of x . Hence we may appropriately say that $U_1 = \phi(x)$. Let a presentation, P , come. This P will be assimilable if it is also a function of x . Between U_1 which is already there and P which newly arrives there may doubtless be a difference but this difference, must exist in spite of the common and general determinant of objectivity, viz., x . Adopting the conception of 'family' we may say that U_1 and P belong to the same family if they are mutually assimilable experiences: and this family is $\phi(x, c)$, where c , as explained in a previous section, is the parameter of the family. We can distinguish between two members of the family, U_1 and P , by assigning different values to c : but though distinguishable they are kindred and mutually assimilable experiences on account of the general determinant condition x . Every ordinary experience is known to possess a family aptitude.

Again, let U_2 stand for that aspect of the objective world which we commonly distinguish as the world of popular belief and acceptance from the verified and verifiable world which exists for science. In the world of popular acceptance the earth is a stationary planet round which the sun rises, moves and sets, the whole is a fish, and so on: while I am in no mood for philosophising I do not challenge the deliverance and verdict of my senses, and easily take things and processes as they appear. Now, evidently what is acceptable for the world of commonplace belief cannot always be acceptable for the world of science. The two worlds, though both are taken as objective, materially differ therefore as regards their apti-

tudes. If U_3 is the objective world of science we have :

$$U_2 = \phi(x, y),$$

$$U_3 = \phi(x, z).$$

The general determinant condition for objectivity appears in the expressions for both. The conditions for the special aptitudes of the two worlds have been respectively denoted by the determinants y and z : though both are objective worlds, they are not the same kind of objective worlds : they are different orders so far as y and z are concerned, but of the same so far as the general condition of objectivity, x , is concerned. The rising and setting of the sun are commonly believed to be objective phenomena just as the dark lines in the solar spectrum are. The sub-families, U_2 and U_3 , may be represented as $\phi(x, y, a)$ and $\phi(x, y, b)$ respectively : the parameters, a and b , will discriminate the various members of the two families respectively. The explanation by families is not a whit more enlightening than the explanation by assimilability ; but I venture to think that this is a more lucid manner of statement.

We have now seen the meaning of habit and aptitude as inhering in the various orders of our universe of experience. Now, what does habit and aptitude essentially imply ? Habit implies a relatively permanent line of selection. To say that it is habit of A to associate with B is to indicate a relatively permanent manner in which A chooses its partner out of any number of its acquaintances in the world of experience. Habit is thus a fixed predisposition which tends A to accept and associate with B and to reject and ignore the larger group in which B may be presented. Out of the group $BCD\dots$, A associates with B and dismisses with hardly any notice $CD\dots$. Thus it is the habit of the magnet to associate with iron filings : this is its selective preference. Thus it is the habit of living organism to assimilate its own appropriate food, and of a growing crystal to take up its own appropriate molecules. In chemical combinations also substances show their mysterious selective preferences, and lately we have been endeavouring to show how our world of experience itself in its various aspects and orders vents its fatal predispositions. The aptitude of the fact

is the basis and type of the habits of the magnet, crystal amœba and the mental nature. Now, does not the aptitude of the fact presuppose veiling or ignorance? Surely A must somehow ignore CD... in the entire group in order that it may associate with B. The group may be either actual or possible: A may select B out of a mass of actual presentations, or A may associate with B selected from among an infinite fund of possibilities. Why should the baby stretch its hand to grasp the burning candle before it? Because it is the habit of its organism to react in a particular manner when it is acted upon in a particular manner. Why should the magnet attract iron and not particles of sand? Why should the given cause be followed by a given effect, a given character objectify itself as a given conduct, a given equation associate itself with a given curve? In all these cases we may push our enquiry somewhat deeper no doubt, but at bottom it must be plainly seen it is a question of aptitude and selection. We may suggest a mechanism to explain the behaviour of the baby referred to before; we may attempt to reduce magnetic attraction to a case of circulating current of electricity: but by these explanations mystery of action and reaction is not removed but pushed only a little way back. Action and reaction are at bottom only a question of selection, ignorance and acceptance. The explanation of aptitude by veiling does not simplify matters indeed: the mystery is as deep in habit as it is in veiling. Habit may be conceived as applying to veil itself. Why should a given continuum be veiled in a certain manner and accentuated in a certain manner? This presupposes occasion or causation, and occasion or causation presupposes habit. Thus while we are to explain habit as a relatively permanent manner of ignorance and acceptance, we cannot apparently explain ignorance and acceptance except by dragging in the habit of the fact itself. This cycle in explanation is inevitable so far as attempt at understanding the veil itself is concerned. The veil cannot be understood: there is possibly no consistent and rational theory of the veil. The veil cannot however, be explained away.

To return to our Principle of the Curve. This principle is only a special manifestation of the principle of Habit. Why should experience grow at all? Why should we not have in the life of experience merely uncompromising A's and not-A's, merely logical contradictories, utter denials and differences? Why should our universe of experience be a cosmos and not a chaos? The growth of experience presupposes, as we have seen, transitional forms of contradiction, synthetic categories to negotiate between downright opposites. Between absolute A and absolute not-A (assuming for one moment that such absolute contradiction is possible), there must intervene such transitional forms as 'identical with A', 'similar to A', and so on. Even categories evolve in a sense. Now, such an evolution of experience necessarily implies habit. Can we really explain without appealing to the inscrutable habit why an experience should grow after the manner of a curve? The equation of fact and the curve of fact go hand in hand as we shall see more fully later on. But we find in the meantime that we cannot otherwise express the curve of experience than by saying that it is the *habit* of experience to grow as a curve does. This is no uplifting of the mystery, but rather a frank admission of it. To the relation between the Principle of Habit and the Principle of Veil I have already alluded. Curve, Habit and Veil are conceptions that are chasing one another in a cycle: each presupposes the others and each is primordial. How can I select and associate with without ignoring the mass from amidst which I choose my partner? This brings out the dependence of Habit on the Veil. Again, why should I select and make match at all and not be impartial to the whole unrelenting concrete (this expression I have been lately using for my entire universe at any moment); and if I must select at all why must I select B, for example, out of the actual or possible group BCD...? In other words, why is there ignorance and acceptance at all, and also ignorance and acceptance in a special manner? This shows the dependence of the Veil on habit. Lastly, experience not only ignores and accepts, but its ignorance and acceptance is ordinarily always governed by a law, *viz.*, the Law of Curve. This brings

out the curve as a fundamental. The fundamental law of fact-operation may thus be stated as a *triangular cycle*

$$\frac{C}{V_H} \dots\dots(1)$$

The life of the fact cannot be adequately explained without bringing in this triangular cycle. Three fundamental conceptions are involved in this cycle, Presentation, Veiling and Movement—**P**, **V** and **M**. This latter is also a cycle

$$\frac{M}{P_V} \dots\dots(2)$$

The cycle **PMV** will readily explain itself. A continuum of experience is *presented*: it moves: it is *veiled*. I have called them a cycle because of their mutual dependence. Presentation presupposes both movement and veiling. Suppose C_A , C_B and C_C are three successive conditions of the continuum, where A, B and C stand respectively for their pragmatic nuclei. Now, the presentation of B, the pragmatic nucleus in the second, implies the passing away of C_A and the veiling of the whole in C_B . Nothing can be known as *presented*, thought as appearing, which is not known or thought as coming after something which was there but which has ceased to be: the full conception of presentation undoubtedly involves an order of time, a thought of something going out and something coming in: in intuition where experience is simply given it is not *taken* as presentation. Order of Time is of the essence of the *thought* of presentation: apart from this order we have no presentation but only existence. Again, to know that B, the fact-section in the second, has been presented we must in some fashion ignore the whole: surely to know that C_B has been presented is a condition of consciousness materially different from that which knows that B has been presented.

Movement also presupposes both presentation and veiling. Suppose ABCD are the different positions in the progress of an object. What is the condition that I may know the object moving from A to B, and from B to C, and so on? While the object is in the position A, I have a certain presentation; now this presentation must go and something else must be

presented before I can know of movement at all. To have the statical unrelenting presentation of A means the impossibility of any knowledge of movement. A different presentation must come ; I must ignore my whole fact during the interval ; while actually emphasising my continuum at B I must in some way recall A and bring them together in thought (though even in such bringing together the emphasis continues on A) : all these at least are necessary before there can be possible in me a knowledge of movement from A to B.

Lastly, veiling presupposes both presentation and movement. That something must be presented before it can be veiled is clear enough : of course I take 'presentation' here in a somewhat extended sense as including both 'being' and 'appearing'. But how does veiling imply moving? When I have a continuum of experience C_A I have a certain presentation : if this is statical, quiescent and unrelenting it cannot obviously be veiled at all, and the pragmatic section A accentuated and abstracted. Surely C_A is a materially different condition of consciousness from A, where the whole has been put equal to zero of ignorance. Now, the first condition must partially shrink back and a new condition must come in order that the operation of veiling may be at all possible. What is this shrinkage of one condition and coming of another but essentially movement ?

We have now seen the cyclic nature of presentation, movement and veiling. Their mutual implication and dependence appear to be fundamental. The full import of each necessarily contains the other two ideas. From this circumstance we derive one advantage. We need not consider presentation, movement and veiling as *three* principles, but as three elements or aspects of *one* principle which we shall continue to call the principle of veiling. **PMV** appears to be a complete statement of the fact-operation : in relation to this therefore it may be looked upon as concrete. *a* is concrete in relation to A if we believe that A has been completely represented in *a*. Now, curiously it is by an application of the Veil itself that we abstract different elements or aspects of the fact-operation, and set them up as

different operations. The operation is not synthetic but organic, if I may use this suggestive distinction. The operation is represented in thought as operations : Stress is conceived as action and reaction, tension and pressure, and so on.

The section has been long, but have we been nearer for all this to a definite conception of the veil as a quantity and a variable? Are veiling and unveiling absolute operations, never admitting of a *more* or *less*? We have seen how a thing passes into its opposite not abruptly but through countless shades of intermediate forms. The question may be seriously raised as to whether development or change in the life of the fact can ever really be discontinuous. Does not a continuum C_A in becoming C_D pass through all intermediate values? Physical or mathematical continuity is a *relative* circumstance : a function of x is said to be continuous between two values of x , a and b , if between these limits each increment, however small, in the value of x produces a corresponding increment in the value of the function, and if the function does not take an infinite value for any finite value. Clearly, this conception of continuity is hypothetical. For example, we consider the continuity of a curve in reference to a system of values given to the co-ordinates. In the science of fact continuity may be taken either categorically or hypothetically. If the continuum of experience continues to change, no matter in what manner, we have continuity of fact-development. If the continuum of experience remains unrelentingly statical, continues *not* to change, we have also another kind of fact-continuity. Both these kinds of continuity I may call *categorical*, since in neither is there an apparent reference to a special system of values. Previously I have considered in some manner of fulness how fact-continuity may be taken in relation to a given interest, object or emphasis of experience (impression or idea). Thus a fact may be continuous in reference to a particular interest, object or level of emphasis. Mathematical and physical continuity surely belongs to this latter order. Now, in the categorical sense, change or development in the life of the fact is not ordinarily discontinuous : life is seemingly a ceaseless flux. We have no ordinary experience of *quiescent* continuity.

But suppose we take continuity in a hypothetical sense. Let my experience pass from one interest I_1 , to another I_2 , or one object O_1 to another O_2 , or from *B*-emphasis to *i*-emphasis. Is any absolutely sudden transition possible? Can consciousness pass at once from *A* to not-*A*, which is not merely logical contradiction but the opposite, utter denial of *A*? Is there not something like a continuous curve, a gradual shading off, between *A* and its opposite? Logically something and the closest approximation to it are unquestionable *A* and not-*A*: but we are not enquiring about this. Is there really a fact-gap between two things which life and common sense accept as opposites? I believe that there is none. Life's pragmatic interest operates even in representing the *flow* of experience: we care not for all the countless shades linking every *A* and not-*A* of experience together: only those portions of the flow, those aspects of a transition, which interest us are selected by us—the entire flow itself we commonly ignore. Here therefore is also another case of the veiling of the whole and accentuation of parts. Thus I have *A* succeeded by its opposite not-*A*, not because the actual process of experience has been from the one to the other, but because we are not interested in the links between them and therefore have, in a distinct sense, ignored the whole operation. From pushpin to poetry may be a far cry but the far cry exists not in my experience itself, but in my common and practical account of experience. The 'one o'clock gun' may come as a surprise upon my reverie and utterly demolish it: one presentation abruptly ceases and another suddenly bursts into my awareness. Is this not really an exception to the principle of curve as applied to the life of experience? But even in a case like this the two presentations are regarded by me as utter opposites, because I have involuntarily accentuated the two maximum positions of the curve of experience and have ignored the curve itself: I have mistaken two successive crests of a surging wave for the wave itself. Try to picture the whole concrete beginning with a reverie and ending with the commotion created by the 'one o'clock gun', and perhaps it will not appear as broken by so much suddenness or precipitation.

I shall not dwell further on continuity here. But I shall ask this : Is the operation of veiling and unveiling a treatment with uncompromising contradictories, a transaction with mere A and not-A ? Is a continuum or a part of continuum either all veiled or all unveiled ? Shall we not admit cases of more veiling and less veiling ? We have seen already that the categories of identity, similarity and otherness all imply an application of the veil : it is by dexterous operations of the veil that we can make the alogical fact-stuff yield us all categories for thinking. The gradual slope of ideas from sameness to otherness is understandable only with the principle of ignorance and accentuation. Now, is not this gradual slope, the continuous curve, attributable to the veil itself ? This is a question that can be settled only by an appeal to reflection. Suppose I have at this moment an experience of morning : the garden in which I am sitting has been bathed in the freshness and joy of morning sunshine : it is a lively spectacle to which my soul is treated now. Now, does my universe of the present moment involve a veil at all ? And if it does, is there a shading off of the veil from some places to some others, from particular features to particular others ? Undoubtedly, my universe is not homogeneous so far as the distribution of psychic tone is concerned : I have places of strongest emphasis and also places of least emphasis, and between these positions of maximum and minimum tone there are spread zones of gradually varying tone. There is nothing obscure in this account of the universe so far. But what we have regarded as the varying distribution of psychic tone over the continuum seems to bear no clear relation to the incidence of the veil. The psychic tone varies from feature to feature and from place to place. Shall we assume that the veil varies *pari passu* ? What necessary connexion is there between the veil and the psychic tone ? Surely, the nature of the veil as a quantity will hinge upon the answer that we may find to the question.

We shall do well to consider for one moment the connexion between the principle of the veil and the principle of presentation— between P and V. In a continuum of experience there are generally a multitude of features presented : ordinarily we have

no knowledge of absolutely simple and homogeneous feeling. I may be partial to some of the features of the given multitude, may take them warmly and cherish them fondly : in regard to the rest of the mass I am cold, indifferent, not at home. But surely I cannot mistake or ignore their knock at the gate of consciousness. The whole multitude is given, and given in consciousness. I *have* possessed even what I have apparently ignored. This sort of possession in consciousness, without reference to the kind or degree of possession, I may call *bare presentation*. Possibilities may have been shut out in my universe of the present moment : it is only *an* actual out of a multitude of *possible* words. But considered as an actual universe only, there is *no* veiling if we confine ourselves to the bare presentation of the universe in consciousness : it is all presented. It is clear now that veiling is opposed to *bare* presentation. To be presented in consciousness is not to be veiled, and to be veiled is not to be presented in consciousness. But bare presentation is only an abstraction in our ordinary life of experience : a particular feature in experience is not merely presented, but presented in a particular manner and degree. The pragmatic nucleus of a tissue of experience is presented as well as the most vaguely apprehended features concealed in the shade of semi-attention. As regards bare presentation there is no difference between the two ; and if we take veiling to mean the opposite or contradictory of *bare* presentation, then obviously no veil is drawn *over* the continuum, though of course we may conceive a veil to be still hanging *about* it in as much as its infinitude is limited— is believed by us to be limited— by the realm of possibilities. If I have ignored anything I have ignored what I think it is to *be*, and not what I know it actually *is*.

Now, what is it that we really mean when we say that there has been a varying distribution of psychic tone over a given continuum of experience? C_A and C_B are two features which have different psychic tones, can we rightly regard that they have been differently *presented*? It behoves us to reflect for one moment if the difference of psychic tone should properly be regarded as a difference of presentation. Presentation can

be taken either in an abstract or in a concrete sense. If presentation were to mean the circumstance of something being given in consciousness, it would be abstract, for we are overlooking the *manner* in which the thing is being given. In this abstract sense I have a presentation of the morning now. I ignore *how* the morning is being presented. It is by ignoring the concrete fact of the moment that I believe I have the presentation of a whole landscape. Undoubtedly I have the whole landscape in my consciousness—though it must be readily seen that the landscape is only an aspect of the concrete fact is a limited aspect of a universe of experience which is boundless in a sense. But have I the whole landscape as a homogeneous stretch of awareness? Do I not feel my consciousness of the scene is more intense, more vivid, more tonic at places than others? Pure consciousness is indeed impartial: there is absolutely no difference between C_A and C_B so far as mere awareness is concerned. But in actual feeling I surely ascribe degrees of intensity to my awareness as distributed over a complex continuum. I mysteriously feel for example that C_A has been more vividly or intensely given than C_B . We need not attempt an analysis of this feeling of varying intensity. Whether belonging to the essence of awareness or not, this feeling is ordinarily always there: commonly always we discriminate between a clear and a vague portion of a presented continuum. This we regard as the manner of presentation. And when we take a presentation along with the manner of tone or intensity which we have been considering, we take it in a concrete sense. It is clear now that in this concrete sense, a presentation is a variable, a quantity. In this sense, therefore, it may be allowable to speak of a *more* or *less* presentation.

This being conceded, we see readily enough how we can pertinently speak of a *more* or *less* veiling also. Presentation and ignorance are respectively positive and negative circumstances. If I take presentation in an abstract sense, *viz.*, in the sense of being barely given in awareness, then veiling, taken also in an abstract sense, may be regarded as the negation of presentation: to be presented is not to be veiled, and to

be veiled is not to be presented. In this sense, as we have seen, no veil need apparently be recognized in a given universe of experience: the entire *actual* universe is all given, all presented. But *how* given or presented? Is the mysterious, though intuitively apprehended, tone of presentation homogeneous throughout the whole universe of fact? Whatever may be the real psychology of the tone, it is not certainly felt and regarded as uniform, impartial. Now, if in this concrete sense presentation is a variable quantity can we not take veiling, which is its opposite, as a variable quantity also? Indeed, in the concrete sense, presentation and veiling are but two aspects of the same circumstances—the positive and negative aspects respectively; so that to every *more* of representation there corresponds a *less* of veiling, and *vice versa*. At the pragmatic nucleus of a fact we have most presentation and therefore least veiling: in the dim borderland of my universe I have—I feel and believe that I have—least presentation and therefore most veiling. In concrete life accordingly, the question of presentation and veiling is clearly a question of maxima and minima: to every maximum of the one there corresponds a minimum of the other. The relation between presentation (**P**) and veiling (**V**), both regarded as variables, may be represented by the following symbolical expressions:

$$\text{Lt } V=0 \quad \mathbf{VP}=\text{Lt } p=e \quad \mathbf{VP} \dots\dots\dots (1)$$

$$\delta P = -\delta V \quad \dots\dots\dots (2)$$

$$E = \lambda \cdot \frac{V}{P} \quad \dots\dots\dots (3)$$

$$\text{Lt } V=\infty \quad \mathbf{VP}=E^V \quad \dots\dots\dots (4)$$

These four relations are important and will require explanation. The two limits in (1) mean respectively the limit of evanescence and the limit of excrescence (*e*). Since veiling and presentation vary inversely at each other, the limit when the former becomes evanescent will evidently be the limit when the latter becomes full or complete: a condition of consciousness of no veil or minimum veil is also the condition of consciousness of all presentation or maximum presentation. Let me take for

experiment my universe of the present moment and gradually think away the veil. The dimly lighted, vaguely apprehended, portions of the universe begin to glow up ; the hovering shades are chased out of the field, and I have a homogeneous incidence of tone throughout : the universe is equally presented in all its parts and features : I do not find any palpable discrepancies in the degree of presentation. If I had been partial to a particular star, I am now unstintedly and scrupulously at home with my whole universe of sights, sounds, smells, touches and the like. This is a sort of universe which our conceptions cannot easily depict. A condition of all impartial presentation of an experience, with no varying degrees of tone involved is not one to which we can ordinarily approximate closely. Giving up all special preferences, interests and motives, I may abandon myself to the fulness of my conscious life : this surely is an attempt in the direction of pulling down the pointed eminences of psychic tone in a continuum of experience. But still it is not ordinarily within our competence to level down the eminences altogether and bring about in consciousness a condition of presentative homogeneity : life can never cease to be partial. In order that presentation may reach the limit of ex-crescence, another condition besides the one explained before must be fulfilled. Any ordinary experience is a relative disposition of the two conditions **V** and **P**. The former belongs to an experience and conditions it in two ways as has been suggested before : my actual world is believed to be limited by the realm of possibilities : it does not shut out the category of becoming or growing. I believe more or less vaguely that there is a "far-off divine event" to which my universe of experience is moving : that Realm of Ends I think has been veiled in some manner from my knowledge. Now, the reduction of **V** to zero in the combination **VP** will mean not only that my actual presentation becomes homogeneous in tone or intensity throughout, but also that my actual becomes the quiescent, infinite all to which no bounds, actual or possible, can be set. In short, my universe becomes the eternally realized Fact in the World-consciousness of which I have lately spoken. The meaning of V-evanescence or of P-ex-crescence has now taken clearer outlines. Briefly, the

reduction of the veil to zero will mean a condition of consciousness in which presentation is uniform and not variable, and which is infinitely and statically actual: it is a state of no partialities, *monotonous*, of no suggestions and possibilities, and therefore insufferably dull from the human point of view. It is a life of no quest and all satisfaction: a condition of existence to which we have timidly referred from time to time in considering the mutual relations of α , β and i . I will only add here that such a life is utterly inconceivable by us. In moods of so-called indifferent abstraction, when all special preferences have become flat and dull for one moment, I come more or less near to the condition of homogeneous actual. The question of life, it may be fairly admitted, is a question of continuity and limits. Our ordinary experience is continuous and it will bring us to a certain limit: but does experience cease beyond this limit? Is ordinary experience the only possible experience and the limit of ordinary experience and absolute limit? In the case we have considered above we have V equal to zero—a limit to which nothing corresponds in common experience—and P equal to full quiescent real to which also our matter-of-fact of life can present no counterpart.

The relation (2) only brings out the positive and negative aspect respectively of presentation and veiling. In accordance with the classical notation of Lagrange let us denote elements of two processes by δP and δV respectively. Then, we have the following relation: Every small increment in the tone or intensity of presentation means a correspondingly small negative increment in veiling: when a feature has been *more* clearly presented, it has been *less* densely veiled: indeed as has been suggested before presentation veiling are but two aspects of the same operation. We are considering them separately because they are *two* aspects nevertheless: there is all the difference in the world between something being given and something not being given. Now, suppose x is the condition of which both V and P are consequences or functions. C_A is presented in a certain manner and veiled in a certain manner because of a certain root-cause which we do not know. Then, representing

as usual the true measures of the variations of V and P by differential co-efficients, we have

$$\frac{dP}{dx} = -\frac{dV}{dx}.$$

This means that as the ground-cause changes the resultant variations of the dependent variables, V and P, proceed equally and in opposite directions. We must not suppose that the two operations will neutralize therefore. They are not *two* equal and opposite operations. They are one and the same operation regarded from two different points of view : psychologically the thought of something being presented and that of something being veiled are different thoughts, and hence our justification for putting apart the two aspects of the operation.

Again, suppose we take a certain feature in an experience and ask with regard to it : How much tone of presentation has this feature on the whole in the continuum ? When inverted this question becomes : How much veiled on the whole has this feature, *e.g.*, a cluster of stars, become in the continuum ? It is surely for direct reflection to find out the meanings and mutual relations of these two questions. Let us bring in a common determinant also here. Then obviously we have

$$\int P dx = - \int V dx.$$

Let our continuum be an objective field in which light or electricity is variously and continuously distributed : suppose also that the tone of presentation in this case is restricted to the intensity of the energy over the field. Then the foregoing integration reduces itself to a total calculation of the energy as distributed in the field. The two psychic integrations illustratively given in the preceding sections are special applications of the operations indicated on the left or on the right side of the last equation.

In equation (3), what does the ratio V : P mean ? The analogy of Q : S will throw light on this ratio. Suppose we fix upon a standard of presentation ; that the degree of the presentation of a given feature of experience will evidently be determined by the ratio of the amount of veiling and this chosen

standard, P. To what extent has the standard presentation been veiled in the experience in question? This ratio I may call *relative veiling* or veiling in relation to a chosen standard of presentation. Now, if λ be the determinant factor which makes an experience possess a certain *qualitative* character, then evidently the experience can be represented as regards its *qualitative* and *quantitative* character as in the equation (3). The factor λ determines the quality of the experience (E), and the ratio expresses the degree in which the quality has been presented measured in reference to a chosen standard of presentation. We shall see later on if we can get at an absolute standard of presentation. Let us in the meanwhile apply this principle to the objective world: I will take only one instance here. Let M and m be two masses of material substance, and D be the distance between them. Then the stress or mutual attraction between the two masses is given by Newton's Law—

$$S = \frac{Mm}{D^2}.$$

Now, this relation can be reduced to the type given in (3).

Here λ given as the qualitative nature of the stress between the two masses, *viz.*, that it is a mutual attraction. This is Newton's first Law of Gravitation. The expression on the left-hand of the last equation gives a quantitative *measure* of stress. This is Newton's second and third Laws of Gravitation combined. With regard to the stress we have to ask two things: What is the *kind* of stress between the two masses? And what is the precise *measure* of stress between them? Clearly, in determining the actual measure of the stress we have to employ a standard of mutual attraction, *viz.*, attraction between *unit* masses at a *unit* distance. The actual measure of the stress must be only a function of this standard. Hence the type of the operation is just what has been laid down in (3): it is a combined question of quality and quantity. The question of quantity again, it may be observed in passing, is a question of relative veiling. In determining any measure we have to consider a unit, a standard of reference. In $\frac{d\alpha}{dx}$ and $\frac{d\alpha}{dy}$, the

standards of reference are x and y respectively. Now, the actual measure is only a function of the unit or standard of reference employed. Any function, y , of a given independent variable, x , presupposes in its conception an alternate veiling and unveiling between itself and its independent variable. A plane curve, for example, $y = \phi(x)$, cannot be conceived without imagining the veiling and unveiling operation. To conceive x as suffering an increment h , is to shift regard from x to something which is not x : thus is x veiled. Again to conceive $x+h$ as an increment of x , my regard must not forsake x : x must, continue in thought as the starting basis and point of reference. Generally, therefore, the thought of anything as a function of some other thing involves an alternate play of regard, veiling and unveiling, between the two things. We shall see in a later section how all fundamental mathematical operations involve the veil.

Take again the perception of an orange. This perception involves a qualitative as well as a quantitative expression. There is the yellow surface, but how much yellow ? There is the round shape, but how round ? And so on. Generally also, we may ask this : Assuming that the orange stands for a certain kind and measure of presentation for a normal subject under normal conditions, what actual proportion of that standard presentation have I as I am now perceiving the orange ? If the kind and measure of presentation for a normal subject under normal conditions be our common standard of truth, I may enquire as to what *extent* my perception of an orange at any moment is true. Again, taking the orange as it exists in and for the World-consciousness as our pattern of absolute truth, we may enquire as to what extent the scientist's or the layman's knowledge of the orange at any time falls short of the ideal. This question therefore clearly reduces itself to one of relative veiling, or what is the same thing, relative presentation.

The equation in (4) represents a condition of veiling which in our ordinary life is not apparently conceivable. But ordinary life is not the only possible life for us, and the limits of ordinary life are not absolute boundaries. We shall be ill-advised to reject

the extraordinary cases. What is the condition of experience when the veil instead of becoming evanescent becomes infinite and all-pervasive? Will this mean the absence, the blotting out, of all presentation? Is the life of *all* veil a life of *no* presentation? On the left-hand side of the equation (4) I have put E^V . This means that the all-pervasiveness of the veil will not imply the annihilation of consciousness altogether which is impossible: experience as such can never be put equal to zero as we have seen. It will mean that we have a consciousness or experience of the veil itself, of nothing except the veil. Such pure experience of the veil is of considerable metaphysical importance. There is all the difference in the world between no experience and experience of nothing, between veiled experience and experience of the veil. This latter will mean a condition of experience in which the order of the universe returns as it were to a state of chaotic mist or primordial nebula. In profound sleep and in certain abnormal conditions do we not come very near to a pure experience of the veil, E^V ? The question of course is not free from difficulties: indeed there is considerable temptation to regard the apparent mental void of profound sleep as a case of dreams forgotten, lapse of memory. A similar explanation might be suggested about the abnormal conditions referred to before. But the two cases, which I have already alluded to previously, will I think throw an amount of light on this curious question of pure experience of veil. The experience of *just* going to be asleep—when the solicitations of the senses have been fast languishing and dreams are not yet in evidence—is the nearest ordinary case of no dispute that we possess, nearest perhaps to the condition of all-pervasive veil. This shading off between wakefulness and dreaming has to pass through a neutral zone of *no particular presentations*, a condition of relational zero. The soul in passing from one order of presentations to the other is thus for a while face to face with the Mother-Veil from the womb of which all things spring out and into which all things return. Let us imagine the condition of going to be asleep as it is being consummated. My world teeming with infinitely various presentations is steadily dissolving, as it were, into a psychic

nebula : from definiteness to indefiniteness, from variety to homogeneity, the condition grows : special preferences are lulled into apathy, emphasis falls flat and even. While the one order of presentations is in evanescence, the other order is not yet in the forming : this is the interesting dead-point between one order and another. Now, as we are witnessing the gradual dissolution of our universe into a fluid of all-pervasive mist, the question naturally strikes us at once : What becomes of our universe *in the limit* ? What becomes of our world when special presentation has sunk down to a minimum ?

Thus we can imagine a pure presentation of the veil, unrelieved by any special presentations, when the limit has been taken, in the experience of just going to be asleep. As I have admitted the question is not free from difficulties, and I cannot pretend that these have been all or materially removed by bringing in the limit. The limit, however, will render my suggestion in some fashion imaginable. I have employed the notation E^V for our experience in the limit when all special presentations are imagined to have dissolved in an all-absorbing veil.

The analogy of this last notation will naturally tempt us into another— F^P . If in the life of experience we may come to a limit where we have a pure consciousness of veil, may we not come to a limit where we have a pure consciousness of presentation ? Pure consciousness of presentation may mean either of two things. It may mean the consciousness of pure, homogeneous presentation in which no special features have appeared. It is *bare* presentation with no differentiations appearing in it. Or it may mean the consciousness of presentation on which no veil is apparently incident : special features there may be in it, but there is no differential presentation of the special features. Both cases are equally inconceivable from our own point of view. To which of these cases, we may ask however, does our experience of *just* going to be awake approximate in the limit ? Is there not also an inscrutable borderland between the world of dreams and that of wakefulness ? Do we not in passing from the former to the latter step across a neutral zone where dreams

have melted and lost their features into a bare, homogeneous presentation of existence, and objective sights, sounds and smells, their associated ideas and memories, have not yet begun to put their constructions on the shapeless mass of awareness? In plunging into a world of shades we have had the pure veil in and about us for a brief while : in returning to the world of 'realities' should we have not pure presentation in and about us for a brief while also? Presentation is the veil inverted, and I have suggested that in the inverse operation of just going to be awake our experience is E^P instead of E^V .

Before passing on to the next section I should like to point out that the neutral zone or dead-point in experience is not a quite grotesque conception. It is idle to seek to explain the affairs of experience by the affairs of the brain : the brain as a part of the objective universe is only a part of the concrete universe of experience, so that to explain experience by the brain is really to explain the whole by part, the concrete by an abstraction. Nevertheless, the whole lives in a part, and we may detect in the part a significant index to the life and nature of the whole. The parallelism of the brain and the mind is useful and instructive in this way. In the study of the brain we may discover a key which we may apply to the interpretation of experiences. Now, in the physical universe we have a quiescent or neutral point just after a movement in any line or manner has completed itself and just before a movement in the opposite line or manner has begun. Every process, before it is inverted or reversed, takes a pause, a condition of apparent equilibrium. In harmonic motion, such as that of a pendulum, the quiescent positions are found and explained : in the career of a pebble thrown up into the air the quiescent point is found and explained also. The quiescent point is the position where a variable impulse in one direction has been balanced by a variable impulse in the opposite. This principle is of universal application in the material world. Wherever we have the operation of two tendencies, opposite in direction, one gradually decreasing and the other gradually increasing, we are bound to come to a position where process in one line is just balanced

by process in the reverse line. The career of the pebble is not an instance of harmonic motion, that of a pendulum, or of a particle in an wave-motion, is : but in both instances Science has not searched in vain for quiescent periods and positions. In the activities of the living tissue we have essentially to deal with the resultant motions of an assemblage of molecules, and surely it cannot be hopeless to detect amid these resultant motions pulses of rhythm. The life of the living tissue is rhythmic : we have processes and reversion of processes in this life. Now, is there not a relatively quiescent period between a given process and its reversion, between a pulse of contraction and a pulse of expansion for example ? The living heart, and indeed every living tissue, is continuously throbbing ; but does the heart not take a moment's respite between a contraction and an expansion ? I need not pile instances to illustrate so commonplace a circumstance of organic being as rhythm. Now, the question that arises is this : Does the brain whose states are admittedly parallel to those of experience enjoy any periods of comparative quiescence ? The brain is undoubtedly a system of most unstable tensions : it is continuously in agitation. But are there not moments of respite also ? Now, on *à priori* grounds I believe that the brain has a tendency to return periodically to conditions of minimum agitation : a condition of *no* agitation is of course unthinkable. This condition of minimum agitation can be artificially induced also : the influence of certain drugs, for example, may bring about such a condition : there are also other and sounder methods of inducing it as we shall see in dealing with the methods of mysticism. The condition is also natural to a certain extent in the life of the brain. At any rate, the condition of cerebral commotion is a variable, and can accordingly be graphically represented by a curve with maximum and minimum positions. We have as yet no accurate physics of the brain : but none the less certain fundamental propositions of brain-dynamics are indisputable. The curve of brain-activity is one of those fundamental truths. The question of more vital importance is, however, this : Does the minimum really sink so low that the general condition of the brain may be regarded as

a comparative equilibrium of tensions, and therefore the corresponding experience as a condition of relative quiescence? There may be differences of opinion as to the extent or depth of the minimum; I should think however, that in the life of the brain, there are periodically states of comparative rest, of just going to be asleep and just going to be awake. My treatment of the cerebral aspect of the question has been meagre, but as I have said, I do not lay much stress on this aspect at all.

In this long section we have been endeavouring to study the veil as a variable. We have seen how it is connected with presentation. In the four equations given and explained above we have perhaps something like a precise statement of the connexion. We may note finally that not only does the differential distribution of tone over a given continuum require the veil as a variable, but the very conception of *degree* requires it is a variable. Indeed it is the degree of the veil that makes anything appear as a variable at all. For degree and variable presuppose a standard of reference, and nothing can be known as a variable between which and its standard of reference there is not an alternating play of veiling and unveiling: my regard must oscillate between the standard and the object and a new experience must come with its emphasis laid on the focus of the object, but also embracing a more or less veiled presentation of the standard. To have the standard fully and unrelentingly displayed in consciousness is to rise above the thought of degree of variable. To have the object fully and uncompromisingly manifested in consciousness means our intuitive absorption in the object and in the magnitude of the object, but no representation of the magnitude as a variable or degree. To have such a representation both the object and the standard we must somehow bring together in thought, though the emphasis of the thought will lie, as suggested a moment ago, on the object-feature of the continuum. Thus, symbolically we have

$$R'd = C_{(so')}d,$$

where the right-hand notation means the representative thought (R') of degree (d); the left-hand expression means a continuum (C) involving the two foci, standard (S) and object (O),

where the emphasis of regard has been laid on the latter. The accent on the two sides has to be interpreted differently. d on the left side means that S and O have been mutually accosted with respect to d : it gives the reason and nature of the combination. Now, putting successively zero of ignorance for C and S in the left-hand expression, we are left with only $O'd$, which means the thought of the object as a variable.

11. *The Infinite and Infinitesimal Facts.*

Let us recall one of the fundamental equations of the Fact—

$$F' = I_1^f \dots \dots \dots (1)$$

Put $f=0$. The equation accordingly becomes

$$F' = I_1 \dots \dots \dots (2)$$

What is the meaning of this derivative equation? A universe of fact may be commonly represented as an infinite continuum, accentuated in finite features, and forming a unity, a system. Now, if I ignore for one moment the finite features (f), I only remove their special accentuation and merge them in the unbounded continuum. I commonly take my universe of fact as finite because I ignore the whole and accept the thought only the accentuated portions. If now I ignore the accentuated portions, it does not mean that I cease to have them any more than the ignorance of the whole means my ceasing to have the whole; it means that I courageously accept my boundless universe as such and refuse to be bound by special preferences in it. It is merely looking the infinite straight in the face : in the commoner attitudes of life we are uneasy with a mysterious dread of the Infinite in which we ever live, move and have our beings. Life's relaxation in the bosom of the infinite will assuredly mean the suspension of all its small play : its pigmy constructions are safe only in some manner of isolation from the infinite : its homes of sand and pebbles are in progress only in the sandy beach from where the limitless sea has for a while retreated. The isolation, the retreat, is the magic of the Veil.

The equation (2) means therefore an infinite universe of fact constituting, in all the majesty of its features, a unity, a

system. I am as yet not haunted by a sense, a suggestion, of the realm of possibilities. I complacently take and live my universe as a boundless actual without my eyes searching anxiously for traces of the veil about the eluding horizon. This sort of absorption in the universe of the actual is not wholly an outlandish experience to me. Gazing into the starry heavens at night and surrendering all special preferences I *have* enough experience of the type explained above to consider it as quite a normal form of experience.

Of the infinite universe of fact I may notice five types. Some of these types may strike us as extraordinary. Suppose we think away all particular determinations from a continuum of experience; can we imagine that consciousness itself will vanish when all particular determinations in it have been thought away? We have ordinary experiences in which the multitude of particular determinations is considerably reduced: in the experiences of just going to be asleep and just going to be awake we come perhaps very near to the condition of bare consciousness: shall we say that this condition of bare consciousness without any determinations whatever becomes an actual condition when the *limit* is taken? At any rate, two things are clearly impossible: We cannot think away consciousness itself, whether or no we can think particular determination, modes, in it *completely* away; and we cannot set any bounds to the stretch of awareness— not awareness in relation to particular objects and process in it, but awareness as such. Let us, however, admit the above as an hypothetical case here: I shall especially devote myself to the study of this case later. Now, the universe of pure consciousness can hardly properly be regarded as a universe at all: the conception of universe certainly involves the idea of system as well as the idea of limitlessness. The latter idea can be applied to pure consciousness, though of course in review; the former idea cannot— neither in intuition, nor in review. For the sake of symmetry, however, let us admit the following:

$$\text{Pure consciousness} = U_0 \dots \dots \dots (I)$$

Pure consciousness is the infinite *plenum* in which the universe

is born, grows and dissolves. Take for one moment the equation with which we have started in this section :

$$F' = I_1^f$$

Put zero for both f and I : ignore or think away them completely. Then, we are left with an infinitude (I) of awareness in which there are no finite determinations and no thought of unity : it is infinitude but no system.

The suffix zero in the notation for pure consciousness shows that it is not a universe at all, but only the absolute possibility of there being a universe.

Shall we next admit what I have recently denoted by E^V and E^P as constituting another order of universe? The former is the consciousness of the veil itself and of nothing but veil ; and in so far it is a consciousness of something, it ceases to be bare consciousness. Bare consciousness is consciousness without any reference whatever : it is no consciousness of anything. The example that I gave of E^V need not be dragged in here to add to our confusion. Whatever the actual counterpart of the form may be, the form with the meaning attached to it as before, cannot be taken to represent pure consciousness. This will perhaps be granted ; but how does E^P differ from bare consciousness? This is a consciousness of presentation ; but what actual difference is there between consciousness as such and consciousness of presentation? Psychologically, and therefore actually, the two conditions *are* different, I believe. Pure consciousness, to be absolutely pure, must lack a form and a name : it must not know itself even as a stretch of presentation. Presentation means 'being given' ; and surely there is a real difference between consciousness which is nothing but consciousness and the consciousness of 'being given.' This delicate distinction I shall more fully deal with when I come to pure consciousness as the special subject of my attention. In contrast with the notations, E^V and E^P , pure consciousness may be simply put down as E . Again, however vital the difference may be between E^V and E^P , it is clear that in them both experience takes on apparently a single determination : the former is apparently an experience of veil only, the latter is apparently

an experience of presentation only. Accordingly we may put down for our universe of the next order—

Consciousness of veil only or presentation only

$$= U_1 \dots \dots \dots (2)$$

Take again the equation $F' = If$. Put zero for f , and put either V or P for I . Thus we have I_v or I_P : either an infinite experience of the veil and of nothing but the veil, or an infinite experience of presentation and of nothing but presentation.

What will be our next order of universe? Suppose we take the universe of fact as it remains eternally and quiescently realized in the World-Consciousness with which we have already slightly cultivated an acquaintance. As explained before, it is an infinite actual swallowing up the possible. This surely is a condition of consciousness which is removed by two stages from pure consciousness: it involves the perception of unity, it also involves the perception of a limitless manifold. It is a universe that knows itself, so far as we can imagine, as a system displaying the infinite richness of its actual presentations. It is not merely the *one* but the *all*. This is the twofold construction put upon bare consciousness or E . We might accordingly write down for this kind of universe—

The universe of all actual and no possible

$$= U_2 \dots \dots \dots (3)$$

Take again the expression I_1^f . Put i for f : for the finite aggregate of fact-sections to which, in conception, we attach a boundless realm of possibilities, let us substitute an infinite, actual manifold in which, as we imagine, the realm of possibilities has been completely merged. Thus we have I_1^i , which means that we have an infinite universe of infinite richness all displayed: a fact all manifested: an ideal all realized.

What comes next? What are the dimensions of our own concrete universe at any moment? Shall we really quit our own homes and lift ourselves in imagination into the majesty of World-Consciousness to live the infinite life? No: we ourselves live, and cannot ever cease to live, a sort of infinite life. There is of course all the difference between the Quiescent Real

of World-consciousness and the restive concrete of our own experience ; but each is infinite in its own way. Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{My concrete universe at any moment} \\ & = U_3 \dots \dots \dots (4) \end{aligned}$$

Evidently in this case we need not make any change in the expression I'_j . Indeed, this is precisely the expression that we have been using to denote the infinitude of our own universe at any time as well as its character as a system. Our own universe is necessarily the starting basis of all our ideal constructions : human imagination is inveterately anthropomorphous.

Next, we come to the universe of the monad. The monad is a miniature universe— a microcosmos. Such at least is the conception of the monad. I need not quarrel with modern Pluralism, and essay to prove in the teeth of its opposition that the monad can really be what we commonly believe it to be. Just now I am concerned merely with the *idea* of the monad. It is a fact which is conceived to be infinitely small as compared with another fact, but is still infinite within itself. If the other fact be macrocosmos, the monad may be called microcosmos. The latter is an infinitesimal as well as an infinite fact. We can conceive the monad only by veiling the infinitude of the macrocosmos and being partial to what is only an infinitesimal portion of it : but the infinite though veiled lives in a way in the monad : the microcosmos is still a cosmos, a universe. We may profitably compare with the *orders* of infinitesimal in Calculus. B is infinitely *small* as compared with A, but there may be another magnitude, C, which is infinitely small as compared with B ; still another magnitude, D, which is infinitely small as compared with C, and so on. These are orders of infinitesimal, and for aught we know, we may have an infinity of such orders. Hence, every infinitesimal magnitude is also an infinite magnitude in a sense, if of course we shut out the idea of the *absolute* infinitesimal. The relative infinitesimal is only a stage in a process of infinite becoming : placing ourselves at this stage we may possibly have an infinite outlook both ways— in the direction of ever *larger* universes, and in the direction of ever *smaller* worlds. The infinitesimal is only the infinite inverted, taken

with a change of direction. Compare for example the infinitude of space with that of the classical monad. Is not each believed to be infinite in its own way or direction? Let us now deduce an expression of the monad.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Equation : } F' &= I_I^{f^1} \\ &= f_I^1, \text{ putting } I=0 \text{ of ignorance ;} \\ &= U_4 \dots\dots\dots (5)\end{aligned}$$

The interpretation of the above equation will be readily suggested. Let us, to begin with, imagine a boundless universe in which there is an infinitely small portion f : this latter is finite in relation to the universe itself: the monad is finite inasmuch as it is a portion of the macrocosmos. But as the index of f itself indicates, the monad is also conceived as infinite within itself—it is a miniature universe, a microcosmos. The monad is also conceived as a system as the universe is. This is the meaning of the expression on the right-hand side of the first step. The monad is a fact that lives the infinite within itself and abroad, but, obviously, infinitude in the direction of the macrocosmos must be hidden in a manner to bring out the actual conception of the monad. The larger universe is not indeed effaced, it is only veiled or shaded. An appeal to direct reflection will throw light on the necessity of this operation. Thus, translated into the language of common sense, the expression f_I^1 means this: The monad is an infinitely small *system of universe*. The atom long passed muster as an absolute infinitesimal: but have we not already glimpses into the mysteries of intra-atomic constitution? Has not the ion pushed considerably back the limit of the infinitesimal in the conception of physical science?

Be that as it may, we find by comparing I_I^1 with f_I^1 that they differ in the *configuration* of the three poles I , f and I . All the three poles are there in the macrocosmos as well as in the microcosmos—which term I have been lately using for the monad. Three poles are really three aspects or directions of thought. Hence when a particular determination passes from one pole to another it really changes its aspect or direction.

Briefly, the poles are only the view-points from which, at any moment, we choose to regard a fact of experience. Let us denote a change of pole, aspect or view-point by a change of sign. Thus we have universe = $+\infty$, monad = $-\infty$. Now, what can an expression like the following mean ?

$$F^{+\infty} - \infty = F^0 = \text{unity.}$$

This evidently means a Statical Fact. A fact remains the *same* if we conceive it as progressing infinitely in one way and also infinitely in the opposite. If we take a fact-section which we conceive neither as a universe nor as a monad, we merely take it complacently ignoring its infinite aspect altogether. How, for example, do I take commonly a particle or any finite object ? I evince no infinite solicitude in its infinite aspect at all. The particle is only a universe regarded in a section, and we may even conceive it as a sort of microcosmos. This is the particle in the aspect of the whole. But this aspect is ignored. Thus—

$$\text{A monad} = f_1^1.$$

A particle f_1 , putting $I = 0$ of ignorance.

The particle is only a small finite fact (or rather fact-section) taken as a unity. We need not discuss the position of the mathematical point. The mathematical point is an absolute infinitesimal or infinitesimal in the limit. This distinguishes it at once from the monad which is a universe within itself. Again, in the conception of the mathematical point the aspect of the infinite is not altogether ignored ; hence its distinction from the particle.

The idea that a fact remains the same if we conceive it as moving infinitely in one way and also infinitely in the opposite is the type of the idea of equilibrium in Statics : Equilibrium is established when the algebraic sum of the forces acting on a body is equal to zero. A fact essaying to be a larger universe and a smaller at the same time and equally, cannot change : it continues to remain what it is.

We may, therefore, speak of the monad as a universe. We have now *five* orders of universe. Two more orders may perhaps be added.

In our theory we have imagined our universe or continuum as continuously changing. Experience is an endless stream of becoming. This aspect of movement or change is certainly not prominent in any of the orders of experience which we have considered. U_0 is a kind of experience which stands clearly above all antitheses : the antithesis of motion and rest, change and permanence, cannot touch it. Pure consciousness, admitting for one moment the possibility of such a condition of existence, cannot know itself either as changing or as statical : by supposition it is awareness as such without any determination or mode whatever* Indeed, the conception of universe also cannot properly apply to it, if by universe we mean an infinite system. To know itself either as infinite, or as changing or as permanent, it must somehow conceal its alogical and unspeadable nature, it must put on a sort of veil, as it were. Here is involved a principle of foremost importance in thought. Suppose there is a fact F which is reviewed by a fact F' . The latter knows the former and represents it. The former also knows itself no doubt ; but such knowledge is from the very nature of the case intuitive, alogical. No F can know itself logically, that is to say, as the subject or the object of a logical judgment : no fact as we have seen can transcend itself, look at itself from aside. To have a representative conception of F we must bring in another pulse of fact which, again, while knowing and representing F does not know itself *logically*; hence, in order that F may be conceived logically, it must be veiled ; so long as it is an unrelenting concrete we can have no manner of logical thought about it— we cannot conceive it either as changing, or as permanent, or as infinite. But does not F , even while it is unrelenting and absorbing, *know* itself as changing or as infinite? Surely logical thought is not the only kind of knowledge available for us : even in full, intuitive absorption we *know*. The fact is alogical, but not unknowable.

Certainly the unrelenting concrete knows itself in a manner in intuition. But it cannot know itself in a manner which necessarily involves or implies logical thought. To be more definite, can the fact know itself as *changing*? I think not. Changing is *essentially a category of logical thought* : my continuum of expe-

rience is changing and there is no doubt that I feel in some way this change : but to feel the change in some way is not equivalent to feeling an experience *as changing*. The latter feeling clearly implies a measure of logical thought : here I am to a certain extent *conceiving* or representing the process although I fancy I am merely feeling it : so intimately are logic and life, thought and intuition blended together. An appeal to direct reflection ought to settle this delicate point. As is abundantly clear, I do not mean to suggest that in warm, concrete experience we do not feel the features that may be there and the processes that may go on there : if we do not feel *these*, what can we feel at all ? But I have ventured to think that there is all the difference between feeling the features as they are given and the processes as they go on and feeling them *in terms* of such categories of thought as 'universe', 'changing', and so on.

This of course does not mean that a concrete fact of experience can involve no thought of universe, or change, or permanence. The point is this : An experience (F) which is being thought or conceived by it (F') has really ceased to be itself, has been veiled, although we may, and do commonly, fancy that we are still living it. This is a miracle of the Veil. If the unrelenting concrete is a realm too sacred to accommodate our profane categories of ordinary thought, it is the region of dumb, unspeakable feeling. Unspeakable wonder, U, is the thought that comes nearest to the native inscrutability of its being. We feel no doubt, but cannot at the moment of feeling think about what we feel : in order that this feat may be possible, that feeling must considerably retreat ; and the new feeling which thinks about it does not, and indeed cannot, think about *itself*. When a feeling is warmly there it is a presentation ; and though this presentation may involve the veil in one sense it does *not* in another ; an actual feeling is something given and as such it is opposed to something being not given or kept back. When this feeling is reviewed in a later feeling, we have two circumstances which render possible such review : the old feeling must subside, for so long as it is what it is, it is a presentation and no representative

thought ; also, the new feeling that takes up for inspection and review the old feeling—this I hasten to admit is only a popular way of putting the thing—must distinctly place its emphasis on the representative thought involved in it in order that we may have a distinct thought of an old feeling being reviewed in a present feeling. The present involves an intuitive basis besides the thought of the past feeling ; now the emphasis of the present feeling must distinctly lie on this thought-element : without such differential incidence of emphasis the thought of the past feeling, though of course involved in the present, will not render it distinctly and explicitly as a thought of the past feeling. Innumerable tributaries of sounds, sights, smells, organic feelings and ideas have poured themselves into the massive experience which we have characterised as our present feeling ; of these countless feeders the representation of the past feeling is just *one* ; and how should the present fact declare itself as especially meant for the past fact without emphasising *its* place in the mass and ignoring more or less the rest ?

I have already called attention to the distinction between feeling of change and thought of change. The former in its actuality is an utterable condition of consciousness. In its concreteness a stretch of experience is not suspected as a series, a manifold at all : it is simply given : it does not, in itself, involve any idea of change. In order that it may know itself as a process of change two conditions have to be fulfilled. The stretch of experience must first be broken into a series of pulses, so that consciousness may represent itself as passing from the first to the second, from the second to the third, and so on. Without my consciousness being reduced to a series of pulses, I have merely a mass, a stretch of awareness which does not know itself as a process at all. Of course the passage of consciousness from P to R, for example, in the given stretch of experience is not without its counterpart in feeling : but we can hardly properly call it a feeling of process or change. It is one of the misfortunes of the Science of Fact that none of our ordinary categories of thought such as unity, infinity, change or permanence can go

home to the concreteness of the fact : fact is alogical, while all our conceptions *are* logical. Unity or change are categories that are especially meant for thought : in feeling they are not serviceable. And yet we must think and talk about our feelings. Hence arises the paradox of casting into a logical mould a life that is essentially alogical. The feeling of change is thus an expression of approximate precision : it is looking at feeling through the glasses of logical thought : we cannot help looking at it in this way however. We must lose science if we plunge into the mystery of concrete existence.

In the second place, change appears to me to be a relative conception. Absolute change with nothing permanent to compare notes with, all flow and no steadiness, is a condition which, even if it exists, cannot be represented in our consciousness at all. To know change I must analyse and represent : so long as I do not analyse and represent I know *something* no doubt, but I am lost in that something and cannot think and say what that something may be. Pulling myself up from such absorption I know it of course as a process of change, but in this knowledge my fact has already ceased to live, I have already dissected it and represented it : logic has crept unawares over the alogical. Now, an absolute change which does not stoop to oppose itself to permanence or steadiness, may be *felt* no doubt, but it cannot be known and represented as change at all. Feeling defies all our categories and exceeds all our limitations. Every condition *may* be felt. But every condition cannot be thought of or represented by us. Such are the inevitable short-comings of logical thought. Duality, polarity, opposition are the very *sine qua non* of logical thought. Hence Logic cannot stand the absolute : Life may. Now, it seems to me impossible to conceive change without bringing in thought all the paraphernalia of logical conception, *viz.* P, M and V. Change presupposes all these three. We may look askance at the self-distinguishing subject of Green which thinks of the change of experience without changing itself : James would serve the ends of philosophy by his pulses of Judging Thought which, while looking before and after, inheriting and bequeathing, cannot stay. I need not go into the

comparative merits of these two momentous propositions ; but I may at once say this that no process of change is ordinarily conceivable by us without our fixing in the universe of experience a relatively permanent point of reference, an origin or pole—although as to the exact place and nature of the origin we may have been quarrelling since the birth of philosophy and may go on quarrelling till the crack of doom.

Indeed there are two extremes that we must keep clear of while we are bringing our logic of concepts to bear upon our life of facts. On the one hand, we must not suppose that our concepts, such as change, permanence, finite and the like can be made exactly to fit in with our facts : that life is easily amenable to a logical construction. On the other hand, we must not say in despair that all our concepts are *equally* wide of the concrete realities, and that therefore science is an absurd business. That a logical concept is wide of the concrete reality and therefore cannot be made to represent the latter without violence is a position that we ourselves have taken up : Life is an unspeakable wonder. But logical construction is a business that we cannot altogether put aside : though living always in presentations we require to fancy that we have in a manner represented them or some of their sections. Logic may be discredited, but it is not ordinarily within our choice to dispense with it always. In this necessity of our facts of life representing themselves in conceptions is contained the promise and possibility of science. It is as we have seen the tendency of life to turn round upon itself : experience to flow back upon itself : experience can indeed never really flow back upon itself, but the tendency is given there in it. It is out of this tendency that the logical concept proceeds. We need not dilate on the birth of the logical concept, but we cannot ignore the circumstance that a logical conception *tends* to apply to the fact, and that therefore no fact can be completely represented in a conception and none can be completely missed in a conception : the applicability of a concept to a fact is thus only a question of degree : we have to choose between a more and a less while we are hauling up a conception before the reality. Conception presupposes a further

operation of the triangular cycle of Presentation, Movement and Veiling : in an idea, a fact has been *at once* presented, it has moved and it has been veiled. We need not explain.

Hence we conclude that certain ideas go nearer home to relating than certain others, though none can go *absolutely* home to them. For example, in our representation of concrete experience we thought that U, or idea of being alogical, comes nearest to it : the ideas of infinity, continuity and unity also do not appear to go very wide of the mark. But suppose we represent a concrete fact as a synthesis of a number of elements, as a configuration or a series : are we not a little further removed from the concrete in this manner of conception than while we are merely content to say that the concrete fact is one and continuous ? In both case we have sundered ourselves from the fact, but in both also we tend to get back to it ; and certainly we come nearer to it in the latter case than in the former. Here there are thus degrees of approximation. Again, while we are representing our fact as a polar triangle ($\alpha B i$) we have surely wandered farther from the fact, as reflection will readily show. The other polar triangle (Subject, Object and Stress between them) does not seem to fare better. Indeed such a polar representation of experience has been one of the toughest fallacies of psychology. Every experience, it has been thought, presupposes a Subject attending to an Object : but experience presupposes it in logical thought but is altogether innocent of it in intuition. Experience in itself is neither subjective nor objective as we have seen. Hence if we must admit ideas for the purpose of representing our experiences, we cannot properly admit them on the same kind of ticket : some ideas are more native than some others.

The idea of ceaseless flux comes very near indeed to our concrete life ; we have ourselves represented our continuum as a ceaseless flux. But even this idea has no absolute application : no *idea* has absolute application to the Fact. Previously also I have taken care to point out that change is a conception that cannot be applied to the concrete *whole* of any moment : it is the sum of fact-sections that appears to change or move, but the infinite plenum of awareness in which this sum of modes appears

can never be thought of as changing or moving. The philosophy of successive pulses of thought of which consciousness is only a function appears to meet to be a relic of synthetic psychology which has continued to live as a ghost in the brains of those who have toiled hardest to lay it in the dust: the pulses are only abstract fragments of the living experience which appears in unshackled reflection as a boundless sea of awareness in which infinite modes are rising and tossing; as a spiritual landscape which no horizon, however wide, can bring to a close; as a song which while shading off into ever softer and echoes never absolutely dies away into stillness. No language can depict a phenomenon so colossal, so all-absorbing as life; but certainly it may be said that life is not a *mere* series of pulses, and that consciousness is not only the small mysterious glow which attends the appearance of these pulses. *Where* do the pulses successively appear? Surely James' present pulse of Thought puts into a nut-shell my entire universe at the present moment: the present Thought includes all—the past, the present and the future meet in it: I may believe that the present pulse is not all, but as I have shown before this belief is inside and not outside the present pulse and therefore cannot really prove an existence wider than the present pulse. All this is true; but I do not see why we must regard our present universe of experience as a *pulse* at all; to regard it so does not seem to me to be *radical* empiricism. The present fact—I may speak of it as present as distinguished from a past and a future only through indulgence—is nothing short of the universe as it lives in my consciousness; and as I can set no bounds to my universe of fact I can set no bounds either to my consciousness which lights it up; if consciousness is a function it is an infinite function; let it at all events rise superior to the paltry pulses which have violently thrown experience into the mould of a series. Existence indeed cannot be thrust into any mould of logic whatever: this is perhaps the meaning of the famous dictum of Kant that the forms and categories of Thought are all empirical—having no proper transcendental application. Change and permanence may knock at the gate of Reality and may be sure of never finding the knock

answered : Heraclitus and Perminides are destined to live over and over again in history. But as I have suggested the question of the applicability of our ideas to our facts is at bottom a question of approximation, and therefore one of degree. We shall see, in coming to deal with the nature of consciousness and with the allied problem of existence, whether change or permanence comes *nearer* to reality : whether the hoary Upanishads are wiser in placing the essence of reality in Quiescence than the modern Bergson who seeks it in an 'endless stream of becoming'.

One thing, however, has been clear. If we must hesitate to force the notion of change or permanence on our own concrete universe (U_s), should we hesitate in thinking of U_0 or the hypothetical universe of pure consciousness ? Can we say either that *pure* consciousness changes or that it is quiescent ? Quiescence and permanence are terms that I shall distinguish for an important purpose later : I am here using them indifferently. The difficulties about the universe of pure consciousness are great, but let us waive them. Now, can we hesitate in answering the point that has been just raised ? My ordinary facts can stand logic to a certain amount : change or permanence are not quite absurd conceptions as applied to these facts, though as we have seen they are not quite correct conceptions either. But nothing can overcome the awe of our notions when they are face to face with pure existence. That substance is either pure rest or pure change is a proposition that has been often made : but 'pure' as attached to notions that are essentially relative and polar is a contradiction in terms. We may have doubts as to whether 'pure being is pure nothing', whether pure consciousness is *no* consciousness : but there is no doubt as to what pure change and pure rest are : they are either utterly inconceivable conditions or pure contradictions in terms.

We conclude therefore that U_0 is a condition about which nothing in particular can be predicated : indeed this was to be expected from its very definition as pure consciousness. The theory of Fact that we have outlined in the preceding sections cannot obviously touch it ; it is above all theory. The triangular

cycle **PMV** is simply our latest statement of the theory ; therefore this cycle cannot be predicated of U_0 . We cannot say that consciousness as such is presented ; that it moves ; and that it is veiled. Let us imagine these operations as applied to awareness as such, and the utter absurdity of the situation will be palpable. A discussion over this point will allure us just now into the mystery of U_0 ; nevertheless, the point is clear to direct reflection. Predication is possible only in relation to determinations or modes in consciousness. Negative predication about U_0 may be allowable however : we may scare away the notions that are improper to it. Thus pure consciousness is a condition of *no* **PMV**. If the index be made to represent the operation presupposed in a given experience, we have the following obvious relation :

$$U_0 = E^0$$

It is an experience of nothing in particular. This must not be confounded with *no* experience. The former is commonly taken to be the latter because life is pragmatic and would not care to notice where it is not its interest to notice. We are ordinarily interested in particular *modes* of awareness ; awareness as such is too subtle and metaphysical for us ; hence *this* we do not care to notice where there are no modes of our own preference to notice—it is void and blank for us. Even in the infinite richness of my universe at any moment, I acknowledge and care for only a few features : I hug my littleness in an unbounded possession. Now, if the features do not all interest me, what interest can I evince in the unbounded plenum of awareness in which these features may appear ? It has indeed a supreme metaphysical grandeur, but this is not precisely the stuff of which life can ordinarily feed itself. To life which is little else than a system of partialities, pure experience in which there is nothing to choose and shun, love and hate, is practically no experience. But what is it *really* ?

The vague, massive consciousness in which we are apparently lost while we are just going to be asleep or just going to be awake has been denoted by the two symbols E^V and E^P . As in the development of the embryo phylogeny is recapitulated—to

adopt the formula of Heckel— as, that is to say, the embryo has to begin at the beginning and pass through the stages which the species have had to reckon with in its entire line of evolution— almost so, I might say, experience has to begin at the beginning even at certain regular periods of our normal life. Perhaps this is not a quite grotesque analogy. Spencer's life must have been thrown away if the close correspondence between the development of the organism and that of experience were not proved ; and as organic structure and life have to start from masses of homogeneous, structureless protoplasm, so experience has to begin from a condition of vague, homogeneous sensibility : in both cases the progress has been through increasingly greater differentiation and co-ordination. Now, this condition of vague, homogeneous sensibility at and from which experience commences is rehearsed at certain regular periods of our own normal life : the past is not irrevocably lost to the embryo ; it has to live it in a certain sense : neither is the past irrevocably lost to ourselves ; we too have to live it in a certain sense. Vague, homogeneous consciousness does regularly recur in our life of experience : our life is not uniformly always a specialized work. As to the nature of the primordial sensibility— the mother-stuff from which our own specialized experiences have developed— we may well quarrel ; it may be doubtful also as to whether our E^P and E^V are exact rehearsals of the primordial sensibility connected with that momentous speck of protoplasm which has grown through ages into the human brain that has divided Wallace from Darwin and into the brain of the ant which according to the latter's verdict is the most wonderful molecule in creation !

We have previously described E^V as an experience of the veil and of nothing but the veil. In the face of this assertion how shall we save our doctrine that P, M and V are necessarily interdependent ? E^V means that V only has been *presented* and that nothing else has been : it is a case of the presentation of the veil. And inasmuch as the veil is being presented, the idea of movement is necessarily presupposed. Thus can the doctrine of interdependence be saved. There are, however, involved two points here which deserve our special notice. In the first place

we have already cried ourselves hoarse over the distinction between intuition and representation ; what is impossible in the former becomes possible in the latter, and *vice versa* : there can be, for example, no logical thought of an object without necessarily involving a thought of the subject : but intuition is monovalent as we have seen : intuition can attend to only one of the poles at a time— while we think we are directly perceiving a subject regarding an object, our thought is really oscillating between the two. The distinction between intuition and thought is vital. Hence the expression E^V may mean this : We have no intuition but that of the veil itself. Possibly there can be no *thought* of V without necessarily bringing in the ideas of M and P : the full conception of V is perhaps the conception of the whole cycle PMV . But what is a necessity in conception need not be a necessity also in intuition : so that the veil alone may be given in an experience, though of course the veil alone cannot be conceived in thought

In the second place, the terms 'nothing' and 'no' have generally to be taken in a relative rather than in an absolute sense in our science. While we say that we have an experience of *nothing* but the veil, we may commonly mean not that we have absolutely no experience of P and M , but that the experience of P and M has sunk down to an impalpable *minimum*. Thus P and M can be tolerated even in the feeling of the pure veil : the former two are also felt but the feeling is only an irreducible minimum and is nearly eclipsed by the side of the dominating, all-absorbing veil. The veil not only affects the particular presentations of the continuum, it veils its own nature also. Really V is only an aspect, a pole, of the cycle PMV : this is its whole, concrete nature. But how easily does the veil appear to conceal its own nature ! Thus in $E^V I$ may not at all suspect either P or M , though as we have seen these latter may be present along with the former (v) in feeling as an almost impalpable background, and though also no articulate thought of the former may be possible for us without bringing in the ideas of the latter. The self-concealment of the veil is a point to which I desire to call particular attention. A full discussion over this point has,

however, to be suspended. If the veil is anxious, fatally disposed, to conceal itself, what renders the presentation of the veil in experience possible? How do I at all feel the darkness that has enshrouded all? The question will turn up again.

The remarks which we have been driven to make with regard to E^V will also apply to E^P . The purity of P in this latter notation may not be absolute. Have we only presentation in *general* and no presentation in particular? Do I merely feel the circumstance of being given, without yet feeling what in particular is being given? It is easy to perceive that the *feeling* of 'being given' involves perhaps an irreducible minimum or the feeling of 'moving' and 'being veiled', so that the feeling of P in E^P is not absolutely pure. Again, as in the previous case, the thought of P or 'being given' in E^P will seem to involve the ideas of M and V.

But I will not linger here over these details. The analogy of E^P and E^V will suggest another, *viz.*, E^M . This last is an experience of preponderant movement—I need not say pure. The feeling and the thought of M may involve the feeling and ideas of P and V: its appropriation of consciousness need not be absolute. In normal waking life I come very near to this experience of utter change or movement sometimes. There are moments in my life when all special interests have become flat, and consequently all special presentations have sunk down to an almost impalpable minimum: I cannot say that this is an experience of no particular presentations, but certainly it is an experience of *minimum* presentations, of sounds, sights, touches, ideas and emotions very nearly ignored. Now, I feel that such stretches of experience do sometimes occur in my normal life. I feel that I can also abandon myself to such stretches of monotonous experience by effort, by way of experiment. It is an experience of monotonous dash or *flow* of life, with no special interests and presentations relieving the monotony. Such a condition should, however, be distinguished from bare consciousness or U_0 . That was no experience of flow or movement: that was an inscrutable, unutterable condition of existence upon which no category, whether of motion or of rest, could be

fastened, *this* on the other hand is an experience of something, *viz.*, flow. It is the perception of the stream of consciousness gliding noiselessly on : but no perceptions of the eddies and ripples which previously engaged our thought so long. This sort of mysterious unrest does possess me at times, when I can pause on nothing in particular, enjoy nothing in particular and strive after nothing in particular. Analytically, such an experience may be found to involve both presentation and veil : it is easy enough to show that the experience of the type described above does. Let us call this type E^M .

Exclusive stress on the indices of the three types E^P , E^M and E^V has been responsible for three main divisions of speculative thought about the nature of reality. The first has been at the bottom of that theory of reality which I may call Quiescent Idealism. The reality is conscious existence and its essence must be laid in permanence rather than in change. It is *not* a ceaseless flux. Change is abnormal and not normal in reality. What we have called the Quiescent Real is an unalterable order, eternally realized : it is all actual and no possible. The emphasis of presentation will naturally put such a construction upon reality. Presentation is inseparable from consciousness, and in itself it certainly implies something that endures. To feel that A has been presented is undoubtedly to feel that it has been given in consciousness, and to be given, apart from the ideas of movement and veiling, is the idea of pause, endurance : A is the feature of my continuum upon which I have rested—rested *for a while* if I bring in the supplementary idea of movement. Thus essentially presentation implies both consciousness and permanence. I may take my present universe of experience to illustrate this view. A universe has been presented in consciousness, and if I do not choose to read M and V along with P into this universe, it is something that remains or endures. Mere presentation thus appears to be connected with endurance.

The second type, E^M , has been at the bottom of that theory of reality which I may call 'ceaseless flux' or 'endless stream of

becoming'. We grope for the foundations of reality not in endurance but in change : change is the normal condition, the essence and index of reality. Here evidently our emphasis has been laid on the aspect of movement in experience. Concrete existence for us is E^{PMV} or experience involving all the three aspects of presentation, movement and veiling : this is the whole for us. But we ignore the whole and accentuate a part or aspect in conceiving of the nature of reality. The 'ceaseless flux' owes its origin simply to this veiling operation.

The third type, E^V , which accentuates the aspect of veil or ignorance in the cycle PMV, has been at the bottom of the theories of Agnosticism, Nihilism, and also, as I believe, of Materialism. The veil disguises the nature of truth— it is the principle in us that induces us to ignore and disavow. In my boundless universe of the present moment I fancy that I have and know only a burning candle before me : I indeed have and know many more things, but with regard to these I think and behave as though they have not come in my way at all. It is thus the magic wand of the veil which makes the infinite assume dwarfish proportions, and an abstract segment of fact pass unchallenged for the fact itself. I actually live the concrete whole at every moment of my being, and I can never cease to be the concrete whole at any moment : but how easily I ignore this, and deal out my existence in cut-and-dried fragments ! It is therefore under the influence of the Veil that I pretend that I do not know the reality : indeed ! I live the reality in experience. I take it as unknowable while it is perhaps only unrepresentable or ununderstandable : and surely the difference between knowing and representing or conceiving is real. Knowing has too long and too readily been identified with logical thought, with the dialectic process ; but the essence and the basis of knowing are in intuition. Now, with this definition of knowing in mind, we cannot say that concrete reality is wholly beyond our reach— is unknowable. It is not only not beyond our reach, but we ever actually live it and can never actually cease to live it : experience and reality can never be divorced from each other. Here I can only very meagrely indicate the connection of

agnosticism with the veil. While my whole being has been bathed in a flood of genial sunshine and every atom of my existence is feeling the freshness of morning, I complacently close my eyes and bury myself into the night and darkness of my own making.

Nihilism also appears to me to involve the veil. Nihilism is the view that proposes absolute nothingness as the ground and the destiny of all things : all things proceed from nothing and return to it. Now, what can be the psychological basis of such a view ? If we regard experience and fact in the light in which they have been regarded in this essay, then surely fact can, in no conceivable condition, be reduced to absolute void. If experience were to consist of a series of pulses of thought to which consciousness might be attached as a sort of glow or phosphorescence, then of course the series could be conceived to come to a close and the attendant glow of awareness to be completely put out. But as we have seen it is an abstraction to regard experience as a series, whether infinite or finite. Even to conceive it as a sort of universal process is an abstraction : by 'universal process' I mean an unbounded, all-embracing continuum in a condition of endless becoming. Now, as I have repeatedly suggested, this universal process is a stress or agitation *in* awareness : so that even if we could conceive a limit to the process, we could not conceive a limit to the infinite plenum of awareness itself. *That* at any rate must endure even where the series and the process have been altogether thought away. Consciousness of is-ness or existence is the irreducible element of our experience. What we commonly call an experience of nothing is an experience of something : in normal life we have no experiences of pure nothingness : experience is normally always an experience of something, with a certain form and determination. We may sometimes take a particular something of experience as equivalent to nothing because we are pragmatic and because we ignore. But waiving this point let us take an experience of pure nothing. Is this not an experience of pure being or existence ? Between the experience of something and that of nothing there is an ultimate point of contact. The difference between a something and

a nothing is not a difference between *is* and *is not*, between pure being and pure no-being. It is really a difference between *something is* and *nothing is*, into which both *is* enters as common and irreducible element. This *esse*, being or existence as such is the ultimate point of contact, the last common platform of disagreeing and clashing facts, and this point and this platform become unmistakably clear when all other possible points of contact have failed and all other possible platforms of collocation have broken down. Hence consciousness of existence must endure when nothing else can be supposed to remain. The conception of an absolute beginning of the series of experience out of void and that of an absolute end of the series in void is a conception which, like every other conception, belongs to the index of a fact : the whole concrete fact, therefore, is not bound to dance to the tune of the index. I may apply all manner of conceptions to my concrete fact which I live : but what I actually live may not really yield itself to the mould of any of these conceptions. Some of these conceptions come nearer of course to the reality of life than others, but none as we have taken pains to point out can absolutely stand for it. All theories are approximations, but some are closer than some others. Now, as I have ventured to **think**, the theory of an absolute void is not even a theory of tolerably close approximation. It involves, as has been suggested in the above hasty examination of the view, a *threefold* application of the veil. First, we ignore the concrete, alogical nature of experience or fact, and conceive it as a flow or process. Secondly, we ignore the unbounded plenum of awareness in which the fact lives. Thirdly, we ignore the element of being or existence which attends, and cannot be supposed to be absent from, our so-called experience of nothing.

The theory of materialism is also clearly a view that arises from V-emphasis in our contemplation of the concrete fact. Our concrete at any moment involves only a minimum veil, as we have seen : it is a universe given in consciousness. The pragmatic fact presupposes a greater veil than the whole in which it lives ; a section or aspect of the pragmatic fact will naturally presuppose a still greater veil. Now, what passes for matter and

motion is only a fact-section and not the concrete fact. Matter is experience accepted only in a segment and ignored as a whole : so also is motion. We need not unnecessarily dilate on a point which can be settled at once by an appeal to reflection. Thus not only matter and motion but Space and Time which they presuppose are abstract fact-sections, and therefore creatures of the veil. Now, what is a fact-section cannot be really equated to the whole concrete fact : matter and motion cannot properly be regarded as the fact itself : neither can Space and Time be regarded as the concrete fact itself. The fact is not only wider than the fact-section, but the latter necessarily presupposes the former, can never be imagined or supposed to live independently of it. Hence, matter and motion are only special forms of experience : we cannot therefore think of explaining experience itself by its special forms—matter and motion. The configurations and displacements of the molecules of the brain may present beautiful parallels to the phenomena of mental life : but what are these configurations and displacements really ? Are they not already segments of experience ? When I have before my eyes or imagination a particular configuration of the brain molecules, the entire concrete fact for that moment is not certainly the so-called physical configuration merely ; I have of course that physical configuration, but also much besides ; and my experience of the moment may involve a more or less articulated belief that the configuration is physical and objective. But the belief cannot make an experience to cease to be an experience : the configuration that I see or imagine is still a pragmatic section of experience, whatever my belief concerning it may be. There is no miracle by which we can transcend our own given universe of fact : and if experience is simply the name that we give to this universe of fact, no miracle can really make it possible for us to bring experience to bear upon something which is independent of experience. Here lies the incurable weakness of materialism. The veil is prominent in the rise of such a theory of fact.

By way of summing up we may lay down the following symbolical expressions to indicate in a precise manner the positions

of these classical theories of Reality. We have the misfortune to fly repeatedly in the face of the dictum of Bergson that metaphysics is the attempt to do without symbols : it has been one of the special features of this essay to put facts of experience and their relations into symbolical moulds ; but I have repeatedly urged that facts in the concreteness of their existence are inaccessible not only to symbols, formula and equations, but to all manner of conception. If according to the verdict of James metaphysics is an obstinate effort at clear thinking, I venture to think that symbolical expressions and equations *do* sometimes magificently serve the ends of clear *thought*. If however metaphysics is the host of intuition and nothing short of intuition, then can we hesitate to answer the memorable question of Kant—'is metaphysics possible?' Metaphysics in this sense ceases to be a science, and becomes equivalent to Life.

Be that as it may, let us recall the triangular cycle in experience—

$$E_M^P V \dots (1)$$

Let us also characterise P as the principle of quiescence and presentation ; M as the principle of activity and change ; and V as the principle of ignorance and inertia. The grounds of such characterization I will discuss hereafter. Now, let put equal to zero or ignore the entire cycle PMV. What does that mean ? It means that experience is taken concretely or alogically, without our *representing* it as a phenomenon involving the interdependent operations of presentation, movement and veiling. It is the acceptance of concrete fact as such. Hence, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{concrete Fact} &= F = E, \text{ putting} \\ 0 \text{ of ignorance for PMV} &\dots (2) \end{aligned}$$

In the order of evolution the alogical fact (2) has priority to the logical fact (1). Nevertheless, for obvious reasons, we have taken the latter as our starting basis in our present investigation.

In the next place, let us put 0 of ignorance for M, V in the cycle. This, as we have seen, will not mean the absolute elimination of the thought of movement and veiling, but rather

the reduction of this thought to a bare minimum. Thus, performing the necessary operation, we have

E^P = the view of Reality as Quiescent

Experience (3)

This is how the theory of Quiescent Idealism is born : the real is essentially Experience, and it is unchanging, statical. The veil is conspicuous even in such an enlightened view of Reality as this.

In the next place, let us ignore not only the cycle PMV, but if possible even E which supports all our logical constructions. Previously we have seen that E can never *actually* be put equal to zero ; but nevertheless we may fancy that a condition may possibly exist in which there is no E. This is a mere fancy however ; we can neither feel nor represent the condition of no experience even if one should exist. This we have—

The base and cycle in (1) all veiled or ignored

= the view of Reality as unknowable

= Agnosticism (4)

Let us next put zero for P, V in the cycle. This will of course mean the ignorance of the aspects of presentation and veiling in a representative thought of Fact. I look at the aspect of movement only, and do not care to unfold in thought the necessary implication of this aspect. Thus, we have,

E^M = the view of Reality as

Universal Process of Change (5)

Two other varieties of conception we have already noticed *viz.*, Nihilism and Materialism. We now proceed to distinguish between them. In both cases, it is clear, the inalienable basis of Fact— E or experience— has been veiled : we do not think that Reality is essentially a condition of experience. But while the former reduces it to a condition of nothingness, the latter reduces it to a condition of matter and motion. Now, I venture to point out that the thought of utter nothingness is a thought of quiescent presentation with the essentially conscious nature of presentation being concealed. In thinking of nothingness or void I naturally represent to myself empty Space or empty Time, preferably the former. Empty Space is for me the symbol of utter

nothingness. Now, empty Space is essentially an experience of statcal presentation : the thought of quiescence forms an element of the conception of void. Movement seems to be bound up with life and concreteness, rest seems to be bound up with death, exhaustion, emptiness. For the representation of utter void, empty Space is, as I have suggested, preferable to empty Time. Thus in Nihilism we may say that the basis of the fact is ignored, and of the triangular cycle PMV, the first is accentuated. Thus we have

E^P (veiled) = the view of Reality as
utter Nothingness— Nihilism (6)

We shall have two expressions for Materialism if we regard matter and motion as separate. Matter preponderantly implies ignorance and inertia : it is taken as something alien and unknown : its essence is also placed in inertia. Motion preponderantly implies movement and change. Hence in materialism of the common type we have the basis of fact ignored, and the aspects of M, V emphasised. Thus

E^{MV} (veiled) = the view of Reality as Matter and Motion.
= Materialism (7)

But the conception has undergone a vast change in these days. We have already referred to the vortex theory of matter more than once. Generally, there has been a tendency to reduce matter to motion. Of course it remains difficult to conceive pure motion, or motion without substance to move. What is it that is supposed to move in a vortex? Shall we say ether? If so, how is ether related to ordinary matter, and how is it related to motion? It is difficult to reduce the duality of matter and motion to *either* of them. But we are prepared to admit that in the latest conceptions of matter itself the aspect of motion has been greatly emphasized and the aspect of dead stupor has been largely ignored. Hence for this latest type of materialism we have,

E^M (veiled) = the view of reality as physical motion.
= Another type of Materialism (8)

I have now considered in a summary way some of the leading forms of speculative thought about the nature of Reality or

Fact. All these theories have been shown to involve the operation of veiling and accentuation. In some of the types the basis of Fact, E, has been suffered to remain undimmed ; such an unflinching acceptance of the inalienable basis of Fact has led to the growth of idealistic theories concerning the universe : they are an attempt to keep exposed the foundations of the fact of life, without allowing clouds and mist to gather too heavily round them. It constitutes a vantage ground of these theories from which they are not likely to be easily dislodged. Agnosticism or the theory of the inscrutable reality has endeavoured to conceal the base as well as the superstructure of Fact ; Reality is all unknowable— nothing can be predicated of it But this assertion and claim of the agnostics cannot be taken seriously. Even in pronouncing unknowable I *do* predicate something of the reality, *viz.*, that it exists at any rate. This indeed is the common point of contact between Kant and Spencer, Hamilton and Huxley. Predication advances even a step further : surely to know reality as unknowable is to know it in some fashion and even definitely. Kant's 'Thing-in-itself' has even been made to figure as cause or condition ; surely this is knowing it somewhat definitely. Thus, whatever we may fancy, the basis of Fact cannot be completely ignored : E can never actually be put equal to zero. Nihilism and Materialism have also essayed to undermine the foundations of Fact in thought and accentuate one or another aspect of the cycle PMV. In both we really build upon ignorance : we set to ourselves the task of rearing up a superstructure of thought where no basis has been provided. Buddhistic Nihilism tries to conjure up a world out of a condition in which nothing is : it is also a world that hinges upon nothing and a world that melts away into nothing. This surely is an effort to conceive where, from the very nature of the case, no conception is possible. In clear reflection, experience— the basis of Fact— cannot be thought away in any manner of existence ; and if the test of 'the inconceivability of the opposite' counts for anything we cannot hesitate to accord to out and out nihilism the sort of reception that it deserves. The two propositions that we do not and cannot know reality at all and that the

reality is utter void, are not precisely the same assertion as will appear from the expressions that we have respectively put down for nihilism and agnosticism. If the latter can be pretended to be a case of all ignorance, the former cannot evidently be. Surely we do positively know something of the nature of reality in the former ; it is absolute blank. In the latter also we do know something about the so-called unknowable, but this circumstance we manage somehow to conceal from ourselves ; we pretend that we do *not* know anything. Accepting for one moment our pretensions, we have also ventured to characterize the knowledge of reality that we seem to possess in nihilism. It is as we have seen a knowledge in which the aspect of quiescent presentation has been accentuated. Between pure being and pure nothing, pure consciousness and no consciousness, there hangs a thin mysterious veil. In the latter we have veiled or ignored a small but all-pervasive term 'is' : pure nothing, to our thought, is the consciousness that nothing is or *exists* : we cannot push nothingness beyond this point. Now, the consciousness of is-ness or existence may be ignored, and thus a conception which is really that of the consciousness of nothing existing becomes a conception of pure nothing. Materialism also, as we have seen, has essayed to build upon ignorance. In the first place, the basis of Fact in experience is hidden ; in the second place, there is also involved in materialism a differential incidence of emphasis as regards PMV : all these aspects are not impartially recognized in materialism.

Though the consequences of the veiling operation are philosophically momentous I need not have dwelt so long upon these mere side issues. We were attempting a classification of our universes of experience. I already gave five orders of universe, and promised to add two more. To the consideration of these two orders I now proceed.

I have already pictured to myself a universe of ceaseless flux, It is clearly a universe of M-emphasis. Flux cannot of course be represented in thought without bringing in the ideas of presentation and veiling ; but there is nothing to prevent my emphasis from being laid on the aspect of movement. My world is to me

a Universal process. In normal experiences, we have seen, we come very near to the condition of knowing a universal flux : the self is listless and life is restlessly fleeting. I cannot say that this is a condition in which there is no feeling or representation of the aspects P, V, but certainly it is one in which the feeling or thought of the latter has been reduced to an almost inappreciable minimum. Let us admit therefore an order of Universe in which the aspect of movement or flux is preponderant. Thus,

My universe as continuously changing—

U_b (6)

There is also another mode in which the universe may appear in me. Suppose I believe there is a universe of fact in which the real and the ideal have become identical with each other—a realized statical fact of all actual and no possible. To such a universe I have applied the name Quiescent Real or Q. R. Evidently, I am not solicitous about the possibility and truth of such a universe ; it is enough if we *conceive* sometimes that our universe is only an echo and suggestion of a finished and consummated scheme ; that our life is an anxious striving after a life all complete and settled ; that our knowledge is a dim presentiment of a Light which no shadows can limit. Such a conception has been an inspiration to some of the noblest systems of ethics and metaphysics. We may admit such a conception therefore as a relatively common one without yet voting for either Plato, or Green, or an wing of the Hegelians. Now, in what light do we regard our own normal universe by the side of the Quiescent Real ? Naturally, our own universe would appear as a partial reproduction of the Q. R. Our knowledge would be a partial reproduction of infinite wisdom ; our moral life would be a partial reproduction of moral perfection ; our truth would be only a partial aspect, an earnest of ultimate truth. What is the significance of this partial reproduction ? It is precisely the Veil. The infinite all is hidden from us ; a part, a preparation, is our lot. Thus my universe at any moment can be taken as the Quiescent Real partially hidden—the infinite Wonder but partially manifested—the infinite Problem but partially solved—the infinite Puzzle but partially explained. Hence I may put down :

*My universe as the Q. R. partially hidden or
manifested* = $U_a \dots\dots (7)$

We have now as many as seven orders of universe. Before closing the consideration of the orders I should like to point out U_a and U_b negotiate between U_s and U_8 —between the universe of Quiescent Real and our own concrete universe at any moment. My universe is not only the Q. R. partially hidden and manifested, but I also take it as a provisional result attained in an endless stream of becoming or reproduction : the All is being reproduced in me not only *partially* but *gradually*. Hence my universe may be conceived as arising from the Q. R. by the two-fold operation of veiling and movement : the Q. R. must move and be veiled in order that I may have my universe as I take it—*viz.*, as the partial and gradual reproduction of the All. The place of U_a and U_b is thus clear. In fact, wherever we conceive a thing or a process as a striving after an End or ideal, we necessarily have to deal in V and M. A growing seed or embryo will serve as a typical case.

What renders the transition from U_0 to U_1 possible? How can pure consciousness become a consciousness of presentation? For this it is necessary, in the first place, that consciousness should cease to know itself as *pure* consciousness : it must veil itself somehow. Such veiling will not of course mean the putting out of consciousness altogether, which is impossible, but its ceasing to be what it was. It was, by supposition, pure consciousness : now it has become consciousness of some state or determination : it has passed on from one condition to another. Now, whenever a certain condition A has moved on to another B, we may suppose that the former has been veiled ; for, so long as A is unflinchingly given, continues to remain absolutely what it is, nothing else can appear in its place. Hence consciousness must cease to be *pure* consciousness in order that we may have a consciousness of something or condition. Thus change or passage from one condition to another necessarily implies the veil. Does it not also imply movement? Indeed, any process or change necessarily implies the cycle PMV : in order that A may change into B, it is of course necessary that A *gives way*,

and B is *gradually presented*. This being so, we see readily enough that while U_0 is an experience of no PMV, U_1 is an experience of PMV. By our hypothesis, there is absolutely no vestige of the triad in pure consciousness; and it requires hardly any pretence of analysis to bring out the triad in the order of universe which comes nearest to it. This latter is no pure awareness: it is awareness *becoming* an awareness of presentation. But though the complete cycle is presupposed in the operation, it is manifest that the result is an experience of *presentation*, accentuating P rather than M and V. The aspects of movement and veiling, though inseparable from the aspect of presentation, may be veiled themselves and bring out in stronger relief the latter aspect. In the ordinary flow of mental life, it is sometimes the circumstance of flow itself and sometimes the relatively stable and substantive parts in the flow that may come into prominence: now I am more interested in the processes, a moment after, I may be more interested in the things. This illustrates the fluctuating emphasis of mental life so far as the aspects P, M, V are concerned. It is emphasis that singles out objects or features for pragmatic selection. Hence the emphasized fact-section passes for the fact; a case of P-emphasis is accepted as a case of pure presentation. If for one moment we represent the phenomenon of deduction of one universe from another by ratio, we have obviously the following—

$$U_0 : U_1 = \text{PMV},$$

where emphasis has been represented by bold type.

We may also enquire in passing as to what the transition from U_1 to U_2 requires and implies. By definition, the former is a universe of simple, homogeneous representation; the latter is a universe of infinitely various presentations. The former is an undifferentiated continuum—featureless, monotonous; the latter is a differentiated continuum, infinitely rich in features, yet quiescent. The former is like a shoreless sea unruffled and in repose: the latter is like an ocean bearing on its bosom an infinity of waves and eddies, but arrested and stupefied in a calm enchantment. The derivation of the latter from the former implies therefore all that is presupposed in the differen-

tiation of a featureless, monotonous continuum into an infinite manifold, calm and unchanging. It is the birth of the many from the one, of the complex from the simple. It is the fundamental problem of creative evolution. We are here of course endeavouring to conceive how the Q.R. may be deduced from U_1 or the universe of simple presentation : we are not concerned with the cosmological question as to whether Q.R. is *really* deduced from U_1 , or is an ultimate order of universe itself to which the question of deduction would not apply. Cosmologically, the former may be either an ultimate, eternally realized universe which is being gradually and partially reproduced in the universes of our own ordinary experience ; or it may be a far-off divine event— an End not yet consummated— an Ideal not yet realized— to which the world is steadily moving ; or, lastly, it may be a universe derived from a simpler form of universe : for example, U_1 may be actually derived from U_0 , U_2 from U_1 , U_3 from U_2 , through the mediation of U_a and U_b : this may represent the *actual* order of creative evolution. I am, on the other hand, merely tracing the 'genealogy of the concepts' without suggesting in any way that the dialectic process of concepts is *equivalent* to the actual order of the evolution of the universe. I am merely endeavouring to show how, taking U_0 as our starting basis we may proceed gradually to our own universe of experience through intermediate forms : clearly the starting basis as well as the order in which the universes have been arranged in our scheme are hypothetical : *assuming these*, what is implied in the successive derivation ?

Now, what renders the passage from one to many possible in thought ? I cannot possibly pass from U_1 to U_3 without in the first place veiling the former : every act of passage or transition implies the veil as we have seen. We need not go deeply into the psychology of the concepts of one and many ; but at bottom, it must be confessed, the antithesis is a fundamental one and cannot be reduced to a simpler relation. Nevertheless to have the many in the place of the one, I must not only cease to have the pure one, but something else of a fundamentally different texture must be *presented* ; and the

presentation of this something else presupposes of course *movement*. Hence, clearly, the transition from the perception of one to that of many is rendered possible by the cycle PMV. This is superficial psychology, but need not be trivial and contemptible on that account. We may try to make our account of the process a little more definite by pointing out the aspect of the triad which is especially emphasized in the transaction. It is, as before, the aspect of P that seems to be prominent in the operation. The Q.R. is after all a universe of infinitely rich presentation : undoubtedly something must have been ignored in order that it might at all *appear* in consciousness, and the appearance, whether gradual or sudden, would necessarily imply movement ; but of these connected aspects of the operation it is the first that unquestionably predominates. But consider also the tone of the aspect of movement. Is this not also fairly prominent ? Conceive a given universe of experience first, and then conceive it as deduced from another order of universe : suppose that the vague, massive and almost homogeneous experience of the amoeba has differentiated itself into a fairly articulated system of experience like that of the adult man : what are the prerequisites of the transition for thought ? Is not the idea of movement a prominent element of the idea of the development ? Suppose also that the development of the latter is sudden and not gradual ; by a sudden convulsion the amoeba's mind is converted into man's ; is not the idea of movement prominent in this wild conception ? We do not know whether the quiescent Real is an eternally realized universe or a universe ever in the making ; it is clearly quiescent in the former sense, but how can we regard an order as quiescent which is perpetually on the anvil of creation ? In the latter sense, the Real is an Ideal which is being ever realized in infinite experience—the vaguely conceived goal to which the finite life is aspiring and moving. It is therefore a condition in which the aspiration is expected to be satisfied, all struggle and striving are expected to be quieted : it is the fulfilment of the Ought to be, the satisfaction of hope and endeavour. Do I commonly not take my life as a preparation for a last fulfilment and

my world as an approach to a final perfection? Whatever the grounds of the belief may be, the belief has been persistently there in many of us. Now, is not the devoutly wished for consummation of my life's ends and possibilities, 'the far-off divine event' to which the whole creation is believed as moving, a condition of quiescence and satisfaction? I have assuredly a foretaste in imagination of the last repose which comes and perpetually lasts after life's long and weary journey, the earnest and anxious struggle, has completed itself. Briefly, I may indicate *three* conditions in which the Q.R. may be conceived by us. First, it is the eternally realized order which is being gradually and partially reproduced infinite intelligence; secondly, it is the far-off ideal to which the world, or at any rate, the life is steadily moving and which it imagines as a condition of infinite satisfaction and peace, the ideal, however, *not* being conceived as already actually realized in any experience; thirdly, it is an ideal, nowhere actually realized which is a condition *infinitely* distant from ours, and to which therefore our life, or the life of the world for the matter of that, is an asymptotic approximation: the cherished ideal is essentially a state of quiescent satisfaction, but it is destined to remain ever beyond our reach: the actual and the ideal may ever come closer together, but they can never meet. Human imagination has painted the quiescent real in all these three characters. We may note that Q.R. of the first kind is an order which especially emphasises the aspect of P; the latter two especially bring out the aspect of M; and of these latter two the ever eluding ideal involves V to a conspicuously greater degree than the ideal that we expect to ultimately catch hold of and make our own. The eluding ideal is somehow ever hidden from us; it will never completely show itself; it is never a perfect presentation: the realizable ideal is taken by us as a *possible* perfect presentation. In every one of these three cases, it should be noted, the conception of the ideal is bound up with the idea of peace and quiescence, though in the first case the ideal is conceived as eternally realized, in the second case as realizable, and in the last as never completely realizable.

In whichever sense we conceive the quiescent Real, does

not the passage from U_1 to U_2 prominently imply movement? Suppose we take 'eternally' in the first case in a somewhat elastic sense and picture to ourselves the rise of the infinitely rich order from the order of utter barrenness as represented by U_1 ; and let this rise be sudden. Is this not the picture of a sudden convulsion, by which the bare consciousness of presentation is made to assume a form and character so grand and complex that human imagination is fatally baffled in portraying them to itself? Is this not the miracle by which the primordial mass of nebula is at once metamorphosed into a universe of infinite grandeur and richness, the primordial speck of protoplasm in the primitive waters of the globe is at once worked up into all the glory and complexity of our Flora and Fauna? The idea is that of sudden birth and metamorphosis; movement, M , is prominently there. The question is of course at bottom a question of intuition. Thus we are in a position perhaps to lay down the following relation:

$$U_1 : U_2 = \mathbf{PMV},$$

where, as before, the ratio represents derivation, and the two bold types represent the aspects of the cycle that have been especially involved in the derivation.

Lastly, we have seen already that when we take our universe as a gradual and partial reproduction of, or preparation for, the Q.R., we undoubtedly put emphasis on the aspects of M and V . It is again a universe that has been actually presented in consciousness: it is something given, and something believed as a gradual and partial reproduction of something else: we may say therefore that all the three aspects of the cycle have been in a way emphasized in our world at any moment when it is thought in relation to the Ideal: our truth is but a foretaste of the ideal truth, our weary and anxious existence is but a striving after peaceful and beatific immortality. We are not infrequently haunted by this dream and suggestion whatever we may think of it in our sober, matter-of-fact moments. The question is not one of absolute fidelity of our dreams to the verities of existence, but one that addresses itself to the necessary implications of our dreams themselves. With a slight wave of

philosophical smile I may brush aside some of the more imposing orders of my universes : U_0 perhaps is but an insufferably dull and unrelentingly absurd abstraction ; U_1 is perhaps an order too hypothetical and pedantic ; U_2 , U_3 and U_4 are perhaps but obstinate reminiscences of old-world curiosities—phantoms over which a Plato might be ecstatic, but which cannot stand a moment's examination in the dry, sober light of up-to-date speculation. But it must be clearly perceived that these so-called curiosities have been immensely important, not only philosophically but practically. Pure consciousness has never awakened a serious interest and an eager response in the bosom of the West which has ever been grimly practical ; but it has been the crown of glory to some of the stateliest forms of Eastern thought. Buddhistic Nirvana is of course not a condition of pure consciousness, but the Fact of Vedanta is : this latter has endeavoured to get at it not only by sustained speculative abstraction as I myself do, but it claims that it has practically devised a way—an experimental method—by which the condition of pure consciousness may be *realized* in us : it is thus not merely a question of theoretical limits, but one of experimental demonstration. What shall we say in the face of this challenge ? Pure consciousness, again, is believed by the East not as a condition, insufferably dull and dreary, from where all the interest and romance of life have vanished—a *reductio ad absurdum* of all that imparts to our living its whole worth and significance. Not at all ; pure consciousness has been to the East the home, the substratum, of the True, the Good and the Beautiful : it is the first principle from which all existence and interest in existence proceeds : the existence of life is only a mode of infinite existence, and the joy of life is but an echo of infinite beatitude, and this infinite existence and beatitude are only aspects—if I may say so about a condition which is absolutely simple and unrepresentable—of pure consciousness. We have preposterously inverted propositions in life : All enjoyment comes from consciousness as such, and yet we suppose that variety and polarity are absolutely necessary for enjoyment : what inalienably belongs to the plenum, the sustaining breath of life, we have transferred to

the pragmatic facts ; knowledge and existence too have been identified with variety, change and polarity—here also, while skimming over the chequered surface of the sea we have ignored the colossal depths which are in repose and which nothing can stir up. But we need not dilate at this stage on the relative merits and interests of our orders of universes ; I have merely hinted that in the East particularly such an apparently absurd order as U_0 has been one of the toughest articles of faith and one of the most insistent ends of practical realization. This being the case we cannot summarily brush aside the abnormal orders that we may have admitted in our scheme of experience. Consistently with what we have remarked before we have,

$$U_2 : U_3 = \mathbf{PMV},$$

where also the ratio and the bold types do the offices which they did in the previous cases. The question, it need be hardly repeated, is a question of emphasis. It remains to be remarked, however, that the first relation, *viz.*, that between U_0 and U_1 is a matter of P-emphasis ; that the second relation, *viz.*, M that between U_1 and U_2 is a matter of P-and-M-emphasis ; and that the third relation, *viz.*, that between U_2 and U_3 is a matter of P-M-V-emphasis. At any rate, this is how the orders deliver themselves in my reflection.

Before leaving this subject of orders it will be advisable perhaps to attempt a classification of the orders in the light of the foregoing explanations. I will merely suggest a classification and shall not pause to examine its foundations. Thus :

- I. U_0 no P.M.V. or E^0 .
- II. U_1, U_2, U_3 $E^{P'}$ (P-emphasis ; the stress on the aspect of P is their common feature).
- III. U_4 $E^{M'}$ (M-emphasis).
- IV. U_5, U_6 $E^{V'}$ (V-emphasis).

In the foregoing analysis and classification I have attempted to give a faithful version of the deliverances of my own intuition as in this fundamental science of Fact one must ; but I am not sure how far these results will tally with the results of those who are greater adepts in the dubious but indispensable art of self-analysis and introspection.

I have remarked already that each of these orders is an infinite fact—even the infinitesimal fact is an infinite fact with its infinitude taken with a difference of sign. The statement in regard to the particle will require perhaps a slight amendment. In abstract dynamics the particle is represented by a mathematical point, hence to such an entity the symbol f_1 cannot strictly apply. That symbol was meant for our ordinary conception of a particle : it is a finite portion of matter, small and taken as a unity. The particle of dynamics is, on the other hand, an infinitely small portion of matter distinguished from the atom by its absolute and abstract nature : the atom may break up one day, and its indivisibility may be only relative, but the particle is absolutely safe. Again, the atom may be a centre of chemical properties and attractions, but the particle is a naked entity divested as far as possible of properties and is a centre of forces such as dynamics alone will be content to take cognisance of. The atom is too concrete, too unscientific to serve the ends of an abstract science of Motion. Hence the particle has been installed in its place. Be that as it may, we must hasten to distinguish between the infinitude of the particle as represented by the point and the infinitude of the monad. The particle is an absolute infinitesimal, and let us regard this kind of infinitesimal as *inverse* infinity or ∞^{-1} . The monad we have previously represented by negative infinity or $-\infty$. The difference between these two kinds of infinitude is patent to plain reflection. Thus we have—

$$\text{Universe} = +\infty.$$

$$\text{Monad} = -\infty.$$

Particle as represented by the mathematical point $= \infty^{-1}$. Also, we have the relation $\infty \times \infty^{-1} = \text{unity}$. The infinite multiplied by the infinitesimal will give us unity. What does this operation and this result mean? Sir W. R. Hamilton's new turn to the operation of multiplication in mathematics gave the possibility of the powerful science of Quaternions : even the fundamental notions of mathematics are thus flexible. Suppose a given vector α is changed by an operation into another β : the operator which thus turns one vector into another may be regarded as a multiplier. Here is undoubtedly a more natural and

concrete notion of multiplication than (that of continued addition) what is accepted in Algebra. We must push a little way further in order to get at the most natural and concrete notion of multiplication. This is not the place to enlarge upon the notions of the fundamental operations of mathematics ; but I venture to say nevertheless that in its concreteness multiplication is the idea of any operation by which a given fact is supposed to change into another. Thus when a fact f is changed into f^1 we may regard the operation believed to be involved in the process as multiplication. Have we not called this fact-operation previously ?

It is thus by multiplication that a homogeneous tissue differentiates itself into a complex organism, a nebulous consciousness articulates and enriches itself into a system of experience, and a vague universe of presentation bursts forth into the splendour and luxury of the Quiescent Real. Simply, multiplication means the passage of the one to the many, the simple to the complex, the vague to the systematic. This is perhaps too subtle and metaphysical a notion to supply and enable basis to such an exact science as mathematics ; but none the less we must make bold to suggest that the philosophical notion just alluded to is the concrete original from which Hamilton's conception of multiplication as well as the popular, finding of the associative, distributive and commutative laws, have been unconsciously deduced by successive veiling and abstraction.

The notions of the fundamental operations in mathematics will come up for consideration shortly. The meaning that we have assigned to multiplication will suffice for our immediate purpose. Now, suppose we apply the process of multiplication to our unbounded universe at any moment ; we conceive the process by which the infinite universe dwindles down to the infinitesimal particle. Can we not interpret the operation $\infty \times \infty^{-1}$ in this way with some show of fairness ? As we are conceiving the process of the reduction of the universe to the point, there is one circumstance that seems to strike us most : the unity of the universe is a unity in multiplicity, but this acquires a tendency to become *simple* unity : the fact is gradually forsaking its

nature of manifold—the indescribable unity-in-manifold to which we pointedly referred at the outset of this essay—and is assuming the character of bare, homogeneous unity. By the operation we have imagined to ourselves one kind of unity passes into another kind—the infinite All becomes the infinitesimal One. This perhaps will be a feasible interpretation of the relation that we set to ourselves to study a moment ago. The notion of multiplication involved in this will certainly call for further elaboration but we propose to respond in an other place.

We must not imagine, however, that the infinitude of the Fact really vanishes when we are making an effort to conceive the infinitesimal particle. In a distinct *conception* of the particle infinitude persists in two shapes. First, there is of course the unbounded plenum of awareness in which the conceived particle exists and is especially taken note of : this indeed is a kind of infinitude which refuses to be compromised by any of our operations, whether actual or conceived. Secondly, particle is conceived as an *infinitely small* portion of matter, and therefore essentially involves the notion of infinitude, though of the inverse kind. The notion of unity suffers a prodigious change when we pass from the universe to the particle.

12. *The poles of the Fact and the Triad*

We should also briefly consider the relation in which the poles of the Fact, *e.g.*, α , β and i stand to the aspects of fact-life, *viz.*, PMV. On the face of it, it is clear that the pole β and i of a fact bring out the aspect of presentation. They together constitute the pole of the actual with which α as the pole of the possible is contrasted. There is undoubtedly a clear and significant distinction between the base and the index of a fact, but they agree in this that they are both given actually in consciousness. α on the other hand is the suspicion of possible development which vaguely or clearly attaches to every normal fact of experience. I conceive reality as being partially hidden from me and gradually meted out to me : α therefore is clearly the aspect of the Veil in the life of the fact. I do not commonly take my

universe as all presented, but as Reality or idea partially hidden and partially manifested. Between these two aspects M negotiates. The base and index of a fact are conceived as growing at the expense of the co-efficient : there is a breathless flux from the side of the possible to that of the actual.

The Veil appears to hold the fact in all-round possession. Not only the entrance but the exit of the actual in consciousness requires the mysterious veil. The element of the actual in an experience is conceived as growing at the expense of the co-efficient of the veiled possible, and this growing presupposes as much the appearance of new fact-sections as the disappearance of the existing. The new fact-sections are believed to spring forth from the dark depths of the possible ; but *where* do the existing disappear ? Clearly fact-sections issue from the dark and disappear in the dark : we can hardly, if at all, arrest them and keep them standing as they appear : like the soft hues of the sunset they are perpetually changing— we cannot say that for two consecutive moments the same hue has persisted, or that the same fact-section has lived. Now, the mystery which marks the entrance of a fact-section is apparently not the same as what marks its exit : birth is quite as much mysterious as death, but it must be a confusion to regard them as alike. Both presuppose the Veil, but the Veil cannot be of the same kind in both cases. It behoves us to note the distinction not merely because it is incidental to our present enquiry but also because it is philosophically important.

The principle involved appears to me to be connected with the Principle of the Curve. The Veil has already been conceived as negative presentation : to each also we have been able to attach the notion of degree. Whenever we have a process gradually followed by its reverse we are bound to have the curve. Mental life— which in its concreteness is the life of the universe— can never be ordinarily represented by the straight line : the straight line is only an abstraction of the curve. Mental life must ordinarily always be represented by a curve with maximum and minimum positions. Now, if we represent maximum presentation by a maximum position of the curve, and

maximum veil— or, what is the same thing, minimum presentation— by a minimum position, we may find a somewhat apt expression for the difference between the appearance and disappearance respectively of a fact-section in life. In appearing a fact-section gradually rises to the height of presentation : the passage is from veiled possible to the presented actual, from *most* concealment to *least*. Here we have one aspect of the curve of Life : this is birth. Theoretically of course the fact-section which we thus trace from utmost vagueness to utmost definiteness, from the embryonic condition to the adult, may break up into a number of uncompromising A's and not-A's : the various stages of the given fact-section are perhaps really different fact-sections. But logic and metaphysics apart, let us take a common sense view of the affair. In common sense the rise of a fact-section is as we have first pictured it to be— an ascent from a minimum to a maximum position of the curve. To careful reflection the full blooming morn of a fact is never ordinarily without its prelude in the paler dawn and the settling gloom of a fact retreated is never ordinarily without its introduction in the brighter twilight. The appearance and disappearance of a fact in consciousness are sometimes taken by us to be uncere- moniously abrupt because ordinarily we are in no mood for accepting the fact in its full concreteness : the one o'clock gun, for instance, appears to take me by surprise and depart uncere- moniously because I accept it in a very partial or abstract way : the unveiled experience of the moment is undoubtedly of the nature of a curve as would appear from direct reflection. Thus when a fact-section appears it mounts up the ascending aspect of a curve— passes from most veiling to least ; when it disappears it slides down the descending slope of the curve— it passes from most presentation to least. Appearance has been conceived as the passage of a fact-section from possibility to actuality, from the pole of the co-efficient to those of the base and the index. Now, shall we conceive disappearance as merely the reversal of this process, as the passage of a fact-section from actuality to possibility again ?

We may in a rough way so conceive ; but there is an import-

ant distinction between the two aspects of the operation. In the aspect of appearance, in the birth of a fact, the process is clearly '*possible and actual*' : at every point or stage of this aspect the fact being born is conceived as something possible as well as actual, with the emphasis of regard laid on 'possible' rather than on 'actual' : it is a possibility actualizing itself more and more. In the aspect of disappearance, in the decay of a fact, the process is obviously '*actual and possible*', with the emphasis of regard laid on 'actual' rather than on 'possible' : an actual fact is becoming a possible one. But does it become a *possible* one ? Do we not rather conceive a disappearing fact as being irretrievably lost— as gone past recall ? Possibly so ; no fact indeed can be recalled to life which has become once dead and stiff. But still do we not believe the lost fact as persisting in *some* fashion, as capable of being rehearsed in *some* fashion ? Between the fact gone and the fact recalled no absolute likeness is of course thinkable : but something short of absolute likeness can certainly be believed as subsisting between them. Otherwise how should we explain our belief in the phenomena of persistence and memory ? A fact-section in disappearing is believed by us as also persisting in some fashion and capable of being revived in some fashion : there is here no question of absolute, unrelenting persistence or of absolutely undeviating revival. Thus a fact that dies also lives : it lives of course with the configuration of its poles and PMV somewhat altered : between life and life-in-death, between actual presentation and veiled persistence there is of course a vital distinction. The fact is believed as not only living in some manner in death, as persisting in some manner while disappearing, but also as capable of being represented in actual experience in some manner.

This is the basis of what we are familiar with as the elasticity of a physical substance. It is as we have seen the mutual disposition of two circumstances of a material substance, *viz.*, stress and strain. Now, this conception of the relative disposition of stress and strain can be readily extended to the life of the fact. A fact is disappearing : this means that its actual configuration is being changed, this tendency we may call the strain of

the fact—it is the fatal disposition of a fact to change, to cease to be what it is, in tone and configuration. But as we have also conceived in our theory of fact-operation, a fact is equally fatally disposed to revert to its former state, or rather to continue in its given state : this is persistence and the disposition may be called stress, in a rather partial sense of the word. Thus Fact is elastic, and material substance which is only the Fact partially veiled is also elastic. In the elasticity of the Fact is contained the possibility of its persistence and revival. The vital process which is known as metabolism is also an illustration of fact-elasticity. A certain living tissue is swayed by two fatal dispositions : One induces it continuously to stray from a certain system of configuration, the other continuously helps it to keep close to this pattern of configuration. The actual configuration of the tissue at any period of its life-history is of course the resultant of these two tendencies. Physical elasticity and vital metabolism can thus be regarded as illustrations of one and the same process, *viz.*, fact-elasticity.

We believe that when a fact of experience disappears it leaves behind it a condition which bears a two-fold character : it is a condition in which the experience in question is supposed to persist in some fashion— a sort of vestige or trace ; it is also a condition which is supposed to be a possibility of the experience in question being revived in some fashion. The former has been called predisposition in mental science and the latter memory. We may quarrel perpetually as to where precisely memory is seated and what precisely are its conditions ; but the underlying belief in the phenomena of memory requires both the persistence in some manner of a past experience— no matter where and how— and the possibility of this potential condition representing itself— no matter where and how. The persistence which underlies the phenomena of memory is veiled persistence : it is a condition of V-emphasis. Memory is a special kind of representation : it is a condition of P-emphasis. So that the disappearance of a fact leaves behind it a belief that it has passed to a condition of V from which it is but possible that it will again rise to a condition of P. As we have remarked before

the veiled and the represented conditions need not be absolutely alike copies of the original experience. We need not believe that what has persisted after the disappearance of an experience is the same as the experience itself : if it were so how should we know that the experience has disappeared at all ? To disappear is certainly not to continue, to die is certainly not to live. But nevertheless we can conceive a kind of continuance after disappearance and a kind of life after death. Our conception of this kind of continuance and life is certainly very confused ; and in philosophy there have even attempts to do without this kind of continuance. Why should we believe that a present experience is a representation of a past one ? That such a belief involves a good deal of veil need not be pointed out at so late a stage : the total experience which passes for the revival of the past is undoubtedly an original and unique experience, as every experience past, present or future must be. But let us waive this point, suppose we say with common sense that the present experience is a recollection of the past. What does this belief presuppose ? It will presuppose *either* of two things : The past experience in passing has left behind it a predisposition—no matter where and how—which being now acted upon by present conditions produces the recollection : my yesterday's experiences are thus stored up in a condition of veiled and imperfectly understood persistence, and the total assemblage of conditions which produce what I take as the recollection of this past experience involve this condition of veiled persistence as well as other conditions : the former condition as well as the latter are of course all present conditions—though the former may refer back to a past while the latter do not. It is thus that I remember my life of yesterday. The difficulties about the problem of memory would appear to arise not so much in this postulate of mere persistence as in that of the manner and locus of persistence : Granted that a past experience in disappearing has persisted ; but *where* does it persist and *how* ? Does he continue as a sub-conscious idea or merely as a molecular configuration of the brain-tissue ?

But this is by the way. There is another way in which we

may seek to explain the problem of memory. There is no direct proof that *anything* has persisted between the disappearance of the past experience and the appearance of the present one which remembers it : the sub-conscious idea as well as the cerebral disposition are after all but hypotheses and *not* facts that can be readily and directly tested. The present pulse of experience appears however to remember a past pulse : but while we are in the present pulse—and we are ever in the present pulse—we cannot pertinently seek to explain it by dragging in something which is not in the present pulse. Suppose the present pulse B remembers the past pulse A. Does B involve A or not ? Of course it does. There is also a belief in B that A which is being remembered in itself is a *past* pulse, is something other than itself. But this belief is also inside and not outside of the present pulse B. Hence neither the circumstance that B involves a remembrance of A, nor the circumstance that this latter is *believed* to be some phenomenon outside and independent of B, can really establish A as a fact other than B and conditioning it. This indeed is radical empiricism—we are hopelessly shut up in our concrete universe of experience at any moment, and can never seek to establish anything beyond it without surpassing ourselves. But the concrete universe, it must be recalled, is the *reductio ad absurdum* of all hypothesis regarding fact—whether immanent or transcendent : it is dumb and alogical. We must in some manner compromise the unrelenting concrete to formulate a theory. If, for instance, we only say that B involves a remembrance of A with the belief characteristic of remembrance, and that beyond this we must despair of finding an *explanation*, a sufficient reason, we are fairly safe ; but if we venture to say that B, the present pulse, remembers the past pulse A, but that such remembrance need not imply the persistence of *anything* in the interval between A and B, we are merely playing fast and loose with our articles of faith. Either let us have nothing to do with a really *past* pulse at all—let us if possible live unstintedly in the given universe of fact and talk of no theory *about* it. We *are* indeed ever living in the concrete universe of fact and that in spite of all theories about it ; but let

us for one moment disburse our minds of the belief that the theories that we may get up concerning it can really be made to go round it—to be true of it. Such a mood of complete abandon to the concrete is perfectly intelligible though perhaps not commonly a feasible one. Or, if we must think and talk about our facts, let us think and talk with perfect candidness. It is no serious philosophy to stop half way in the midst of an essay at theorizing. I do not see what right we have in splitting up our concrete life into pulses, past, present and future at all: the concrete is always actual and all-inclusive—we can make no reservations whatever in describing its fullness. To say that life consists of a series of pulses is already to climb down from the unrelenting concrete—the safe vantage ground of radical empiricism. After you have installed these pulses and believed them to be different facts, you cannot forego the further task of somehow bringing them together. They *were* together in the concrete presentation—discriminated perhaps, not logically but intuitively. Your philosophy has parted them from one another and it cannot shirk the responsibility of again bringing them together. Thus if you believe that B remembers A—the former being a present and the latter a past pulse—why must you refuse to believe that something has persisted—no matter where and how—between the disappearance of the one pulse and the appearance of the other? I am merely for following up a belief involved in fact-presentation, and not for inspecting its credentials. My belief as to the persistence of something in some manner during the interval between A and B may be correct or false; but at any rate the belief is unquestionably there, and it seems to me to be no real gain to theory to admit *temporarily* different pulses of experience into our scheme and yet to refuse admittance to the thought of connecting links—Hume and empiricism notwithstanding—amongst them.

Thus we have to choose between two alternative explanations of the phenomena of memory. A in disappearing leaves behind a residual disposition which being acted upon by proper conditions produces an experience, B, which we take as the remembrance of A: this is one explanation. The pulse A is followed by another

pulse B which involves *somehow* a retrospective thought of A : in this latter we merely accept the fact of memory but refuse to go behind it. This attitude is not strictly radical empiricism as we have seen : Concrete existence will have nothing to do with pulses coming and going. At any rate, this attitude is not scientific. To say merely that a state B somehow remembers a previous state A is undoubtedly a perfectly safe statement of fact, but it is no explanation of memory. The moment I proceed to link together A and B in any way I must drag in the notion of persistence of some sort. Let us for one moment ignore the cerebral aspect of the question : let us only admit one pulse being followed by another. Shall we say that A in passing away 'bequeaths' something to its successor, or that the latter becomes in some way an heir to the former? Have we not already brought in the notion of persistence surreptitiously in saying this? The matter is not sensibly improved by calling to our rescue the philosophy of association. Association may have its basis in the cerebral connexions, but even cerebral connexions pressed into our service will not render the problem of memory easy of solution. Suppose C_1 and C_2 are two cortical centres between which a special connexion has been established ; suppose also the irritations of the two centres correspond respectively to the two psychoses A and B. Now, when C_1 is excited we have the thought A ; and as the excitement passes on to C_2 we have the thought B. The cerebral affair is ordinarily hidden from our view, so that we fancy that the thought A has directly recalled the thought B, and that there is a sort of mysterious influence between the two thoughts. There need not be any direct influence between them however ; whatever real influence there is subsists between C_1 and C_2 ; the stress between A and B may be, for ought we know, only a figment of our own imagination. But can we altogether do away with the notion of persistence in this latest psychology of association which has emptied the mind of all unconscious ideas and influences and attempted to account for the order of mental life by the too readily serviceable cerebral mechanism? At the most we have been able to shift persistence from the mental to the

cerebral aspect of the fact. A and B as mental states must fleet, but are not the cerebral centres C_1 and C_2 which correspond to them tolerably stable arrangements in the cortex? A past psychosis is forbidden to exert any direct influence upon a present one, but is not the cerebral connexion between C_1 and C_2 which is the basis of the *apparent* influence between A and B, a fairly persistent molecular arrangement in the brain? Again, how should A and the excitement of C_1 , B and the excitement of C_2 , be correlated with each other? The brain-state and the mental state are now classically parallel: they are but two aspects of the same inscrutable process: philosophy has even invented the mind-dust to keep pace with the infinitesimal pulse of nerve-agitation. But what does this parallelism, this duality of aspect, this correspondence between neurosis and psychosis, really mean? It may mean either of two things. That parallelism and duality of aspect are only figures of speech to state a simple fact of experience, *viz.*, that when we have a given neurosis we have also a given psychosis; we do not pretend to go beyond this simple fact—we do not know how this observed correspondence between the two is effected. This is Humian empiricism and we cannot quarrel with it so long as it chooses to stick to its guns. But this is no explanation, good, bad or indifferent, of the mystery. Or we may believe that the one actually influences the other as they appear to do—this is Reid and common sense philosophy. But this is only the beginning and not the end of the mystery of the interaction between mind and matter—from the never failing womb of this Mystery are born quite a host of theories to add little to the enlightenment and much to the confusion of the poor human race. We have not here instituted an arbitration court for all such old and garrulous theories. Our own responsibility in the matter is comparatively simple.

The fact is according to our view neither mind nor matter, neither a configuration nor a series. We may indeed think of it either as mind or as matter or as both; either as a configuration or as a series or as both; but the thought together with the belief which accompanies is not equivalent to the fact which is

being apparently thought and believed. No human survey can go round the Fact itself : hence all our ideas and beliefs about facts are only apparently and pragmatically relevant. But though the nature of the Fact is unthinkable and unspeakable, we are fatally disposed to think and speak about it, and even ordinarily to take our thought and speech concerning it as not only relevant but exact. The gods who preside over our destinies have thus ordained the birth of philosophy out of a material which in its essence of absolutely unpromising for speculation. Philosophy is born nevertheless : and by the processes of PMV the dumb alogical Fact is made to yield a richly and agreeably various harvest for man's speculative and practical consumption. Every theory presupposes the mighty Veil : no theory can be wholly consonant with the Fact. By setting up a standard of truth we may of course distinguish between a true theory and a false : but if truth be conceived as the *perfect* correspondence of a theory with the fact, it is abundantly clear in our own view that every theory is false. All the same, we have developed a theory of fact-operation ; we have however grown it in a hot-house. Within this hot-house we cannot be well advised to allow our theory to remain crippled and stunted— let us rather courageously allow it to grow to the fulness of its stature. That is why we have sometimes parted company with so-called radical empiricism and followed the guileless lead of common sense : to have science we must to a certain extent draw not only upon common sense but common imagination— we must admit not only what we actually have but also what we think and imagine we *should* have.

We have now saved the idea of persistence from dissolution. This idea, it must be noted, is not a mere accident of speculative anxiety. Persistence is quiescence and quiescence inheres in the essence of reality. Awareness of the type U_0 is essentially a quiescent universe : we can conceive of no movement in pure awareness as such : it is like the unbounded space emptied of all its contents. Far from being a function of experience such awareness is its very sustaining breath : the cycle PMV makes life a consciousness of persistence *and* change— makes it appear

what it is in itself *and* what it is not. No operation can possibly suspend altogether the essential nature of being and consciousness, but it can make it appear itself as well as its opposite : *this* is implied in its alternate veiling and unveiling. No ordinary experience is an experience of pure persistence, and none is an experience of pure change : the opposites meet in the life of the fact. The thought of persistence in the reading of its life-history is not a mere accident therefore : the thought has its basis deep laid in direct intuition— we feel persistence and not merely think it. Of the two feelings— persistence and change— the former is more fundamental : it is this that remains after we have pushed as far back as U_0 . It would be preposterous to regard it either as a forced or an illusory feeling, and the feeling of change as alone normal and essential. This is not the place to decide between the rival claims of these two feelings to primacy, but I will say this that our ordinary experience certainly involves both, and that if it does we cannot regard the thought of persistence as a mere exegency of theory. We do not admit it because theory requires it, but because life directly and unquestionably involves it. The conception therefore that a fact-section in disappearing persists somehow and is inspired by a tendency to reappear in some manner, is not an altogether baseless hypothesis. The persistence of matter and energy, the persistence of life after the apparent dissolution of the organism, the continuity of the germ-plasm— in fact all the thought which has given to science her stability and earnestness— is modelled unconsciously after the persistence of experience to which I have more than once alluded. The rigid, immutable world of Platonic archetypes was not altogether a queer conception : it has its basis firmly laid on the fundamental persistence in the life of experience. The substance of this life is quiescence and change is but its shadow : this doubtless is the keynote of that sublime philosophy. The ether is an aspect of the universe of experience, and in the ether persistence has a place in the vortices which are believed to be our indestructible atoms. Whatever the atoms may be, persistence cannot be altogether scared away from matter, for persistence is bound up with the essence of experience which appears through

the veil as matter, as mind, as life. The atoms may not be safe halting places for latest culture ; we may be dislodged and driven back even from these. But can material philosophy do without *any* halting places? The idea of persistence cannot be ousted even from the world of energies of which Proteus seems to be the presiding genius—the realm of M-emphasis. However the energies may change places and forms, can they really spontaneously grow and wither? Life again is fatally disposed to procreate itself—this surely is persistence in a tolerably good sense ; Weismann's continuity of the germ-plasm is a bolder step in the vindication of persistence in the ceaseless anabolic and catabolic processes of the living being ; the belief in the transmigration of the soul is old even as our hills are old and it is certainly destined to die and exceedingly hard death even in the ruthless fire opened by physico-physiological culture of to-day ; lastly, belief in the immortality of the soul has proved to be one of the most tenacious articles of human faith. The fabled phœnix is the emblem of persistence. The idea of persistence has so stoutly persisted in history, because history is the flow of experience itself, and experience assuredly hinges upon an intuition of persistence.

Can we then in all cases conceive disappearance and death as the descending aspect of the Curve of existence—as the passage from actual presentation to possible presentation? It is now clear that persistence of some sort is the connecting link between actuality and possibility, and also between possibility and actuality. In order that an actual A in disappearing may again be represented in some manner, we must think of persistence of some kind between the two conditions ; it may be a persistence of substance, or a persistence of mutual influence, or a persistence of law. A seed is a possible plant : evidently we must conceive of some kind of persistence between the one condition and the other ; a grown up plant is also a possible seed—here also persistence must serve us. In general we may lay down this as a fundamental proposition of thought. Whatever is actual is possible. We inveterately believe that a particular configuration, physical or mental, that has been an actual presentation *may* again be an actual presentation : whatever has

happened may happen again. The two presentations or happenings may not, however, be absolutely alike : we can never bathe twice in the absolutely same stream. Between what disappears and what reappears there is undoubtedly a more or less divergence, and the fact that we commonly take them as mere repetitions must be attributed to our inveterate habit of veiling and abstraction. Nevertheless the belief that what is actual now may become actual again is obstinately in us. It will be instructive to notice the different orders of the **Curve of existence** according to different values of the slope between actuality and possibility. The curvature between actual and possible will be manifest from the consideration of the following typical cases.

Case I. Take U_0 or pure consciousness. This is ever unflinchingly actual for us. The actuality of consciousness never goes, it never becomes a merely possible condition for us. We admit unconscious ideas or reject them ; but there is apparently no conclusive proof that we have ever a real lapse or suspension of consciousness in our life. In a certain sense, consciousness is also possible for us. I have a stretch of consciousness now and I believe that more stretches of consciousness will come in my life, or rather that consciousness as such will continue. But is there any difference of curvature between the actual stretch of consciousness *as such* and the possible stretch of consciousness *as such*? I see none. Such continuity of pure consciousness therefore may be fairly represented by an infinite straight line. The idea of straight line is indeed a special expression of the fundamental fact of the life of experience, *viz.*, awareness as such.

Case II. Suppose we next take the universe of the Quiescent Real. The possibility of a novel order is indeed shut out from the life of this universe as it is excluded from awareness as such. The Q.R. cannot change and grow. But though it does not change it continues. At any moment, therefore, in the life of Q.R. we may conceive a possibility of continuance—a bare, homogeneous continuance, an absolute maintenance of the *status quo*. Here also there is evidently no difference of curvature between the actual and the possible. Will the right line serve us here too ?

Case III. In our ordinary experience there is commonly a difference of curvature between any actual stretch of experience and a possible : the possible is a more or less novel order : there is no unrelented monotony. Suppose now a given fact-section disappears ; to what extent do we believe that it may reappear again ? Its persistence and its revival are circumstances that we have already dwelt upon : we have pointed out also that neither of these circumstances is absolute : the persisting potential fact cannot be absolutely the same as the actual fact gone already—the revival also is not an absolute rehearsal. Hence in the present case, the curvature or the rate of change of direction cannot be zero. The continuity of our mental life cannot be justly represented by a right line. Yet the curvature is rather low, is believed to be low, between what is presented and what is represented, between what I feel and what I remember about the feeling. If in the first two cases we had absolute rectitude, curvature of the zero degree, in the present case we have an appreciable deviation from the rectitude, a curvature that we might look upon as of the first degree.

Case IV. In mental life we might profitably consider various shades of curvature between an actual experience and a possible. Such a consideration could not fail to be of material interest in mental science. Here however I would hurriedly refer to two typical cases of curvature, one in the world of life and the other in the world of matter. An embryo is a possible plant or animal. The systematic development of an embryo into a plant, for example, cannot of course be explained as a fortuitous construction throughout— an assemblage or configuration of molecules brought about by chance— ; a very pronounced spontaneity will in any case have to be read into the unpretentious germ in order that its wonderful life-history may be at all intelligible to us. To scientific inspection the constitution of the germ is simple enough : but we need not take the result as decisive. Let us believe, as formerly we have been inclined to believe, that the germ is a veritable universe teeming with wonders that lie concealed beyond our most searching glasses. Nevertheless between the germ-world as the actual and the

full-grown plant as the possible there is a far cry : the curvature is considerable. We need only compare this curvature with that between a presentation and its memory to be in a position to characterize it. Let me roughly call this curvature of the second degree. In this fundamental science the degrees of curvature are to be decided of course by reflection.

Case V. Lastly, let us take a typical case in the material world. Suppose a given configuration of material particles is destroyed : what assurance have we ordinarily that this configuration of particles may again approximately turn up ? There are of course several grades of the kind of assurance that we ask for ; but let us take an extreme case. A given assemblage of matter—say the dried leaves that are strewn about me at this time—is disintegrated past all recovery : the actual is lost for ever : what hope of recovery or revival have we as we are witnessing this undoing ? That matter cannot be completely undone—both in form and in substance, both in configuration and in mass—is indeed one of our staunchest articles of faith ; but do we believe that the same mass can turn up again in the same configuration or nearly the same configuration ? Can the dried leaf which has murmuringly returned to dust and blown about by the wild, restive winds draw together and coalesce again into a rehearsal of its past existence ? Does our latitude of physical probability extend so far as that ? I have purposely taken a general case in which the operation of rhythmical natural laws do not render the periodical recurrence of certain forms or configurations not merely a theoretical possibility but a fairly assured order. Suppose a system of homogeneous waves is being propagated along the surface of a liquid ; at a given instant the particles of the liquid in a certain place are in a certain configuration ; at the next instant they lose this configuration and take another ; at the third instant the particles reassume the first configuration. This is a case in which is involved the law of harmonic motion. But this is a special case upon which we cannot generalize : we cannot say for instance that the particles of a dry, crushed leaf and those of a dissolved crystal will assuredly and periodically rearrange themselves into a similar leaf and a similar crystal

again. So far as *these* groups of particles are concerned those configurations are perhaps lost for ever. Yet even in such a general case we are not indisposed to hoping against hope. What has been possible once may be possible again : in the ceaseless permutations and combinations of the world-dust can we really send a crushed leaf or a dissolved crystal into eternal damnation ? May not the particles, now gone mad, wake up one fine morning of the millenium to find themselves drawn together by mysterious family preferences and rehearse the long forgotten leaf or crystal again ? This is no poetry really, but one of the toughest tunes arising from the credulous cords of human nature. We *do* believe that what has been possible once may be possible again. We need not pause to inspect more narrowly the credentials of this belief ; but it is certain, at any rate, that possibility involved in this case is of the thinnest texture. Here the curvature between actuality and possibility is extreme. An appeal to direct reflection ought to settle this point also.

The whole science of Probability hinges upon these degrees of curvature. The fundamental basis of quiescence and assurance is awareness as such ; this is the surest ground on which we stand. As ill luck would have it, consciousness has been trifled with in the history of thought even by men who have done most to enlighten us : it has been an epi-phenomenon, an accident or a function. But all this, I venture to think, must be attributed to the action of some lingering refracting media in our effort to flash light in upon reality. To me there is no probability about consciousness as such : it is assurance itself : I cannot conceive it otherwise than as absolutely continuing, as complacently self-sufficient, as scrupulously maintaining its *status quo*. It is the level of no probability, not simply the level of minimum probability. It is only after ignoring the nature of consciousness that we think that more stretches of consciousness are possible to an actual stretch : in itself, apart from ignorance, it is *the* stretch and not a *series* of stretches at all ; hence, consciousness, apart from veiling, is unspeakably actual. Even attaching a possible to the actual in consciousness we cannot, as we have seen, create a difference of curvature between one stretch of consciousness as

such and another stretch. The Q.R. also we have represented by a right line : but it must be plainly seen that there is a material difference between U_0 and Q.R. The former being an absolutely simple, homogeneous condition of existence cannot be conceived as being either changed or undone : all known change presupposes diversity and differentiation. Let us try to imagine awareness *as such* as growing or ceasing and we should assuredly fail in our attempt. A thing or a condition must have a form, a configuration, before it can be thought as changing or ceasing. Q.R., however, is a condition of infinite diversity ; by our definition it is quiescent no doubt, but there is everything in the conception of infinite diversity to tempt us to regard it either as the finished result, actual or possible, of a stupendous process, which need not grow further or as a temporary breathing place of world-evolution from where it is ready to take a fresh and vigorous start. Thus Q.R. may be either a statical result dynamically achieved, or a relatively stable height of the world-curve with a backward *as well as* a forward slope leading respectively to and from it. In either case, it is only through courtesy that we can let alone the Q.R. in the enjoyment of its doubtful quiescence. The metaphysical grandeur of the Q.R. has been superb, and humanity has gone upon its knees before it in unintelligent awe, but the mighty Q.R. has always been nervous in the calm, steady light of close inspection. The boundless plenum of experience—pure awareness—has indeed been an insufferably dull abstraction for most of us ; we crave for modes and forms ; we cannot stand the plenum itself. Nevertheless this plenum has no mystery about it—its very essence is to shine itself and make objects shine even as the sun shines itself and makes objects shine. The Q.R. is an absolutely ununderstandable condition which no imagination can depict, no categories can reach and possess. In so far as we do understand it the Q.R. cannot be regarded as a condition of *no* probability : it is a condition from which extrinsic limitations have been sought to be removed ; the Q.R. is the all-inclusive All ; but where extrinsic limitations have been removed intrinsic limitations may well remain. In the eye of logic it is a configuration, vast though

it be ; and in human experience configuration appears to be inveterately associated with change ; an absolutely changeless configuration is altogether foreign to our commonplace empirical logic. From these considerations, which could be only very meagrely given here, it would appear that U_0 and Q.R. should not be brought quite in a line with each other. There is a distinct falling off in absolute quiescence as we pass from the former to the latter, though the latter particularly involves the adjective 'quiescent' while the former is without it.

We have been much involved in these metaphysical side issues. We have brought them in as illustrations ; but we cannot let our principles be eclipsed by their imposing illustrations. It is only in the passage from U_0 to the other orders of universe that Probability is born. It is only then that we can ask questions like the following : Given a condition of experience, what probability is there of its continuing as it is ? A given condition of experience has disappeared, what probability is there of its turning up again ? Out of a number of fact-sections, which has the strongest probability of continuing ? Out of a group of fact-sections that have disappeared, which has the strongest probability of turning up again ? Probability necessarily implies a fall from the condition of absolute quiescence and absorption. From the degrees of curvature that we have already considered it will also appear that probability varies inversely as the quantity of the veil. In the dumb, alogical fact itself it is all quiescent assurance and no probability. The mental fact is one degree removed from the Fact, and it possesses a low curvature of actuality-cum-possibility. If the degree of probability be measured by the element of certainty and repose involved in a case, we may say that mental life possesses the greatest probability : it is more certain and self-sufficient than any other aspect of the Fact. 'Certain' in what sense ? Organic life and material existence are progressively less assured planes. We have inverted the real order because we have inverted the standpoint of approaching and studying these planes. We look at the mind and life from the physical standpoint commonly ; hence matter seems to us to be criterion both

of reality and quiescence ; matter is the most certain and real thing for us. But from the proper standpoint, *viz.*, that of the fact itself, this appearance of certainty and reality in Matter is illusory, preposterous. The home of reality, the foundation of assurance, the basis of belief, are all in the Fact ; the more we veil it, the farther are we removed from this home, this foundation and this basis. Matter is the condition of maximum veiling, hence *really* we can accord to matter very little of reality and assurance. We must compare material with mental existence as regards these two characteristics not with the glasses of preconceived theories on, but in an essay of unsophisticated intuition. To such intuition Matter will surely appear as the condition of most ignorance and the place of the most complete delusion. In mental life, a fact-section is precisely what it appears to be : a feeling exists for the mind precisely as it is felt : there is absolutely no difference between the appearance of a feeling and its reality— though of course there is all the difference between *F* and *F'*, between a feeling as it is *felt* and as it is *regarded* in thought. In the material world, on the other hand, there is commonly a wide and perhaps unbridgable gulf between what a thing appears to be and what it may really be : yet the appearance is accepted as the reality. What I take as rest, is only apparent rest ; what I take as simple, is only apparently simple ; what I take as exact, is only approximate. What I take as green colour in an object is perhaps nothing of the sort at all— it is only a vast assemblage of particles vibrating and propagating waves in the luminiferous ether ; and so on. I rely on the testimony of the senses ; but this testimony will give me no pause and sure ground. I am dislodged from the world of my natural and unaided senses to be cast bewildered into the heart of a world which knows only particles and their motions, a world that would fully satisfy Dynamics and mathematicians, but a world robbed of all taste, smell, touch, sound and sight. *These* are merely our own sensations which have of course their proper stimuli in the *real* physical world, but these proper stimuli are only particles dancing according to the bidding of the mathematicians. Now is the world of particles even a safe lodging place ? May not a

better and wiser science turn us out from this so-called *real* universe of ether and vibrating particles? Hence Matter is not what it appears to be : it is ever deceiving and eluding us. Feeling never deceives and eludes, though thought *about* feelings may. If a feeling is quiescent, it is so ; there is no further question about it. If matter is quiescent, it is so only by appearance : we may question it and even may believe it as the reverse of fact. In the language of our science, feeling as feeling is a fact of P-emphasis : we take it without any reserve : we allow nothing to stand between it and ourselves at least for one moment. Matter is feeling in a certain aspect : but here we do not take it without considerable reservations, without drawing a veil between it and ourselves. While I have matter I fancy that I do not have it all or even as it is in itself ; it is an entity outside of me and independent of me. This strangeness which matter wears for me is attributable to the veil : it is a condition of V-emphasis. Organic life which seems to be intermediate between feeling and matter is to me the condition of spontaneity, activity. We seem now-a-days to have outgrown the stage in which humanity is unable to conceive activity apart from life : we are quite at home with blind, physical stress. Nevertheless life is still to us the condition of existence which brings into prominence the aspect of M—it is a condition of M-emphasis. This last point will smoothly introduce us to a discussion about the relation between Fact and Motion.

13. *Fact and Motion*

I have now launched upon a very large subject, but within my present limits I can only deal with it in a very summary manner. What is the fundamental idea in motion? Motion has been commonly regarded as a physical fact ; I need not go into the psychology of this fact ; but it is clear that motion presupposes both diversity and space, apart from the attending Subject whom we now completely ignore ; there must also be a relatively fixed point of reference, pole or origin. There is no clear discrimination of course in the *feeling* of motion of these

prerequisites : the elements surprise one another only in analytic thought : While I am witnessing the motion of a body I am generally innocent of a thought of these elements ; but then there is no talk, no science, about the feeling of motion. To understand motion I must undergo an analytic operation. Besides those prerequisites, experience of motion stands for a special feeling-series in me, a series too which is chiefly physiologically generated. Let this aesthetic series be λ . Let the attending Subject be I, the relatively fixed point of reference be 0, and space be S. In these we have of course enough elements of diversity. Then, the fundamental idea of Motion (M) can be represented by the following relation :

$$M = \int (S, 0, I, \lambda).$$

where the sign of integration has been made to represent the peculiar synthesis of experience : experience of motion is thought as the integral of the various aspects symbolically stated within the brackets. There is no mysticism about the equation given above ; it professes to be nothing else than a simple statement of a very random psychological analysis. Yet it will presently appear that such a symbolical statement is not quite unprofitable. The above may fairly pass as a complete statement of motion. This we may call the *polar* equation of motion, since on the right-hand side we have stated the poles, aspects or elements which, we believe, are involved in a representative conception of motion.

By supposition λ stands for a certain aesthetic series ; it is a series, which being translated into objective language, gives me *successively* different *positions*—hence involving both Time and Space. Space has been especially mentioned in the equation ; Time which is presupposed by series as much, whether subjective or objective, has not. We cannot regard the feeling-series as equivalent to the successively different positions : what I totally feel when I am witnessing the gradual displacement of a body cannot be equated, as reflection will plainly show, to the phenomenon of displacement itself. The phenomenon of gradual displacement is merely a physical rendering of the total

feeling. If the displacement is D and the total feeling-series be λ , we have evidently

$$\lambda = D + x.$$

This x is an additional factor whose place meaning in the total feeling-series ought to be clear to reflection. Let us put 0 of ignorance, for x . Then, $\lambda = D$. By ignorance, the feeling-series is made to represent an objective phenomenon, *viz.*, physical displacement. Evidently, the feeling-series may be taken in a narrow as well as in an extended sense. It may be made to swallow up the other factors of the equation of motion : the attending subject, the point of reference, as well as Space and Time, are elements which cannot strictly be regarded as external to the total experience of motion. The feeling-series may also be taken to mean, as it has been taken to mean in the equation, the peculiar muscular and visual sensation which successively appear in us as we are following a moving body. This latter is only an aspect of the total experience. For the purpose of our investigation let us take λ in this narrower sense. Put $I=0$ of ignorance ; then we have an equation of motion which being translated back into the language of common sense will mean this :

Motion is a gradual displacement of a body in space regarded in reference to a relatively fixed point or condition. As a definition it will beg the whole question perhaps ; but I do not offer it as one.

Extensivity of experience is a characteristic which is clear to intuition ; I directly feel the difference between a more extensive feeling and a less, a more massive consciousness and a less. This massiveness of experience is a feeling which it will be impossible to reduce to simpler determinations. I have repeatedly represented my concrete world of experience as an unbounded continuum : is not this feeling of unbounded continuum an experience of massiveness or extensivity ? This massiveness supplies a quantitative basis for our experience. It is clear also that the physical mass is only an aspect of this massiveness of experience. Physical mass is derived from fundamental massiveness by repeated ignorance. The concrete All becomes by ignorance the pragmatic

fact—and a given physical mass is merely a pragmatic fact as will appear from a comparison of a physical mass with the entire experience which knows and sustains it.

This massiveness together with another fundamental circumstance of fact-life, *viz.*, ceaseless drift or flow, supply as I have suggested, the quantitative basis of Fact. Without these two Fact could not be known as a quantity at all. Of these two, drift presupposes extensity. A particle as represented by a mathematical point may drift and yet may not be an extended something; but drifting is surely not possible without an extended something *wherein* to drift. Now, extensity of experience is the original, the concrete datum, of Space; and drift or flow is the concrete original of Time—Time is an experience of ceaseless flux from which we abstract as far as possible the *matter* of the flux: to us it is the *form* in which something can be known as flowing, by which a stretch of experience is broken into a series: but is this *which* something external to the experience which is supposed to be treated by it? Do we not rather abstract the form from the matter, with which it forms a concrete whole? As time is an abstraction apart from drift, so space is an abstraction apart from extensity. The Cartesian characterization of matter and thought as respectively extended and inextended substance is not after all so vital a difference as might appear. Thought may not be extended in a physical sense—it may not occupy space; but it is a massive or *extensive* phenomenon nevertheless. Experience is always a condition of massive existence: even pure awareness we cannot but regard as a boundless plenum: differentiations we may possibly think away, but we cannot conceive a state of experience in which it is absolutely contracted into a point: even the analogy of the point cannot serve us, for the point though having no magnitude has a position still, and if it has a position, *where* is it placed? It is mainly on the strength of this basis of fundamental massiveness of experience that we have ventured to regard our various types of experience—not excepting U_0 —as universes: we can surely have no universes where we have no masses, spiritual or material.

The relation between Extensity and Space, Drift and Time

need not be gone into more deeply in this volume : that would make our enquiry too psychological and too metaphysical even now. I confess, however, that I do not discover any fundamental difference between the one and the other. What I call the perception of space is really an experience of extensity : it is extensity appearing in a special form only. Comparing my continuum of experience at any moment and the perception of the physical universe I do not find any fundamental character which the one possesses and the other lacks : both appear to be essentially extended, though in somewhat different senses. From the concrete universe of experience in consciousness to the physical universe in space the transition is not violent at all. To this view our Theory of Fact lends all the countenance that it can command. Too long and too recklessly have we quarrelled over the opposition between Thought and Matter : they are but two sections obtained by ignorance from the concrete Fact : *this* is extended : Thought and Matter are extended.

As Fact-extensity is the basis and original of Space, so Fact-drift is the basis and original of Motion or physical displacement. We have with some fulness gone into the nature of Fact-drift. What I have previously called thought-oscillation is one of the most interesting cases of this drift. The general nature of the drift is, however, given by the ceaseless forward sweep of the continuum conditioned by a continuous but variable backward sweep. Oscillation may indeed be regarded as a special case of this. Now, how does the special case differ from the general and original—I mean, how does Physical Motion differ from Fact-drift ? If we glance back at the equation of Motion given above we shall readily discover that in physical the factor λ assumes a somewhat different value : physical motion involves either the intuition or the suggestion of a visual and muscular series. Does not Fact-drift also involve the intuition or the suggestion of a visual or muscular series ? Suppose I am imagining a continuum of experience as continuously changing ; this continuum may be either an aspect of the physical universe, extended in Space and changing in Time ; or it may be an aspect of thought-universe, spread in Extensity and changing in Time ; in the language of

fashionable psychology the continuum may either be an objective or a subjective experience. That drift in an objective experience is motion involving a visual and muscular series is a proposition that requires hardly to be stated. But can we say that drift in a subjective experience also may imply this? I think I can answer it in the affirmative. 'The mind's eye' is not a mere Shakesperean figure of speech; when I am imagining an extensive subjective experience as changing, I have continually to adjust my 'inner eye' to appearing portions of the continuum: there is a shifting distribution of imaginative and attentive effort. Now, I think every attentive effort, whether inwardly directed or outwardly, is normally attended in us with a muscular feeling; also, every imaginative effort or introspective attempt is accompanied by a *quasi*-visual feeling.

Hence λ is a factor that cannot be supposed to be absent altogether from the Fact-drift. Since Fact-drift is the general affair of which both subjective process and physical motion may be regarded as aspects, the factor just referred to should be given a general meaning. Muscular feeling and visual feeling are commonly taken in a physical sense, and we perhaps do well in so taking them. Attentive effort is a consciousness not only very analogous to muscular feeling but even normally inseparably connected with it: there is a prominent family affinity between muscular activity and attention, and there is commonly always a presumption of the former involved in the latter: to verify this last statement we must carefully look into what are known as the physiological conditions and expressions of attention. But suppose we are enabled to connect attention with muscular activity; is there not still a sufficiently wide difference between the two to justify us to set apart subjective process from physical motion? That there is a material difference between these two aspects of Fact-drift is a proposition that can hardly be challenged; but I am endeavouring to bridge over the gulf between them as far as possible. It is the mysterious veil which makes near facts appear distant, distant facts appear near, similar facts appear as different and different facts appear as similar. Fact-drift in general—that is to say the process of the continuum of

experience— involves the consciousness of attentive *effort* and also a feeling that I cannot more plainly describe than as the feeling of following a process with the 'mind's eye'. Now I submit that between this consciousness of attentive effort involved in general fact-operation and muscular activity involved in the special case of physical motion there is no radical distinction ; and also between the feeling of the mind's eye and that of the bodily eye there does not appear to me to exist any fundamental difference in so far at least as their psychological nature is taken.

I have run the risk of being taken to task for playing fast and loose with such fairly clean— but conceptions as attention, muscular activity, introspection and visual perception. But as I have taken care to point out already the distinctions among these are real but not fundamental : attention and muscular activity may be regarded as different modes of the same kind of fact of experience, and so also introspection and visual perception. I was endeavouring to explain physical Motion as a special case of Fact-Drift. An analytic expression for this latter will also involve the factor λ ; now, in the case of physical Motion this factor assumes a different— but not fundamentally— value. Let Fact-Drift be denoted by the notation FD Then, since Fact-Drift is simply the continuum of experience in movement (ME), we may write down the following relation :

$$FD = ME.$$

Now, analytic thought will forthwith break up ME into three such factors as Extensity (*e*), an attending and witnessing Subject (*I*) and also a certain determinant aesthetic series which particularly renders consciousness a consciousness of movement or flow. Without Extensity or massiveness experience cannot be imagined as moving or flowing ; no movement of experience again can be *conceived* without planting a statical point of reference and judgement in the midst of the flux, *viz.*, a self-distinguishing subject which witnesses and renders possible the *thought* of change without itself changing : this, I cannot but concede, is a thoroughly solid rock in Green's metaphysics of knowledge. I must recognize, however, with James that the experience of drift *as such* need not presuppose anything of the kind : I need not

require an unfailing and unchanging witness in me to change and to *feel* the change : but to *conceive* and imagine a process of change I have to bring in a factor which was not at all called for in simple feeling.

Thus employing the sign of integration in the sense of the present section, we have

$$ME = \int (e, I, r)$$

This is an analytic account of the continuum of experience regarded as moving. First, put $e=0$ of ignorance, and then put it= S or space. In plain language, let us substitute space for extensity, extension for massiveness : substitution clearly implies (1) veiling, (2) movement and (3) presentation—implies VMP. Thus a special aspect is substituted for the general nature of experience, which means not that the general nature of experience can be suspended at any moment, but that it is ignored and regarded by us differently. We have got extension in the place of extensity. Let us next treat the second factor, I . First, put it= 0 of ignorance, and then = I, O . In the thought of physical Motion we undoubtedly require a relatively statical point of reference, more palpably concrete than the metaphysical self-distinguishing subject which was sufficient for the conception of a continuum in movement : either our own body or some other material object at comparative rest we take as our point of reference in conceiving physical displacement. But is the attending subject himself altogether in abeyance in the conception of motion ? It is ordinarily very nearly ignored no doubt but not completely : hence in place of the bald metaphysical witness of the Drift we have a duality, *viz.*, an attending subject (I) and some other tangible point of reference (O). Lastly, the feeling-series which characterizes a consciousness of drift must be first ignored and then given a somewhat different value (r') in order that we may have physical Motion in place of Drift. I need not pause to explain a distinction which ought to be patent to reflection : the series which is necessary for the conception of experience-drift merely, will not suffice for a conception of displacement in space. After performing these operations we have

$$FD = \int (S, I, O, r')$$

= Physical Motion, an expression which agrees with that given at the outset of the present section.

We have now tried to connect Fact-Drift with Physical Motion. There is no essential difference between the two : the latter is only an aspect of the former. All Fact is *extensive* or massive : normally at least such is always the case. Fact is *extended* sometimes. The cloud of sense-perception is taken as an extended object ; the thought of the daffodil as it flashes upon the inward eye is taken as an extensive experience merely. I do not stumble upon any very fundamental difference between the two, however. Both are slightly different *aspects* of experience or Fact, and I am inclined to think that both are connected together by laws which are alike in all essential respects in both. For example, if Motion applies to the material particle it applies *also* to feeling and thought. Even these move and not simply change. This is apparently a very wild proposition and would require a word of explanation. A material particle P moves from one place A to another B in space S. Does a feeling exist in space S ? Does a feeling exist in space ? Not in space exactly, but in an extensive continuum of experience of which Space is only an aspect. The continuum of experience includes space ; it includes everything ; nothing is foreign to it. Just imagine your continuum of experience at any moment— your entire conscious existence, and see how Space appears to be related to it. We shudder at the thought of a feeling being extended : we are too completely possessed by the bogey of Cartesian philosophy. But in the fullness and clearness of intellectual perception a feeling *is* extended ; a feeling is a section of the concrete Fact : this is normally always extensive, and extension is only an aspect of extensiveness. Such circuitous logic apart, let us seriously ask this : you say that patch of sombre cloud is extended while a placid reflection in your mind is not ; but what is that extended patch of cloud ? Is it not a feeling of your mind which you have objectified and localized ? Now, this objectification and localization cannot surely render your feeling something other than a

feeling whatever your belief concerning it may be. Hence your patch of cloud is really equivalent to a feeling—it is only a pragmatic section of experience. What you call a placid reflection in your mind is also a feeling (I am using this term as meaning a section of experience)—a pragmatic section of experience. Hence the issue lies between one *section of experience* and another; if one is admittedly extended—experienced as such—what can we mean by saying that feeling must be *ipso facto* in-extended or nothing at all? Indeed the wall of partition between Thing and Thought has been in some respects a most arbitrary and fantastic one: all differences exist among sections of experience, and none between experience and something which is absolutely other than experience: this latter is simply an utopian category.

I have already distinguished between vistas of experience and space. The former constitute what we have previously called Extensity or spiritual Extension. Space or objective extension is certainly not something external and foreign to this: it is only a pragmatic section. When I say I am feeling Space I am really feeling this spiritual Extension—the boundless continuum of experience: I ignore the real whole and fancy objective extension to be the fact for me: Space is born of ignorance. Now, let us answer the question that we have put to ourselves: Does a feeling exist in Space like a material particle P? It exists in the unbounded spiritual extension of conscious life, in the normal universe of our experience. My whole world is contained securely in this Spiritual Extension: Matter and Space and Motion are in it: You and other acting and reacting Subjects are in it: this as we have seen does not reduce us to Solipsism, for the self is only a pragmatic section of Fact, so that you, I and all other subjects are but pragmatic Foci in a curve of infinite dimensions: we are all in *it* and not it in any of *us*. Now, every feeling represents a condition of stress in this shoreless sea of experience: every pragmatic fact-section is a condition of disturbance in the Fact. The material particle in motion is a fact-section in regard to the objective continuum or Space: hence the moving particle represents a condition of stress in

Space. Again, we can have no insular disturbance in the Fact, a disturbance completely exhausted in one part only. Every disturbance is propagated in the boundless spiritual Space, and this propagation surely implies the transference of a pragmatic section of experience from one position of the continuum to another. The transference however need not be taken to mean the actual translation of a part from one position to another : as in the propagation of an wave so in this the continuum is merely thrown into similar states of stress in different positions in successive moments. Thus the unbounded spiritual Space in you, I and all of us exist may be thrown into states of stress in which different positions simultaneously or successively. When you and I both see an orange and are similarly affected by it, we have, in the language of our theory, two different centres of a co-essential spiritual continuum taking nearly similar conditions of stress at the same time. At least such a conception is more in keeping with radical empiricism than the view which would describe the affair as a transaction between two similarly constituted and disposed Subjects on the one hand and an external agency in space on the other. This view does not make it clear *where* the Subjects stand and in what relation the external agency in Space stands to them. The phenomenon of action and reaction is ever a mysterious transaction, howsoever we may conceive the relations of you and me and the world. But surely nothing is gained by mystifying the issue still further. I prefer to take you and me and the world in the universe of Fact, and explain by the way the co-presentation of an orange in you and me as a case of similar or nearly similar conditions of stress arising in the same boundless tissue of Fact. We all live, move and have our beings in a co-essential spiritual stuff : even Matter and Motion cannot really be so alien as we commonly take them to be.

Now, not only can two similar conditions of stress be induced in two different places or centres in this co-essential spiritual stuff, but a condition in one place or centre in the stuff. This does not mean, as already hinted before, the actual transference of a pragmatic section from one position to another in

the continuum : it means that two or more different positions of the continuum are thrown into similar conditions of stress in successive moments. In the language of common sense what disappears in a place of the continuum now reappears—with certain limitations of exact resemblance of course—in a future time. It means also, and I draw prominent attention to this, that a condition of stress that has appeared in me (A-centre) now will have a tendency to be transferred to you (B-centre) : no disturbance I can keep absolutely confined to myself or a given centre in the continuum : it has always a tendency to go over to other centres. The co-essential stuff plays the part which Faraday's dielectric medium plays between two centres of electric disturbance : indeed the dielectric medium, ether and so on, is only an abstract segment of the spiritual stuff, and electric disturbance is only an abstract aspect of fact-disturbance. The above of course supplies a basis for Thought-transference, Hypnotic Suggestion, and so forth, which are steadily gaining ground even in the Western world in spite of the waves of scepticism and discredit which have occasionally swept past them. Thought-transference, however, does not mean that a thought in my mind actually passes over to your mind : but that a condition of stress which *represents* a given thought in me is propagated to you through a spiritual medium in which both you and I live, feel and think. The condition of stress represents but is not equivalent to the thought in you and me, as the condition of stress which causes two similar complete waves in a fluid may be the same, the same energy being transferred from the first to the second, and yet the two waves are different inasmuch as the vibrating particles which produce the first are not those which produce the second. Thus we can save the face of the subjectivity of a feeling : feeling is subjective in one form and objective in another. Feeling is subjective in so far as I feel it and nobody else can feel what I feel : the particles of the continuum of Fact (I should not however be taken to declare for mind-dust in using this convenient figure of speech) which vibrate in me do not leave their mean positions absolutely and go over to any other subject. Feeling is objective in so far as the

condition of stress which causes it in me may pass on to you through the unfailing medium of an all-embracing Over-Soul, and produce in you a feeling more or less akin to mine. The hard and fast demarkation that feeling is subjective and thing objective is after all only a myth : thing is objective as well as subjective, and feeling is subjective as well as objective : both are pragmatic aspects of the fact of experience. The subject is too large and too engrossing to be dealt with in a cursory manner : the theory of the relation between Fact and Motion outlined above will however be found to be, in future volumes, one of the main planks not only of the Doctrine of Mysticism but of such a commonplace problem of science as Perception. To my thinking, no intelligible and consistent account of Perception can be given without postulating the Spiritual Stuff in which all subjects and objects live, and the propagation of a condition of stress from one centre to another in the Stuff. After we have definitely identified Fact with Experience we cannot afford to be frightened by the consequences of our own proposition.

It should be further observed in passing that Newton's Laws of Motion upon which the whole science of Dynamics and Dynamical and Physics rests are not altogether foreign to the life of the concrete Fact. The First Law states that everybody perseveres in its state of rest or of moving uniformly in a straight line, except in so far as it is made to change that state by external forces. This Law enables us to ascertain where there are no external forces acting on a body. Here we have really the foundations of Fact-persistence exposed to view : Fact persists in its own state—such is its innate tendency. Persistence in a given state is the essence of Fact, the ceaseless flux is only an accident. U_0 and the Quiescent Real *do* persist in their given states ; my concrete universe at any moment is perpetually giving way. Yet even in the latter we cannot deny the tendency to persistence any more than we can deny the tendency to persistence of a material system which is yielding to the influences of external agencies : remove these influences and the system will continue to go on precisely in the state, whether of rest or of

motion, in which it has been left by the influences withdrawn, unless and until it is acted upon again by external agencies. The material system cannot change without being disturbed : this is its inertia in one aspect and its spontaneity in another. It cannot change but can and does persist : if to *become* is an activity, to continue to *be* is also one. This virtue of persistence is not peculiar to the material system but is of the essence of Fact itself out of which matter is carved by abstraction or limitation of the data. In U_0 and $Q.R.$, as already hinted, we have this tendency to persistence of the Fact unopposed : these do persist in their states and cannot change, and the reason is fundamentally the same as in the case of the material system left to itself. In the case of those two orders one can conceive no *external* influences, for nothing can be imagined to be external to awareness as such and to a universe in which all is quiescently actual and nothing is *possible*. This indeed is not a dynamical explanation of a metaphysical truth : the persistence of Matter in its own state is simply an illustration of the persistence of Fact.

The two orders referred to above cannot change because we cannot imagine any external influences operating on them ; but what about our own concrete universe of Fact at any moment ? This surely is an infinite fact— all-inclusive— yet it is known as perpetually changing : have we not ourselves conceived our universe as in a state of ceaseless flux ? What *external* forces can possibly make it change ? In the first place, we do commonly oppose our universe to a vaster universe our actual to the possible ; the actual includes all, but is believed to be limited by the possible : this is how it is distinguished from the $Q.R.$ The infinitude of my actual fact at any moment is thus relative and not absolute : one category is still limited by another, being by becoming, actual by the possible. Hence we can conceive external causes inducing changes in the given state of our continuum of experience. In the second place, the conception of flux which we have applied to the continuum of fact does not apply to it in its concrete entirety ; this is absolutely alogical and uncommunicating : we cannot certainly say that Fact changes. Change is an idea which we apply to the sum of fact-sections,

the aggregate of features that we can discriminate in the continuum. More commonly also we know and think our pragmatic fact-sections :s changing. In either case, what we attribute change to is a magnitude sensibly short of the infinite ocean of awareness in which fact-sections rise, toss and die away like waves. The extent of the sum of fact-sections is limited by, overlapped by the extent of my concrete existence. Hence external influences can be imagined as operating in regard to this sum. I have put the case in an argumentative form, but surely it cannot be set at rest without making an appeal to reflection. Change is always applicable to a sectional object—it must be conceived in reference to something, whether it be U_0 , or $Q.R.$, or the Self-distinguishing Subject of Green, which does *not* change : an absolutely all-pervading existence opposing itself to nothing can be lived and felt undoubtedly, but it cannot be known and conceived as changing. How it is lived and felt is inconceivable and unspeakable.

Without yet venturing into obscurer metaphysics let us give a moment's thought to Newton's second Law of Motion. Change of Motion (that is to say, momentum) is proportional to the impressed force (that is to say, impulse), and takes place in the direction in which the force is impressed. This gives us a measure and direction of the change after a body has been acted upon by external forces. This also is a special application of the general law which governs fact-operations, *viz.* Every fact-operation is adequate to the cause which produces it, and is produced in the direction of the cause. 'Adequate' is of course a vaguer substitute for 'proportional', but the underlying sense need not be laid bare. 'Direction' means 'in the line and nature of' the cause. Change is adequate to the cause and is produced in its line : change cannot be away from or contrary to the cause. This belief regarding fact-operations is the prototype and basis of the belief which is formulated by the Second Law.

The Third Law tells us that action in the material system is always in the nature of a Stress. Reaction is always equal and opposite to action, that is to say, the actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal and in opposite directions. Action

and Re-action are the partial aspects of a Stress, and these two aspects have been related by the third Law. That all force is of the nature of stress— such as the tension of a rope and the pressure of two bodies against each other— is also a proposition that touches the foundations of the Fact. All physical theories— whether relying upon action at a distance or upon impalpable intervening substances— constitute on the whole a Philosophy of Stress in its material aspect. In the preceding sections we have developed, somewhat hastily, a Philosophy of Stress in the concrete aspect, or in relation to the Fact. All operation in the continuum of Fact is in the nature of stress, involving action and reaction, and I even make bold to suggest that these two aspects are equal and opposite in the Fact also. Herein is contained the germ of the Hindu doctrine of Karma which I propose to examine in a future volume. I may also note in passing that the primordial agitation in consciousness is the primordial stress which has set lessons to all the stresses in science: it is closely akin to Schopenhauer's Will, though essentially it is a stress in consciousness and not a mere universal blind impulse which has swelled into consciousness in you and me. Of the nature of the stress I have been content to say nothing more in the present essay than that it is the Triad PMV.

Newton's three laws bring out to my mind these three aspects of the stress respectively. The first law which will have a body left to itself continue in its own state brings out prominently the aspect of Presentation. Indeed, we have already adverted to the peculiarly close connexion between Persistence and Presentation. If left to itself, a body will continue to remain as it is presented; and conversely, so long as a body continues to remain as it has been presented, it is left to itself. The first law assigns therefore when a thing is simply presented without being made to change. The second law assigns when and how a thing is made to change from a given condition of presentation. This therefore peculiarly involves the Principle of Movement. Lastly, the third law which tells us that every force, or for the matter of that, every action is in the nature of stress, brings out to my mind the aspect of veiling. Action is really more concrete

and complex than we commonly take it to be : when we know that A is acting on B, we commonly forget or ignore that B is reacting on A with a force equal and opposite to that of A. Action, whether spiritual or material, is thus always a double-sided or rather many-sided affair : in its concreteness it is a phenomenon of infinite and inextricable complexity : even physical and mathematical analysis simplifies matters by abstraction or limitation of the data : even such great masters of analysis as Laplace, Lagrange and Gauss would find their work impossible without first drawing a veil round about then to shut out the infinite and inscrutable. Hence the third law appears to me to emphasize the aspect of V.

But cannot a Fact change except in so far as it is acted upon by external forces ? Cannot a fact change spontaneously ? We have previously suggested that Fact possesses the nature of matter as well as of Life, and it has been commonly thought that the essence of the latter is in spontaneity ; now, if Fact possesses also the nature of Life, we cannot think of a rigorous application of Newton's First Law to the Fact. That this law is not altogether foreign to the constitution of fact in general we have ourselves been somewhat anxious to maintain ; but does not fact also exceed the physical bounds of this law ? This indeed is one of the deepest and crucial questions of philosophy : upon its solution hangs the fate of such momentous problems as creation, free-will and necessity, and so on. Within our present limits we can bestow on it only a passing notice however. For every change in a given portion of matter we must presuppose an adequate impulse or '*impressed force*' : this seems to be the natural law prevailing in the universe of atoms, their configurations and displacements : but shall we part with this law in mounting up into the realms of Life and Spirit ? Mechanical explanations of the phenomena of life are not quite rare and unpromising ; the actions of a vital tissue might possibly be explained adequately in terms of molecules, their configurations, disposable energy and the actions of stimuli, as the action of a Newton's 'machine', can be with the aid of his three laws and dynamics based thereupon ; perhaps spontaneity in the living cell may be

dispelled one day living our mechanical account of life all complete. But we have admitted 'disposable energy' as one of our terms; does this correspond to be 'potential energy' of physics, which term was naturalized by Professor Rankine, and which means the energy which a material system possesses in virtue of configuration only, and by which it can do work in passing from the given configuration into another. Let us assume that Spencer's disposable energy in the vital tissue roughly corresponds to this; can we now say that the tissue can be spontaneously active? That the tissue can act absolutely in the absence of all external stimuli is a position that is not only hard but impossible to establish; Life like matter can never be left completely to itself; now, if Life is always exposed more or less to the influences of its environment, how shall we *prove* that a given action of a living tissue is *really* spontaneous and not a reaction provoked by the separate or accumulated actions of its environment? It may be difficult to connect a particular reaction of the organism with a particular action of its environment at any time; the organism may also *appear* to act absolutely, or of its own accord. But the default of a ready explanation in the first case in the appearance of absolute action in the second, do not prove spontaneity. That the reaction of the tissue to the stimulus does not seem to be quantitatively adequate, that great stimuli sometimes produce but slight effects and small stimuli invoke tremendous responses, is a fact that need not conflict with the mechanical account of life. We must remember that even in physics we have commonly to reckon with potential energy between the two sensible aspects of the transaction: the application of a spark to a quantity of dry gun-powder is followed by a thundering explosion; how much disproportionate the reaction appears to the action! What the spark has done is the throwing of the molecules of the gun-powder from a given configuration into another, and by this passage the powder does mighty work with the potential energy contained in the given configuration: the impressed force has roused from slumber a vast quantity of molecular force, is added on to it; and the effect that is produced is just adequate to the total force behind it.

Can we not explain the apparently spontaneous, self-initiated and disproportionate actions of the living tissue on similar lines by requisitioning and drawing upon the disposable energies of the centres? Every current that finds its way into the brain at length finds a way out; can we not say conversely that every current that finds a way out of the brain must have first found a way into it?

We are being gradually allured into the thick of the discussion: but let us rather be on our guard and content to note that in spite of the appalling complexity of the data mechanical explanation of life is not altogether an absurd business. The disposable energy is the obscurer counterpart of potential energy; the latter has ordinarily its exact mechanical equivalent. The potential energy also involves an element of mystery: energy is due either to motion or to configuration: the former is kinetic and the latter is potential energy; but we are not a whit enlightened by it: *how* can a given configuration (apart from even molecular motion such as heat) contain energy? Energy is known and measured by the work it does; how can a state of matter which can be represented by a configuration merely—a state of no *work*—contain the possibility, basis and motive of work? Now, however strongly I might have put the case for vital mechanism, I venture to think that spontaneity lurks in the midst of the exactest mechanism which dynamical physics has been proud to glorify. Even matter is spontaneous not merely in the sense that it resists and tends to persist in the own given state, but also in the sense that it lends to change and even to select. I thus vote for certain types of Modern Pluralism, but I bring down the wrath of the mighty physicist on my poor theory. Matter is larger than what can be recognized by the physicist: he has abstracted. The potential energy which does not reside in visible or invisible motion of matter but is contained mysteriously in the configuration of particles is larger and more mysterious than he has thought. He can ordinarily take note of, measure and compare only a *part* of the total energy of configuration: he has veiled the whole and accepted only a fragment. He can possess an equation of energy only by a

limitation of the data. The stone and the earth removed from each other possess a potential energy, due to a particular configuration, which can be measured by taking into account the work expended in lifting the stone from the earth and also the work done in bringing it back to the earth. But are we sure that the total energy of configuration is precisely what we have shown in this equation? The electro-magnetic energies have been left out of account by pardonable simplification; and are we really able to say that we may possess a complete catalogue of the energies of configuration of a given material system? If the constitutional dynamical stock of matter is larger than what we may ever be able to exhibit in our physical equations, how can we be sure that a given portion of matter reacts only in so far as it is acted upon by external forces, that its change of position or configuration is *not* due to an impulse acting from within, an impulse which remains over as a residuum after we have subtracted what ordinarily passes as the potential energy of a material system? This balance of inner impulse, which we ignore in the abstract treatment of dynamical physics, may constitute the Spontaneity of Matter. Hence Newton's First Law is approximately rather than absolutely correct as a theory of Matter. If the total disposable energy inhering in the constitution of a given portion of matter be E , and the potential energy that can be ordinarily computed in our physical equations regarding it be V , and spontaneity be S , then this last may be defined as

$$E - V = S.$$

The question is a difficult one and cannot be settled off-hand either by *a priori* reasoning or empirical. Is matter ever known to be eccentric in its conduct? Can we not always expect to explain a given behaviour of matter fully and adequately as a dynamical resultant? It is difficult to meet questions like these and satisfy them. I have ventured to think that what we commonly propose to study as a given behaviour of matter is an abstraction of its *actual* behaviour, and that therefore in its dynamical account we ignore a component factor, *viz.*, what we have just put down as S . If the magnitude and direction were

known accurately a full dynamical account of the phenomenon could in all cases be given, however.

I have purposely refrained from going into the deeper foundations of the problem. I shall here make a few categorical statements, however. Matter is an aspect of fact ; and as fact is spontaneous, selective, Matter cannot afford to be so absolutely bound and determined, so utterly a sport of external forces, as we commonly take it to be. A certain residual energy resides in Matter after we have sought to explain its conduct by the factors of external impulse, kinetic energy and energy of configuration ; this residual energy explains the eccentricities, aberrations of its *actual* conduct. Theoretically, this stock of constitutional energy of matter is unlimited ; it is a starting proposition (one that would provoke the opposition of some types of Modern Pluralism, though perhaps it would accord with the pluralism of Leibnitz) that the whole universe really lives in a particle, that the infinitesimal is only the infinite taken with a change of sign, so that what appears as *vis viva* in the universe inheres in the particle as constitutional energy. Practically however, it is enough if the constitutional energy of a system is larger than what is known and calculated as potential energy. Fact which is unbounded, having therefore nothing external to it, appears to move or change : we cannot say of course that it moves or changes exactly, but what it does cannot be otherwise *thought and described* than as moving or changing. Now, if it changes not by the operation of any external impulse, it must change by inherent impulse or spontaneously ! I *believe* that my fact is limited by a co-efficient of possibilities, but this does not prove that there is actually something external to my fact at any moment : the co-efficient is internal and not external to the fact, though in belief it is projected out of the fact and conceived as conditioning or fulfilling it from outside. In the present section I have stretched Newton's First Law to cover the fact by pointing out how we believe that there is something external to it. But my meaning is clear. Of U_0 or pure consciousness we cannot say properly that it is either absolutely determined or absolutely spontaneous : movement by pure external impulse or

pure internal is utterly inconceivable in relation to it : it cannot be conceived as moving : nothing external to it and no impulse connected with it can be conceived. Spontaneity is bound up with Stress, and can have therefore no place in an order of existence in which no stress exists. Stress has been vaguely connected with Will in this essay ; hence spontaneity is the essence and manifestation of Will ; hence also, if my analysis of Matter is correct, even Matter wills. Between Spontaneity and Martineau's Will there is a difference no doubt, but the former is wider than the latter and need not exclude it.

Stress is a condition of experience which involves polarity and PMV. Indeed PMV and their mutual dependence give the essence of Stress in the life of the fact. By necessary applications of the Principle of Veiling we have what are called Aspects of Stress. The aspects of physical stress such as tension, pressure, and so on are commonplaces, but in this fundamental science we must note—we have hardly any room here to discuss—the three natural aspects of Stress : P-Stress, M-Stress, V-Stress. We have characterized the aspects according to the peculiar emphases in them. A story of the Stress in fact we have outlined in the foregoing sections, but the metaphysics of the Stress I reserve for future treatment. A more systematic treatment of the connexion between our theory of Stress and the principal dynamical theories of Matter and Motion will also be attempted in the continuation of the Series.

In U_0 there is no stress ; in the Q.R. with its infinite richness all displayed we may *suppose* that there is on stress either, though this latter case is not quite as undisputed as the former. All ordinary experiences involve stress. Can there be stress, for example, in Ea or an experience accentuated at a feature a ? Yes ; accentuation means heightening of the potential of a point in the continuum. 'Potential' is the tendency of a condition of experience to revert to the level of absolute quiescence E^0 or at least Q.R. Compare this idea with what has been given of 'psychic potential' (fact-potential would be a correcter expression) in the opening sections of this essay. The potential of E^0 is zero, and that of Q.R. may be either zero

or infinite. A condition of experience in stress is continuously tending to a condition of experience in quiescence ; this tendency is a variable and is function of the distance (as apprehended ordinarily by intuition) of a given condition of experience from the condition of E^0 or Q.R. Without sallying into psychology I may say at once, as I have said herebefore, that P, next to pure consciousness, is particularly connected with quiescence and persistence, so that we may have orders of fact-potential according to orders of presentative emphasis in emperience. For example, perception, memory, ideation, imagination will be successively ascending orders of potential. Now, since Stress varies directly as Potential we may say that these classes of phenomena are in ascending orders of Stress. We have already discussed the peculiar quiescence of perception as compared with the stress of idea, and also the compromise of quiescence in a complex in which impressions rub shoulders with ideas. I promised to revert to the question in the sequel, but I am not able to redeem my promise in the present essay. Before closing this section I should invite attention to the conception of 'conservative system' in dynamics. "When the nature of a material system is such that if, after the system has undergone any series of changes, it is brought back in any manner to its original state, the whole work done by external agents on the system is equal to the whole work done by the system in overcoming external forces, the system is called a Conservative System." This is Clerk Maxwell ; I might also quote Thompson and Tait. Now, what is this *going back* to the original State ? Is this not connected with the fundamental idea of fact-potential ? The answer ought to be an important one, yet I will not pause for it.

14. *Fact and Mathematics*

The general connexion of fact with Number and Magnitude is a topic too metaphysical for the ends of the present essay. It is abundantly clear from the conception of fact, however, that Number does not pertain to the concrete fact. Even a fact that especially relates to a thought of number is not a numerical fact

itself. We cannot even say that a concrete fact is one : the indescribable unity-in-variety that we have attributed to it is after all only our thought and description of the concrete fact. When I am having a fact and noting its numerical nature, I have generally an oscillatory stress between the alogical fact innocent of number and the logical fact which, though itself being also alogical in its concreteness, involves a thought of number. A 'numerical fact' is felt no doubt ; and what is felt in it may be the basis of, but not equivalent to, a thought of number.

Number is born in the cycle PMV as applied to the fact. Suppose we have a given stretch of experience : by the operation of veiling as explained before this given stretch must be first resolved into a configuration or a series before the category of number may bear upon it. So long as it is an unbounded stretch merely, it can be thought of neither as one or as a manifold. To reckon a particular part of a continuum as one and a particular other as two, and so on, pragmatic fact-sections must arise in place of the concrete fact— not displacing it altogether which is impossible but eclipsing it— and each such fact-section must be taken note of successively. Try for example to count the fruits of a plant as it has been totally presented in experience, or the ticks of a clock upon the wall. Surely the veil is prominent in the birth of Number. Since PMV is the statement of the Fact-Stress, we may say that Number is born in Stress. To clear reflection, there are degrees of the applicability of the category of Number to Fact. If we start with bare consciousness as such and mount up to the reviewing fact, we find that the category is not uniformly applicable or inapplicable throughout. At the starting point of U_0 the category is absolutely inapplicable— pure awareness is neither one nor many ; Q.R. is a sort of manifold to our imagination, but since it is *quiescently* actual it must be, as we think, an experience lost in the infinite wealth of its features, and not allowing a review of itself as infinite : it is complacently and alogically infinite. In our own concrete fact there is no doubt an intuitive discrimination of features, but *such* discrimination is hardly enough for a thought of number. Number fully appears in F' or reviewing fact. Accordingly, we might almost speak

of a *Number-curve*. Unity is born upon a single application of the veil to the Fact. This would be circular metaphysical definition, but it may be inexceptionable as a precise statement of the form. More properly we might say that we come to think of a fact as one after there has been a complete revolution of the cycle P.M.V. in relation to it : a presented fact is *veiled*, and *moves* to *represent* itself or a section of it as one. For the representation of a fact as two, or two fact-sections in a fact, two such revolutions of the cyclic operation will be needed. I appeal to reflection.

Many in relation to the Fact is born from a plural repetition of the cyclic operation. The case in which I seem to apprehend at a glance the manifoldness of the starry heavens for example, is only an apparent exception to the principle. In the first place, the rotations of the cyclic operation may be more swift than we may ordinarily care to think : a fact may have been several times presented, veiled and represented without our suspecting anything of the kind. Take for example the oscillation of regard in a normal kind of perception. The rotations of the cycle need not be sub-conscious, however. Pragmatic consciousness has been very commonly mistaken for actual consciousness, and this is mainly responsible for the philosophy of the unconscious. In the second place, where we do apprehend the many in a twinkle of the eye— though as I have just pointed out the case is not altogether free from doubt— our perception of manifold is an *acquired* perception and not an original one : the conception of many having been obtained originally by *repeated* veiling and unveiling comes to inhere in us as an empirical disposition, and when a *basis* for a configuration or a series has been presented in experience, as in the example of starry heavens, the idea of many is supplied forthwith as a superstructure. Looking at the heavens I know it as a configuration : this does not mean that a thought of configuration comes from a single operation of the veil always as apparently in this case, but because a thought of configuration developed originally by repeated operations of the veil has become a permanent possession of the mind— a sort of readily available category— which has simply

been brought to bear upon an adequate basis that has been actually given *viz*, the intuitively discriminated features of the heavens. If we represent the cyclic operation by $\phi(\lambda)$, then, $\text{Many} = n\phi(\lambda)$. In the case of the starry heavens where we appear to read the whole picture in a twinkling, n is what I call, in the light of the foregoing explanation, a *potential* number, that is to say, a number gathered from previous experiences.

Infinity will not surely require infinite rotations of the cycle. It is born in quite another way. It arises from an ignorance of the pragmatic features of the Fact at any moment and an unreserved acceptance of the dimensions of the concrete. The finite pragmatic is born from a reverse operation. This again is no definition or explanation of the infinite. I make haste to admit that there is perhaps no real explanation of such categories as unity, plurality, infinity and so on. It should be further observed that infinity is not a mere negative conception obtained by thinking away the limits of the finite. From our theory of Fact it is clear that the reviewing fact, if not too narrowly pragmatic, knows a fact as an infinite-finite-complex—as I_1^f , so that both the categories are obtained by abstraction or veiling of the concrete. Of infinite we have already distinguished two varieties: An infinite which admits of direction and rival categories; as an infinite line in the positive direction and an infinite line in the negative; Space is infinite *and* so is also Time. An infinitude which does not admit of direction and is not limited by rival infinities may be distinguished as absolute. Fact including the co-efficient of possibilities, conceived as opposed or limited by nothing whatever, may be regarded as absolute infinity. It is also an engaging question as to whatever we may not have *orders* of infinity analogous to those of infinitesimal.

When the Values of two quantities A and B are made to approach each other so closely that ultimately their difference becomes smaller than any assigned value however small, their difference may be regarded as an infinitesimal. Smallness presupposes considerable pragmatic accentuation of the continuum of experience which is normally not only extensive but unbounded: this extensive experience must be accentuated at a

tract with marked concentration in order that this tract may be regarded as small : the greater the concentration of emphasis of regard the greater is the contraction or smallness of the section apprehended : a point in a continuum is the position of greatest concentration of emphasis : the whole mental stress has to be focussed as it were in order that one may have an apprehension or a thought of a point. Abandonment to the concrete fact as a whole means a more or less uniform distribution of the stress over the continuum. The orders of smallness will roughly correspond to the orders of the concentration of the stress. Infinitesimal implies the maximum presentation of a part and minimum presentation or maximum ignorance of the whole. Leibnitz's principles of Infinitesimal quantities lie at the foundations of Calculus, but I have no space to go into them in the present essay.

Continuity, again, is a topic which is supremely important in mathematics, but to the treatment of this I have no room to devote either in the present volume. This has received some measure of attention in the foregoing sections, however. Absolute continuity, or continuity of experience *as such* can never be conceived as broken by discontinuities : it is independent of the *kind* of stress that may be operating in experience in a given period : we have no gap in experience, though kinds of experience are continuously rising and subsiding. The other kind of continuity relates to the *kind* of stress which determines the nature of experience at a given time, and is a function of this stress. The kind of stress is settled partly by the intuitive nature of the continuum and partly by pragmatic operations upon it : the continuum is ceaselessly changing, it is also displayed as a variety of features : now, what changes, though different, and what features, though different too, will be regarded by me as constituting the *same kind* of stress ? While I am writing this essay I feel that I have the same kind of stress and that also my experience is continuous, though surely the pulses which make up my present series or the features which compose my configuration of the moment are various. This indeed is the psychology of classification upon which I need not

dwel. If from the writing of this essay I turn to the eating of my breakfast I feel that one kind of stress has been substituted for another and that my experience has been discontinuous. Suppose α and β are the conditions which determine the kind of stress (S) which operates in me at any time (t), then continuity (C) of experience may obviously be represented as follows :

$$Ct = \phi\{f(\alpha, \beta)\}.$$

Suppose now that $Ct - Ct' = \phi\{f(\alpha, \beta)\} - \phi\{f(\alpha', \beta')\} = 0$ of ignorance. What will be the meaning of this equation? It is this : If for two periods t' and t' , two sets of slightly differing conditions, (α, β) and (α', β') , have caused in my experience two states of stress differing from each other so slightly that their difference any be neglected pragmatically (this is the meaning of zero), then the difference between the two continuities or stretches may also be neglected, and the two regarded as practically constituting the *same* continuity. This I propose to call the fundamental equation of continuity. The above equation can be easily extended to a conception of Universal Continuity.

The conception of Limits I have freely used in my previous investigations. I have also casually distinguished between two fundamental kinds of Limits, *viz.*, the Limit of evanescence (zero), and the Limit of Excescence (infinity). Zero or evanescence should be taken to mean in the Science of Fact *ignorance* or veiling; hence this conception is elastic and will clearly admit of degrees of variability. Absolute nothingness is a notion that we have characterized as chimerical : consciousness of existence as such is the irreducible minimum of experience. Nothingness is therefore only pragmatic or relative nothingness. If a given thing is $E\phi(x)$, where E represents the inalienable datum of experience, then $E\phi(x) = 0$ really means that the inalienable datum has been ignored, and also that we have $\phi(y)$ in place of the original function, and finally that $\phi(x) - \phi(y) =$ pragmatically considerable. Take for example the dissolution of a crystal in a liquid. The crystal has vanished when it has completely dissolved. But the permanent basis of experience as such (E) which supports the crystal, the solution and all thing,

cannot vanish. The assemblage of conditions, again, which made the crystal cannot be supposed to have vanished completely either—the same mass and the same molecules have passed from one configuration to another. But this change from x to y happens to be considerable for pragmatic judgment : even while the crystal endures it is continuously changing : x is turning into x' , and so on : but $\phi(x) - \phi(x') = 0$ for pragmatic judgment, and therefore the crystal is regarded as not changing at all : it continues, persists. Compare this last equation with the fundamental equation of continuity. In the mathematical notion of evanescence the place of the principle of ignorance is conspicuous. Q.R. and E° are two limits of our ordinary concrete fact : the former is the limit of perfection or fullness in which the fact becomes infinitely and exhaustively actual being limited by no co-efficient of possibilities : it is the limit of *relational* fullness ; the latter is the limit of the reduction of all features and determinations in the universe of fact : it is like the reduction of the universe to the primordial stuff : it is the limit of *relational* zero. Limit in mathematics means the extremity (I really apologise for this circle in definition) of a progressive conception either in the direction of infinity or in the direction of infinitesimal in regard to a variable quantity. Give a wider and more concrete meaning to 'quantity' and this definition of Limit will apply to the fact, as indeed we have previously seen.

Addition in regard to the fact is the bringing together in *thought* of two or more fact-sections. It is thus that the fact assumes the aspect of a configuration. In intuition also there is a sort of plurality in the continuum, but is not a plurality thought as such. Hence addition has no place in the intuitive complex or fact-stuff. When two fact-sections are added together, the *order* as well as the *values* of the fact-sections go to determine the result. This is the nature of *concrete* addition. Addition in vector-analysis retains to a certain extent this nature. Ordinary mathematical operations are based upon an abstraction of the process. Again, in vector-analysis the result of the operation is what Mill has called a homogeneous effect of the components— it admits of a rigid numerical analysis ; in the

life of the fact in general the result of the operation is *apparently* what Mill has called a heteropathic effect of the components—commonly it does not admit of a rigid numerical analysis and representation. A fact-section, whether physical or mental, has to be dexterously chiselled to a very considerable extent before it can be expected to take precise mathematical outlines ; thus fact-sections have to be pared down by limitation of data or elimination of complexities before their syntheses can be expressed as strictly homogeneous effects : this has to be done even in the physics of configurations and displacements. Suppose we express a homogeneous function as Hf and a heterogeneous function, which by limitation of a data can be resolved into a homogeneous function, as $(H+h)f$; suppose also that the position of fact-section is p and its value is V . Then, obviously, the addition of fact-sections

$$= (H+h)f(p, v) \dots\dots (1)$$

Position may be either in the temporal scheme or in the configuration scheme. Value may include both quality and quantity. Now, put $h = 0$ in the above equation ; we have,

$$\text{Vector-addition} = Hf(p, v) \dots\dots (2)$$

Next, put $p = 0$ of ignorance ; thus the addition of statical numbers and magnitudes

$$= Hf(v) \dots\dots (3)$$

Further, if q and q' stand respectively for the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of v it is clear that the former has been ignored or neglected in the latter two equations. This indicates in a very cursory way the connection of fact-addition to mathematical. The conceptions of Equation and Function will require here a word of explanation each.

Equation of fact is the representation of certain elements of fact being equivalent in *some manner* to certain other elements : the notion of equality is fundamental and therefore appears in the definition itself. For example, the mutual attraction between two material bodies is expressed as a function of the variables—their distance and their masses. This presupposes (1) a resolution of the fact-stuff which includes all into certain fact-sections, *viz.*, two material bodies, their masses, distance, stress ; (2) a

fashioning of the crude elements obtained by empirical analysis into forms neat and proper for dynamics : herein is also involved a limitation of the data. The actual complexity in the life of the fact is so formidable that fact-segments can be put into rigid moulds of mathematical operations only by violence : much of the complexity must be ignored even in a fairly complete equation. Suppose a visual experience is expressed as a function of an objective stimulus, of nervous and cortical agitation, of psychic predispositions and of the degree of attention brought to bear upon, Is this not only a pragmatically correct equation ? So much about *functional* equations. When a fact-section is simply put down as equivalent to a certain other or a group of certain others, the equation holds only by ignorance ; for, strictly speaking, a fact-section never repeats itself— neither in a given configuration nor in a series. Take for example $F = F'$, the reviewing fact being regarded as equivalent to the fact reviewed.

Function of mathematics is a sufficiently philosophical definition to apply to the fact ; and it *has* been very frequently applied to it in the present essay. We have to substitute 'fact-sections' for 'variable quantities' in the definition however. Function expresses an *indirect* or hypothetical relation of equivalence between one fact-section and another. Thus an effect is not directly or categorically equivalent to its cause, but is equivalent to it *provided* that nature is uniform and the given assemblage of conditions is followed by a certain set of consequences. Compare the two equations $x = y$ and $x = \phi(y)$: the indirectness of the latter relation of equality is clear. Of the varieties of function and their applicability to the fact I must say nothing here. Only one type I shall notice, however. If

$$U = Ax^{\alpha}y^{\beta}z^{\gamma} + Bx^{\alpha'}y^{\beta'}z^{\gamma'} + \dots\dots\dots$$

where $\alpha + \beta + \gamma = \alpha' + \beta' + \gamma' = \dots\dots\dots = n$, then U is a homogeneous function of n th. degree regarding which the well-known Euler's theorem in Calculus holds. Now, what can be the pattern of this in the life of fact ? In the above homogeneity resides in the indices of the variables : the sum of the indices is constant. This surely is only one aspect of homogeneity. A stretch of fact, whether a configuration or a series, may be

defined to be homogenous if the sum of the co-efficient, base and index in each segment of fact in the stretch is constant. Symbolically, if A, B, C . . . are the fact-sections of the stretch, then

$$\alpha A_{\beta}^i + \alpha' B_{\beta'}^{i'} + \dots$$

where $\alpha + i + \beta = \alpha' + i' + \beta' = \dots = n$, a constant ; here the fact-stretch may be regarded as homogeneous. If, for example, for successive moments I have pulses of experience such that the conceived possibilities (co-efficient), the actual feeling and suggestions constituting each pulse are on the whole equal to those of the succeeding pulse and equal to a constant, then I may be supposed to have a homogeneous experience for those moments. Now, it can be philosophically demonstrated, I think, that of our ordinary stretches of experience such a description can only be roughly true : in the complete sections of a fact we can hardly expect $\alpha + i + \beta$ to be a constant for a certain period or for a certain tract of a given configuration. *Absolutely* homogeneous experience is E^0 or pure consciousness, for the simple reason that in it the triangular polarity has altogether vanished : elsewhere the constants and identities appear only as results of the ignorance of discrepancies. Compare also Homogeneous Strain, Homogeneous Medium of Physics.

It has been my misfortune in this section to dismiss large and engaging problems with a few bald, categorical sentences. Briefly, Addition is the operation of P-emphasis and Subtraction of V-emphasis : in the former something *else* is presented, in the latter we abstract from a given something. Multiplication is the operation by which one given fact is *changed* into another: Compare the operator by which one vector is changed into another. As a special case, multiplication means the passage of a comparatively simple state into a comparatively complex one. Clearly, it involves M-emphasis. Division is inverse multiplication. If q^- is the multiplier which changes β into α , then q is the divisor or q^- is the multiplier which changes β into α . In the special case, if in multiplication we progress from simplicity to complexity, in division we progress from complexity to simplicity. Employing the inverse notation we may say that Division involves M-emphasis.

Ratio is the quantitative aspect of Relation, and presupposes a unit or standard of comparison. Cf. the ratio $\frac{Q}{S}$.

Differentiation in mathematics is the operation of finding the limit of a certain ratio, viz., $\frac{\phi(x+h) - \phi(x)}{h}$. Integration is summation under special circumstances, viz., when n is indefinitely increased of a series like the following :

$$h \{ f(a) + f(a+h) + f(a+2h) + \dots + f(b-h) \}.$$

So far as the fact is a quantity these operations apply to it, and we have occasionally subjected fact-sections to the operations of the Calculus. Herbart and his disciples have indeed developed a stately Dynamics of Experience. But with respect to the crude fact, these operations can mean anything hardly more precise than what pass for Analysis and Synthesis respectively. The conceptions of these and their connexions with Differentiation and Integration, the mutual connexions of such forms of Analysis as Cartesian, Vector, Temporal, Physical, Psυχical, are large and inviting topics, but I feel that it will be worse than useless here to fling at them a few bald, superficial remarks as I have been generally doing at the devoted head of Mathematics.

15. *Fact and Consciousness*

The place of Consciousness in my theory of fact has been so conspicuous and so fundamental that I feel it incumbent on me to devote this last section of the present essay to a narrower inspection of its credentials. The subject being avowedly a metaphysical one should, however, belong more properly to the next volume of the Series— 'The Veil of Nature.'

I need not just now cross swords with Materialism which from ages immemorial has looked upon consciousness as a sort of 'bye-product' or 'epiphenomenon.' Two other views viz., (1) A World-Principle, whether Will or Idea, essentially unconscious, swells into consciousness; and (2) consciousness is only a function, though perhaps an inseparable function, of pulses of experience; require to be examined with some care, though as in my present essay generally my method of treatment shall be

constructive rather than critical and historical. As before, our chief weapon of investigation will be self-reflection. The evidences that can possibly be culled within my present limits should be taken as suggestive: I can hardly mean them as decisive here—it will be the task of at least two future volumes to place my Reality on a stable basis. Reality for me is Consciousness.

My theory of fact has already in some fashion prepared the ground for a true conception of Consciousness. Repeatedly, I have urged consciousness as a sort of permanent plenum or spiritual ether in which the fact lives, moves and has its being; it is the infinite sea of awareness in which fact-sections rise, toss and disappear like waves and eddies. This of course does not make the fact something other than the plenum: consciousness together with the totality of fact-sections make the fact. These are two aspects of the fact—the aspect of quiescent foundation and the aspect of Protean superstructure respectively: one is the inalienable, unchallengeable datum, and the other is ever shifting construction reared upon it. I leave aside for one moment the case of pure consciousness which might perhaps strike one as an insufferably bald abstraction of the concrete fact. But how does consciousness appear to us even as an aspect of the concrete fact? The question of course can be settled only by intuition. Give up all pragmatic interests as far as practicable for one moment and take an imperial survey of our whole concrete fact as it lives. How does consciousness appear to be connected with it? Is this not like a boundless illumination which makes all things and their relations shine in it? Is this not like a sort of spiritual space which makes room for and contains all things and processes? To oriental reflection this has been generally plain enough. Placing the concrete fact courageously and unstintedly before your mind's eye, try to define the limits or bounds of consciousness in relation to what you totally have: can you assign where consciousness ends and fact continues, or for the matter of that, where consciousness ends and something *else* continues? You may indeed *believe* that the real fact is wider than what you actually feel or know; but does this belief really transfer you

from what you actually feel or know to something beyond your experience? The belief is a part of the experience fact, and as such cannot establish an existence wider than experience if we are to stick desperately to the guns of radical empiricism. I am about to launch on this delicate question, but apart from belief, does not awareness strike you as a boundless atmosphere sustaining all things in it?

There are three questions which ought not to be allowed to get mixed up with one another. First, what is the place and function of Pure Consciousness in the scheme of existence? Secondly, how is consciousness connected with the concrete fact that we ordinarily live? Thirdly, what is our *belief* concerning the limits of the concrete fact and those of awareness attendant on it? It is the second of these questions which I am tackling first by preferring an appeal straight to intuition. Laying aside all beliefs and predilections it is impossible to take consciousness otherwise than as an unbounded plenum in which all the wealth of the fact is displayed. This at any rate is the deliverance of my own self-intuition and represents, as I have incidentally observed, the net result of oriental philosophizing.

Let us next try to clear the apprehension raised by the third question. Surely, we persistently believe that our experience of a fact cannot be equivalent to the fact as it is in itself: we know it only gradually and partially. What we do know lives no doubt in our experience and in our consciousness; but we do not know all, and partly at least therefore the fact is beyond our experience and consciousness. This indeed is one of the staunchest articles of common sense faith, and seems to be the vital breath that sustains our life of striving and knowing. We are being perpetually haunted by a sense of imperfection, moved by a hope for something more, in all our life's ordinary possessions. Even the mighty Kant could not do away with the 'Things-in-themselves' existing beyond the limits of empirical knowledge. Whether in common sense, or in science, or in metaphysics we cannot apparently close with what we actually get: a fact is ever growing for us in a solution of endless possibilities: this indeed was our justification for developing the third pole (α) in the

representation of the fact. But what does this stubborn faith of common sense and philosophy really establish? Does it *prove* that Fact has two aspects for us, the known and the unknown, the actual and the possible, that while the former lives in experience and consciousness the latter does not? In other words, is Fact inseparable from consciousness (or conditions of experience), or is experience only an accident of Fact—Fact existing in experience and also beyond it? As can be readily seen, the question is philosophically a momentous one, and let us try to face it.

In the first place, we are hopelessly shut up in our own universe of fact at any moment and can never really go beyond it. The belief that this universe is but an earnest of a universe infinitely larger and fuller may obstinately cling to us: but *where* does this belief concerning possible and kept-back possessions lie? Surely it is inside my universe of fact, and hence cannot prove an existence beyond what I actually possess. The whole fact for me at any moment is simply this: I have something in conscious experience and believe that I have not all and may have something more. The actual possession *plus* the belief about possible possessions constitutes the actual fact for me: the latter element is also a part of my actual possession. If I represent my actual fact of experience by a circle, point out any element of fact which must be placed beyond this circle. Whatever I know or conceive, have or believe, accept or refuse, admit or question, is within this circle: it is my all-absorbing universe. I may believe or conceive many things about vistas of existence ranging beyond the circle: but this belief or conception together with what is believed or conceived actually is within the circle and not beyond it. In this sense my universe is self-sufficient and securely bolted from within: there is simply no without. I believe in objective fact, self-conscious individuals like myself, society, history, science, relativity and advancement of knowledge: but all these are *some* of the richness of my own universe at any moment displayed: I have somehow woven around myself a vast web of relations in which all things are suspended and represented. This need not spell solipsism, however, as

must be clear from our definition of Fact : the *me* is not an inseparable feature of experience and like other features it appears and disappears. It may be curious that while I am confined in my actual fact I dream and care about a large possible fact : if the larger fact is not really there beyond my knowledge at any moment why should I project it into unknown objectivity at all, and not live snug and complacent in my own possession ? This is curious no doubt, nevertheless my universe of fact at any moment may have no *real* limits, no *real* without and no *real* windows. You can adduce nothing to drag me out of my universe. There is a wiser Bergson leading thought to-day ? But the master lives in my universe at this moment and he and his system are precisely as they are actually known to me at this moment. This is a very startling proposition, it is perhaps philosophy gone mad. Nonetheless it is radical empiricism if I but slightly amend the above account of Bergson as he is given in my universe. Bergson lives in my universe and is neither more nor less than what I now know him to be ; but I believe in his objectivity ; I somehow think that he and his system are really larger and deeper than as they are known in my universe now. But this belief and thought, however curious, are inside and not outside my universe of the present moment. This is a typical case and shows the relation of objectivity to my concrete universe at any moment.

But surely my experience is changing and going : with study and reflection my acquaintance with James and Bergson deepens. Now, what is the growth of experience ? Growth is the change of fact from one condition to another with this characteristic that in each condition there is a retrospective thought of past conditions and a prospective thought of future ones : this is conscious and contemplated growth. What are these past and future conditions which are thought of in a given condition of fact ? Surely these show that a given condition is not sufficient by itself ; that in order that this may be conceived as growing, past as well as future conditions *other* than this have to be postulated. These have to be postulated no doubt, but the belief and postulation of past and future conditions connected with the

present are inside and not outside the present condition, and cannot therefore seriously undermine the self-sufficiency of this. It is simply an ideal construction that I put upon the present condition : I do not know how and why. My thought and theory of Fact cannot really make it possible for it to go beyond itself : if it is empirical it can by no means cease to be empirical. But does the thought of change—not to say of growth—prove that Fact is larger than experience? I do not see how it can. While I am in a given condition I think that this is giving way to *another* condition : therefore the given condition is not all. But no ; the case stands precisely as before ; the thought of another condition in the midst of a present cannot make me go beyond the present.

It should be observed however that to represent fact as a series of pulses of experience, past and future, is not quite radical empiricism. While I am conceiving my experience as a flow, as a series of pulses, I am of course in a present pulse of thought together with my conception of the experience as a continuous flow extending both ways beyond the present : the series therefore really lives in a given pulse : it cannot prove any existence beyond the given. This is recognized in the Pulse-theory. But why should I call it a pulse at all? By such characterization the Pulse-theory stands self-condemned. To call experience a pulse at any moment amounts to postulating a flow of conscious life or rather experience vastly larger than what I may have at that moment ; and yet the apparently beginningless and endless flow really lives as an index in my experience of this moment. This indeed was the incurable defect in the metaphysics of Buddhism which would put the whole universe into a single experience and would yet believe experience to be an actual series of no beginning and end : it is a conceived series undoubtedly : but this conception is undoubtedly too a part of the whole universe as it is being given in the present experience. History is only repeating itself in the latest Pulse-theory of knowledge. This also fights shy of the consequences of its own proposition. If my experience must be taken as all-inclusive, and it cannot but be so taken in

thorough-going empiricism, it cannot consistently be regarded as an *actual* pulse, present, past or future, at all. Even to call it a *present* experience is to take an unwarrantable leap and find our brains dashing against a wall which never gives way. Are there past and future experiences, experiences of other subjects, actually beyond what I now have and conceive as my present experience? Now, compare the present pulse of thought with my Fact. Which satisfies more the requirements of radical empiricism? Fact, as I defined it, is not a present pulse at all improperly suggesting actual pulses other than itself: it is experience simply, dumb and alogical in its concreteness which may *involve* the thought of configuration, series, time, causality, actual, possible and what not. The resolution of Fact into pulses is only an immanent fact-operation. It is experience, but cannot in itself be regarded as either subjective or objective: it is not *my* experience, I have myself opened this essay with the statement that experience is a single pulse of fact, but as has been abundantly clear from my account of the fact, neither of the two qualifying epithets 'single' and 'pulse' can properly apply to it: it is concrete existence simply which refuses to be compromised by either Aristotelian or Kantian categories. The superstition which is responsible for our thrusting a logical construction upon existence essentially alogical, may be noted as *logical superstition* and is a near relation of James' psychologist's fallacy: it dies hardest.

There is no escape from the prison of my own Fact then. Fortunately my prison is my universe of whose dimensions I have little cause to be ashamed. It embraces all that I actually know now—my knowledge of Nature, Society, other individuals, History, and so on: You and Bergson live with *me* in my prison and are precisely as I know of you and him: curiously it involves also a belief that this universe is a poor sort of prison, a wretched abiding place, beyond which are spread infinite vistas of unknown knowledge and existence: it is therefore moved by an unrest and yearning. But the prison-wall stands and defies me in spite of this belief and this yearning. Though there is thus no escape from the prison of fact, I may somehow reconcile myself to

it and make the best of an inexorable necessity. Let me frankly and courageously admit the fact : it is alogical and unbounded in its concreteness : it is not a pulse at all : it is not my fact any more than it is yours or Bergson's— you, Bergson and I are merely rising and tossing waves in this shoreless sea of awareness : the belief and yearning spoken of a moment ago are also a part of the stress which mysteriously agitates the bosom of this sea. The incidence of logical constructions to this alogical fact-stuff is also a part of this stress : it is indeed thus that the dumb, mystical fact wears the aspect of an intelligible system— a world with a society of co-ordinated human beings, with history, science and advancement of knowledge. It is thus that it is conceived as a changing and growing universe, an amalgam of actual and possible, an worthy object of life's satisfaction and seeking. Fact must not be identified with *present* experience either ; the Time-construction is also superimposed on it. And if such be the true story of the prison in which you and I and everything are shut up, is our lot so wretched as we might be tempted to think ? The acceptance of the fact does not spell the dissolution of the belief in the objectivity of World and Society and of the yearning after more light and bliss. The fact is abstract without this belief and yearning, so that the acceptance of the fact includes the acceptance of this belief and yearning. Common sense is not materially compromised by this acceptance except in so far as we substitute for the actual objectivity of World and Society our *believed* and *conceived* objectivity. But we cannot help this. Will common sense say what precisely it means by 'actual or real' objectivity if not the circumstance that B, for example, is believed and conceived to be external to and independent of A— that I believe that Bergson is a master who is leading philosophy not merely in my own universe of experience but in an objective world inhabited by objective thinking and feeling units like myself ? But perhaps 'real' objectivity is existence independent and outside of my thought and belief. The only basis and warrant in me of such existence is, however, my thought and belief touching it. The Fact *believes* in real objectivity. And this believing in real objectivity *plus* the object so believed are sections of the fact.

Since Fact is essentially conscious experience—I thus keep clear of unconscious philosophy—and fact is all-inclusive, I can really establish nothing beyond the pale of consciousness : existence is essentially conscious experience, as Berkeley would say. Unconscious experience has been assumed to meet the exigencies of theory, but there is not a vestige of unquestionable evidence in support of it. The philosophy of the unconscious is really an offshoot of the veil. In the boundless continuum of fact at any moment I ignore the outlying vistas of semi-attention, and fancy that a particular feature or group of features is the fact experienced by me : this is my pragmatic fact. But the pragmatic fact is not the entire conscious fact of the moment. The neglected portions of the continuum are supposed to lie in the region of the unconscious, while really they are only not *sufficiently* conscious. Let the entire concrete be accepted unreservedly and the plea for the unconscious goes. We may have degrees of consciousness in a certain sense, but unconscious and subconscious are categories that seem to be fictitious and part of the magic of the Veil. To go into the bases and evidences of the unconscious would be a very arduous task, and within the limits of my present essay I cannot undertake it. Unconscious Matter and Motion have at least the sanction of common sense to redeem their strangeness : we have admitted them as sections of the concrete fact and therefore as modes of conscious experience. Unconscious Will and Idea have neither plain common sense nor sound philosophy to countenance them. I *believe* that a Will, essentially unconscious, objectifies itself as the brain and swells into consciousness : making consciousness thus a product of an agency and operation essentially unconscious. Now, let me ask as before, Is this belief and theory inside or outside of my conscious experience ? If undoubtedly inside, it cannot be made to prove an existence or operation outside. It is only my thought of existence as such and of how my experience is related to that existence. My prison indeed cannot cease to be prison if pressing my fore-head against the prison-bars I slide into a dream of a larger and freer existence beyond. But in this sense I can have no theory of the fact— no explanation as to how it comes, lives

and passes away : philosophy is thus completely undone. Quite so ; the concrete fact can yield itself to no theory, deliver itself unto no system of thought. It can reflect and think about itself in any manner however : such reflection is necessarily always immanent, and cannot really establish any theory or system transcending or going beyond it. Common sense has called such reflection Theory or System : it could not do otherwise. But in this fundamental science we gain nothing by mincing matters : our theory of Primordial Stress in consciousness or PMV is only a statement of immanent reflection : we have never offered it as a transcendental theory. Again, Will and Idea are terms that are understandable only as vocabularies of mental science : Will may be conceived as Impulse or blind stress to get rid of its conscious nature and to make it serviceable as a transcendental theory of Being : but Will thus stripped naked is a monstrous entity. Impulse or stress of physics is an abstract idea of which the concrete original is the human Will : this latter we directly have as an actual phenomenon of our experience : the former which we have implanted in Matter is obtained by abstracting from this phenomenon—stress is Will *minus* something. We may not be prepared to go the whole length with Martineau, but neither have we any empirical warrant for regarding the life of the fact to be a condition of blind, unconscious stress. The claims of unconscious Will and Idea cannot indeed be dismissed after so slight an examination, but I shall be content here to note only how my own Theory of fact is prepared to entertain them.

We have no doubt so far as to the essentially conscious nature of the Fact. We have seen also how it is impossible to go beyond the concrete Fact as we live it, in our fatal anxiety to redeem the pledges contained within the Fact and in our equally fatal craving for a theory of the Fact such as may be satisfactory to our philosophy and common sense. The Fact undoubtedly contains the promise of far wider vistas of existence than what may be actually given in consciousness : we desperately believe in the growth of the Fact, in the World in which our fact of experience is only a part and consequence, in Entities co-ordinate with ourselves who live facts of experience precisely as we do :

and we also believe in a First Cause or causes beyond our ken by which our reason will fashion for itself a decent hypothesis of the creeds of common sense and the persuasions of philosophy. But the promise and the belief, however curious and unailing, are contained in the concrete Fact as I live it, and therefore cannot really carry me beyond it. To a man who chooses to cling complacently to the *actual*, radical empiricism can offer no really serious warrant for a *possible* and *objective* order of existence—that is to say, an order of existence outside and independent of the actual experience at any moment. Such desperate clinging to the actual will of course mean the suspension of all theory transcendental to it, good, bad or indifferent.

But suppose, in the next place, the promise and belief contained in the Fact are allowed to consummate themselves in a theory of Reality. Why should I believe in an objective Order at all, in Entities like myself, in a First Cause and in a history of my Fact, if all these are nothing but fond delusions, idle dreams into which I am allured while pressing hard and mysteriously against my unyielding prison-bars? Is it not wiser to accept my Fact as it is conceived in this Promise and belief than to take it as a prison with arbitrary walls of self-confinement? Surely the Fact as it is lived involves this promise and belief, this objective World, co-ordinate self-conscious entities, First Cause and so forth, as unimpeachable fact-sections—quite legitimate like the actual feelings and ideas that there may be in it. If it does, why must I take it as a pure actual scrupulously ejecting the possible, thus making the concrete mutilated and abstracted? The point thus raised will not seriously disturb the jealous limits of the Fact as we have defined it. The Fact does *not* eject the possible, the promise and belief referred to before. But the thought of possible—the conception that the Fact is growing in Time, is related to a World and other self-conscious entities—is an actual section of the Fact, and therefore cannot by any means be made to prove an order of existence apart from and independent of *this* actual. Fact cannot refuse admittance to the possible : it is at home with all manner of beliefs and ideas. Only it cannot see its way to go beyond its actual limits to prove an

existence independent of itself. But suppose we take the Fact at its pretensions : let my Fact be a section of a larger Fact which we believe to be the World, let my experience be only a leaf taken from the book of Social experience. Briefly, let us say ditto to the fundamental propositions of common sense.

Now it will be possible to have a transcendental theory of the Fact. Fact, which is my concrete experience at any moment, becomes thus an effect of a Cause which is infinitely larger than the Fact. This latter is the Objective Fact to which the lesser fact is opposed as the Subjective. The derivation of the latter from the former, the lesser from the greater, becomes *the* problem of philosophy. The greater Fact has often been identified with Matter and Motion and with what result we all know. It has been supposed to be Spirit or Universal Soul, and with this solution of the problem we are familiar. Emphasis has shifted from the aspect of Idea to that of Will and back ; the essentially conscious nature of these two aspects has often been obscured too. In all these we have however a transcendental theory of Fact. The position of vital importance in admitting such a theory is this : Consciousness is inseparable from the concrete fact of experience— fact is essentially for us a condition of stress in consciousness ; now, in going beyond this fact to set up a theory regarding it shall we part company with consciousness also and search for the foundations of Reality admit the dark, blind forces of a partial, half-awake imagination ? Is it possible to seek for an explanation of the Conscious in the Unconscious which comes to exist under the Veil and which rushes to storm and overwhelm the actual after it is born ?

This as I have admitted is a very grave question and I shall do well not to enter into it with a light heart and scant leisure. I cannot however leave the crux of the problem wholly untouched. Matter, inorganic and organized, is born under the Veil : it is an abstract segment of the concrete Fact which is essentially conscious experience. The abstraction invests it with a certain character : it is an unconscious something that extends in Space, resists, weighs and so on. The brain, which is an especially interesting form of matter, is invested with certain other char-

acteristics also. Let us grant with James that the nervous tissue is selective—mysteriously selective. Yet it appears to select without any consciousness apparently attending its activity : it is blind, unconscious selection. If this appearance be correct, selection need not necessarily be a conscious affair : the cerebral selection which is presided over by the conscious Mind is doubtless attended with consciousness, but this may be only an accident and not a necessity. We have then two species of selection : one exercised by the brain and supervised by consciousness ; the other exercised by any living nerve-tissue and not apparently supervised by consciousness. Now, which shall we take as the normal kind of selection ? Selection without consciousness or with ? Is the unconscious selection of the nerve-tissue only an appearance or the conscious selection of the brain-centres only an accident ? Shall we extend to the case of the brain the law of the lower centres of the spinal cord, or cover the apparent attitude of the lower centres by the law of the higher ? The principle of continuity will cut both ways. But which is the more rational way of applying it ? Shall we not say that conscious selection is the law and normal order and that the unconscious selection of the lower centres is only an appearance ? The lower centres appear to select unconsciously, but are we quite sure that this activity is not presided over by a consciousness *ejective* to that which presides over the activity of the higher centres ? How consciousness as such presides over an operation is one of the subtlest questions of metaphysics : but in selection, as we know and exercise it in experience, consciousness certainly does not appear as a mere accident. As Force and Causality are notions that we first come to understand in the experiences of our own conative life, in the exercise of our own motor nerves, and then learn to transfer to the phenomena of the objective world after abstracting from their true concrete nature, so in the case of Selection. Abstracted Force and Causality divorced from Consciousness and Will, have been naturalized in the physical universe around us : we have grown accustomed to physical Force and causation. But Selection has as yet been hardly naturalized in the domain of physical pheno-

mena whether organized or not : we yet hardly suspect that Matter selects or even that protoplasm selects apart from intelligent direction. The claims of Matter to selective activity are yet hard to establish, though Philosophy is already slowly making to a recognition of such activity, viz., an activity quite as mysterious as the spontaneity of the living tissue. We have already touched in a preceding section the claims of spontaneity as inhering in Matter to which Newton's Laws of Motion apply : long will the battle be fought before these claims can be assured or rejected in Science. The temptations to think of a purely mechanical explanation of the living tissue are still very considerable, but here the evidences of the selective activity are more palpable and less eluding. However, Philosophy is not likely to be easily dislodged if she takes up a position like the following. If going beyond the concrete fact of experience we must have a transcendental theory of existence, it is but rational to portray this larger and objective Existence much in the same colours and touches as make the lesser and subjective Fact for us : if the lesser Fact is essentially spiritual, there can be hardly any justification for making the greater Fact material ; if consciousness is the very plenum in which the lesser lives, we cannot be justified in giving a short shrift to consciousness in our attempt to conceive the larger ; if force and selection are essentially phenomena of conscious Will in the lesser Fact, it will be hardly meeting the ends of speculative justice to imagine them as blind impulses— anything but conscious operations— in the larger Fact. Verily, the lesser fact is for us the standard and datum of actuality : we must know and measure and interpret the Actual in terms of what we actually have, and this latter is the lesser fact. Every act of conception implies an incidence of the Veil over the concrete fact of intuition : this is a proposition which the investigations of the present essay have perhaps established. As we cannot help conceiving the fact that we live in intuition, we are always burying our existence under the Veil. Now, the degree of veiling will render some conceptions regarding existence nearer the truth than some others. As a general rule, the greater the veil between the actual fact of intuition and the

conceived nature of reality, between what we have at any moment and what we conceive the nature of reality to be, the greater the divergence of the conceptions from the truth. Let Reality be by all means made in the image of the intuitive Actual. This is anthropomorphism perhaps, but we cannot help it. Hence Materialism we have discarded as a correct theory of transcendental reality, and the view that a Quiescent Real, essentially spiritual, is gradually and partially reproducing itself in our experience—the view of Berkeley and Green—we have admitted as making a very near approach to truth. It is no part of my business here to examine the claims of Modern Pluralism as a still nearer approach to truth, but the principle of the fundamental basis of Reality in ourselves and that of relative veiling in regard to this basis—the fact of intuition—are, I conceive, of supreme importance in the code of metaphysical justice.

I am perhaps dealing in a very cursory way with the great problem as to how consciousness is related to existence. One of the crucial points involved in the problem I have touched, however. If consciousness appears to be essential to the basis of Reality in me, the fact of experience, it cannot be, in accordance with the principle just laid down, made inessential to the Reality outside of me : this cannot be conceived as blind, unconscious or even sub-conscious Substance or Force. The sheer impossibility of conceiving any mode of substance or operation apart from conscious activity is also another crucial point involved in this problem. The intuition of force or operation is essentially a conscious experience : the conception of these also is impossible without implying spiritual activity. Conceive Matter and Motion for example, and see how these so-called independent entities vanish into thin air when the sustaining breath of spiritual activity is withdrawn. What does an extended, resisting and heavy substance mean really ? Is not every one of these 'primary' qualities a spiritual phenomenon ? Is not the same essentially true of the movement of a body in Space ? Can we be justified in playing fast and loose with this spiritual activity then which endows Matter and Motion with their very essence, and which being withdrawn leaves them empty terms with no meanings.

whatever? I cannot dilate, but I appeal to reflection.

We do not require indeed unconscious mind-dust to serve the ends of consistent philosophy. We need not conceive a mind-molecule attached to a molecule of matter, and each infinitesimal nerve-shock inducing an infinitesimal iota of feeling. But we do require a universal spiritual stuff— not certainly made up of spiritual atoms— in which all experiences, yours as well as mine, appear and disappear : a co-essential spiritual stuff which holds you, me, the world and everything, to which nothing is foreign. No consistent philosophy of the World and our own place and destiny in it can be reared up without such a foundation. James' pulses of experience cannot do any more than Clifford's mind-stuff which the former so ably demolishes can. The spiritual stuff, it must be plainly seen, is essentially conscious existence. The philosophy of the unconscious has also laid its basis in the apparently unconscious conditions of our own existence. But it need hardly be pointed out that these unconscious conditions in us— such as in profound sleep, in perfect anaesthesia, and so forth— are only apparently so. In the first place, it is always possible to explain such cases as instances of lapses of memory, of dreams forgotten. But even assuming that in these instances we do not dream and feel anything, no case is made out for the discontinuity or break of consciousness as such. In the West, consciousness has been too hastily identified with directed or informed consciousness, so that where no direction or form is discernible Western thinkers have been apt to imagine that consciousness as such has also ceased. To their pragmatic eye, consciousness is always particular, having a particular direction and form. Hence if in profound sleep we concede that we dream no dreams and in perfect anaesthesia we grant that we feel nothing, we really concede that consciousness may sometimes cease to exist in us. But the extinction of consciousness as such is utterly inconceivable in any case. I have myself suggested consciousness as a permanent plenum which sustains and vitalizes everything : to me this is an unmistakeable deliverance of direct intuition. Ordinarily, we never meet with a condition of consciousness which is absolutely without a direction and a

form : but this is no reason why we should have no consciousness at all where this direction and form are supposed to have gone : that will be seeking to prove too much by the accidents of our normal life.

Consciousness has been often carelessly identified with Intelligence or Understanding. But we have defined consciousness as the state of awareness or feeling, so that granting that sensibility is attached to such minute specks of protoplasm as the amoeba we may pertinently say that the amoeba is conscious. Any substance that feels, however chaotically, is conscious. It need not be intelligent or logical to be conscious. Even our own concrete fact is alogical, but it is certainly conscious. Intelligence is only a special manifestation of conscious existence, a specialized organ developed out of the primordial stuff of life. The limits of conceptual and thinking existence are not the limits of consciousness therefore. Common sense is prepared to concede to the amoeba feelings of a most rudimentary kind ; the philosophy of Evolution has confirmed and not weakened this simple faith of the human mind. But what about the corpuscles of dead matter ? That there is an absolute line of cleavage between matter and organic being is a position that is being challenged by the enlightened culture of to-day as it was challenged by the ancient wisdom of the world. Are we quite sure that the material particle is not a living corpuscle with a low curve of response, so low indeed that till now it has escaped the vigilance and ingenuity of exact science ? But the barriers which seemingly divide the wide realms of Nature are proverbially uncertain and shifting. Science cannot hope long to keep matter and organic being wide apart and miss the fundamental affinities between them. Sensibility, Life and Matter are after all only pragmatic and approximate divisions of Nature, convenient perhaps but not answering the true ends of sound philosophy. The differences are probably differences of degree and not of kind so that even the material particle lives and feels. It is not height of dogmatism to maintain this. Nothing could be more apparent than this if we were not blinded by the unreasoning faith of common practical life. In life we commonly ignore what is not

relevant to our special purpose in view. The Veil works wonders, deals out existence in queer and fantastic forms, and the simple savage and the child who regards all existence as akin to his own being—living and feeling like himself—has more truly felt the pulse of being than the civilized man of culture. If fact is the basis and prototype of existence, do we not find it permeated with life and consciousness? And if so, should we not take existence also as permeated with life and consciousness? If life and consciousness are of the very essence of the Fact, they must be of the very essence of Existence also—Fact and Existence being related to each other as they are. If existence has been generally robbed of life and consciousness, the circumstance must be attributed to the Veil. In practical life and in philosophy which is oppressed by the nightmare of practical living, we do not care for life and consciousness as such but only for certain forms and tones of life of consciousness. Where we miss these forms and tones we fancy that we miss life and consciousness also. Certainly out of infinite possible modes and tones in which life and consciousness may exist we suspect and recognize only some and ignore all the rest. A crystal is dead to us, because it possesses a kind and degree of life which we do not care to know. A germ is unconscious to us, because it possesses a kind and degree of consciousness which we do not care to apprehend. To be or not to be are after all pragmatic ends, being and non-being may change places. What does not exist for commonplace life may exist for science; but even science is swayed by pragmatic ends, can seldom break completely loose from the idols of commonplace life. Hence the essential basis of existence—consciousness—has been commonly looked upon as a very much specialized and peculiar manifestation in Nature. A full and unreserved acceptance of the fact, such it has been the earnest endeavour of this essay to establish and classify, would effectively dispel the self-delusion of our so-called commonsense. In a sense the savage and the child are far less removed from the concrete fact than we are: the processes of civilization and manhood are essentially processes of abstraction. To live the concrete again Man must in a sense

go back to the state of Nature.

As I have conceived the fact to be a structure laid upon consciousness as such, so I conceive concrete existence to be a structure laid upon being as such : and also, I identify consciousness as such with being as such. To my reflection, the essence of being is in consciousness. Take for example the cloud which I now see. It is a section of my experience project and objectified—a circumstance which does not take me out of my experience. In fact, the concrete experience of the moment includes all. Space, objectivity and everything, and if this concrete is essentially conscious existence, can the cloud really cease to be so also? An object is merely a bundle of sensations actual and possible—is a proposition that has been often made since the time of Berkeley and Hume. In spite of the boldness with which this statement has been made, commonsense has been loathe to part with its belief in a mysterious substratum of objective nexus underneath this bundle of sensations. Mill's permanent possibility is vagueness incarnate : either it means the mysterious substratum or it means nothing. The Buddhist's reduction of the thing is similar and perhaps more thoroughgoing ; but sensations aggregating with sensations and following upon one another as a series leave the confusion of thought about existence worse confounded. In the first place, the sensations and even the pulses of James are abstract fact-sections and not the fact ; the Thing which is an aspect of the fact is an aspect of conscious experience which is a continuous mass, so that Thing cannot but be of the essence of this continuous mass ; the same substratum which supports this continuous mass of experience supports and underlies the Thing. The substratum is boundless, changeless and alogical, but *not* mysterious or unknowable. It is the structure upon this Basis that contains all the mystery : it is the nature of the Stress PMV on the bosom of this shoreless sea of spiritual being or awareness that is really inscrutable. The Basis is the unfailing Light itself : the structure is the wonderous Veil. I hope to devote two future volumes to a study, so far as study is possible, of this Veil and this Light respectively. In advancing consciousness as the Basis of

Reality, whether subjective or objective, I do not seriously rely upon the worn-out arguments of the schools, but, in consonance with the practice of the present essay, upon the deliverances of unbiased reflection. All concrete existence, which in its entirety is the fact, appears to me as a crust laid upon spiritual being as such—not the shy, mysterious entity of sneaking dogma, but the Light of the very pupil of our eyes, the fundamental state of our knowing, feeling and willing experience.

I am coming to the nature of this Basis presently, but in the meanwhile I note that, in the second place, the reduction of the Thing to a mere bundle of sensations actual and possible with nothing left over appears to me defective psychology in another respect. I am asked to think away all actual and possible sensations which apparently make the cloud and then to conceive what remains over. This request itself is uncritical and unscientific. As I am looking at the cloud I have, or rather I am, a continuous mass of experience which is intuitively differentiated into a variety of features and tones. The cloud is not for me merely a synthesis of these features and tones. What I can think away is not the continuum of experience as such (this can never be put equal to zero), but the features and tones appearing in it. It is like the thinking away of the waves and forth from the heart of a boundless sea: does the sea itself vanish by such abstraction? As we are left with a placid, quiescent sea in this analogy, so we are left with placid, quiescent, homogeneous continuum of experience in the case under discussion. By thinking away the features I am merely left with a vague, undifferentiated consciousness of existence. As in cultivating perceptual acquaintance with an external object I often begin with vague continuum and have features and tones gradually emerging out of it, as in short the objective picture grows from almost indistinguishable vagueness to a progressively articulated definiteness, so in eliminating or otherwise losing the object in consciousness, I have to go through a reverse process, viz., from variety and definiteness to homogeneity and vagueness. It is as if adult human experience is relapsing back to amoeboid sensibility. The consummation of the process does not therefore really

bring me to absolute nothing but to an undefinable something.

As in the appearance of an object so in its disappearance *three* broad landmarks can be fairly well indicated. I always carry with me consciousness of infinite existence. Even while I am not engaged with special forms or relations of existing things I am an experience of infinite being. A moment's unbiased reflection will, I am sure, bring me out. When a particular object has not appeared, this placid, unsuspected yet unmistakable consciousness of being is lying silently in wait. It is the primordial stuff of creation, shapeless and all-pervasive, waiting for the forms that the hand of God may impress upon it: *This* can never be dispensed with, either in thought or in feeling, for, it is the essence, the substratum of thought and feeling themselves. Let me call this the Ultimate Basis of the fact. In the next place, when an object is just beginning to appear in consciousness, it commonly begins as a chaotic mist, almost indifferential *fact-plasm* as it were, and gradually proceeds to assume a form and a name. It is like the starting of an embryo as a structureless mass of protoplasm and then proceeding to assume such differentiations of structure as the hypoblast, the mesoblast and the epiblast. The precipitancy with which objects appear in consciousness leaves the first stages of its appearance very much obscured and their character almost wholly unsuspected: the pragmatic interest also lies in the fuller possession and not generally in the earlier earnest and promise. The chaotic mist is not however a *wholly* undifferentiated and indiscriminated condition of existence. In it the promise and potency of the fact yet unborn are given already; it is also somehow discriminated from the rest of the continuum: it is felt as a certain local stress in the placid experience of being in which we perpetually live: it is already a centre of a mysterious stir and anxiety of birth. Let me call this the Secondary Basis of the fact. After this and seeming to merge out of it we have of course a fairly articulated picture growing apace. This is the third stage. Now, I wish to emphasize the fact that a full-fledged object in disappearing, whether in thought or in feeling, has to pass through a process commonly the reverse of the above. Dis-

appearance is appearance inverted. Hence in thinking away the sensible qualities of the cloud before me I am merely reducing variety into homogeneity and am certainly left with either the secondary basis or the primary at the end of the experiment.

Very briefly and hastily I am seeking to establish the indispensable connexion between Consciousness and Existence. The most substantial plank in my argument is, I venture to hope, my theory of Fact itself. Before I close this essay I should discharge a small part of the heavy burden of obligation which rests on me, *viz.*, a discussion of the nature and claims of consciousness as such. Throughout the present essay I have not only frequently referred to it but freely pressed it into such service as it can render. The claims of this order of existence, which I have just now spoken of as the ultimate or primary basis of fact, appear to rest not so much on dialectic grounds as on intuitive and experimental grounds. These grounds I must now briefly mention. Experiment in this connexion I define to be a special kind of intuition : for example, to think away the sensible qualities of an object before us in an experiment. Intuition also is a term that calls for some light and definition. Of intuition we must distinguish two kinds. As a fact lives in consciousness, the circumstance we may call intuition : for example, my concrete universe is given to me in intuition. Such intuition is dumb and alogical : it is a consciousness of existence over which a mysterious crust of features has been laid, as it were. All the categories of thought are wide of it. Repeatedly we have referred to the nature of this kind of intuition. The other kind of intuition may be roughly identified with what is known in mental science as introspection or reflection. It is an attempt to make an object of a fact, or rather, of a section of fact : the fact or the sectional fact becomes an object of regard. Experiment is a more special kind of intuition. Here the pragmatic interest of the subject is more apparent. Reflection is the observation of a fact as it is without consciously disturbing the circumstances of its occurrence, existence and change ; Experiment is the observation of a fact in a condition or under circumstances in which it is our interest to take note of it. Now I proceed to indicate the

grounds of pure consciousness, E° or U°.

Though a logical intuition will not tell its own story, we can make reflection *on* intuition render us some sort of account ; if we cannot stare at the sun itself, we can at least bring the sun sufficiently within our ken as it is being reflected on the glassy, placid surface of a lake. Such an effort we have previously called the *reviewing* of a fact. Now, how does the intuitive fact appear in review ? Is it not an unbounded consciousness of existence over which the mysterious crust more than once alluded to before is laid ? Does consciousness appear either as restricted or merely as an attendant circumstance, an accident, a function ? Does it not appear as the very basis, the very sustaining breath, of the fact itself ? Suppose, we grant that consciousness does appear as the very basis of fact and not merely as an attendant circumstance ; but surely this does not render the case for *pure* consciousness absolutely proven. How can we be sure that the Basis is not an abstraction apart from the structure, the crust, laid upon it ? If by abstraction we mean an aspect isolated in thought from the concrete whole in which it is given, then I can have no hesitation to concede that the inalienable and unrestricted basis of fact is an abstraction in relation to the concrete whole as we ordinarily live it. The basis though given in the concrete whole cannot be equated to it, and hence it is an abstraction in relation to it. But this circumstance does not render the basis an abstraction for all time and in all conditions even for a normal human being. Concrete wholes change their characters from time to time, so what is an abstraction in relation to a particular concrete whole at any time may become a concrete whole itself at any other time. By the bye, are not our pragmatic facts, those with which our common sense and culture play, abstractions themselves ?

The question of real importance is this : Have we ever a case in which the basis of the ordinary fact becomes the fact itself ? Briefly, have we ever a bare, homogeneous consciousness with no determinations whatever ? If we have, the plea of abstraction goes : the Basis becomes the concrete Fact itself. To begin with it must be frankly admitted that the Basis becoming

the concrete Fact is not at all an ordinary case, and hence it is one which is exceedingly hard to establish either by reflection or by experiment. The bare consciousness of *this* or *that*, the experiences of just going to sleep and just waking, and even the consciousness of being as such, are more or less close approximations to the state of consciousness as such, but none can be identified with it. To take the last and perhaps the closest of the approximations— the consciousness of being as such. In this two aspects have been separately presented, *viz.*, consciousness and being, which are absolutely one in pure consciousness : this latter is not a consciousness of being but being-consciousness where there is no duality of aspect at all : language cannot reveal this curious confusion of being and consciousness, for in the very attempt it must polarize the substance into being *and* consciousness ; but reflection ought to enlighten us. Similarly, if quiescence and bliss be of the nature of consciousness, we cannot properly say that pure consciousness is a consciousness of quiescence and bliss. If Bliss and Being are really bound up with the essence of consciousness, we should rather say that the concrete substance is Being-Bliss-Consciousness or *Sacchidananda* as the Vedas would say. Even this is dressing up the alogical, unspeakable fact in the garb of thought and language.

Now, what evidence have we of the fact that the pure consciousness is ever for us or can be ever for us an actual state of existence ? In normal life as well as in abnormal pathological states we have occasionally stretches of experience in which simplicity of features or determinations has advanced perilously near to barrenness and homogeneity, in which experience has become *almost* structureless or featureless without being evanescent ; but do we ever actually come to the limit of featurelessness or homogeneity ? Ordinarily do not of course. There are, however, *two*, only two, *experimental* methods by which this consummation may be realized in us ; and if it is thus realized we should be precluded from regarding pure consciousness as a mere abstraction in all cases. I begin by distinguishing the two methods as the Method of Conceptual Limits and the Method of Actual Limits.

1. In the previous investigations we have already very freely and frequently employed the former method. The latter method is however more important and conclusive, but to a systematic study of this method with its accessories, stages and results I hope to devote a future volume of the Series. The first method may be divided into two kinds according to the different directions in which the limit may be taken, *viz.*, the direction of evanescence (zero) and that of excrescence (infinite variety) : the one limit will take us to homogeneous experience— not evanescent experience, which is impossible—to pure consciousness in which all features have disappeared ; the other limit will take us to an experience of infinite richness and variety—to the Quiescent Real in short. With this latter limit we have scarcely anything to do here. But what does the Limit of Evanescence mean really, and can we expect it to bring us to homogeneous experience ? With a view to finding an answer to this we have to try an experiment ourselves— as we have occasionally tried it in various connexions before now— in the direction of evanescence. Let us take a concrete fact, and let us gradually think all determinations away from it : the sensible qualities, the associated ideas, the polarity of Subject and Object— in fact all that make the experience a particular experience— are made to vanish. Now, what is the limiting value of this operation ? Absolute void ? I think not. In the limit, we should be left with consciousness as such, or what is the same thing, with being as such. In pursuing this method we can, however, hardly expect to come to the limit itself : the most scrupulous effort can perhaps bring us to a condition of minimum determination, and not to a condition of no-determination. But as in mathematical and physical limits so in this we have to imagine or conceive a condition of no determination as a consummation of a condition of vanishing determinations : in this method we can imagine or conceive the limiting condition, but not actually realize it.

Here I have simply stated the method and what I believe to be the Limiting Condition without considering the thousand and one difficulties with which the way of this method is beset. Two of the more formidable difficulties I shall do well to mention

here : it shall be the look out of a future essay to see if these difficulties can be faced and overcome. *First*, is the operation of vanishing determinations which is expected to bring us to the Limiting Condition continuous ? We can go on thinking away determinations from a concrete object of experience to a certain extent no doubt, but can we proceed in the same direction indefinitely ? We may have possibly discontinuous operations in mental life : for example, Weber's Law which establishes a quantitative connexion between Stimulus and Sensation is true to a certain extent ; beyond that the Stimulus may increase and act upon the organism but the direction of the resulting sensation may not be the same as before— if it were systematically increasing before it is now either stationary or even decreasing. Beyond this limit therefore Sensation is a discontinuous function of Stimulus. May not the same thing be true of the operation that are so far imagining to ourselves ? May not this operation (1) cease itself after it has proceeded a certain way ahead, and (2) produce a resulting experience which forsakes the direction of the operation beyond a certain point as Sensation does in relation to Stimulus ? In either case, the Limiting Condition fails. *Secondly*, assuming that the operation is continuous, both in itself and in relation to its function, what guarantee have we that the Limiting Condition will be one of no determinations and not merely one of minimum determinations as in mathematics. Limiting Value means a value from which the value of a function can be made to differ by a quantity less than any assigned value however small. The mathematical limit involves therefore a distinct conception of infinitesimal difference. Shall we admit this conception in our own case too ? Shall we say that pure consciousness is only the *theoretical* limit from which a given *actual* experience can be made to differ by an infinitesimal difference ? If so, pure consciousness remains an abstraction, an ideal, still. These difficulties cannot be lightly met and easily overcome. Briefly, however, I will say this : In an actual trial of the experiment referred to there appear no suspicious signs of a possible discontinuity either of the operation or its result. Also, infinitesimal difference in mental life is no difference, if it means a diffe-

rence that we cannot feel : if we at all feel the difference between two conditions A and B— no matter how and to what extent— the conditions *are* different ; if we do not— not even as regards Time and Space relations— then A is absolutely identical with B : now, what does infinitely small difference between A and B mean ? These are only hints to reflection.

II. The Method of Actual Limits is a mystic method by which the mystic swoon of Vedanta and Neo-Platonism may be *actually* realized by an experimenter. In this we do not simply conceive a condition when the limit of a certain operation has been taken : we actually *live* this condition. And if we live it— and that beyond the shadow of a doubt— it becomes a concrete state itself, not merely the inalienable Basis of Fact as reason and reflection expose it to be, but Fact itself. Here I can do no more than passingly refer to this Method and its Result : the evidences are too varied and exacting to be fairly compressed and considered in a closing paragraph of an essay. Shall I merely refer to the cerebral difficulty which is supposed to be fatal to this audacious claim of the mystic ? Psychosis being admittedly parallel to neurosis, how can a quiescent condition of pure consciousness : pull on with an unstable— ever acting and never resting— cerebral counterpart ? Why should it not ? I shall ask in reply. Has science ever proved that an unstable brain-state must correspond with an unstable mental state ? When I am deeply merged in an objective vision the experience is fairly a stable one, though not absolutely ; what about the cerebral state which corresponds to it ? This latter also may be *relatively* stable : but have we really established a law that the degree of quiescence of a mental state varies directly as that of the total cerebral state ? Suppose we grant this : we have ourselves previously suggested that in the life of the brain as in the life of the mind there may be comparatively quiescent conditions either periodically recurring or artificially induced. But even then the mental state need not correspond to the motions of the *individual* molecules, centres or fibres of the brain ; it corresponds perhaps to the total or *resultant* state of the brain ; Now, the respective components of two resultant

conditions may vary among themselves without necessarily making the resultants vary also. Thus the component p, q, r of the resultant A and the components x, y, z of the resultant B may change respectively into p', q', r' and x', y', z' without making A and B take different values. Hence, if during two consecutive moments the resultant brain-state continue to remain unchanged, though the component motions of the molecules, centres etc., may have changed, the corresponding mental state will also remain unchanged. Thus a stable mental condition may have its counterpart in a stable, unchanging *resultant* cerebral condition. 'Stable' as applied to the brain need not necessarily mean a condition of *no* motion ; it means perhaps the condition of uniform or unvarying in motion in so far as the brain *as a whole* is taken into account. This state of motion is still a condition of stress ; the question therefore still remains : Can an experience which is supposed to be a condition of no stress correspond to a resultant brain-state which is undoubtedly a condition of stress ? Spinozistic Parallelism may really carry matters to such a head as this. But here we need not stay for a discussion. This Method will engage us more fully in a later volume.

About the nature of the Primary Basis I have to offer but few categorical remarks in this closing paragraph. *First*, none of our categories of thought such as unity, plurality, infinity may touch this ultimate Basis. It is this that imparts to the concrete fact its essentially alogical and unspeakable nature : as the Fact is so the facts are. Nevertheless, the Fact, the Basis is not unknowable— it is consciousness as such. *Secondly*, it is conceivable or realizable in us not by means of dialectics but by means of an experiment in the line of either of the two methods explained above. Ordinary intuition supplemented by dialectics will still reduce pure consciousness to an abstraction. *Thirdly*, Consciousness and Being are the two aspects of this Basis— if we may say so about an existence which is absolutely simple. In ordinary experience Being and Consciousness, though essentially bound up together, still diverge from each other : we inveterately believe in objective existence which is beyond the pale, and

independent, of consciousness : there is the co-efficient of possibilities attached to the actual. But in the Basis the divergence is absolutely gone. *Lastly*, the Basis is the home of quiescence and also, as we shall see in a future volume, the essential substratum of enjoyment and bliss. It is level of no stress, zero potential, absolute homogeneity, all consciousness, all being and all bliss.

conditions may vary among themselves without necessarily making the resultants vary also. Thus the component p, q, r of the resultant A and the components x, y, z of the resultant B may change respectively into p', q', r' and x', y', z' without making A and B take different values. Hence, if during two consecutive moments the resultant brain-state continue to remain unchanged, though the component motions of the molecules, centres etc., may have changed, the corresponding mental state will also remain unchanged. Thus a stable mental condition may have its counterpart in a stable, unchanging *resultant* cerebral condition. 'Stable' as applied to the brain need not necessarily mean a condition of *no* motion ; it means perhaps the condition of uniform or unvarying in motion in so far as the brain *as a whole* is taken into account. This state of motion is still a condition of stress ; the question therefore still remains : Can an experience which is supposed to be a condition of no stress correspond to a resultant brain-state which is undoubtedly a condition of stress ? Spinozistic Parallelism may really carry matters to such a head as this. But here we need not stay for a discussion. This Method will engage us more fully in a later volume.

About the nature of the Primary Basis I have to offer but few categorical remarks in this closing paragraph. *First*, none of our categories of thought such as unity, plurality, infinity may touch this ultimate Basis. It is this that imparts to the concrete fact its essentially alogical and unspeakable nature : as the Fact is so the facts are. Nevertheless, the Fact, the Basis is not unknowable— it is consciousness as such. *Secondly*, it is conceivable or realizable in us not by means of dialectics but by means of an experiment in the line of either of the two methods explained above. Ordinary intuition supplemented by dialectics will still reduce pure consciousness to an abstraction. *Thirdly*, Consciousness and Being are the two aspects of this Basis— if we may say so about an existence which is absolutely simple. In ordinary experience Being and Consciousness, though essentially bound up together, still diverge from each other : we inveterately believe in objective existence which is beyond the pale, and

THE PATENT WONDER

आश्चर्य्यवत् पश्यति कश्चिदेन-
माश्चर्य्यवद् वदति तथैव चान्यः ।
आश्चर्य्यवच्चैनमन्यः शृणोति
श्रुत्वाप्येनं वेद न चैव कश्चित् ॥
—गीता ।

पिता धर्मः पिता स्वर्गः पिता हि परमं तपः ।
प्रसीदतु स मे पूज्यः पिता श्रीमधुसूदनः ॥

To

My Father

Sri Madhusudan Mukhopadhyaya

PREFACE

The present work is a sort of interlude between my previous work, *The Approaches to Truth*, and the larger works which I hope to be able to take up shortly. In some respects it is a re-statement, in less technical terms of the views enunciated in *The Approaches*; in other respects it is a carrying out of those views. In carrying them out I have apparently gone beyond them at many points. My Fact there was after all only the Fact as given through a particular point of view, though I stoutly and repeatedly disclaimed all intentions to make it a Fact individualised. It was not *my* Fact, though it was the Fact as revealed through *me*. I was loath to drag the Fact beyond such revelation. Here also I have started at this point; my first presentation of the *Bhāna* here is only a representation of the Fact-Stuff as depicted there. But here I have striven hard to rise above particular points of view, and reach up to a perception of Reality such as may be regarded as truly indefinable. The first perception was correct so far as it went; but still its messages have to be revised or at any rate reinterpreted when a deeper perception comes. Even in perception we have a method of Limiting Values. It gradually approaches the fullness and nativity of Truth and its different readings or messages ought to be taken rather as growing instalments of a realizing Truth, supplementing and illuminating one another than as statical results, either consistent or contradictory. It is as if one were first made to fix his gaze on a bright neighbouring star and then to move his eyes to a small, inconspicuous luminary *Arundhati*, lying close to it, which could not be readily pointed out to begin with. I hope these remarks will prepare my reader to follow my method and test my results.

The method here followed is essentially the same as that followed in *The Approaches*: intuitive self-reflection. I have offered some remarks regarding the nature and possibilities of this method in the body of the present work. I need not forestall them now. I am not a disciple of any European master so far as this method is concerned; in clinging desperately to this method I have been true only to my Indian phylogeny; it was *the* method

with the Indian Seers for the perception of Truth. We have only a reassuring echo of a by-gone method in recent Bergsonianism. My race-instinct has again spoken through my struggling deliverances as it has reasserted itself through my home-bound method. My reviewer in the *Modern Review* dubbed me as a follower of the late Professor James ; but there is perhaps little substantial sympathy between his point of view and mine. ; I agree with him in so far as I have chosen to stand or fall by radical empiricism which means for me the method of intuitive self-reflection, a reaction against absurd intellectualism and the same as the *aparokṣānubhūti* of the Indian Seers. Like its fore-runner the present work is not critical but constructive, not an examination of different possible points of view but an interpretation of life from my own. I have also striven, as said before, to dispense with a point of view altogether ; but then every metaphysician has to do it. Within the narrow compass of the present work I am able to show life only in *some* of its aspects ; it never aims at completeness. Religious and ethical aspects and the emotional side generally have been almost entirely overlooked here ; the purely theoretic constructions are also partial.

The frequent references to *The Approaches* will not require in the reader a knowledge of that technical and prohibitive work. I shall be happy if they will only stimulate his interest in a more rigorous presentation of these views. I may be allowed to add also that the reasons that led me to depart from the official method of Philosophy in *The Approaches* are not to me minor and unimportant. I do not know if to a reader of that book my special method of investigation will justify and commend itself ; but my adoption of that mathematico-scientific method in metaphysics is certainly not due to a love of technical complexity, but to a growing conviction that such a method, if courageously followed and judiciously applied, will lead to a very considerable simplification in abstruse thinking ; that it will bring within sight the realization of a dream after which all thoughtful minds in all ages have sighed, *viz.*, a definite, durable, scientific metaphysics. It is not a physical treatment of metaphysics, but an attempt to attain to the archetype of a method which has already appeared in physics with so much promise and potency.

and which *ought* to appear in metaphysics also. The method of Limits, for example, has been to me profoundly instructive. At the same time I have certainly not concealed the alogical nature of the Fact which no scientific method can reach and possess. The supreme accent in my presentation lies of course on the method of experiment and *not* on that of theoretical Analysis : the Fact can be only lived and not thought about. In the present work I have reverted to the official method, not because I have had already too much of the method of *The Approaches*, but because I intend to offer it for less academic consumption. The larger works which should follow would try to cure that method of its first nervousness of hesitation and apply it with more precision and thoroughness. I am not without a bright suspicion that the method will be largely justified by its results.

The Hon'ble Justice Sir John Woodroffe kindly suggested to me what I readily perceived to be an improvement on my original plan of work. I have said in my former work—the Preface to *The Approaches*—that my last conclusions are substantially the same as those contained in the Upaniṣads. But the fact was hardly recognisable in the rigid, mathematico-scientific form of that work. And yet the fact was there. Sir John Woodroffe himself broke the crust and pointed out to me the correspondence underneath in two or three places at least : my ether of Awareness is the *Cidākāśa*, to take only one of these cases. He suggested that this correspondence should be laid bare by means of reference to the actual texts or terms of the *Sāstras* themselves. A modern interpretation of the old truths would be valuable, he said. Now, in the present work I have taken up his suggestion, but perhaps have not wholly carried it out in a manner in which he would wish me to do it. In the main body of the work, which is in English, I have interpolated Sanskrit terms very sparingly : perhaps Sir John would like me to do it more liberally. But there is a distinct Sanskrit limb of the work which, with its fifty original verses and their short commentaries, is an independent work by itself. The English portion is likewise an independent reading. I do not know if such an arrangement will meet his wishes.

About the Sanskrit portion I should say one word more.

The verses are composed by myself as are also their brief explanations in Sanskrit. I do not know how this humble performance of a lay man will be received by the scholars. I hope they will indulge me in my little vagaries. The presentation of the fundamental doctrine of the Upaniṣads is perhaps somewhat unorthodox even in the verses and in the explanations. Many terms have been used in apparently novel senses. But they will show nevertheless how really close I have sought to keep to the intuitions of my ancestral Seers. My mathematico-scientific method has only confirmed me in my native mysticism. The Sanskrit commentaries do not pretend to be what commentaries in Sanskrit commonly are— expository discussions. They do little more than paraphrasing and turning into prose. They are written in plain, common Sanskrit. I have given also a free English rendering of the verses. I hope my English readers will forgive me if they find the verses dry and dull, and my Sanskrit readers if they find them loose and fanciful in many places.

I cannot bring out this book avoiding typographical and other errors. A list, possibly incomplete, is given at the end. I cannot also close this preface without expressing my gratitude to my friend and pupil Sj. Purnashasi Basu, B.Sc. for the constant and valuable help I have received from him in the publication of this book.

PANCHABATI VILLA
Manicktolla
Calcutta, the 23rd August, 1915

P. N. M.

नास्त्यस्तीति प्रतीतौ नियतमनुगतं सन्दधे शुद्धवसत्त्वं
 बैचित्र्ये प्रत्ययानामपि निरतिशयं चिद्घनं निविशेषम् ।
 हर्षमिर्षादिमध्ये सुखद्वन्द्वममलं चास्ति यद् बाधहीनं
 सत्यान्नद्वयप्रबोध-प्रतिफलितकलं निष्कलं तत्तुरीयम् ॥ १ ॥

अध्यारोपापवादौ खलु निगमयतो भूम्नि सर्वप्रतिष्ठा-
 मौदासीन्यं समाप्तं पुनरपि विशदं निर्विकल्पे समाधौ ।
 सिद्धः सन्धानशेषात् परममधुरिमा चात्मनि प्रेमवृत्ते-
 र्हानोपादानतृष्णाप्यथ च विगलिता सर्वभृत् सर्व एषः ॥ २ ॥

कूटस्थाकाशलग्नश्चलति जलधरो वायुभिस्ताड्यमानो
 विश्वव्यापारधारा प्रवहति विविधा शाश्वते चैव काले ।
 एवं दिग्देशकालानुपहितमहिमा शुद्धबोधस्वरूपः
 कूटस्थो लेपहीनो न चलति तनुते विश्वनाट्यैकमञ्चः ॥ ३ ॥

शेते श्यामा धरित्री जलनिधिवसना कारणाव्योम्नि यस्मिन्
 वायुर्वाति प्रसन्नो नवमुकुलरसस्निग्धगन्धश्च यत्र ।
 चित्तं प्रत्येति नित्यं मम भवरसिकं यत्र भावाश्च नाना
 सर्वो लीयेत भूयो भूवनपरिचयश्चैव यस्मिन् हि तत् सत् ॥ ४ ॥

I meditate on the Pure Being which is invariably implied both in the perception of being and in that of non-being— both when I feel that something is and when that nothing is ; the Pure Awareness which is without differentiation and growth even in the manifoldness of experience ; the Pure Blessedness which continues uncompromised in the midst of all feelings of joy and sorrow. I meditate on the Reality which transcends the three states of waking, dreaming and sub-conscious experience ; which is absolutely simple and therefore without any aspects, and yet whose aspects are recognised as being reflected in Being, Beatitude and Consciousness.

Given that bounded Continuum, all things can appear ; that being subtracted, all things must disappear ; hence that is proved to be the Primary Basis which contains and supports all. The absolute transcendence of that is realised in pure, non-polar meditation (where the polarities of Subject and Object, Being and Becoming, and so on, do not exist). That Ātman is the

final object of liking and therefore is the substratum of unsurpassable sweetness ; and yet all desire for acceptance and refusal has melted away in it. So that it is at the same time All and Beyond-All.

Masses of clouds floating in the changeless Space are moved by the winds ; the varied stream of World-process glides on also in eternal Time. Such is also Ātman whose essence is pure consciousness ; whose greatness is not limited by the determination of Direction, Space and Time ; which is quiescent and absolute which neither moves nor extends, and yet remains as the sole stage where the World's play is enacted.

That primordial Void (or Pure Being) where the green Earth girdled round with the oceans lies ; in which the joyous Wind mildly scented with the perfume of new blossoms blows ; where my Mind, a lover of change, ever experiences varied notes of feeling ; where again the whole bubble of my universe of experience bursts ; that is the Reality.

THE PATENT WONDER

भूतस्यागोचरत्वे प्रणिहितमनसो भाविनोऽप्येवमेव
सामस्त्येन प्रतीतं यदपि भवति मे चापरोक्षस्वरूपम् ।
सन्देहस्पर्शलिशश्च विरमति यतो हि स्वयंसिद्धसत्त्वे
सर्वप्रामाण्यभूमिर्मदनुभवजगद् भानचैतन्यमेतत् ॥ १ ॥ *

The surest fact for me is my Experience. By this I mean the whole content of my consciousness : it is my entire universe as I live it in consciousness : it is the concrete fact that I am unreservedly aware of. Let me tell you what I actually am and entirely possess now, and I tell you what my universe of fact now is. I cannot indeed define this universe of fact, for in the very act of defining I cannot but ignore the concrete whole and seize upon what is after all only an abstract segment. The whole eludes me in my thought, though it is inalienably with me in my feeling : I can never cease to feel the whole, but I can only think about a part. I cannot define the whole for the very reason that it exceeds all my limiting categories ; I cannot miss it for the very reason that I can never go beyond it. I may, however, call it Fact-Stuff (*Bhāna*). All the constructions of thought are worked out of it, and none can be stretched beyond it. Whatever I think about it, I necessarily think in it ; whatever I question, believe and hope regarding it, I necessarily evolve within its bounds. I cannot overstep its bounds even as I cannot jump across my own shadow. It is an unbounded sea of awareness where the modes of thought and feeling rise and subside like waves and eddies. No positive idea can be conveyed by words and description ; some sort of negative conception can possibly be formed by

* भूतविषयस्य भाविविषयस्यापि ज्ञानागोचरत्वे प्रणिहितमनसः मम यत्-
किञ्चित् सामस्त्येन चापरोक्षत्वेन—इदं सर्वं विभाति, प्रतीयते स्मर्यते अनुमीयते
कथ्यते—इत्याद्याकारं ज्ञातं भवति ; यस्मिन् स्वतः सिद्धे ज्ञाने (न तु ज्ञानविषये)
सन्देहस्पर्शलिशश्च न सम्भवति साक्षाज्ज्ञानमात्ररूपत्वात् ; सर्वप्रामाण्यभूमिभूतं तन्मम
ज्ञानममष्टिरूपं अनुभवजगत् भानचैतन्यमिति कथ्यते ॥ १ ॥

scaring away the categories which claim to possess it with a spurious title.

The Fact-Stuff cannot be regarded a present fact as distinguished from a past and future one. To *think* of it at all I must conceive it indeed as a flowing stuff with a history, dealt out to me in time-sections. This is a necessity of thought. But it is not a necessity of feeling. To live the Fact-Stuff I need not necessarily live in the tenses. It is above Time. Generally it involves no thought of time even ; when it does, it is not itself transcended and conditioned by what it involves. I dream of time on the bosom of a time-less Fact-Stuff. I have the illusion of an endless stream of becoming set against the background of quiescent inscrutable Being. The order imbedded in the Fact-Stuff is indeed changing and the conception of this change also presupposes Time, but both change and movement are immanent operations, and therefore cannot be made to apply to the Stuff itself. I cannot say that the Stuff itself changes or moves, while I do say that elements or sections of Fact are coming and going.

But about the nature of the Fact-Stuff I may notice, to begin with, one prominent feature, *viz.*, its note of fundamental assurance. The Fact, the concrete whole of experience, is assurance itself : the fact that it is given cannot possibly be questioned, though I may have all sorts of misgivings about what I pragmatically call its objective validity. Leave all reference to anything beyond itself, take it as the given actual, and you cannot possibly doubt it ; for to doubt it is to contradict yourself, to refuse to be what you actually *are*. Perhaps you ought to be something else, and if you choose to regard that 'ought' as your real, you actually may be what you really are not. But then this distinction between 'actually' and 'really' is a pragmatic one : it is one that you have chosen to believe in and abide by. Apart from this circumstance of choice, actual and real are identical categories of thought. My actual experience is not only the surest but the only ground upon which I stand. My theories of reality are necessarily founded upon this basis. The theories can never go beyond the actual, though I may imagine that my actual is but a little speck in the infinite universe of the possible. The belief in

the possible, the foretaste of the possible, the remembrance of the possible, are sections of the actual itself ; I actually believe, remember and forecast. The magic circle of the actual can never be transgressed. What I believe to be past and gone yet finds a place in my actual to hinge upon : I *actually* believe that the past is past and beyond my recall ; what I do recall as pertaining to the past I actually recall now : so also in the case of my hopes and expectations. I cannot therefore cast the actual itself into the dimensions of Time. Any such play with the actual is indoor, immanent : like a helpless child I am only given to play on the bosom of the indefinable Given. I speak perhaps in enigmas, but the warmest, commonest facts of living are more enigmatic than the haziest, subtlest riddles of thinking. The given as given opens up the deepest vein of assurance and quiescence. That which is merely possible speaks undoubtedly in a feebler and shakier tone. I may credit a past and a future fact more than I may credit an actual one ; but this is so because the former stand for possible actuals ; nothing which is not an actual itself, or is believed to lead to and culminate in an actual, can bear comparison with the actual in point of assurance.

Again, what is discredited is never the concrete actual itself. When I doubt the rope-snake of my illusion, the rope-snake is not certainly the concrete whole of the moment : this is only a section of the fact which has attained to liveliest interest and therefore to almost exclusive attentive regard ; but it is not my entire universe of experience at that moment any more than the suspicion of its illusoriness is my universe at the next. I will not attempt a description of the universe, but only prefer an appeal straight to self-intuition. The whole universe of feeling is not, and never can be, discredited. As it is given in consciousness so it is. What I have felt I have felt. The question as to how I should have felt is a very pertinent question no doubt, but it cannot surely render my feeling to be other than as it has been actually felt. I have felt differently in the past and may feel differently in the future, but nevertheless I feel as I feel. Even the rope-snake as an element of the concrete actual is not, and can never be, discredited. What I have seen I have seen : the

rope-snake and not the rope is the actual experience for me. I am dissatisfied with my actual experience and expect to see something else being actual instead, not because there is a real difference in assurance and quiescence between the former actual and the latter, but because I happen to be more interested in the latter kind of experience. As experience one is as good as the other, and if I could take them only as experiences I would not recognise any disparity in tone of assurance between them either ; but life is grimly practical and selective, so that I have been driven to credit experiences or discredit them according as they have or have not a certain reference and serve or do not serve a given purpose. It is the practical interest in experiences which creates the difference in level or potential between any one and any other. The rope-snake though as genuine an experience as the rope does not show this reference or serve this given purpose. If I eschew this purposiveness, I reduce all pulses or stretches of experience to their native homogeneity of givenness. I have true experiences and false feelings ranging between the limits of fancy and direct intuition, because I *want* to have such distinctions super-imposed upon a datum which is in itself impartially and unrelentingly doubtless. Clouds divide the genial flood of sunshine into light and shade : fleeting states render consciousness into knowledge and obliviscence, memory and expectation. Let the clouds roll away, and we have brightness pure and simple ; let the fleeting states either go or stand, and we have unflinching, undiminished knowing. The surrender of all practical interests will make experience an actual wherewith the real has once for all blended into one ; no divergence between the two can be maintained. Hence in itself, apart from all practical interests, the given is the limit of evanescent doubt : it is the primary source of assurance upon which all the practical facts of life draw. To become or to be made is to be given. The Actual is self-evident (*svatahsiddha*). It is manifestation itself. That which is manifested cannot be supported or proved by the unmanifested. It requires no such support or proof. What has appeared has appeared. The fact that it has appeared cannot be called in question. Here lies its self-evidence. That which has

not appeared lacks this self-evidence. This latter is only a suspicion, an expectancy, a category in my mind. I conceive the manifested as flowing from the unmanifested and returning unto it : such a conception may be necessary or problematic, correct or chimerical. But in any case the actual is not compromised by the laws or accidents of my thinking. I may imagine whatever I like regarding it, but I can never doubt or disclaim that what is given is given. It is again my practical interest in modes of experience which makes me refer my actual to some shadowy potential as its origin or destiny : I consider the latter as more evident and self-sufficient, because I happen to be more interested in it. Thus the unseen is invested with charms such as the seen never possesses. I am haunted with a sense of dissatisfaction with the actual. It is not an order of existence which I would fain close with. It is imperfect, ephemeral. It is only an effect of a hidden cause. It is only a halting stage in an endless journey, a passing earnest of an unfathomable fulfilment. But does all this really undermine the self-evidence, eat away into the self-sufficiency of the Actual ? Can any order which is not actual, or which is not going to be actual, be self-evident and final ? The cause is accepted as more evident than the effect, but then the cause is *believed* to be an actual order also ; the end satisfies me more than a passing instalment, because the end is believed to be an actuality also. Nothing which is unmanifested pure and simple, which is never believed to go in for a manifestation, can really upset the repose and attenuate the evidence of the actual.

Actuality is the level of self-evidence. The unmanifested derives its evidence from this. In the first place, the unmanifested is believed to be a more abiding actuality, one from which the actuals emanate and into which they are absorbed : it is thus believed to be more actual than the given actual. This confirms rather than weakens the conviction that the basis of self-evidence must in all cases be sought in actuality, whether felt or believed. In the second place, when I refer my actual to the unmanifest as its ground or end, my reference is certainly immanent and not transcendent ; I cannot surely go beyond the actual in making such reference ; hence whatever extraneous evidence I may seek,

or find *for* my actual, I must seek or find *in* the actual— I can never cease to be actual either in the search or in the finding. The self-evidence of the given cannot be undermined by an immanent operation like this. Neither in the act of believing in an extra-given cause or end, nor in the act of conceiving or finding them, can I really be extra-actual. The actual is changing and growing perhaps—in what sense we do not yet know ; but even assuming that it is really changing and growing, as we suppose it to change and grow, I cannot show that my experience can ever be other than actual. There has been perhaps a change in actual experience when from a complacent acceptance of the actual I pass on to question it and refer to an unmanifest cause or end. I have said 'perhaps', because the nature and extent of the change in the bosom of the actual are yet to be understood : does change apply to the whole universe of fact or only to a group of fact-sections ? But does the change, whatever be its nature and extent, take me out of the actual and even momentarily exile me into extra-actuality (*abhāna*) ? If assuredly it does not, I do not see how I can *really* prove the *Bhāna* by the *Abhāna*, the given by the ungiven. The contained never really proves the container, an immanent operation can never properly be accepted as a transcendental theory and demonstration. In the last place, what is it that we really seek to prove in the actual and imagine as having been proved ? Can it ever be the whole concrete universe of fact ? Sometimes I do of course conceive my universe of fact as derived from, or following upon, a previous order, as leading to a succeeding order : I thus enquire about its cause and about its consequences or end. But what is it that is thus arranged in the perspective of Time and moulded according to the category of Causality ? Can it be the whole ? If it were so, I could really go beyond the whole concrete. It will not be correct to describe the concrete (*Bhāna*) as my entire experience of the present moment ; to do so will be to mistake a section of the concrete for the concrete itself. The concrete is a time-less fact which involves, but is not conditioned by, time-determinations. So that the concrete itself is independent of all immanent arrangements, temporal, spatial, causal, and so forth. The

present fact is *not* the fact : it is merely a cross-section of the Fact. What is the Fact then ? I say, though it would be premature to say now, that it is Consciousness itself in which the totality of fact-sections (*pratyayāḥ*) is conceived 'as an endless stream of becoming'. Consciousness is actuality itself. About this no temporal, spatial or causal questions can be raised with sense or without absurdity. But this is merely a hint at this stage. Generally, however, we ask about the causes and consequences not of the Fact itself, but of the included fact-sections : not about the entire universe of experience in which a double yellow line has appeared in a spectrum band, but about the double line itself. There is no appeal from actuality to some order other than actuality, but from one mode of actuality to another, from what I have to what I expect to have, and never beyond the pale of my having. But is not the expectation to have a kind of non-actuality (*Bhāna*) ? Certainly not ; expectation like remembrance is an actual state of consciousness— they are only modes of actuality different from perceptual. The accompanying tones of belief and other characteristics vary from one case to another, but they can make for me only different kinds of *Bhāna* itself.

As the Actual contains within itself the very soul of self-evidence, so it possesses securely in itself the very essence of immediateness. The Fact alone is self-evident and the fact alone is directly, immediately served. Hence it is known as the Given. What is merely possible forms a part of the actual too in a sense. In the concrete whole of experience I may distinguish a part which I take as given and set in contrast with another which I regard as suggested ; I may hedge round a portion which I suppose to be actual and jealously guard it from the overflow of a containing possible. But it is easy to perceive that the former distinction as well as the latter are immanent distinctions which can never really transfer me from the custody of the given and actual. The neverfailing larger given veils itself as it were in admitting within itself the polarity of given and suggested. The polarity admitted can never really efface the larger given and set up instead a real antithesis of given and not-given : by such

polarity I can have only different modes of given itself, though I may choose to retain the old name for some of these modes and bring in antithetic names (suggested, possible, and so on) for the rest. The larger given including all concrete experience and the smaller given opposing itself to a suggested and possible, agree as well as differ between themselves. They agree in essential givenness— they are both given ; they differ in pragmatic interest and emphasis— we are interested in regarding only a *part* of the actual as *the* actual, a *part* of the given for *the* given. We refuse the title to the all-embracing fact and thrust it upon our chosen part ; but the fact is not materially compromised by the manner and circumstances of our choice. Our choice of course means a difference in the life of the fact : a fact unreservedly accepted and a fact accepted in part and ignored in the whole are certainly different facts, but each is a fact nevertheless with none of the essential marks of fact taken away. The whole continues as given while in it we distinguish a given portion from a suggested one ; the fact remains as concrete whole while by abstraction we seize upon a section and apparently ignore the whole, and deal in such distinctions as whole and part, fact and fiction, direct and remote, and so on.

There would be no meaning in immediateness or directness apart from feeling. To be direct is to be felt : directness is a part of the essential import and deliverance of feeling. Feeling can never cease to be direct. When we regard certain elements of a mass or continuum of feeling as indirect, we really take, as suggested above, directness and indirectness in special, pragmatic senses which obscure for a while but cannot extinguish the sense of directness which the entire mass of feeling as feeling inalienably possesses. We are perpetually playing hide and seek with ourselves. A concrete feeling comes (but are we warranted in saying that it comes ?) ; it is all given, all direct, all evident. But forthwith an immanent operation sets in which creates all sorts of polarities or conceptual differences in the fact : certain elements are accepted as immediate, given and evident while others are regarded as indirect, suggested and requiring proof. By such operation the concrete fact has changed no doubt (as

I necessarily conceive it) : but it has not really sacrificed any of the characters of directness, actuality and self-evidence.

आधत्ते कालदेशौ परिणामति न तद् भानमेतद् हि ताभ्या-

माक्रान्तं व्यर्थं एवं किमिह किमधुना चेति लोकप्रबन्धः ।

सर्वावच्छेदशून्यः कथमिति विततो भानचैतन्यसिन्धु-

निर्व्वक्तुं नैव शक्यं स्थितिलयजननप्रश्न एवाप्रसक्तः ॥ २ ॥ *

As hinted before, the Fact-Stuff may involve both Time and Space. I may know the given as a configuration of elements in Space and also as a series of pulses of experience succeeding one another in Time : I may know it as Nature and as History. Such representation of Fact as Nature and History is not an inseparable incident in its life. I may *also* live the Fact without conceiving it either as an objective order spread as a configuration in Space or as a stream of events succeeding one another in Time. For all normal subjects at any rate, Fact is an extensive or massive form of existence ; I necessarily and invariably live it as an unbounded continuum : it is my universe. Consciousness is always an extensive feeling. It is a seemingly boundless *plenum* in which the sections or elements of the Fact appear and move. This immediate feeling of massiveness or extensiveness I can never put away from me : I can ignore but never efface this consciousness of spiritual extension. When I imagine I am interested in a point only or in a simple shade of feeling, when in

* देशकालौ भानस्यैतस्य अन्तःपातिनावेव । भानस्य परिणामः न हि देशेन कालेन च आक्रान्तः संघटति । न हि भानं देशाधिकरणे कालाधिकरणे वा परिणामति भानस्य देशकालयोश्च यथाक्रमं आधाराधेयसम्बन्धावगाहात् । येनाधिकृतं यत् किञ्चित् तस्यैवाधिकरणत्वं तन्न भजते । परिणामविज्ञाने कालज्ञानस्य आवश्यक-त्वेऽपि परिणामप्रत्ययमात्रे तस्य अनावश्यकत्वात् न कोऽपि विरोधः । भानं तावत् किमिह किञ्चाधुना इति लोकेयः प्रबन्धः क्रियते स खलु निरर्थक एव भानसाकल्ये तस्यावकाशलेशविरहात् । भानांशे तु तस्य सार्थकता सम्भवत्येव । देशकालादिभिरनवच्छिन्नो भानचैतन्यसिन्धुः कथं तर्हि वितनोति परिणामति वा विताने देशस्य परिणामे च कालस्य उभयत्र च कार्यकारणसम्बन्धस्य आवश्यकत्वादिति परिप्रश्ने कृते ब्रूमः निर्व्वक्तुं नैव शक्यमेतन् निजबोधरूपं भानचैतन्यमिति । अनिर्व्वचनीयतत्त्वे जननस्थितिलयकन्ताप्रश्नस्यैव सुदूरपराभव इति सक्षेपः ।

rapt fascination I am gazing at a solitary star which redeems the shadowy, spectral outlines of a far-off hill, and am feeling in a corner of my soul the stealthy quiver of a slight emotion, I have apparently ignored a limitless possession which never fails me and have mistaken a small, passing bubble for the vast unspeakable wonder of my reality, a faint rippling echo for the sublime, absorbing music of my life. Existence can never put away this vastness and sublimity : even while my interests and preferences would carve out of it snug, little toy worlds and induce me to shut myself up within them, I can never really cease to be the mighty Fact that I ever am. This inalienable consciousness of vastness and transcendence I have distinguished as Spiritual Extension or the Ether of Awareness. This spiritual Ether may condense at some places and exist in an attenuated condition at others, so that some portions of the universe of awareness may be regarded as a more tangible possession than others ; but by such preference I have not discriminated between what has appeared in consciousness and what has not, but merely between a certain mode of appearance in consciousness and a certain other. Briefly, discrimination is an immanent operation. I cannot settle the frontiers of my own universe myself.

But though the vastness of my conscious life can never really be cut down to dwarfish proportions, we should not lightly permit ourselves to confound this absolute vastness with what we abstract and know as Space. Fact is always extensive : but need it be always extended ? This is a question which we cannot easily set at rest. We should best begin perhaps by distinguishing between the intuition and the conception of Space. In the next place, we shall try to make clearer the relation between Space as involved in experience and the unfailing, unrelaxing vastness of experience. To begin with, how is Space intuited ?

Space as the possibility of muscular or physical movement comes to exist as an aspect of the universe of Fact. This universe is a condition of Spiritual Extension ; it is a stress in the Ether of Awareness ; it is a posture of the Ocean of Feeling. The vastness implied in the universe is probably of the essence of Awareness or Feeling ; it is an expression native to the structure of

spiritual being, not something alien to, and imposed upon it. Like the Fact itself it is immediately given : like the Fact also it is self-evident and ultimate. I cannot surely ask the reason 'why' regarding it, nor probably can I explain the manner 'how' concerning it. I cannot vouch for the vastness or massiveness of the amoeba's state of feeling, nor even for the vastness of the anthropoid ape's. Does the amoeba's or the ape's pulses of experience appear and disappear in a vast ether of awareness as do mine or yours ? Can those be aptly described as conditions of stress in an ocean of feeling to which as such no limits can be set ? I do not know ; yet I must necessarily conform my story or theory to the deliverance of my own concrete feeling. If I am anthropomorphic, I am necessarily so. I cannot but regard feeling or awareness as a sort of practically boundless *plenum* which completely fills up my whole being in which particular tones and modes of feeling may appear and disappear ; it is *not* equivalent to the sum of these particular tones and modes of feeling any more than the sea is equal to the aggregate of waves and eddies which appear on it, or the ether is equal to the sum of material objects which are in stress in it. But as I have pointed out before, it is rarely that I am in a mood to look this stupendous Wonder full in the face. Though I ever live, move and have my being in the bosom of this patent Wonder, I somehow manage to draw a veil between it and myself, fancy that I am only a comfortable, handy, little fact, and would talk and act as though I knew the Fact not. This is Ignorance of the Given which has its law and practical value. By this ignorance the patent Wonder in ourselves, without ceasing to be an actual consciousness, becomes latent to pragmatic attention which knows business and cares not for science. Thus it requires an essay of scientific reflection to bring into notice what has never really ceased to exist as an actuality in feeling. It has only not been *sufficiently* felt ; it has only wanted the *proper* height or tone of presentation. Not all the elements which have appeared in a given stretch of feeling possess the same tone of presentation ; many are veiled more or less. The entire stretch, which embraces all these elements as the whole, embraces its parts also, generally abdicates its rights to

intensive presentation in favour of the included fact-sections themselves : the mother-Stuff almost effaces herself so that her children may have the play all to themselves. Life is thus the Cross upon which the Fact is perpetually sacrificing itself. This apparent retreat of the Fact and the feverish, insistent knock of the fact-sections, together with occasional, rhythmic flashes of the Fact itself, make Life as we commonly live it.

Now, in order to transplant this story into the life of the amoeba or the ape, I need only perhaps conceive the Veil of ignorance as a variable. It is a variable in ourselves ; all fact-sections in a Fact are not equally veiled or unveiled. The tone or manner of presentation certainly varies in a complex continuum of experience, though all elements are actual as regards *bare* presentation. There need be nothing sub-conscious in the entire experience itself : though of course many of the given features are not *sufficiently* conscious. The Veil may not be a variable only within the limit of human experience. The variability may be continuous even beyond our own limits. The Veil may work even beyond the child and the savage. Thus the amoeba's or the ape's Fact may be essentially like ours, possessing amongst others the attributes of vastness and actuality, but it may be more completely veiled in them than in us ; and for the matter of that the amoeba's may be more completely veiled than our anthropoid ancestor's. This is a momentous conclusion from the principle of continuity. In fine, it means this : Believing in amoeboid sensibility, we shall do well perhaps to regard the Fact for the amoeba not as a slight pulse of elementary feeling but as a universe whose character of vastness has been almost completely veiled and where a few elementary features have been almost exclusively accentuated. In its life the abdication of the whole and favour of a part has been most complete. For all *practical* purposes its life consists of a series of elementary pulses. But this is not the entire life that it really lives. As partially in our case so almost completely in the case of the amoeba, this entire life may be ignored but it can never be effaced, can never cease to be the actual life. Of course we possess no manner of conception

about this sort of almost completely ignored actual life : in our own case, as we have seen, the veil that is drawn over the whole is comparatively thin and occasionally withdrawing, so that we may possibly have a science, a perception, of the whole. We must not dogmatize about the amoeba and the ape ; we must not too readily extend to them the accidents or even the incidents of our special intellectual existence. But neither should we surpass ourselves altogether in portraying the fact of feeling when we have passed beyond our own boundaries. The Fact in its essence and substance must not be compromised, though the principle of continuity may be trusted to impart to it new forms. To this extent we cannot help being anthropomorphic. Only such a rule of interpretation can be safely relied upon when we are trying to conceive "elective" facts or consciousnesses other than ours. We have offered an interpretation of amoeboid sensibility in terms of the fundamental principles that we have discovered and recognized in ourselves. The fundamental principles are mainly two : The immediate vastness or extensiveness of the Given (*Bhāna*) in our life which can never be contracted into *actual* smallness—the stretch never really becomes a simple shock of elementary pulse in ourselves ; the apparent and practical subsidence of the whole Given on behalf of a bounded and intensive feature or features—the apparent sacrifice of the extensiveness or breadth of life to intensiveness or depth.

Evolution of life, in the aspect of feeling, ought to be explained on the solid basis of these principles. The innate vastness of Feeling-whole should be taken as an original and inalienable datum rather than as a later development and peculiar manifestation. We should *begin* with it in the amoeba, and attempt to explain its apparent pulse-life by extending the Principle of Veiling which is ceaselessly and profoundly working in us reducing our life to an apparent series of pulses too. An explanation that would not start with this primordial extensity of experience should never expect to end with it : if you do not posit it at the beginning you cannot derive it at the end. No intelligible account of the vastness of feeling can be given by

means of elementary pulses alone which come and go, but do not possess or imply this vastness. Granting this vastness, we need not of course concede to the amoeba a universe of feeling of the same model as our own, but we cannot hold back the essentials of this universe either as our own monopoly. The Principle of Veiling playing variously with Whole and Part, Fact and Fact-sections, now tightening its grip now relaxing, now offering a glimpse of the unfailing Wonder, now insisting upon an exclusive acceptance of a commonplace— all according to a method : this is Evolution. What the Veil does in us it does everywhere, not excluding the amoeba : only it does more or less thoroughly. Vastness of conscious life— the universe— which practically does not exist in the lowest forms of life, gradually emerges and becomes patent. It is not quite and always patent even in ourselves. Our ordinary life is little better than a string of commonplaces with no clear and consistent avowal of the continuous Wonder by which these commonplaces are strung together and sustained. The avowal, the acceptance, the recognition has become clearer with the process of evolution in the living being, in society and in history. To adopt provisionally the Hegelian antithesis, the Fact is becoming "for itself" what it is "in itself". The Veil should not be mistaken for voluntary subjective preference and selection : that would render my story too fantastic. It is however connected with Habit as also with the Principle of the Curve. Compare the cycle V C H in the *Approaches*.

I do not pretend to be able to give an account of the minds of the lowest forms of life, or even to maintain on demonstrative grounds that minds exist at all in them. Assuming that minds do exist and that there has been a continuous development from those minds to ours, I have merely ventured to indicate in roughest outlines how we must feel our way back to these primitive minds in the light available from our own experience. This experience immediately delivers to us the ever-given extensiveness of our spiritual existence, and also the law of hide and seek apparently governing the presentation of Fact and Fact-sections. In exploring the depths of our past history in the more primitive

forms of mind we should courageously stick to the essentials of this deliverance. We should beware of making a physical treatment of spiritual existence. We should not imagine an all but infinite number of organisms existing and interacting in Space filled also with inorganic matter, and a unit of spiritual existence or mentality attached to each unit of living matter or organism. This is the commonplace description of the universe we live in, but it owes its origin and plausibility to the same Ignorance by which we play hide and seek with ourselves. Let us substitute Spiritual Extension or the Ether of Awareness for what we have called Space ; Space is merely an aspect, and abstracted and specialised expression of that Ether. You, me and all organisms — and I might add, the molecules of inorganic matter too— are so many centres or nuclei in this vast spiritual existence, so that this latter cannot properly be claimed as mine or yours or his. We are all in it, and not it in any of us. The Principle of Veiling, which we cannot mistake or doubt in ourselves, operates differently in the different centres of this universal Spiritual Stuff. In me it works in such a fashion that while commonly ignoring the universal Stuff itself and noting and dealing with petty segments in it, I am thrown back often on the bosom of the Fact also, and recognize and accept *this* as my Fact. The whole Fact is never sub-conscious however ; I have definitely identified existence with consciousness, the *sat* with the *cit*. Only my interest in the fact-sections makes me *regard* them alone and drive the whole under the mask of semi-attention.

The Centres in the co-essential Spiritual Stuff should not be regarded as physical centres. In so far as Spiritual Extension presents the aspect of Space, the Centres in it may also be conceived as taking spatial dimensions : spiritual reals may be known as physical organisms or bodies. The Centres are therefore in Space and yet out of it ; in their concrete fullness they belong to the concrete order of spiritual existence and not to Space which is only an aspect of such existence : yet an aspect of the Whole is also an aspect of the parts or centres included in it. Hence the Spiritual Reals are embodied *and* disembodied. The postulate of a co-essential Stuff

shuts out the possibility of a thorough-going pluralistic universe. They are a Many in One, and not a Many simply. In representing the co-relation of the Stuff and its included Centres we are not therefore bound hand and foot by physical analogies. The parties co-related are physical and super-physical, so that their points of contact will be physical as well as super-physical. So far as the Stuff appears as Nature extended in Space, the Centres in it also appear as bodies possessing spatial dimensions; so far also their mutual relations will be physical. But the concrete Stuff is the Fact itself which is alogical, neither objective nor subjective nor ejective, which is neither Nature nor Super-Nature. It is however larger than physical Nature, being the wholeness of the Given itself. The mutual relations of the Given and the centres in the Given cannot therefore be conceived as physical relations purely. Physically, a whole is shut out from a part, or rather a whole ceases to be a whole in a part. Concretely, the whole lives in its part, a part is apprehended as a part only in the whole : the whole never withdraws or ceases to be the whole : it can only emphasize itself in a part. Intuition on the nature of the Fact itself ought to settle this point. The conclusions from this proposition are really momentous. A Centre in the co-essential Spiritual Stuff can never shut out the Stuff itself : a Centre is the whole itself more or less ignored in the whole and emphasized in a part. Thus it never ceases to live the whole though it cares not to avow so much to itself : its cares are low, its interests are narrow : it is and knows vastly more than it believes it does. The Veil conceals the Wonder, but can never efface it.

All individual units of existence, living as well as non-living, higher as well as lower, are tolerably enduring centres in the co-essential Spiritual Stuff that I partly feel directly and partly construct ideally. The Stuff as outlined above is not something other than, or foreign to, the Fact-Stuff : nothing can be other than, or foreign to, *this*. Whatever I feel directly and whatever I construct ideally is securely contained in the Fact which continuously changes no doubt in a sense but can never outgrow or surpass itself. The bosom of the Fact is apparently ever in

stress, but I can never feel or imagine any condition which applies beyond the Fact itself. It would be quite legitimate perhaps to speak of various conditions of stress *included* in the Fact, but there would be no sense in saying that the Fact itself exists in various conditions or that my mental life consists of a series of various Facts. It is permissible to speak of the Fact existing in various conditions only in the sense which limits the variety or change to the stress or sum of fact-sections involved in the Fact and does not carry it beyond. Thus I can speak of *many* facts only in a special sense which takes care to distinguish the concrete whole from the stress abstracted from it, the ocean from the aggregate of waves and eddies discriminated in it. Properly speaking, I have even no right to regard the Fact as one. Be this as it may, the co-essential Spiritual Stuff, partly intuited and partly constructed, must be conceived as a condition in the Fact and not as a condition of the Fact. The latter way of speaking would suggest that the Fact itself is always becoming, changing from one condition to another, and that the life of the Fact is a process which presupposes a Time larger than and supporting the endless instalments of pulses of fact. From this suggestion it would follow that awareness is but a small, mysterious glow which attends the appearance of these coming and going pulses. Such a suggestion would cut across the grain of the essential import of Fact-life. Awareness in which stress exists and becomes, the elements of the Stress are perpetually changing and re-arranging, is the Fact.

Hence the theory of a co-essential Spiritual Stuff is necessarily an immanent one : I can never really be away from the Fact to formulate a theory. I cannot, however, help formulating one immanent though it be ; while thinking *in* the Fact I necessarily fancy that I am thinking *about* it. Let me boldly recognize the range and limits of my thought : I am thinking only about the stress that I can discriminate and conveniently hedge round in the vastness of my spiritual existence. This vastness is no importation of my thought, no part of my ideal construction : in is an inevitable cast of my Feeling itself, an inseparable incident of the Fact itself. That the Fact is a

boundless stretch of spiritual existence is not a proposition of my ideal construction, is not an appearance, a show, by which I wrap up the nakedness of what I immediately have ; I live this spirituality, I immediately have it, I inalienably am it. Hence in constructing a theory about this stress in the Fact, I cannot seriously think of renouncing this vastness and this spirituality. If no theory, no thought, can possess the complete Fact in its grip, let it at any rate possess as much of it as it can.

Let me therefore conceive my universe as a vast Spiritual Stuff in which countless individual units or centres exist and interact : let this be the story of the stress which I feel and recognize in my life. I repeat, it is no story of that life itself in all its concreteness. I have no right to claim this universe, this life, this vast spiritual existence, as my own : the Subject, the Ego is not, as I have been some-what anxious to maintain, a necessary and inseparable feature of experience. I am not therefore prepared to give the palm to myself in the universe, the *Bhāna*, that has appeared or that I ideally construct. I am merely an individual unit or centre among countless other units or centres. I am undoubtedly the liveliest centre in the Stuff, but I cannot set myself up as the centre round which the whole universe revolves or as the *only* centre that dreams of a universe of countless other centres acting and reacting. The whole stress in the bosom of the Fact may be, for aught we know, a colossal dream, but certainly this dream cannot be set down to my agency or authorship any more than it can be fastened upon you or any other centre. If the whole is a dream, I am necessarily a part of it, a function of it. It is not *my* dream. Moreover, the Awareness or Spiritual Being over which this dream is laid cannot be a dream itself.

The countless individual units or centres which I partly perceive and partly conceive in the universal Spiritual Stuff cannot shut out the whole in which they exist and interact. Each lives the whole in a sense : each is a monad in a sense. Each represents an individual standpoint in the manifestation of the patent Wonder. Each gives us a distinct angle of vision in regard to the sublime Fact. To define the individuality of any

particular centre more precisely we may say that it is the entire Spiritual Stuff that has been presented or veiled in a way and to an extent different from that in which or to which others have been presented or veiled. This indeed is no explanation of individuality, no sufficient reason of the differences that exist and relatively endure in the co-essential Spiritual Stuff. I have merely offered a formal statement in accordance with my theory of the Fact and the Veil. According to this theory, the difference between any one centre and any other is a difference in the manner and extent of the presentation or veiling of the Fact. One centre *accepts* the Fact in a way and degree in which another does not, though probably one *lives* the Fact just as another does. This makes the difference between one centre and another. A centre also *habitually* accepts the Fact in a tolerably particular manner and degree: this constitutes its individuality. When I suggest that a centre lives the Whole but does not accept it, I merely generalize upon a patent distinction between life and acceptance, experience and avowal, that I discover with fair certainty in myself. I live and accept my life differently, I feel and avow my feeling variedly. I have conceived this distinction which is wrought by the Veil to be variable, continuous and general. The Veil has worked differently in man and in the amoeba and in the long course of evolution between the two, as it has worked differently in Bergson and Eucken, James and Royce. One centre may be a clearer standpoint of viewing and representing the Fact it lives than another. Thus Bergson is a clearer standpoint than myself, as I am a clearer standpoint than the anthropoid ancestor. From the amoeba's standpoint the infinite vastness and lustre of the Spiritual Stuff apparently contracts into a simple, elementary pulse of feeling: such is its acceptance, avowal of Life. The gradual widening and deepening of this acceptance and avowal is Evolution. What in organic life we know as nutrition and assimilation is the physical rendering of this phenomenon of acceptance and avowal. It is the tendency of an individual unit or centre to overflow, to extend the zone of its emphasis and accent, to push the limits of its ownership. It must own more

and disown less. It must avow more and disavow less. The Stress that acts in the universal Spiritual Stuff impels this process in the countless centres : it is the underlying Energy or *Elan* or whatever else you call it that creates and develops. The cyclic nature of the elements of the Stress, viz., Presentation, Movement and Veiling, carries with it the necessity of this creative evolution. Veiling necessarily moves to Presentation : existence becomes less and less veiled in order to become more and more displayed : individuality moves from its ownership of an elementary shock of feeling to that of a fully furnished universe : organic life proceeds from simple cell-nutrition and cell-division to the highly co-ordinating and delicately self-adjusting activity of the human brain. Presentation again, by the same cycle law, leads to veiling : there is also a tendency from more presentation to less or from less veiling to more. Hence Evolution and Reversion are the two aspects of the world-process. Infinite evolution is a chimera. Alternate veiling and unveiling are incidental not only to my life of experience as I live it now, but to the history of the entire world-process itself which is but a stupendous stress in experience. Whatever fundamentally pertains to the life of experience belongs fundamentally to the life of the universe. Spirituality, vastness and rhythmic pulsation of the operations of veiling and unveiling necessarily belong to the former ; therefore they cannot but be supposed to govern the latter. Hence in the World's history the cyclic law rules ; so that in the Stress which manifests itself as the world, we must conceive a disposition in which the element of **P** prevails and imparts in character to the whole operation, and also another in which **V** prevails conforming the process to its own preponderance. During the former course the world slowly appears, during the latter it slowly disappears. This is the *curve* of existence which I have explained and discussed in another place. It merely shows that the disposition of the stress in the bosom of the Fact is subject to a law, is amenable to the discipline of an equation. It proves that I must not only possess more and more but lose more and more. That which I accept I must also refuse, and that which I disown I must also own. The two operations

are not merely co-existent, each implying and presupposing the other, but fairly rhythmically successive, so that each act of acceptance and possession is followed by an act of refusal and privation, and *vice versa*. Every feeling that comes to the mind grows as well as decays : in fact its waxing and waning are but the ascending and descending slopes of the curve of its existence. This is substantially true of the world as a whole. The death of the world is only the carrying out, consummation, completion of its life.

Here I am outlining a story of the Stress in the Fact and not of the Fact itself. Even the Stress in its concrete fullness is perhaps alogical and uncommunicating. It cannot perhaps be understood or thought about. Thought and talk become possible probably after the process of abstraction or veiling of the Given has been carried to the second remove at least. First, I abstract the Stress in the Given from the Given itself. Can this be thought about ? Perhaps no. In the apparently boundless Stress itself I hedge round a part that I can conveniently deal with and accept this partial stress for the whole. Here now I can think and talk. Life has been shorn of its aspect of speechless awe and invested with all the familiarity and handiness of a commonplace ; the eloquence of silence and absorption has given place to the noisy flutter of discursive treatment and talk. The theory of the Spiritual Stuff in which countless centres exist and interact is born, in so far at least it is a theory and not an immediate deliverance, after this double abstraction. This is no disparagement indeed, for theory *must* begin after this : it cannot touch the Fact itself, nor even perhaps the whole Stress in the Fact.

Spiritual vastness is a matter of direct feeling. My life is never really contracted into a point pure and simple. This Spiritual Space in which I ever live, move and have my being, which is in itself neither subjective nor objective, is, as I have suggested before, the concrete original of which objective Space is an abstraction and special manifestation. The essential substratum of Space is intuited when Spiritual vastness is intuited ; and as the latter is ordinarily ever a matter of intuition, the essential substratum of Space is also ever necessarily so. In this sense

Space is an inalienable element of the Given. It is but an *element* however. I never feel objective Space as swamping my whole being, as co-extensive with the entire Given. It is but one aspect of the Given ; that aspect of Spiritual vastness which involves visual and muscular feelings of a certain character, either actual or suggested. When I suppose I am intuiting objective Space merely, I am labouring under a delusion. I am ignoring my entire being and lavishing my favour upon an abstraction : objective Space is thus a pragmatic fact. It is imparting to the essential substratum of my life a special tone and connotation. Space, therefore, is not something distinct radically from Spiritual Space. The Stress in my life which vents as the movement of attentive regard in the exploration and elaboration of the Given, vents itself also as visual feeling and muscular movement in the apprehension of that aspect of the Given which we know as objective Space. The Given with the attentive regard apparently moving in it (this is a pragmatic way of representing the phenomenon though) is the general posture of the Stress in life ; Space involving or worked out by visual and muscular feelings in certain combinations and orders is a special posture of that Stress. The same essential substratum, *viz.*, the vastness of spiritual existence which I know by the intuition of the mind's eye and explore and elaborate by movements of attentive regard, is also especially apprehended by the bodily eye and worked out by the movements of the muscles assisted and supplemented by tactual sensations. Conception of Space, *viz.*, that all objects and minds are in it, arises from a mistaking of the pragmatic and sectional fact for the fact itself : they are in it of course in a sense, and yet they are out of it.

Space is an aspect but not a physical partition of the Spiritual Stuff. I cannot say that the Stuff is partitioned into Space and not-Space. The physical partition of an entity into Space and not-Space is a contradiction in terms. Physical partition—I use this term for want of a better—is itself a spatial operation ; hence it cannot be made to yield the antithesis of Space and not-Space. When again I say that Spiritual Reals exist in Space and yet out of it, are embodied as well as disembodied, I do not

suggest that they possess spatial dimensions in some *places* and lack them in others, but that they possess them in a special sense or aspect but want them in the general, concrete sense. From the view-point of the Fact itself they are only centres of individuality neither objective nor subjective, but spiritual ; each living the whole stuff but accepting and avowing it differently. Call this Spiritualistic Pluralism if you like. From the view-point of the Fact-section which we regard as Space these centres are known as embodied. The essential difference therefore is a difference of view-point : Are we going to take life in a concrete or in an abstract way? The embodied Real is born under the Veil. But what sort of body shall ascribe to the Real? Must the Real possess in all cases a physical or material body— must the Stress in the Fact vent itself in all cases as a material centre of activity? By Matter I refer to the matter of popular acceptance, and not to the matter of Science which may be a vortex in ether or a nebula of moving charges of electricity round a nucleus. The question must, I think, be answered in the negative. Incidentally I must observe that the birth of Space in the Spiritual Stuff proceeds through more than one stage. In the primordial extension or vastness of the Stuff, the germ so to say, the essential substratum of Space, is given already : that is as it were the Platonic archetype of our sensuous Space. The first beginnings or rudiments of sensuous Space appear as vibration or pulsation (*Spandana*) adapted to a special and restricted sense. Vibration in a general sense is discernible in the concrete Given : it pertains to the life of experience at least as we ordinarily live it. But this has to be adapted to a special and abstract sense before it can lay the possibility of material Space : material vibration or motion is an abstraction of Fact-Drift as suggested in the *Approaches*. The continuum is the possibility of Fact-Drift : fact-sections cannot appear and disappear and my regard cannot move among them unless my experience is presented to me as a continuum or as a spiritual mass. Even Consciousness appears to me as a sort of changeless *plenum* or ether in which the stream of the world-process glides ceaselessly on. It is the substratum of quiescent Being upon which the World sprouts

out as a phenomenal Wonder ever in the making. Hence Drift as pertaining to the life of experience presupposes this background of a continuum. Drift in a special light and emphasis appears as Motion, and the continuum to afford the basis of its possibility appears as Space. Motion not only presupposes but expresses Space.

The above gives us merely a very rude outline of the doctrine of Space that would be consonant with our theory of Fact. It has been clear perhaps that Space cannot possess or claim the Fact itself. Space is the Fact viewed from a special and despatched point of view. Under the Veil the Fact appears as Space with countless material centres in stress in it, just as my perception of the starry heavens at night may appear to my practical regard as a particular cluster of stars. The cluster of stars is merely the accepted portion of a vast actual possession in consciousness. Similarly Space is merely a special aspect of my spiritual existence which has been apparently detached from the whole in order that certain ends of life may be served. Such a detachment is more a biological than a spiritual necessity.

If the claim of Space to possess the fact can be thus disposed of, we should know how to decide when Time presses its claim to it. Surely we cannot but apply the notion of time to conceive the process of the Fact as a history. Can the whole Fact or *Bhāna* itself be thought of as a process? I do not see how it can. I conceive and necessarily conceive my universe as a ceaseless process of becoming : I feel also that it is changing and moving. But I ask : To what does this conception or intuition relate? The fate of the Philosophy of Absolute Change hangs on this delicate thread. The deliverance of my own feeling is categorical on this point. The whole concrete Fact is never felt or imagined as moving and changing. The concrete Fact, as I repeatedly urge, is the unchanging Ether of Awareness in which a mighty Stress is in stir. I would be false to the essential deliverance of my life if I should think and talk as though the Fact were an endless stream of becoming merely, with consciousness lighting up the process as best it might. Fact is not to me a stream of coming and going pulses of events, all

shading into one another, conscious, semi-conscious and sub-conscious. I do not imply of course that something, some transcendent reality, changes and moves, so that the process must be fastened upon it. I feel and think that the change or process, which cannot be denied, exists or appears in a changeless ether of cognition to which as such the change cannot be imputed. However variously I know, I *know*: the variety relates to the modes of knowing but does not affect knowing as such. I impute ordinarily the change to knowing : but this is a false imputation. It may be disputed whether pure knowing in which all varieties and forms have been thought away is a bald abstraction or no ; but if I claim that awareness is or appears as a sort of permanent spiritual space which makes room for and contains all varieties and forms appearing and disappearing, I do not think that claim can be seriously disputed. At any rate, I must abide by what I inalienably and unmistakeably have. Therefore, the process does not pertain to the entire Fact itself. Yet it must pertain to something in the fact. Does it then apply to the stress in the bosom of the Fact? Even here I feel I cannot be quite sanguine. The Stress is felt in Consciousness ; but surely this does not imply that the latter is a larger fact of which the former is only a segment ; the field or space of Consciousness cannot apparently be partitioned between Stress and that which is not Stress. I do not commonly feel that in the ether of my spiritual being Stress is exhausted within certain limits and that pure quiescence extends beyond them : briefly, Stress is not commonly felt as a local or partial disturbance in Consciousness, not as a sprouting development set against a *larger* background, placid and formless. I cannot point to any zone or corner of my awareness which remains placid and spotless while the rest of the field is rich with luxurious variety and astir with the thrill of unsatisfied life. Practically, Consciousness and Stress appear to be co-extensive with each other, though I cannot help feeling that the latter is *in* the former. This is a riddle I cannot explain.

Now, does process and movement apply to the whole Stress in my life? This is a point which, as I have admitted, cannot

be readily settled. If I seize upon any element in the Stress I feel of course that it changes ; but is my feeling unfalteringly sure about the whole Stress itself ? The process of the Stress, if it as a whole has a process, I feel no doubt : indeed my life of experience consists in feeling the Stress in all its colossal concreteness. But I find that I cannot perhaps render my feeling into a logical account with any show of philosophical right. I cannot conceive in logical terms that the entire Stress in my life is changing, for all the logical terms that I should require to bring to bear upon are evolved in the Stress itself and therefore cannot, without violence, be made to claim and possess the whole. Accordingly I can have perhaps no theory or logical representation of the Stress itself. I can deal only with the elements of the Stress. The conceptions which I form about the elements I extend no doubt to the whole itself : thus I may be driven to ask about the origin and reason of the world as a whole and its destiny. But such conceptions are bound to lead us unawares into inextricable antinomies, to the haziest confusion of thought. We may quite legitimately enquire about the world, but not about the world as a whole which means the all-embracing Fact itself. In this sense therefore the Stress is beyond our conceptions—inscrutable if I may say. Nevertheless it is Stress and felt as such ; if we must apply the idea of process to this Stress, let us make it perfectly clear that it is process as we *feel* it, not as we *conceive* it : it is *alogical* process—an expression that cannot clear the mist and lift the veil of existence but is nevertheless a face to face avowal of it. By alogical process I mean that it is not in itself resolvable into a representation by means of the categories of Time, Space and Causality. We ordinarily thrust such a logical representation upon it, but this is doing unwarrantable violence. Hence the whole Stress in the Fact, the whole stir of life in the ether of consciousness, cannot rightly be characterized and labelled as either here or there, either cause or consequence, either present or past or future. Here is a considerable simplification of the fruitless labours of metaphysics. Let it admit that it has no story to tell about Life itself : that Life is a wonder, patent and

sublime, which must be lived in grim earnestness but never talked about in profane arrogance.

A question of even greater importance and perplexity is : How is Time related to the life of the Fact ? Does the Fact essentially live in duration ? We may appeal to intuition but I am not sure it will readily throw an amount of clear, unmistakable light on this difficult point. Many of the commoner aspects of Life are hardly recognized as *aspects* : we are rarely in the mood to challenge and find them out in their true perspective and bearing. Duration is one of such aspects : Life appears to us as a flowing stuff, a fact running as a history. But we apparently never challenge this duration and essay to find out its true import and status. We apparently never suspect that duration or history may be only a special cast and acceptance of Life which in its essence and wholeness may transcend this cast and overflow this acceptance. Upon making an essay of intuition we are certainly very much tempted to regard Life as duration pure and simple, as Time in its concrete actuality. But are we really justified in thus identifying Life with concrete Time ? Are we quite sure that in taking this view we are not still looking at Life through some elusive refracting media of the all-pervasive Veil ? Of course we may have such misgivings touching any view that we may take regarding the Life we live. Nevertheless an enquirer should endeavour to come to a position where he can command as much dry light as possible to his soul's satisfaction and put away from himself the melancholy mist of misgivings and mistakings as completely as he can. In spite of all his heroic endeavours the mist may still abide ; but at any rate let it not abide in a greater degree if by an essay it can be made to remain in a less.

To begin with, intellectual or rational intuition is not a faculty fully designed and accomplished by the architect of our nature and blown into it with all the authority of an infallible instinct. It is an art, natural in its origin, into which the human nature requires to be educated. The power grows with the growth of our nature. It is the power by which Life accepts and rejects itself : a measure of acceptance necessarily implying

a measure of refusal. I broadly define Intuition, sensuous as well as intellectual, as the self-acceptance and self-rejection, the self-affirmation and self-denial, of Fact or Life ; it is an affair therefore which will admit of limits—either in the direction of complete acceptance or in that of complete ignorance : either **Lt V = O**, or **Lt P = O**.

Life, as I have maintained here and elsewhere, is a stretch of vast existence : existence also I have made co-extensive with feeling. Life, therefore, is essentially vastness of feeling. Note that Life is only another name— a more impressive one— for what I have so far called Fact. Now, Life, though never actually ceasing to be a vast tissue of feeling, may care only for a part or aspect and identify itself with this : the rest is ignored though it can never be effaced. This circumstance I may call *acceptance* and *ignorance*, *affirmation* and *denial*. Life never ordinarily avows, accepts and affirms what it undoubtedly and concretely lives. To avow, accept and affirm the whole is to lapse into the level of dumb, alogical feeling : the concrete can be and indeed is lived but can never be thought and talked about. Thought or conception is essentially a circumscription or limitation of Life : it is like a view of the sea which alluring horizons bind and conceal. There are two tendencies, apparently opposed to each other, implanted in the nature of the Concrete : the tendency to detachment from the concrete and the tendency to absorption. When the first tendency prevails, we have the veiling or ignorance of the concrete and the tonic presentation of a detached aspect or part : conception arises in the progress of this tendency. An idea is the thing in its apparent detachment. When the latter tendency dominates, we have as much tonic presentation of the whole as we can well have : we are merged and absorbed in the Fact. The progress of this tendency brings us to what I may call Natural Intuition. It need hardly be pointed out that detachment in ideation is only apparent : there can be no real detachment, isolation or breaking away from the fact. In a sense we are always merged in the fact. Ideas seem to be detached from the Fact as the breakers that dash upon the beach appear to be let loose from the mass of the sea whence they arise.

We have simply ignored, veiled, set aside the whole in order that we may conveniently deal with an aspect or part : the vastness and majesty of the sea would awe our little hopes into nothingness and dash our pigmy efforts into unredeemed mockery ; the breakers rolling on the sandy beach in measures of robust yet capturing delight cut the Infinite, as it were, to human proportions, thus summoning both our courage and gaiety, provoking us to play as well as to exercise. What the breakers make of the sea, the ideas make of Life : those make the sea conveniently amenable to human play and exercise, these make Life a handy plastic material to be moulded according to all manners of human ends. In neither does the Infinite actually retire or cease to live. The outlook of a rocky prominence will be a panorama of breakers and waves all contained in the sea : the blue sunny waters kissing in mystic devotion the skirts of the pale crystal sky—the placid paler blue brooding in cosmic inspiration over the quivering deeper blue beneath : the grey earth and dusky hills, the little white sand-homes made by tiny human hands for social life and habitation : do not all these merge and mingle in one, continuous wonder of Beings as I stand on the solitary crag in rapt, unquestioning enjoyment, enchanted by the vastly ancient and yet strangely prophetic music of the sea ? In the trance of enjoyment there is really no clear partition of aspects : similarly in what I have called natural intuition there is really no taking to pieces of the parts which compose the whole of living experience—the parts or aspects are merged in the whole. In ideation and thinking the parts and aspects are regarded and dealt with in seeming isolation. Natural intuition should again be distinguished from voluntary intuition—or intuition made with a purpose. In this latter we make an effort, with varying measures of success, to look Life straight in the face, to enjoy the divine gift of existence instead of merely criticizing it. It is an attempt to avow to myself what I actually am, an essay at accepting and affirming the reality of Life with all its engaging sweetness and unwelcome rudeness. Voluntary intuition has to face the profoundest question of Life : What am I ? But what is easily achieved in a natural mood of intuition

cannot perhaps be quite wholly achieved in voluntary efforts of self-intuition. Thus Nature exceeds the limitations of Art. In voluntary intuition we should get as near as possible to the ideal of absorbing, natural enjoyment of life. Volition is essentially of the nature of self-determination and self-restriction : to will is to determine and inform the plastic, unformed clay of life : thus is it akin to thought. Hence voluntary intuition carries within itself its own inadequacy to reach and possess the ideal of natural ecstasy. Yet self-intuition is a fount of inspiration which we should rather invoke than neglect. It is in this way that we can recognize and own from time to time the gift of Life in all its unsuspected richness, beauty and pathos. In the ideas and wishes of life the soul is a wanderer in strange and unending paths : sometimes the paths are dreary and graceless, sometimes they are joyous and reassuring : but in all its wanderings the soul is moved by a deep yearning after something which it dares not tell itself about : its Home. Self-intuition is an impulse, sometimes naturally and sometimes voluntarily induced, which brings the wanderer back to the warm precincts of his Home, and induces him to look upon his entire life of strivings and wanderings from that calm and commanding point of view.

Intuition, therefore, comes with the tendency to absorption or relaxation in the bosom of life. It is the life of *feeling*. Thinking and Willing, on the other hand, tend to take life to apparently discrete parts and deal with them in apparent detachment. In natural intuition we feel life as a matter of course ; in voluntary intuition we make ourselves feel it or rather bring ourselves into the proper frame of receptive alertness so as not to miss it. But as I have remarked before, Nature succeeds, where Art fails ; hence let Art emulate Nature as closely as it can. The mark of genius is in the supreme unconsciousness of its deliverance : it is an uncommonly deep and lucid natural intuition. The effort of great talent never quite reaches the serene, majestic height where the soul of genius shines like a crown of ineffable light set by the hand of Nature herself. The instinct of genius and the effort of talent bring home to my mind in a pointed manner the distinction that I am seeking to draw

between natural and voluntary intuition. It is given to genius to receive and reflect the ray of pure truth ; talent has to toil through refracting media both in catching and reflecting it. The very conscious wish that I must know and grasp life as I live it, is a refracting medium itself ; by this wish I have thickened as it were the atmosphere about my soul so that the ray of truth is sure to go astray in coming home to me. The unconscious *relaxation* of genius maintains an evenness between Soul and Nature, a harmony of texture and tone, so that no pulse of truth in coming may be lost, weakened or abused, nothing may be kept back which ought to be given and told.

Intuition tends to bring us to the level of alogical feeling : both thought and willing must be reduced to a minimum. When I think and will I am certainly as much an alogical fact as when I feel ; my logical constructions and rational ends cannot surely render my life itself a logical and rational fact. But in the case of thinking and willing there generally operates the tendency to detachment, isolation or ignorance referred to before, so that a very partial aspect or segment of the fact is likely to be credited and accepted as *the* fact. In the case of feeling simply this tendency is least in evidence. By 'logical thought' I refer to the ordinary kind of thought which involves the process of predication in terms of categories or predicables. The categories are essentially boundaries of thought— or forms or modes of acceptance and refusal of life. When I regard a particular experience of mine as 'object', I have evidently hedged round a portion of my life's being or possession, lavished all my cares upon it for a while and temporarily disregarded the outlying background of my concrete existence. The 'subject' is also a similar limitation of this existence. The same remark will apply to all the usual categories of our logical thought. Logical thinking as well as rational volition (or willing with a definite end in view) is essentially turning to shape and direction the shapeless mass and Stress of Life. In mere feeling also— it must be noted however that feeling generally involves an element of thought and willing— the mass and Stress of Life are not wholly shapeless and undirected. Feeling is never ordinarily

a state of pure, indeterminate feeling : to feel is generally to feel in a certain way. On the other hand the determinateness of our ordinary feeling never really touches the wholeness of our Life. I can hardly properly say that I live in a certain way : no determinations can cling to the unbounded Ether of Awareness which is the enduring substratum of Life, nor perhaps to the Stress in this Ether in its concrete wholeness. When I speak of my living and feeling in a certain way I ignore this Spiritual Ether and also the uncircumscribed vastness of the Stress in it : I have accepted sections of Life, heightened their tone of presentation and have surreptitiously ascribed to the whole the shape and direction which are found in the distinguished elements of the Stress. It is pragmatism therefore to regard existence as individual. It is only the centres in the stretch of existence that can be truly conceived as individual. Thus though feeling itself may be supposed to have shape and direction in a sense, *viz.*, in a pragmatic one, it is logical thought and rational willing that possess them *par excellence*. It is patent to reflection that the mental stuff assumes more definite outlines when one thinks and wishes than when one merely feels. We are prepared to concede to the lower animals a life of feeling, but we would not readily extend to them a life of thought and desire ; and it is mainly on the score of definiteness that we think there has been an evolution from the former kind of life to the latter. We have generally agreed to call this process evolution, but it must never be overlooked that this process is essentially a process of abstraction and ignorance of Life. To live and accept the concrete Life as it is one must undo this so-called evolution, go back to the state of concrete feeling with as slight admixture of thought and motive as one can possibly carry with him. He must possess as much of the instinctive vision of the man of genius and as little of the dialectic exercise of the philosopher as he can well command. Dialectic is certainly not without its important uses ; it is the process that negotiates between the simple, chaotic feeling of the undeveloped mind and the wide, penetrating vision of the seer. The process goes on from feeling most veiled in the cruder forms of mind to feeling least veiled in the spiritual

supermen. From life given but almost wholly ignored to life given and almost wholly accepted ; from self-forgetting to self-realizing, from simple being to being and having and knowing : this is the drift of evolution. Dialectic exercise is only the hammering process by which the solid crust of ignorance laid over Life is slowly broken away, so that Life or Fact may stand unveiled and unbound as the *patent* Wonder. In the language of the *Approaches* it is the Principle of Movement that leads from the primordial Veil of lowly life to the consummated presentation of spiritual loftiness. The present cycle in the history of European thought which began with the glorified dialectic of the Hegelians and has culminated in the sovereignty of Bergsonian intuition has marked an advance in the method of life.

I have also hurriedly referred to the two limits of the method of Intuition. The life of that centre in the Fact-Stuff which we characterize as the amoeba is apparently a life of simple, chaotic feelings ; it has perhaps not risen to a life of thought and motivation. We may regard therefore such life as one of natural intuition. The amoeba is of necessity something of a seer ; it has not budded into a philosopher yet. A human philosopher thinks, reasons and wills ; but he feels in all these ; he even feels when apparently he does not either think or will. He has not broken loose from the essential mentality of his amoeboid root. Natural intuition still persists in him. Nay, it has gained in volume, depth and clearness. What was the shy phosphorescence of a glow-worm in the amoeba has become, as it were, the clear steady light of a shining star in man. It has burst forth as a flood of sparkling brightness from the solar splendour of a spiritual superman. The superman feels and the amoeba feels ; both are centres in the essential stuff of spiritual existence ; they are two different standpoints not only for living but regarding the same wonder of Life. I cannot indeed explain why Life as we commonly live it should be a stress in consciousness and not consciousness pure and simple, nor why there should appear in the field of operation of the stress distinguishable, individual centres constituting for us a world of things, living and non-living. This is a mystery which I must leave to the hallower of dialectics to unravel ; for

my own part I am inclined rather to bow down to it in intellectual confusion and muteness ; it is an inscrutable, though revealed, wonder to me. Be that as it may, the acceptance and therefore the intuition of the wonder is different in the different centres. So that the sage accepts life in a manner in which I cannot or do not. And this acceptance relates to the life of feeling quite as much as to the life of thinking and desiring. What does acceptance of feeling really mean ? It must not be supposed that the distinction between acceptance and ignorance is a distinction between having and not having, feeling and not feeling. If to accept is to barely have, then all feeling is necessarily accepted ; my entire life of experience for example at this moment, including as it does myriads of sights, sounds, smells, touches and other sensations is accepted in this sense : it is a vast stretch of feeling in which I discriminate elements or features. But to take acceptance in this sense is to miss its real significance. Acceptance is the necessary correlative aspect of veiling or ignorance. I undoubtedly *have* the whole world of feeling ; I can never refuse to have it ; what I am I am. Nevertheless in the midst of my having I undoubtedly have a very wide latitude for preference and partiality : I am partial to a particular tract of my vast possession, so that the rest, though never retiring beyond the pale of my having, is almost completely disregarded. Thus acceptance is exercised within the bounds of my having or feeling ; a certain feature of my feeling, say a sound or a smell, comes into tonic prominence round which spreads of course as a misty, blurred background the Fact-Stuff as a whole. This meaning of veiling and acceptance is readily understandable in self-intuition. Now, this circumstance of acceptance may vary in the various centres in the Spiritual Stuff as also in the various moods of the same centre itself. I am not disposed to accept and ignore life uniformly always ; the sage is not disposed to accept and ignore life precisely as I do. The amoeba feels, but in its case, as suggested before, the essential vastness of feeling is almost completely veiled, so that it lives probably a sort of glow-worm life in the world-flood of brightness to which it is blind : it is merely a glow-worm in the dark where it can well be a sun unto itself.

Such is *its* acceptance of Life : it is only an atom of acceptance in the ocean of refusal. Acceptance and refusal need not be voluntary facts of course. Looking at the amoeba under my glass I cannot help thinking that it is the enormous wonder of existence shutting itself up in a throbbing molecule—the lord of creation masquerading in the pigmy littleness of a granule of protoplasm : here indeed is the miracle of individuality. Individuality comes from an essay to accept *and* ignore life : it goes with complete acceptance as also with complete ignorance. But this question of individuality I shall deal with later. In the meanwhile I have noticed that in the natural intuition of the amoeba, ignorance is deepest and most extensive. I have of course not considered the case of the so-called dead molecule. Through a long course of evolution this ignorance has systematically yielded, so that in our own case, though acceptance and refusal are commonly exercised, the vastness and richness of life can only be thinly and occasionally veiled.

The amoeba's life therefore represents one limit of intuition: the limit where presentation, without actually vanishing, has been carried almost to the vanishing point. The limit where presentation may be absolutely equal to zero, where, in other words, the Veil's possession of the Fact is absolute, is a theoretical limit only which, from the very nature of the case, is never attainable. It is only the ideal limit towards which the presentative aspect of the life of a centre may tend in the manner of an asymptote. Given an individual centre in the Spiritual Stuff, it is a particular point of view through which the Stuff may manifest itself. Now can the mist of ignorance gather round this particular point of view in so complete opaqueness, that the Fact may fail altogether to present itself in and through it ? In plain language the question really means this : Does the meanest molecule in Nature's wide realm feel, or is feeling limited only to those centres that we choose to call organized bodies ? Is feeling—presentative life—co-extensive with existence ? This is a question which I think I must answer in the affirmative. In a rather literal sense, the meanest flower that blows has thoughts too deep for philosophy ; it possesses a life which the biologist

would readily grant to it and also a life of feeling which the philosopher could not credit it with. Thus the intuitive creed of the poet may at last draw homage from unexpected quarters—from sober science. But this is an important question which I must pass over for the present. I shall only assume that feeling pervades the whole Stuff of Existence, that every atom of existence throbs not merely with life but with sentiency : that existence, life and consciousness are co-extensive. The popular partitions must be attributed to the work of the veil. Nature knows no sharp boundaries and yawning gulfs : we ignore the delicate connecting links and the soft leading shades. Hence the continuous wonder of life is split into discrete fragments, the flowing music of the Soul is broken into a series of notes, coming and going, jarring or sweet. We seize upon only the crest of the curve of life and discard the approaching slopes, so that while to us an amoeba is living, a crystal is dead. Similarly we care only for some modes and tones of feeling or their expressions ; where we miss these we think we have missed the response of the soul. So that while to us an amoeba may feel, the daffodil need not.

The other limit of intuition will be that in which the veil over Fact is reduced to zero, so that we have the Fact not merely fully displayed but impartially presented in all its parts and features. In one sense the Fact is ever fully presented ; it is a mass of feeling and as such is *felt*. So far as a Fact has been felt, it has not been kept back—it has been presented. But though a Fact may be presented in its completeness—I speak of the Fact as it is and not as we hope or believe it to be—it is never ordinarily presented with an impartial distribution of tone or emphasis throughout. Generally always I am partial to a part or feature, which partiality brings it into tonic prominence, driving the rest of my experience under the shade of more or less obscuring ignorance. This is the phenomenon of acceptance with which I have been dealing so long. Now, is it possible that in intuition, whether natural or voluntary, I may be impartially at home with the whole Fact, as it is given ? Of course a Fact in which I select and emphasize will be different

from one in which I do not ; perhaps in a Fact I cannot but select and emphasize to a certain extent ; perhaps also the latter kind of Fact is one which is not only abnormal, but which wholly exceeds our comprehension. I cannot look at the sea without being partial to the sable cloud with silver linings peeping at the horizon out of the glistening waves ; I cannot look within myself without being arrested and possessed perhaps by a solitary thought amid the living vastness and depth of my spiritual reality. Such engagement with a part while the whole eludes and escapes me is perhaps no accident of my mental life. But, on the other hand, it must be noted also that there is no law uniformly governing my acceptance of Life, except perhaps the law of rhythm. The whole need not elude and escape me always ; I may not only life the whole always but even accept and avow it sometimes. Even when it does escape me, its sacrifice and abdication may be more complete at some times than at others. Briefly, the prominence of the favoured part may be high or low, and consequently the depression of the Fact-Stuff greater or less. Sometimes I am in no mood for preferential regards ; I maintain an evenness of attitude in relation to my Life. Of course even in such cases my impartiality or evenness of attitude may be comparative rather than absolute ; but then the question of limit forces itself upon us. Experience may, as we have seen, tend in some centres to the ideal limit of evanescent presentation ; may it not in other centres *tend* to the equally ideal limit of evanescent veil ? The preferential regard which we generally always bestow upon a section of the fact, is a circumstance which I have connected with the veil ; it is the veil which renders the tone of presentation in a stretch of experience a variable quantity : but for the veil an experience would be a monotonous presentation, possessing an evenness of tone dreary and loathsome to life. Whenever by effort or by nature, discursive thinking and willing have been lulled to sleep in me, I have a curious, awfully vast consciousness in which nothing in particular strikes and engages me ; a feeling which I fail to contain within any definite dimensions, and which approaches without yet reaching the dreary limit of monotonous

presentation. Note that it is generally thought and desire that will break my Life's outlook into shady valleys relieved by prominent peaks : obscured stretch of feelings sustaining a clean-cut thought or purpose. By effort also this condition of comparative evenness can be brought about in me. I start with the purpose to accept Life as a whole and eschew all in-door preferences such as may interfere with the acceptance of the whole : it is only thus that I can form some sweeping idea as to what Life in its concreteness may be like. Is it a vast flowing stream, or is it a Stress in the Ether of consciousness which no categories— whether of Change or of Rest— can define and circumscribe ? Without this feat I would miss the reality of Life altogether ; I do not suggest that I can possess that reality in my grip in ordinary intuition, whether natural or voluntary ; but in it I make as near an approach to it as I possibly can. In a sense I have the reality always, whether in intuition or in thought : I always live it, and I cannot but live it. But I accept and avow the reality far more truly in intuition than in thought ; far more truly in natural intuition than in voluntary. After I have accepted the reality in a manner in intuition I have to pass it in review so that I may think and talk about it. In this review, Life again becomes cold and abstract. But at any rate, if we must think and talk about Life, let us do so *after* an effort of as thorough-going intuition, undisturbed by thought and desire, as we can possibly make. Before we have opened our mouth, let us by all means be mute for a moment, and tearing ourselves from our small play abandon ourselves to the warm embrace of the abiding wonder with little reserve and less anxiety.

To the stages and varieties of this method of life I can only slightly refer in passing. At the bottom of the scale we have what I may call sensuous intuition ; for example, my experience of the sea at this moment including sensations of sound, sight, touch, and so on. From this I shall distinguish two other varieties of intuition, *viz.*, intellectual and spiritual. Before I describe these latter two, it should be observed that these are not three kinds or stages of the method excluding and succeeding one another. No such exclusion can be contemplated. The difference

arises merely from the way of emphasis. Common intuition is at the same time spiritual, intellectual and sensuous in character: these are the three aspects, or if I might say, elements of the same method. My intuition for example, is never purely sensuous—apprehending merely sensations induced through the sense-organs. It is intellectual and spiritual as well. Now, intuition in its sensuous aspect apprehends and accepts the sensuous elements of the life of experience : what are my sensations now ? Life, as man at least lives it, is never however a tissue of sensuous elements merely. One who has raised and answered the foregoing question only has ignored much of the tremendous content and import of his life. A far larger question has to be raised and answered : what are my impressions and ideas, presentations and representations ?—to aim at greater psychological completeness. Intellectual intuition is an attempt to have a broad look at the *phenomena* of mental life generally, rising above the mere sensations. In intellectual intuition we think we know the elements of the Stress which compose life in their totality and mutual connexions. This method will possibly yield us a view of life flowing like a stream without a beginning and an end, the running stuff of concrete duration. Thus arises the philosophy of ceaseless flux—absolute change. But as intellectual intuition is a wider outlook of Life than sensuous, so spiritual intuition is a much wider outlook than intellectual. We do not enquire about the ideas and impressions, the phenomena, of Life, but of the concrete wholeness of Life itself : what is Life and Fact and Existence ? In this supreme and broadest effort of intuition Life must appear, as I am persuaded, as a Stress in an unbounded Ether of Awareness or Feeling, the concreteness of which, without being unknowable, defies all our limiting categories of thought.

Relying on this supreme method of life, *viz.*, spiritual intuition, I refuse to accept life only as a flowing stuff, or to identify it with concrete Time. The truth of such acceptance will be compromised by the untruth of a tremendous refusal. Life is a Stress in consciousness : this is the concrete Fact. Flow and therefore Time do not surely touch this concrete Fact. Even

if we could identify the Stress with concrete Time or actual duration, the conception would still fall short of the Fact itself which is not equivalent to the aspect of Stress in it. I am afraid I shall be taken to task for thus dissociating the Stress from the ether of feeling and charged with the vice of oriental abstraction. But I must say in reply that while certainly not dissociating the stress from the ether, I cannot take my life as a stress merely : to me such a view of life implies and presupposes an abstraction or detachment from the concrete actuality. The spirit with its wings free cannot possibly be tied down to such a partial view of life : the world is rushing like a stream, but the stream is contained in a quiescent background which is unmistakably clear in me and which, while surpassing all definition, cannot better described than as the ether of feeling. I do not surely isolate pure feeling from particular modes of feeling ; but surely also the modes appear and disappear like waves and eddies on the bosom of a shoreless sea of awareness. The modes and the substratum, the stream and the sustaining background, must not be abstracted from each other ; each should be represented in the proper relation and context as displayed in an unfettered and unbiased effort of spiritual intuition. A series of pulses of feeling constituting in their continuity a flowing stream of experience which consciousness may light up as well as it may : is this radical empiricism ? Radical empiricism will not allow us to cling to any fetish, howsoever time-honoured, which is not made good to us by direct, actual experience. A substratum which only reason demands as the ground of sensations and feelings, actual and possible, but which is not *given* along with the sensations and feelings themselves, which is not in their essential, actual deliverance, cannot be admitted. We are not prepared to trust reason and readily anxious to meet its requirements ; we are determined to stand or fall by the actual. Now, is the ether of feeling which I have introduced a *rational* substratum merely or the essential deliverance of the given itself ? It may be neither to my western critics who I am afraid, in spite of all their profession of true enlightenment, are generally disposed to take too physical and fantastic a view of life. My ether of awareness, though openly

suggesting a physical analogy and perilously verging upon fancifulness, represents perhaps an indubitable deliverance of spiritual intuition for which I do not of course take credit to myself, for this ether is as old as oriental meditation, and was spoken of by the Rishis of India as the *cidākāśa*. I have not certainly accepted this ether upon credit ; it is an unquestionable deliverance of even such modest spiritual activity as I can put forth. The series of pulses of feeling coming and going, bequeathing and inheriting, the stream of world-process gliding on by itself as an actual duration without requiring any containing ground ; these are views of Life abstract and fantastic. The physical analogies which they equally openly suggest and the fancifulness upon which they more perilously verge, are unredeemed by any pledge of true intuition. Surely it is only in a very abstract and narrow way that I feel my life as a series of pulses or as a stream of concrete duration ; in taking the former view I have mistaken unawares the seemingly discrete prominences in the vast stretch of life for life itself— the array of rising and falling waves for the limitless sea itself ; in taking the latter view I have brought together the scattered bones of life and invested them with the connecting tissues of flesh and fibre, and have thus materially improved upon my former theory of life ; but my theory is still a corpse, cold and dead, which nothing short of the inspiration of the seers of old can make instinct with life. The stream is thus an improvement upon the series ; but the Ether, the *cidākāśa* is the consummation of man's view of life. But I suppose I must not dogmatise too much upon a fundamental question to which everybody must find an answer for himself : it is a question of honest intuition and not a bone of logical contention. I have essayed to bring out what is given in me : I can only ask my critics to bring out what is given in them. I cannot argue and convince, but only appeal and wait. Let us not forget that there are varying degrees and ranges of intuition : we cannot fix upon an uniform method of life. Abstraction and ignorance may still linger even after we have done our best to get at the concrete and the true ; a larger view to which we cannot attain now may yet come with patience and earnestness.

Time like Space cannot apply to the Fact itself. It must be an obstinate remnant of prejudice to talk of the Fact in the plural and regard them either as existing side by side or as succeeding one another. The sections or centres of the Fact may have to be dealt with individually, but in no case must we forget that they are imbedded in a co-essential staff of existence out of which they project like the silvery drooping crests of breakers in a dark sea. Time and Space are in the Stuff ; and not the latter in them. In certain moods we may know existence as a flowing stream ; but this is not knowing the reality of existence. The flowing stream, though identified with the world-process itself, requires an ether of feeling to make it flow ; no flow, no process, however stupendous, can be felt or conceived without this sustaining background of cidākāśa. The background has certainly no mystery about it ; it is essentially feeling ; hence it is given even while it is being apparently ignored ; it is the atmosphere of awareness in which alone all things and processes can be known. It is the spiritual Light which nothing else can reveal, but which reveals the suns and the stars themselves. Now, all process and determination are impertinent in relation to this. We cannot imagine that this Light itself flows ; we feel indeed that this Light endures and can never fail us, but this feeling of quiescent persistence has nothing to do with a time-determination. The thought that it persists in time is a section of the Stuff and therefore has no proper applicability in relation to it. It is above time. It is a misfortune of Life that immanent operations are thus stretched so as to cover it. They can never cover it, but we are free to fancy that they do.

As the Stuff, without itself being in Space, manifests itself as Space, so the Stuff, without itself being in Time, manifests itself as Time. Like space, Time is only an expression of spiritual vastness. Consciousness spreads itself as space and also as time. This vastness, as I have taken pains to point out previously, is an essential cast of consciousness itself : Life is essentially an ocean of feeling. When I feel that Life flows, I really feel that it extends, that existence is a vast, continuous wonder. Now, the crude original which yields us the category

of time is contained in the Fact itself—it is what I have elsewhere called Fact-Drift. Drift is the circumstance of the elements of the Stress changing and moving : it cannot pertain to the whole Stuff itself. To whatever it may apply, it is the crude ore from which our notion of Time is obtained. To explain its derivation from the bosom of the Fact, which I can hope to do only very meagrely now, I have to distinguish three stages in the birth of Time. Generally in my life of Fact I am quite innocent of Time. I have a dumb, allogical possession in which neither Space nor Time, as I know them, has appeared. My possession is possibly a configuration of features and elements ; there are also changes going on in the midst of what I have. But both configuration and change are ideal after-construction and not my original, native make-up. I do not *think* of my possession or existence as a configuration or of the stress as a change. It is only at times that I think in this manner. Generally my being is scrupulously jealous of any such thought. During a normal morning how often have I represented my life to myself a configuration or as a process ? Not often perhaps, it will be readily granted. But have I not always *felt* my life as an order of co-existence as well as an order of succession ? Surely I have intuitively felt the co-existence of the many aspects and features of my life, the many tributaries which mingle to make the broad stream of my existence ; similarly I have also felt the drift and the changes which render my existence a varied stream. Undoubtedly I have felt in some way ; but I should be false to my intuition were I to say that I felt the order of my existence either *as* co-existence or *as* succession. It was an allogical feeling which must of course be *described* in logical terms, if at all ; but in itself it might be as innocent of logical terms as the amoeba's feeling probably is. What is a necessity of thought and talk may be a luxury in the absorbing depths of concrete living. If you put to me : What did you feel if not co-existence and succession of some sort ?— I have to remain mute and possibly confounded. To convey to you what I did feel I must disturb and reconstruct what I felt. Briefly, my feelings are generally uncommunicable. To feel co-existence is not quite the same

thing as to feel a stretch or continuum : the former presupposes the bringing together of the parts into which a whole has been broken ; in the latter the parts are not taken as *parts* at all— they are swept together in an alogical apprehension of the whole. Similarly to feel succession is not quite the same thing as to feel alogical drift : the latter is an absolute feeling in which phenomena appear and disappear without their being known as preceding and succeeding. Perhaps this distinction may not be challenged ; but have we not confused the *feeling* of co-existence and succession with the *thought* of them ? We have briefly referred to three conditions in which a tissue of experience may be presented to us. First, we have the alogical Fact-Stuff in which there appears no suspicion of co-existence and succession : a stretch of feeling presenting diversity, changing and flowing as we suppose, but not known or presented as such. This is the native intuition of the Fact. After this we begin to feel that the continuum is a composition of various elements and features, and that it is changing from state to state. We have however no articulate thought as yet of these orders of co-existence and succession. It is the preliminary condition of thought. In it we have merely an instinctive analysis of the presented continuum into parts and features and an equally instinctive integration of these. Such instinctive analysis and synthesis of life is one of the commonest incidents with us : in it there is no articulate thought of either order, though the materials for such thought are presented in it. Thought generally grows out of such inarticulate beginnings : Nature forestalls Reason. Instinct is Reason veiled : what is inarticulate in instinct becomes articulate in reason— the latter only confirms and accentuates what the former has effected already. The process of analysis and synthesis which the former has begun and done under the veil, the latter continues and consummates in broad light. The process was never unconscious, however ; it was only not sufficiently conscious. Reason has brought to a focus the diffused activities of life. Reason formulates its operation as an act of judgment : the parts are regarded in relation to the whole, the pulses are represented in relation to the flowing stuff ; and

this relation rising into full consciousness makes an act of judgment. In instinctive perception this relation is *quasi*-conscious ; its operation therefore is never formulated as an act of judgment. Yet in such perception this relation is vaguely felt ; and in order that it may be felt the given continuum must first have been differentiated and integrated in some way. This relation is not felt at all, either implicitly or explicitly, in the presentation of the original Fact-Stuff. In this sense it was an *absolute* Fact. In its concrete entirety it was always an absolute Fact : it is only the parts or sections of the Fact that have been related to one another by the two latter processes of the instinctive perception of co-existence and succession and their thought.

Time therefore is not a necessary expression or attitude of the Fact. Both Time and Space are however necessary in my conception of the Fact. I cannot think of it without representing it as a flowing history having a before and an after. This circumstance renders my account of the Fact curious. For example, I have spoken about the three stages in the birth of Time. The timeless Fact proceeds through felt time to conceptual time : first there is no time, and *then* time gradually emerges. In giving this account or in conceiving the process to myself, I have already requisitioned conceptual time. This is however merely a necessity of my thought : it need not be allowed to tamper with the time-less alogical character of the wonder of Life. I do not say that this wonder is time-less sometimes and temporal at other times ; I cannot even say that it is time-less *always*. Such statements will involve contradiction in themselves. Yet perhaps this cannot be helped if we are to make any statements at all regarding the character of the Fact-stuff. We need not be surprised at the contradiction ; for a statement is a logical process which when stretched to the alogical Fact contradicts it. Thought and speech therefore not only involve ignorance but also contradiction. In thinking about Life I not only ignore it in a manner but contradict its reality : I represent it as something other than it actually is. Hence if in giving my account of the time-less Fact I am detected as dealing surreptitiously in tenses, I can only plead that I have been guilty of a

vice native to my mental structure—the vice of ignorance and contradiction. I can never be consistent in my theory of Life. If without refusing the lead of commonsense I desire to make my story of Life consistent in all its parts, I discover that I have begun with an unpardonable ignorance of the reality of Life. Shall I give the following account of life?—Time is an objective order which exists whether I think of it or no ; my life of experience is flowing in this real Time ; while flowing in Time my life may sometimes be so absorbed in itself that it neither feels nor thinks of time, sometimes it has sufficiently roused itself to feel Time, and occasionally it is interested in conceiving the order of Time itself. This account like the foregoing involves the tenses ; but it is apparently free from contradiction. I will not care to challenge that it is ; but while seeking to avoid the devil of contradiction have I not unawares cast myself into the deep sea of ignorance ? The reality of Life will assuredly fight shy of such an account as has just been given. An objective time larger than and containing Life, or even identical with it, has robbed Life of much of its real vastness and unspeakable wonder. It is an abstract, made-to-order Life that can be conceived as flowing either in something other than itself or even as flowing at all in its concrete entirety. To think that Life is a *flowing* wonder which is time itself marks an improvement in our philosophising : it is not flowing in some substratum, but is an absolute flow itself. But I venture to point out that this so-called absolute flow of Life is a flow under the mask—the veil to which I have occasionally drawn prominent attention. A containing substratum which is not patent to radical empiricism, which spiritual intuition is not able to confirm, may be discarded : and nobody will be happier than myself in the event. But on the other hand, a flow of Life with an air of false absoluteness thrust upon it, should be sooner exposed than not. For myself I must avow that the mighty flow of Life is an intuition plain enough to me ; but nothing is plainer to me than the containing background of the *cidākāśa*, the Ether of Awareness, against which the intuition of the flow is set. I can never persuade myself that this thought is there merely on the score of an inveterate habit of physically

representing spiritual phenomena. The Ether I can never put away from myself : it is the essential ground of my existence. To me therefore, pledged to the free avowal of the essential deliverances of Life, the Ether involving the Stress in it constitutes Life, and to this latter aspect of Life the conception of flow can be applied in a partial and abstract way. I have an intuition of the whole living Stress in me no doubt ; but I have no theory to offer regarding it as a *whole*. The theory that I have rudely fashioned in the *Approaches* relates, it should be recalled, only to the totality of fact-sections discriminated in the apparently unbounded stretch of the Fact-stuff. I cannot pertinently say of the whole Stress that it changes in Time, appears and disappears. The budding out of the poles of base, index and co-efficient in the Fact as also the abstract analysis of the Stress into Presentation, Movement and Veiling renders a theory of Life in some manner possible to us. But let us not deceive ourselves that it is a theory touching the concrete itself. I must not dilate ; but I may be permitted to observe that the theory— or, I am even prepared to concede, the intuition— of Life as an absolute flow, is only a theory of approximate closeness or an intuition of relative truth. Life has been ignored in such knowledge ; it has been more carelessly ignored in the commonsense view of the valley of objective Time with the stream of Life rolling through it.

In order to rescue this theory from the pit of absurdity, I have been somewhat anxious to maintain, both here and elsewhere, that I do not subscribe to the philosophy of solipsism. Life cannot be claimed as my life or as yours or as his. We are only centres of individuality in the unbounded stretch of existence. Existence I have of course identified with consciousness ; but the latter cannot be properly fastened upon myself or any other centre. There is no essential connexion between consciousness and individuality. Existence cannot indeed be stretched beyond consciousness ; but it may well extend beyond the range of any individual centre's consciousness. This difference between universal consciousness and individual is created by the Veil. Veil I have defined to be the circumstance of greater or less blurring or concealment without however reaching the point

of complete effacement. Thus universal consciousness embracing countless centres of individuality becomes more or less veiled in me : I can only accept it in part ; I reject it in its entirety. Hence I am a lesser Fact imbedded in a Larger : I am merely a spark from an unfathomable Source of Light. My realization of this Larger Fact simply means my acceptance of it ; the Veil which has held me in its all-round possession must only be uplifted. The Veil is a variable, and so there becomes possible a plurality of individual centres or points of view in the Fact-Stuff. The metaphysics of the Light and the Veil is difficult, and I will not certainly enter into it with a light heart. At present I shall merely point out that an individual is removed from the Light by the circumstance of his timid and hesitating acceptance of Life. Even in such acceptance he has not indeed ceased to be the Light that he eternally is : the Veil never puts out the Light. But he does not realize the infinite vastness and richness of his shining substance. With a full and courageous acceptance of his being, this realization dawns upon him. In a divine flood of Light the Soul is playing the part of a blind, thirsty beggar : it is but a pretended concealment of his native glory. His eyes sealed by a spell are striving to open and see ; they are opening and seeing only by degrees. With the spell his individuality is sure to go ; for individuality necessarily means a limitation of existence, a sacrifice of the native glory of being. It is the Veil, the non-acceptance of Life, therefore, which makes it possible for him to play a part, whether that of a beggar or of a king. But I think I need not vaguely hint at a consummation which I mean to study especially in another place.

Now, Time except in so far it is an expression of Spiritual extensiveness relates only to the life in a centre. Apart from the centre there is no time in the usual sense of the term. I thus distinguish the essential substratum of Time from its special manifestation ; the former, like the essential substratum of Space, is identical with the vastness of spiritual being. When I feel Time or conceive it, I really feel or conceive this vastness of my nativity. But Time supposes not merely this stretch or extensiveness, but also flow and change. Without this latter element,

Time would not be Time to me at all. This makes the special manifestation of Time. It is as it were the form of Time whose matter must be sought and found in the vastness of Life itself. Clothed with the form of sensuous experience of a certain character, this same matter manifests itself as Space. Like Space, Time possessing the matter and the form just spoken of, is incidental to central or individualized existence. Apart from such existence we have merely the alogical, unspeakable stretch of living wonder, but neither Space nor Time. A centre that has merged itself in the Spiritual Stuff and ceased to be a centre, has an experience which is *not* conditioned by either Space or Time. My ordinary experience is central, Space and Time are therefore its forms ; but even such ordinary experience, if only accepting itself in its entire concreteness, transcends and knows that it transcends both these forms. Central experience may thus fling itself on the bosom of the Spiritual Stuff, and lay aside in the tremendous consciousness of its infinity its little playthings. There central experience bears a character which is *not* strictly amenable to its ordinary logic and ethics. Thus in order to go beyond the forms and categories I need not quite hold my soul in patience till the consummation devoutly to be wished for comes. I go beyond them even *now* ; although in giving an account of my experiences I cannot but deal with the categories which I imagine I can dispense with. This is an unfortunate necessity of my life of thought and discourse which I should take care not to make too great a fuss about. What I do require in my representation of Life I may well lay aside in Life itself. I maintain on as sure intuitive grounds as I can possess that the circumstances of flow and change which make for me the special connotation of Time are incidental to central existence ; therefore the form, though not the matter, of Time is born under the auspices of Movement and Veiling.

Flow or Drift implying change is the form or embodiment of time. This it is in no metaphorical sense. If we allow that Drift implies the background of spiritual vastness or extension, there need be no hesitation either in allowing that Drift is the same as concrete Time. I have not been able to identify Drift

with Fact, and therefore I am precluded from identifying Fact with Time. There is no Drift, and consequently no Time, objective to the Fact. The Fact is not carried along in a stream ; nor is it the same as the stream itself. As intuition decisively proves, the stream is merely an immanent process in the life of the Fact. The stream distinctly presupposes a quiescent background, an environment of spiritual vastness, which, however it may overflow its banks, it can never carry along with itself. I do not hint at any positive banks or limits of the stream ; for aught we know the stream may be a moving ocean where all bounds are lost. Nevertheless the very circumstance that it is felt or known as a moving stuff requires, not merely in thought but in intuition, a quiescent background of spiritual ether. Movement is inconceivable except in reference to a thing which is at rest ; this I venture to point out is not merely a law of thought ; it is an unmistakable deliverance of intuition also. There is no such intuition as that of pure or absolute movement. I am quite prepared to waive the fixity of the attending subject or Ego which feels the movement ; though in finding an equation of motion in another place I could not dismiss its claim to be a stable point of reference in relation to which any process of flux must be known. But even discarding the transcendental Ego, the metaphysical pole, origin or point of reference, I feel that I cannot discard the *cidākāśa* which contains and sustains all the process of life without itself being in any way conditioned by them. Pure movement is never felt or known as movement at all ; we are very likely to mistake the stream of Life for the whole concrete Fact itself because we are very likely to ignore the sustaining *plenum* of awareness. It is the contrast of this *plenum* that makes the stress of life appear as a drift. This however is an analysis of thought which should not be mistaken for an actual partition of reality. Drift is not an affair other than, and imposed upon, the background : the latter is the matter of which the former is a special form or expression. Existence appears as Drift ; to make this appearance possible existence must be centralized.

Central existence means a greater or less non-acceptance or ignorance of the Fact-Stuff. The moment I abandon myself to

the concrete whole of my experience I feel that I have ceased to be individual. The Ego is not a necessary pole in the Fact, as I have maintained elsewhere. In ordinary feeling, I am generally a stretch of feeling innocent of an Ego or Self ; it is only at times that the Fact swells into a consciousness of the Ego. Hence the Fact is oftener self-less than not, though in the representation of the Fact the Ego has to be so constantly and necessarily commissioned. To think and talk of my life I cannot dispense with *me* ; but in feeling it may be, any generally is, otherwise. Even while I do attend to the Ego, I cease to attend to its object, and *vice versa* ; there is thus an alternating play of regard between the Self and its material. I feel positively that I cannot have an intuition of the concrete whole of experience without discarding and merging the Self— I mean the consciousness of the Self— in that intuition. A Self that is conscious of itself has undoubtedly drawn a veil between itself and Reality. In this sense the perception of Life is self-less and unconscious. Now, by central existence I mean a kind of life which refers itself to a centre or definite point of view. Such reference may be definitely conscious and particularly lively as in a centre which we call man ; it may become more and more veiled and chaotic as we descend to other varieties of individual existence, According to the law of experience just referred to it will naturally follow that central existence, presupposing a more or less articulate reference to a definite point of view, means a greater or less non-acceptance of the reality of Life. I can know and accept Life only by merging the point of view which I regard as *me* ; conversely which I keep to the point of view which I call Self, I have regarded Life only in detachment : the Fact has become *for me* what I have elsewhere called a pragmatic Fact. I will not dilate further on this aspect of the question now, but shall only point out that but for such non-acceptance of the Fact in centralized existence, Drift and consequently Time, would never appear. Drift or rather the consciousness of Drift presupposes precisely such non-acceptance. Refuse to circumscribe or compromise the Fact, and you have shut out the possibility of an intuition of flow. Life has settled down to be a patent wonder which cannot be

known either as moving or as at rest ; bestow your regard upon sections of the Fact, and they can easily be conceived or even felt as appearing and disappearing, moving and changing. Will not intuition bear me out ?

What I have referred to as Fact-Elasticity elsewhere should be once again requisitioned to provide a basis for time. The Stress in the Fact may be supposed to be subject to two opposite tendencies ; for the sake of brevity I may describe these as the principle of change and the principle of persistence. By virtue of the former the known Stress in the Fact continuously changes : fact-sections appear and disappear and are disposed to one another in ever novel relations. Briefly, I may call this the Strain of the Fact. But there is also a tendency, opposite in character, ceaselessly operating in the constitution of the Fact by virtue of which the Stress (in a wider sense of the term) tends to persist in a given condition ; it is the tendency which induces a Fact to keep to a given constitution ; it is the principle of conservation as the former is the principle of change. In a rather narrower sense of the word, we may call this latter tendency Stress. The nature of the constitution of the Fact is of course determined by the relative disposition of these two tendencies, Strain and Stress. Now I shall enquire about the most fundamental Strain and Stress in the life of the Fact. The Fact is a vast stretch of feeling which is the boundless universe itself to which I cannot assign any limit without arbitrary ignorance of the concrete. It is an alogical Stuff of which all our conceptions and categories necessarily fall short. It is the profound wonder of Life itself of which it is impossible to take any adequate soundings. The fundamental Strain of this Life is its ignorance or non-acceptance. By a miracle which we can neither comprehend nor fathom, the wonder dwindles into a commonplace, the unsurpassable Reality becomes a comfortable, little pragmatic fact. Life has not indeed ceased to be a wonder by such transformation, but it is a transformation nevertheless, and the most wonderful that I can think of. My categories are again inadequate for the purpose of its explanation. I have ignored myself. But on the other hand the fundamental Stress—the

tendency of persistence—is also ceaselessly operative : hence I cannot ignore myself completely ; in the midst of my most complacent ignorance of Life, the dark curtains hanging about me will be lifted for a precious while so as to allow my wandering eyes fall and rest on those of my Mother whose tender embrace never leaves me, even when I would dream of utter helplessness in a cheerless wilderness of creation. The concrete therefore stresses to burst through the mists of our ignorance : the Spirit is a Light struggling through the distractions of matter for expression and acceptance. I have already prominently alluded to this tremendous revelation of the Soul to inspire and sometimes confound the small play plotted by our little cares and interests !

Now the feeling or conception of Time, arises out of this fundamental tendency of the Fact to keep to itself, to remain and be accepted as a continuous stretch of feeling that it is ever in itself. Through this feeling or conception of duration, the Fact presses and provides for its acceptance. Through it we learn to know the concrete in some manner of fullness. Of course it cannot be known in its true proportions except by going beyond this feeling or conception ; what does not really belong to Life should not be suffered to stand between it and ourselves when it comes to be a question of living and not merely talking. Yet Time prepares for a consummation which it is not in its power to bring about itself. This, however, is not a prerogative of Duration ; Thought and Desire have about the same part assigned to them in the economy of life. But Time achieves the result remarkably well ; hence the place of honour given to this category in mental evolution. To understand and appreciate its function we must observe first how the Fact is broken into pieces or pulses of apparent discreteness under the operation of the principles of veiling and movement inherent in the constitution of our being. By the operation of the former principle a vast stretch of feeling becomes accepted and avowed only in a small fragment, this fragment of heightened tone and interest passes for the Fact. Again by the principle of movement the Stress in the Fact wears a different aspect and

assumes a novel disposition, and here also we select, emphasize and ignore. Generally we are in no mood for noting the change as a whole ; as before we are partial to an aspect or feature. This new aspect or feature especially regarded passes again for the Fact. In this way we have apparently disconnected pulses of Fact. By means of symbols and explanations I have sought to make this process plainer to our understanding in the *Approaches*. Thus we have apparently taken to separate pieces the continuous, all-absorbing wonder of existence. The process may be a necessary one without being at all voluntary : so that the life of a lower centre in the Stuff is apparently a life of pulses only with no distinct recognition of the continuity of the flowing Stuff. In a higher centre these discrete pulses are again brought together in some manner and recognized as parts of one running stream. This bringing together of pulses of experience is wrought by the conception of Time in a remarkable manner of course such collocation is ideal—past and future pulses can be present in the current pulse ideally ; they cling to the *index* of the Fact. Nevertheless by this conception we essay to accept the whole in some manner, to extend our cares beyond the immediate pragmatic point of view, to look before and after, gather and forestall. Now, I ask this : Is this not an expression of the fundamental impulse in the bosom of the Fact, *viz.*, to keep to itself and press for its acceptance and avowal where it has been ignored and disavowed ? By feeling duration I sink below the broken, floating parts and reach the unfailing undercurrent of the whole. The perception of unity and continuity which Time ushers into my consciousness lacks the grandeur and completeness of the prospect of spiritual vision ; nevertheless it is a tendency in a direction which cannot possibly be mistaken. Time achieves this by virtue of its innate vastness, the same as the vastness of spirituality itself ; it is also especially adapted to deal with the work of Veil and Movement. I will not dilate further here, but shall offer this as food for reflection.

To sum up : The sort of intuition that would induce me to regard Life as absolute flow is not to me the truest intuition. In such knowledge I feel I have discarded the concrete in a most

essential repect, viz., in respect of the placid background of awareness as such. It is no mysterious, metaphysical background which we are called upon to maintain on the title of a law of reason. It is the vast stretch of feeling as such in which modes appear and disappear, endure and change. I cannot bring myself to regard this Ether of feeling as such as an unwarrantable abstraction merely, nor to look upon my Fact as equivalent to the totality of the modes coming and going. I feel awareness to provide a background for such modes, some prominent while others obscure. Let this be called *cidākāśa*. But this awareness pure and simple is not the Fact as I commonly live it. The Ether involves in it a Stress. It is this that makes consciousness of modes, things and their relations. Both the Ether and the Stress are alogical, unreachable by thought and uncommunicable by discourse. It is analytic thought which regards these two as aspects of the Fact. In reality they are blended into the same utter inexpressibleness. Time is wide of the Reality. We can distinguish three conditions in our ordinary living of the Fact : the condition of time-less experience, the condition of felt time, and that of conceived time ; the first is nearest home to reality—the concrete which has not in the least been ignored and abstracted is certainly a state of time-less experience. Nevertheless the feeling and the conception of Time have their own parts to play in the economy of our experience ; we have seen how they spring out of the Elasticity of the Fact and represent a tendency in it in the direction of fuller and fuller acceptance ; yet they must stop short of the limit. An analysis of Time also yields us two aspects—the aspect of vastness and that of drift which merely express in a special manner the vastness and the stress of Life.

आकाशो दिव्य एको हि परमविपुलो मेघसन्तानलूनः
 पारावारः स एकोऽपरिमितमहिमा वीचिविक्षोभचूर्णः ।
 एकं ज्योतिर्हि विश्वे जगति वितनुते तत्र नाना स्फुलिङ्गा
 एकं भानं वरेण्यं ततमपि च ततो वृत्तयो वै विचित्राः ॥ ३ ॥

नावच्छेदेऽपि क्षिप्रं परिधरति वियत् कल्पितं चक्रबालं
 सीमाशून्योऽपि सिन्धुः परिधिवलयघृक् संस्थितः स्वे महिम्नि ।

छायाध्वान्तैर्निरस्तं पुनरिव विपुलं ज्योतिरेकं समस्तं
एवं छिन्नेव संविद् भवति च विरला ग्राहहानानुरोधात् ॥ ४ ॥

तारारत्नैः प्रगल्भे नभसि कथमहं तारकां काञ्चिदेकां
नानापुष्पैः समृद्धे विपिनतरुवरे मुख्यतः सेव एकम् ।
मुख्याज्ञाने कदाचिज्जलदमुखरता क्वापि तन्वी वलाका
मुख्यामुख्यौ हि बोधावपि चिति भवतः कस्य हानं ग्रहो वा ॥ ५ ॥

कार्यं वा कारणं वा परिहरति मतिं भानमित्यत्र विद्वान्
बोधाकाशो हि धत्ते विषयजलधरां स्तत्र न स्यात् प्रबन्धः ।
लोकानां यो विकल्पः खलु घटति न वा वास्ति नास्तीति सर्व-
स्तस्मिन् सिद्धान्तहीनो दिविसुरनगरो मेघलग्नेव मोहात् ॥ ६ ॥*

* एकः अभौतिकः परमविपुल आकाशः अस्ति, स च मेघविस्तारहेतुना ग्लान इव परिलक्ष्यते । अयं खलु अविच्छिन्नबोधराशिरूपश्चिदाकाशो विविध-
वृत्याश्रयत्वाद् विचित्र इव प्रतीयते । एकश्चिन्मात्रभूतः पारावारः अस्ति यस्य महिमा सर्वपरिमाणानि अतिक्राम्यति, परन्तु यः शान्तोऽपि रागद्वेषादिरूपतरङ्गो-
च्छ्वासैरुद्विग्न इव ज्ञायते । एका दीप्तिनिर्विशेषं निग्विलं जगत् परिव्याप्नोति तत्र तु विविधाः स्फुलिङ्गाः समुत्पद्यमानास्तां विचित्रतामापादयन्ति । एवं एकं वरेण्यं भानं समन्ताद् वितनं, ततस्तु विचित्रा वृत्तयो जायमानास्तमेव मेघसन्तानलूनगगनवद् वीचिविक्षोभसंक्षुब्धसागरवद् विकीर्णविस्फुलिङ्गदीप्तिराशिवद् विचित्रसंसाररूपत्वेन परिकल्पयन्ति । चिदाकाशे भानसाकल्ये वा मालिन्योद्वेगवैचित्र्याद्यवस्थारोपः असंलग्न एव, अपरिच्छिन्नतत्त्वे अवच्छेदात्मकसकलप्रबन्धानां संस्पर्शविरहात् ॥ ३ ॥

अपरिच्छिन्नोऽपि आकाशः कल्पितं चक्रवालं परिगृह्णन् परिच्छिन्न इव दृश्यते । सीमाशून्यः सिन्धुः स्वे महिम्नि संस्थितोऽपि परिधिवलयद्वृक् ससीम इव प्रतीयते । विपुलमेकमखण्डं ज्योतिश्छायाबन्धकारैः क्वचिन् कदाचिन् निरस्तमिव परिलक्ष्यते । भानचैतन्येऽपि एवमेव भवति । भानकुक्षिगतविषयेषु प्रमातुः पक्षपातित्वात् केषां वा उपादानं केषां वा हानं भवति । केषां विशेषतः उपलब्धिरितरेषां प्रायशः अनुपलब्धिरेव, भानावयवीभूतत्वात् ऐकान्तिकानुपलब्धेरसम्भवात् । भानाङ्गेषु भवत्येवमुपलब्धेः वैशद्यवैषम्यम् । विपुलभानराशौ न सर्वत्र प्रमातुरभिनिवेशः । यस्मिन्नभिनिवेशस्तस्यैव उपादानमपरेषाञ्च हानमिति सर्वं निजबोधगम्यम् । प्रमातुरपक्षपाते या संविदेका चापरिच्छिन्ना सैव पश्यपाते खण्डिता प्रायशश्चापसारितेव स्यात् । यत्र यत्राभिनिवेशः स्तत्र तत्र संविदस्ति इतरत्र तु तस्या अभावः ; यदा यदा

It has been perhaps clear now that we cannot properly speak about the Fact in the plural, nor even in the singular. Any such description will evidently apply to a Fact-section, and not to the whole Fact-Stuff. Yet while all descriptions are irrelevant to the Fact, some are more irrelevant than others : some go nearer home to the nativity of the Fact than others. If upon this ground we may admit some of our conceptions and descriptions of existence as *relatively* true, we shall say at once that the conception of the Fact which makes it appear as one and infinitely continuous is less far-fetched than one which will make it a many and a series. It is merely a question of choice between irrelevant conceptions. It is true that centres of individuality do appear in the Fact-Stuff ;

परिस्फुटवोधो भवति तदा तदा संविज्जायते अन्यदा सा अनुत्पन्नैव ; इत्यादि परिकल्पनैरखण्डनित्यस्वप्रकाशचिदाकाशे उदयविलयादिनानावस्था उपस्थाप्यन्ते ॥ ४ ॥

अयमेव हानोपादानरूपः पक्षपातः दृष्टान्तैर्निर्णीयते । अगणिततारारत्नैः सुशोभितं नीलाम्बरं प्रति अवलोकयन् काञ्चिदेकामेव तारकां कथं मुख्यत उपलभेय ? नानापुष्पैः समृद्धे विपिनतरुवरे कथमपि च मया एकमेव पुष्परत्नं एकदा विशेषतः परिदृश्यते ? बहुषु एकस्य मुख्यतो ग्रहणं अपरेषाञ्च हेलयेव विधूतनं किं न प्रमातुर्मम पक्षपातं घोषयति ? एकदा एकस्य मुख्यज्ञानं कालान्तरे अपरस्य तृतीयक्षणे पुनरपि अपरस्य इति प्रायशः नियमः । वर्षासु मेघाच्छन्नवासरे कदाचिद् वा जलदगर्जनं विशेषतः ममाभिनिवेशं बध्नाति कदाचिद् वा अम्बरतलसञ्चारिणी एका तन्वी बलाका । अतएव बोधौ मुख्यामुख्यौ हि भवतः । ताराविशेषाभिनिवेशस्थले तस्यैव मुख्यज्ञानविषयता इतरासाममुख्यज्ञानमपि च अभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । एव अन्यत्रापि । एवञ्च चिदाकाशे केषां विषयाणां ग्रहः केषां वा हानं भवति ॥ ५ ॥

भानं कार्यं वा कारणं वा इत्यत्र विद्वान् मननं परिहरति, भानसाकल्ये कार्य-कारणसम्बन्धस्य अनवकाशात् । भानस्य समग्रबोधावयवत्वात् कार्यत्वं वा न सम्भवति । विशेषयोरेव कार्यकारणसम्बन्धः । कार्यत्वं कारणत्वं वा पदार्थस्य कञ्चन अवच्छेदं अपेक्षते । अनवच्छिन्नज्ञानराशौ सकलसम्बन्धानां विसर्गं एव भवति । भानं तावत् अनवच्छिन्नज्ञानराशिरूपम् । यस्मिन् चिदाकाशे रूपरसादि-विषयजलधरा उद्यन्ति सन्ति लीयन्ते तमपेक्ष्य न कोऽपि प्रबन्धश्चिन्तनीयः । व्यवहारे यः कोऽपि विकल्पो भवति, इदं घटति न वा इदं अस्ति नास्ति वा इति सर्वः, स भानप्रसङ्गे न कमपि सिद्धान्तं निगमयति । मोहादवलोकिता मेघलगा सुरनगरी यद्बद् आकाशे न किञ्चिदपि तत्त्वतः साधयति तद्बवत् ॥ ६ ॥

but we cannot isolate them from one another or take them apart in thought without palpable ignorance of the whole in which they are imbedded. They are like vortices in a sea in agitation. Apart from the sea itself, they are but abstract non-entities. I shall not raise the question as to whether the sea also may not be an abstract non-entity apart from the vortices of individuality which we discern in it. The question is indeed one of great philosophical moment ; but we need not care just now to enquire as to which of the two aspects of Reality—the aspect of universality or that of individuality—is the more fundamental one ; it is enough that they both blend together in the ordinary intuition of the Fact. Of course in warm intuition we do not take the aspects as under and regard them as aspects ; it is a feat that we perform in what I have elsewhere called the Reviewing Fact which indeed is not a Fact following upon another Fact, but is only a special condition or attitude of the Fact itself : Fact has never ceased to be Fact either in the intuition or in the review which appears to follow it ; one pulse of Fact has not been followed by another ; the Fact has remained one, if I may say so, and inscrutable, while we have felt, reviewed and felt again ; only we have inevitably ascribed to the Fact itself the conditions and their relations which pertain only to the discriminated segments or elements of the Stress in the life of the Fact. Thus we fancy that there is one stretch of Fact in which we mainly think and review. Such a fancy is possible only from an ignorance of the concrete whole of Life : it is "night-view" of Existence. A courageous appeal to intuition would throw much dry light upon these seeming riddles. Life is inexhaustibly rich in natural resources ; but all these, though discoverable, cannot be pressed into service by the intellect of man ; in the discovery of natural intuition the intellect is awed into silence ; it dares not bring out its measuring rules and fashioning tools. But fortunately for it, mists arise from the depths of our own being and gather heavily about its eyebrows ; the inexpressible sublimity of Life is now forgotten : this is the circumstance of veiling or ignorance dressed up in a metaphor. In this way, do the special needs of Life appear, and the intellect of man is induced to fall to and work in reference to

those needs upon the few abstracted segments of the living wonder which it may find lying about itself conveniently within its reach. It is easy to strip this account of all its metaphor and expose it in the nakedness of its intense realism. In my life now I fancy I feel only the music of rustling leaves : I leave aside my books ; close my eyes, and abandon myself to a mood of enjoyment. How circumscribed is my acceptance of Life and how partial is my attitude in response ! Nature has surely spread for my soul's entertainment a banquet infinitely richer than the music of rustling leaves ; but the vastness of her entertainments are far too disproportionate to its common, little appetites ; hence it ignores much and accepts but little ; its adaptations to whatever little it accepts are likewise small. My ordinary cares and strivings all arise out of, and are directed to, small presentations into which the Light of Life is broken by the variously moving and grouping clouds of ignorance. I need not bring in examples to support a view which becomes at once plain upon self-intuition.

The two phases of Ignorance or Veiling are acceptance and elimination. The process fairly corresponds to what is known in science as the metabolism of the living tissue. Biological life is only an illustration of concrete Life, so that the vital process of metabolism is merely an extension and illustration of the process of the Stress in Life. The process, in its essentials, can be extended even to the constitution of the atom upon which the researches of Kelvin, J. J. Thompson and Rutherford have thrown so much light. The whole repeats substantially in its included centres of individuality what it necessarily lives in its entirety. By the operation of the Principle of Veiling, the Fact presents the aspect of a continuum in which a particular feature or group of features attains to an emphatic or tonic presentation while the rest of the field is more or less blurred and ignored : in my view of the heavens at night, it is thus that I have a clear perception of a particular star or cluster of stars only ; it is thus that concert of the leaves particularly strikes me while in my concrete experience of the moment Nature has poured lavishly countless odours, sights, sounds and touches and organic sensations. By

this law Life ceases to be a homogeneous presentation throughout its entire stretch—homogeneous as regards tone or intensity of presentation ; it possesses a centre of concentration, a zone of intensive life, round which spread tracts of comparative diffusion and relaxation. When relatively permanent or self-conserving, such a place of concentration or intensiveness becomes a centre of individuality. Thus, I as a centre of individuality, am only such a place of self-conserving concentration in the co-essential Spiritual Stuff. I might call it a Nucleus instead of a Centre. The living tissue has a tendency to assume the nuclear form : a nucleus is a place of concentration or intensification in the protoplasm. It has also become fashionable in modern dynamical theories about the constitution of the atom to speak of a nucleus round which a nebula of electrons revolves. Now, I venture to suggest vaguely at this stage that the nucleus in the protoplasmic tissue as well as that in the constitution of the atom, are only illustrations of one and the same phenomenon, *viz.*, the birth of a zone of concentration in the stretch of the Fact. Indeed, the Fact-Stuff includes both the living tissue and the so-called non-living matter ; hence the fundamental process of the former cannot but determine the structures and functions of the latter. The details of this parallelism I must not go into at present ; the nucleus of matter can be only vaguely connected with the Fact-centre by such purely general considerations ; Fact-operation also can be only vaguely connected with vital metabolism and with material attraction and repulsion. At present I am content to leave this parallelism vague and fantastic.

Fact-operation, as I have taken care to point out, cannot apply to the Fact itself ; it applies only to discriminated sections or elements of the Stress. I cannot say, for example, that the whole Fact is presented, moved or veiled. The *cidākāśa* is never presented ; it never moves ; nor even is it veiled. In my universe of experience I can apparently ignore most of my possessions, sensuous as well as ideal, and confer my favour upon a particular feature which becomes for a while a nucleus of concentration and intensive living. But can I possibly conceal from me the Ether of Awareness in which the universe appears, lives and

dissolves ? I think not ; the Ether is an inalienable possession which is wholly unaffected by my favours and disfavours. The appearance and disappearance of Fact-sections are improperly extended to the Fact itself : thus I am conscious and unconscious. So also the variations of tone which pertain to the elements are misapplied to consciousness itself : thus I am more conscious or less. In a sense, this contention is of course true ; but nevertheless am I quite sure that the Fact— or the Ether for that matter —is not veiled at all ? I am perhaps precluded not merely from making a positive statement about the Fact, but a negative one in many cases if not in all. Shall I say that the Ether at least is absolutely unveiled ? This Ether as we have seen is the Light itself which illumines all ; the universe must sink into the unredeemed darkness of dissolution if this Light should be kept back. It is the self-sufficient, absolute fluid of revelation or manifestation. The sun lights up the solar system ; but it is consciousness which lights up both the sun and his illumination. It is impossible to imagine anything behind consciousness itself which imparts to it its lucidity and brightness. The brain surely cannot be commissioned to do this ; no blind Force or Stress can be supposed to do this without logical and psychological violence. In Fact, no such derivation is at all called for ; consciousness is the ultimate principle of appearance or manifestation. When I say that something has appeared I only mean that I, and perhaps others also, am aware of it ; this at any rate is the usual and natural sense of appearance. Common sense also believes no doubt that some object may appear though there may be no consciousness to make it appear ; its appearance is independent of consciousness ; in other words, an object has two kinds of appearance, objective and subjective. I should not care to dispute this position of common sense now, although I have definitely identified consciousness not merely with appearance but also with existence. Suppose common sense is right ; appearance need not necessarily be in and for consciousness ; but will common sense dispute that consciousness is a *sort* of appearance or manifestation, and that as such it is an ultimate one ? By calling it ultimate I mean this : Not that such appearance may

not have its causes or conditions, but that as appearance it is self-sufficient. A mode of consciousness may be preceded or accompanied by a mode of the cerebral tissue: without this latter the former may never take place. But suppose it does take place ; now, does it, after it *has* appeared, require any cause or condition outside of itself to make it aware of itself ? Granting that the sun and his light are objective phenomena, I can know them only by being conscious of them ; they can appear to me only in and through my consciousness ; so also all things and processes that I know of. But consciousness appears to me by itself : it is identical with at least one kind of appearance, *viz.*, spiritual or subjective appearance. Indeed I cannot prove the ultimateness of this spiritual appearance by means of arguments and analogies ; they will certainly involve me in inextricable metaphysical mazes of circumlocution. Consciousness *means* a certain kind of appearance, *viz.*, spiritual or subjective appearance ; it must be futile therefore to seek to prove a term by its own meaning or connotation. At the same time, it may be worth our while to note that consciousness is an ultimate Light ; it shines by its own light, and not by light borrowed from any other Source.

I have promised not to challenge seriously objective appearance, or appearance independent of consciousness, at the present stage. But I cannot let this opportunity pass without categorically observing that objective appearance, however sanctified by our natural belief, is born under the veil. My universe is my experience which can hardly be better described than as a Stress in consciousness. I have absolutely no right to take any thing or process in my universe as otherwise than involved in this stress. But the permanent ether of feeling in which countless vortices of objects appear, though ever patent, is liable to be oftenest ignored. We are surprised to hear of this ether of feeling. We are very much inclined to suspect it as mythical : it is an atmosphere of self-delusion in which the morbidly mystical brain of the East can alone live and revel. To a healthy and stout intellect, consciousness is but a speck of appearing and disappearing glow-worm phosphorescence in the infinite darkness of

existence. Thus we have been told not only about unconscious modes of objective being, but about unconscious presentations, selves and personalities. A philosophy that could convince Herbart, Hartmann, Schopenhauer and the modern Psychic Researchers, must of course be examined with painstaking care before it can be left. But even in default of such examination I would make bold to suggest that the whole position rests upon a profound ignorance of the concrete, so profound indeed that it cannot be lightly shaken. The concrete is essentially conscious existence. We veil the *cidākāśa* and accept only the Stress in it ; and we have either an alogical, blind stress striving to swell into consciousness and intelligence, or an unconscious reason evolving and unfolding into self-consciousness : it is either unconscious Will or unconscious Idea making for a consummation to be devoutly wished for. This is ignorance of the concrete in the first instance. But even in this abstraction the Fact has not altogether ceased to live ; Will and Idea, though denuded of consciousness, are yet closely akin to the Stress as we live it ; the veil that is drawn between the former and the latter is yet thin enough to reveal to close, unsophisticated vision the real disposition of the Fact. But the mist may gather and thicken ; the unconscious Will and Idea will very smoothly pass into the likeness of blind Force and Matter. This is ignorance in the next instance. In the *Approaches* I endeavoured to indicate briefly how the various theories of Reality and the World are fashioned out of the given stuff of experience through the instrumentality of continued veiling and abstraction. I will not traverse the same ground now ; I only point out that objective appearance and existence is merely a creature of our mania of abstraction. I am sorry I have to return the compliment paid to Eastern ways of thinking in this unvarnished manner, but when it really comes to be a question of comparing notes, truth has to be told as well as heard.

This diversion into a bye-lane of our enquiry must now stop. Consciousness is at least a kind of appearance or manifestation which we cannot but accept as ultimate. Whenever a thing or a relation has appeared, the question remains : In and for

what does it appear ? But when a feeling or thought has appeared, it is not only idle but absurd to persist in that question. Feeling appears by its own right ; it appears because it is feeling. So much cannot be claimed for any order of existence supposed to be independent of consciousness. I may add also that upon best intuitive grounds I have been unable to follow upon the heels of my European masters who would identify consciousness with particular kinds and degrees of feeling : a feeling is felt in all its qualitative and quantitative characteristics : it is but metaphysical pedantry to postulate an Ether of awareness which makes a feeling appear or makes it felt. To a certain extent this contention is true of course. If we were to commission a subtle, elusive ether to dub a feeling as feeling, a thought as thought, we should be guilty of a vice that would not suffer us to stop at the ether itself. If a feeling requires an ether to be felt, why may we not require a subtler ether for the manifestation of the ether itself ? Surely we must stop somewhere in our search after a first principle of manifestation ; and if we think we can stop at the ether and accept this as the ultimate principle, what was it that dislodged us from the particular feelings themselves ? Nothing whatever ; we are *not* dislodged from the particular feelings in making for the universal stuff or substratum. A feeling is a myth apart from consciousness : this really amounts to saying that feeling is a myth apart from feeling. Feeling and awareness are identical, so that when I say that feeling appears in the ether of awareness, I really mean, apart from the metaphor, that feeling *simple* appears or that it appears by its own right. Now, if feeling may shine by its own light, why should we require a *plenum* of awareness at all ? Can we not do with pulses of feeling coming and going, each appearing by its own innate right ? It is here that I feel I cannot any longer bear my European masters' company : pulses of feeling coming and going cut violently across the grain of my plainest intuition of Life. I positively feel my life as a vast ocean of feeling in which particular modes toss about as waves ; the particular modes cannot certainly be abstracted from the substance itself ; they are modes of the substance even as the waves constitute an

actual agitation of the ocean or the vortices and waves in the ether an actual stress in the ether. A particular feeling is felt : this means only a particular attitude of the whole mass of conscious existence, of the entire tissue of Life : there is no question of isolated pulsation.

From the last observations it would plainly appear that even consciousness is in a sense veiled ; at least we cannot confidently maintain that it is not veiled at all. Thus we have been driven to speak of the Ether in flagrantly contradictory terms : its essence being awareness it can never be veiled and yet we find that it is veiled or ignored. The position is wholly unacceptable to logic and common sense, and yet curiously it is supported by intuition. Suppose I am intently gazing at a particular star now, or have my attention tied to a particular dominating thought : has the Ether withdrawn ? Am I not actually and unstintedly having a vast stretch of feeling in which a nucleus of peculiar vivacity and liveliness has appeared, for example, the fortunate star or the favoured thought ? Surely the unfailing spiritual Light has not failed in the present perception. In a stretch of awareness I am a centre noting and engaging myself to another centre. Feeling or awareness as such thus never fails as the sustaining background of the most partial and localized perceptions. It is the halo which the Soul ever carries about itself. A moment's intuition ought to satisfy us as to the undiminished glory of our spiritual illumination in the midst of all vicissitudes of feeling, thought and desire. In the midst of our completest self-delusion we have every atom of our being thrilling in the vitality of this Light. But if this Light should never go under a mask, how could we think and talk as though we knew it not ? The Light continues and fills us up even while we fancy we have buried ourselves in the thickest gloom ; our Soul remains as the shining sun of the universe even while we have persuaded ourselves that its effulgence is but a kind of poor glow-worm phosphorescence set against an infinite background of the unknown and unknowable. But how can we bury ourselves at all in the dark while our being is of the essence of spiritual Light itself ? Whence comes the darkness, real or fancied ? By what

miracle can the sun appear at all in the role of the glow-worm ? This is a riddle or wonder which intuition easily discovers in the make and life of our existence, but which logic or common sense dares not accost : its deliverance is allogical ; it makes existence a sublime and profound non-sense. Ask an European master if he knows anything about this unfailing, all-pervasive spiritual Light, this *cidākāśa* ; and I am pretty sure he will shake his head and shrug his shoulders ; he will begin to suspect whether the proposer of this Ether is serious and sane. What the master denies, disavows in science, I deny and disavow myself in my lay and practical moods. The spirit is never without this halo and lustre, and yet curiously the recognition of this halo and lustre is commonly the last consummation in his spiritual awakening.

Now, whence is this disavowal ? Surely this is the Veil in a clearly recognizable form. The Light, though flooding me, is not commonly accepted by me. In intuitive, actual or concrete life this Light can never be kept back or obscured ; and as my life is always concrete, even while I abstract and mystify, the Light never fails me. Yet I shut it out of myself in a manner. I stare with gaping wonder if I am told about its unfailing presence and unextinguishable glory. I disavow it in *thought*, in my review and representation of Life. Using the symbols proposed in the *Approaches* I might say that the disavowal clings only to that pole of the Fact which is called the *index*. The poles arise from an elaboration of the Fact-Stuff : they are incidental to analytic thinking. Prior to this analysis, the Light continued ; it continues even while the analysis is made ; it continues after the analysis is over. Being the essence or stuff of cognition it never of course fails to make itself known ; but it may fail to make itself recognized, represented and accepted. In thinking, it is the index of the polarized Fact that counts ; the base and the co-efficient, though undoubtedly given, are silently ignored. Thus unfailing and undiminished cognition may co-exist with minimum or no recognition. This is the kind of veil which apparently covers and conceals the *cidākāśa*.

The veil has been studied at some length in another place,

and I hope to study it with greater completeness and scientific rigour in a future essay especially devoted to it. But here I may be allowed to refer briefly to two important forms in which the veil appears in us. We have seen just now that it appears in the review of our experiences : we do not review of our experiences : we do not review and accept even what we undoubtedly feel and know. Note also that by this non-acceptance the feeling and cognition may be unaffected : the Light shines perhaps with undimmed glory while we have gathered clouds and fog about it ; the clouds and the fog are imaginary and they do not actually compromise the Reality. Upon the background of reality I may conjure up a fantastic dream-world ; but surely fact is not affected by such incidence. The rope remains a rope while in my illusion I have dressed it up as a snake. That the *plenum* of awareness is not really affected by the accidents and incidents of my thought and fancy, can be in some manner verified by intuitive experiment. Here therefore ignorance cannot shut out knowledge, thought cannot belie feeling ; non-acceptance cannot scare away possession. This is one kind of veiling—a very curious kind indeed, since it is a circumstance in which we can neither say that the Light has been veiled or obscured without being effaced, nor that it is unveiled, for it is in a way unaccepted and disavowed. To save the face of Logic we may take veiling in two distinct senses : one of which I have just explained.

The other kind of veiling pertains to the fact of intuition itself. What makes a presented continuum uneven in tone and lucidity ? A small tract or feature attains to tonic prominence, while a fog of obscurity hangs over the rest of the field. I cannot deny for one moment that the entire field has been presented ; my partiality for a section of the Fact has not effaced the Fact itself. Now, this unevenness of tone in the presentation of the field may be regarded as a proper kind of veiling and unveiling : the obscurer portions of the continuum are veiled in relation to the part which has mounted up the curve of presentation. I do not say of course that the veil *causes* this unevenness and makes the tone of presentation a curve with maximum and minimum positions ; the veil is merely the circumstance of unevenness and

curvature. It is easy enough to verify this sort of veil by an appeal to intuitive experiment. This kind of veil is more fundamental than the former kind ; it apparently operates in the bosom of the concrete itself ; it is part of the essential deliverance of the Fact as we commonly live it. The explanation by organic and objective causes may render the curve of presentation somewhat intelligible ; I am partial to the star Sirius in my review of the heavens at night because cerebral conditions and those operating from outside of my organism incline me in that way ; an end present in my thought may also be added to the list of conditions. I shall not challenge this explanation now ; but I am not sure that I can press it into my service without first making it clear what place the brain and the objective world and the mind occupy in the constitution of the Fact. Moreover, I am not here concerned with explanations, good, bad or indifferent ; I have simply described the circumstance of tonic unevenness and curvature that we readily discern in the Fact ; the veil merely summarizes the matter without in the least enlightening it. I shall let fall just one word, however, touching the ultimateness of the veil which expresses this curvature. After the explanation by cerebral, objective and subjective (in the narrower sense of the term which sets the mind in opposition to an objective order) conditions have been stretched to the utmost to cover the fact of curvature, an irreducible minimum must, I am afraid, remain of this phenomenon which we should have to accept as ultimate and unaccountable. It is the habit, the will of the Fact to appear as a curve ; it is an essential disposition of the Stress in the Fact. This, however, is a mere hint which I made in the *Approaches* and which I repeat here. In the meanwhile, the curvature of tone and intensity in the presented continuum expresses the veil of a fundamental kind.

The Ether of Awareness can neither be felt nor imagined as being veiled in this sense. The clearer tone is not a clearer consciousness, the obscurer tone is not an obscurer awareness ; briefly, the degrees or grades of tone are not degrees or grades of awareness. This is a marvellous statement of fact which my European masters will set down to perverse and muddled !

mysticism. The tone is a peculiar vivacity and intensity of presentation which does not really affect awareness as such. I am just as much aware of the dimmest borderland of the field of experience as of the lucid central zones. Let me make an appeal to self-intuition. I have a lively presentation of the star Sirius now, while around it spread heavenly zones of gradually vanishing tone and distinctness. Am I *more* aware of Sirius than of these outlying zones? In a sense I am of course, and in that sense the verdict of common sense need not be reversed. But in what sense? I have very often spoken of the *Cit* or Awareness as a Light; but let us not be compromised by physical laws in drawing upon physical analogies. Physical light is actually diversified into tones of light and shade: it is clear here and obscure there. This at any rate is true of what natural belief takes as physical light; the objective stimulus of science which causes the sensation of light in us may vary also in degree of intensity, and other supposed objective characters. But the Spiritual Light is not thus subject to variations; at least its felt or supposed variations are not real but imposed. This is a statement which requires to be examined in the light of clearest intuition. Thus examined, it will, I doubt not, be found to be true. In the experiment that I have proposed I find that awareness as such is even and impartial throughout, if I once courageously set my face against temptations of unwarranted imposition. The Light is impartial, though being reflected upon various dispositions of the Stress, it becomes, or rather looks as it were, chequered itself. Again a misguiding physical analogy, but I really cannot help it. I impose upon the Light what pertains to the dispositions of the Stress; such imposition is instinctive; hence the peculiar vivacity in a fact-section which I call its heightened tone is ascribed to awareness itself; I say accordingly that I am more conscious of it than of others in the field. But really in point of awareness as such there is no disparity between the clearest zone and the obscurest: the lustre of consciousness is equally lucid and sparkling throughout. I am equally conscious of the whole stretch of my experience at any moment; various elements of the stretch have their tonic differences, but these are

intrinsic in them ; I *know* my vaguest feeling quite as much as the most distinct of them.

But perhaps I shall be taken to task for confounding abstract feeling with concrete, feeling pure and simple with feeling as we actually feel it. The vaguest feeling is felt as the clearest one ; I have *felt* in both cases ; but it would be impossible to urge that I have felt exactly in the same way in both cases ; I have felt more, or at least differently, in the one case than in the other. Degree can surely be predicated of feeling or awareness. It can be and is undoubtedly ; nevertheless I persist in thinking that degree is an imposition upon feeling and not a part of its intrinsic possession. On making the best essay of intuition that I am capable of, I find that awareness—and this term is better for our purpose than feeling—is the principle of manifestation pure and simple : it is an homogeneous atmosphere of cognition and nothing else. Differences do not inhere in it, though it reveals or manifests all things and all differences. The differences that are revealed by it are naturally ascribed to it, so that we come to speak of clear or obscure manifestation, of appearance more tonic or less. Differences of quality and quantity belong to the Stress in consciousness ; consciousness impartially and complacently manifests them all, and in manifesting them reflects them all, just as a pure crystal reflects the redness of the flower which has been placed near it, to borrow a classical simile of Sāmkhya Philosophy. Awareness is *cinmātra* and nothing else, and though perhaps I appeal in vain to European reflection, I feel in my own intuition the purity and evenness that have been claimed for it by the Seers of the East. The European master will be loath to abstract consciousness from its mode or form, and accept the subtle abstraction as the reality. There is no evidence, says he, that we impose upon consciousness a mode or form which does not intrinsically belong to it ; we have consciousness *plus* its form and name ; this therefore must be the concrete fact for us. This indeed is the concrete fact for us, at least in the commoner planes of our existence, if I may add this without being guilty of mystical predilections. But there is a trifle of a blunder, a slight confusion, both in the representation

and in the statement of the fact. I have involuntarily misrepresented in portraying my living experience ; I have dipped my brush unwittingly into colours that exist for a prejudiced imagination, and have thus drawn a chequered picture of the *cidākāśa* itself which is pure and impartial as the sparkling heaven itself. Leave all practical interests and all psychological theories and meditate on the native glory of existence : do you not find it as a calm, even light which indifferently reveals all differences in the elements of the stuff, differences of quality, tone, and so on ? This is the true intuition for me, so that if I represent my consciousness as a variable itself, admitting of degrees of tone and intensity, I feel that I have not given a true picture of my life. In my race for the concrete I have left the concrete behind and thrown myself headlong into the abstract ; such is the grim irony of life. Consciousness assumes degrees under the veil ; tear off the veil as completely as you can and look the Fact straight in the face, and I am sure, you will feel awareness as an impartial, sparkling space (hence the justification of the designation of *cit* as *ākāśa*) in whose embrace lies a mighty ocean of Stress in chequered agitation. I really beg pardon for constantly running into more or less misguiding similitudes, and for appearing to offer mere figures of speech as bases of serious demonstration ; but I cannot otherwise carry home into sceptical minds a deliverance of my own intuition of whose importance and certainty I am convinced beyond the power of doubt. The representation of consciousness as admitting of degrees owes its origin and plausibility to the ignorance of the concrete : a startling paradox, the European masters would think. The charge which they have levelled against the Eastern mystic in season and out of season thus rebounds on themselves : they and not the mystics deal in abstractions and unwittingly pass them for concrete experiences. The series of feelings arise out of the veiling of the concrete as we have seen ; even the stream of consciousness which at least saves continuity is born out of the same operation ; and this common sense account of consciousness possessing degrees of tone and intensity must be, as far as I can see, set down to the same credit. The phosphorescence view

of consciousness must be abandoned, the wide outlook of the *cidākāśa* must be accepted instead. The wide outlook will miraculously bid the series flow as a stream, make the stream overflow its containing limits and burst into the vastness of the ocean, and set the ocean tossing and rolling against the placid, impartial background of the spiritual ether. The transformation of the slight pulses coming and going into the unutterable vastness and glory of Life, is incidental to the gradual uplifting of the veil, a slow waking up of the spirit, a delayed recognition of what the Spirit has all along known. It is no real transformation of Life itself ; it is a transformation of the representation of Life, a revised estimate and a renewed acceptance of the gift of existence. The so-called abstract view of consciousness becomes the concrete view with the coming of the wider outlook : this is a statement which I would merely place at the bar of unsophisticated intuition, eastern or western. The few observations that I have made would serve as a finger-post only—suggesting the way perhaps, but not by themselves conclusive.

I have been rather dogmatic in tone in the foregoing observations. In defence I would only say that I assumed the air of assurance because it was a question of fact verifiable by intuitive experiment only. If I have erred in the experiment, I have erred in excellent company—the seers and mystics of old. The two terms 'veiling' and 'ignorance' I have used as synonyms ; but it is no disparagement of the acuteness of the philosopher to say that he has ignored life. We all ignore life and perhaps necessarily ; practical living and even science are impossible without such ignorance. Philosophy is an attempt to push back the veil closing upon life as completely as it lies in our power. It is an essay to avow and accept what I ever am and will to be. But by its very nature philosophy is prevented from achieving its end—the completest acceptance of Life. Philosophy is not an experiment only, it is also a science ; it not only feels but reasons, it not only knows but represents. Now, inasmuch as it systematizes, reasons and represents, it ignores and abstracts, it breaks away from Life. All these operations which I may broadly summarize as logical are more or less wide of the alogical Fact-stuff, the inscrutable

but not unknowable Reality. But conceptions may be more or less wide of the truth as I have said ; so that we have the choice between a better philosophy and a worse. In the *Approaches* I have indicated symbolically how the main systems of speculation arise out of the various dispositions of the Stress in the Fact—the Stress being represented by the aspects of presentation, movement and veiling. I shall forbear treating the subject anew here, but pass on to a method of life which transcends both science and philosophy—Mysticism. Mysticism, in spite of its growing influence in Europe, has been discredited as a symptom of intellectual degeneration and its growing hold in the West has been attributed to the prevalence of 'superior insanity' and melo-dramatic imbecility in modern societies of high-pressure living and nervous exhaustion. Now, such mysticism which is only another name for superior insanity bears a close family resemblance to mist : it is the failure of the habit of clear, concentrated perception and thinking. Eastern mysticism is just the reverse of this insanity : it is a perception of Life which has attained to greatest vividness and quiescence : no mists loitering about the field, no aimlessly roving and feverishly turning attention. It is an experimental essay in which these disturbing factors of intuition are reduced to a minimum. It has therefore nothing to suggest of the mist and insanity ; it may be an uncommon method of life, a prerogative of spiritual aristocracy, but neither unnatural nor fantastic ; it is only an uncommonly lucid, unsophisticated and undistracted thought.

The justification of mysticism and its methods will engage me in a more fitting place, but, here I propose to notice two important varieties of the method as bearing closely upon my present enquiry. The method of mysticism is essentially a method of intuition : it is but intuition stretched to the farthest range of its possibilities. Intuition, as I have noted already, presents two aspects—acceptance and rejection : it is an effort to accept Life as we concretely live it : this at least is voluntary intuition. But every essay of acceptance carries with it a measure of refusal. Now, the range and depth of acceptance have to be enlarged, and those of refusal to be reduced in order

that intuition may come nearer home to Life. Is it possible to reach the ideal of fullest acceptance of Life in efforts of intuition? We need not commit ourselves as yet to a definite answer, but it is clear from the very nature of the problem that intuition aims at taking the veil off the face of the Fact as completely as it can : it fights against the ignorance of Life. It is the regarding of the Fact in its completeness which, in our actual living, we have disregarded. Now, the veil may operate in the bosom of the Fact in two distinct ways. In the first place, the Fact in its completeness may be disregarded, and regarded only in particular features ; the whole as a whole may be veiled while a part only is prominently given ; I may refer again to my observation of the starry heavens as an example. With regard to this, voluntary intuition will be an effort to take off the veil which has obscured the Fact as a whole and allowed it to be lighted up only in parts. What is the Fact that I have actually lived? What am I really? This is the question to which intuition addresses itself. Then again the veil may be supposed to operate with regard to the particular place of accent also. Let us suppose this place of accent or emphasis is a particular centre in the Fact-stuff. Now, we have conceived a centre as a given point of view through which the whole expresses itself. But how does the whole express itself through a given centre? The star Sirius is a special point of view through which the reality of the universe bursts forth as it were into some sort of manifestation : the Reality has in a way appeared as the Sirius. I am also a particular point of view through which the Fact may and does appear in a way. This may at first sound as rank mysticism, but I doubt not such a view of a centre will satisfy the demands of deeper reflection. A centre is the whole in a particular posture, in becoming and unfolding. This view bringing me as it does very near to Monadism will provoke the opposition of some types of modern Pluralism. I shall have to settle accounts with Pluralism on a later occasion ; but here I will not push the matter too far by saying that a centre is the Fact itself in miniature and grows by unfolding and not epigenesis. It will do for my present purpose to point out simply

that a centre is not a surface only but has a depth and constitution. A centre not merely appears but veils ; it not merely shows but conceals. Take for example a drop of dew or a particle of sand. It reveals the Whole in a way no doubt, but only as a stray glimpse or glimmering ray. The wonder of existence, the mystery of life, lies hidden behind the suggestion of its appearance. This indeed is the proposition of the unmanifested in the deliverance of the manifested to which our natural belief and science alike gives sanction. There can, however, be no question of the unmanifested pure and simple ; it is non-appearance from the view-point of a particular centre in the Fact-stuff, but it must be appearance in the wholeness of the Fact itself. But this distinction between appearance and non-appearance as regarded from different points of view which apparently throws discredit on my story of the *Bhāna* as outlined in the opening pages of this essay and in the closing section of the *Approaches*, will have to be examined with great care after we have pushed a little farther into the heart of the subject. In the meanwhile we shall concede that a centre in the continuum not merely shows but veils. It veils the depths of its own being and the complexity of its own connexions. Now intuition may also aim at assailing the veil in its central concealment. Cannot the Spirit force a thing to yield up its secret ? In fact Science is born out of such effort of intuition : to interrogate the things and processes of Nature as to the Life which they reveal and yet conceal : to explore their depths by observations unaided or aided by artificial means. Scientific observation and experiment represent a move essentially in this direction. Metaphysics primarily relies on the former kind of intuitive effort, its end being the recognition and avowal of the Whole rather than penetration into the appearance of a part. Nevertheless the two methods cannot properly be put wide apart, the part reveals the Whole in a way so that in following up its secret by scientific research we are sure to be thrown at last on the bosom of the Whole ; hence the study of a dew-drop or even an atom may fling us into metaphysics. On the other hand, the Stress in the Fact cannot be placed in the way of understanding

unless we have also essayed to reach out to its wholeness through the infinitely diversified elements that we discriminate in it. It is doubtful whether the Stress as a whole is at all understandable by any means : whether we start with the whole or with the parts we are destined perhaps to come to an inevitable *ignoramus*. But there are the two methods which, for the purpose of clearer distinction, I may respectively call the *acentric* and the *concentric* method. In the former we essay to go beyond the centre and have perception of the Whole ; here our regard is not allowed to concentrate, but is spread almost evenly on the entire continuum—we regard the Whole ; local concentration is an impediment in this method. In the other, attention is gathered home to a particular centre ; diffusion over the whole or even overflowing is an impediment.

Now, it is by acentric intuition that I recognize the *cidākāśa* and its placid indifference against all the differences exhibited by the Stress embraced by it. A mind disciplined by scientific habits will be induced to make concentric intuition generally, and it will not commonly rise above the series of pulses or the stream of becoming. There may also be several stages leading from one kind of intuition to the other. Concentric intuition is pragmatic and practical ; the ordinary ends of life cannot be pursued and fulfilled without considerable concentric regard in the field of the Given. In my observation of the heavens at night my regard must concentrate at particular stars now and then in order that I may observe to any definite purpose. In my vast possessions of sights, sounds and smells I must selectively seize upon a few, attend particularly to them, and ignore all the rest for the time being, in order that I may think and act definitely. How little I have seen or heard particularly in my evening rambles in the fields ! As I am writing at my desk now how few of the actual impressions warmly engage my attention, and how very partial I am in the rush of ideas, feelings and wishes as they are sweeping past me ! This therefore is the pragmatic method of life ; the success of what we ordinarily take as life depends upon the perfection of this method. The stronger the hold one can exercise upon his selective regard, the greater his fitness to

live. Rambling regard is certainly an index of imbecility, and the sort of mysticism which owes its origin to this must be regarded as a sort of insanity. But true mysticism, as I have pointed out, has absolutely nothing to do with rambling and insane roving. It is acentric intuition carried to perfection as also it is concentric attention brought to its consummation. Physics and Metaphysics are the two wings of this mighty searcher after Truth : both propelled with courage and faith will surely carry it into the ecstatic vision of the *cidākāśa*. Now, concentric intuition pure and simple, unless it can be pushed to the last consummation, will defeat its own purpose if it is not supported, nourished and enlightened by the other kind of intuition ; in the interests of practical living we require no doubt to take particular notice of the special features ; but the meaning and purpose of these special features fail to impress us unless we have at the same time a glimpse of the whole. It is only in the subtle atmosphere of the whole that a part can really be understood as a part ; rational living becomes completely undone without the perception of this atmosphere enveloping the special centre which has received our keenest attention. The lack of this larger perception mainly accounts for the diminishing rationality in the lower centres. In myself, apart from efforts at this larger or acentric perception, I feel the rhythmic natural outbursts of the whole upon the parts ; even while I am busy concentrating my regard upon special centres I feel the walls of partition suddenly receding and disappearing now and then— moments of natural acentric intuition interpolated into and enlightening efforts of concentric intuition.

From a consideration of the two kinds of veiling we have been led naturally to a discussion of the two kinds of intuition. Species of non-acceptance have made us consider species of acceptance. But the two species of the one do not quite correspond to the two species of the other. Let us recall the two kinds of veiling alluded to before. The one pertains not to intuition itself but to the review and representation of the intuition. It is in this sense that the spiritual Light is veiled. In intuition it is all right, and as life is always intuitive in the actual wholeness of

its method, the Light never really suffers. I need hardly re-open the question discussed in the Approaches that intuition is the inalienable datum of life, meaning by intuition a stretch of feeling directly and immediately served. What I regard as an idea never actually snatches me away from this stretch : an idea is indirect and mediate in one sense, but it is direct and immediate in another ; and it is the latter sense that it takes when I look at it from the stand point of the concrete Given. Taking intuition in the sense of feeling immediately served, I maintain on intuitive grounds that the Light is always equally manifested ; as a feeling immediately given it is never compromised. But in the review of this feeling we may possibly deceive ourselves : the veil may surreptitiously creep between life and its reviewer. The other kind of veiling relates to the fact of intuition itself : thus arises my partiality, concentration and diffusion of regard, heightening and lowering of tone, in the presented continuum of experience. Now, I have been rather anxious to maintain that the light of awareness is not really affected by such partiality and differentiation. It remains evenly placid in the face all differentiations of tone and intensity that may appear in the stuff. Such distinctions are no doubt commonly ascribed to the principle of manifestation itself, but it is a wrong ascription, an illusion similar to that in which I clothe an innocuous rope laid across my walk in the dark with the offensive characters of a snake. This assertion goads us into a varitable labyrinth of metaphysical discussion about abstract and concrete, reality and appearance out of which we must cut our way of escape by appealing straight to acentric intuition. Intuition again is a term which very readily gathers about itself a cloud of ambiguity. I have defined intuition in one way just now—it is a stretch of immediate feeling : it is Life itself as distinguished from the representation of Life, which, however, is nothing beyond or outside of Life. I have also previously distinguished between natural intuition and voluntary : this latter may be regarded as an effort to flash light in upon Life : it is at the same time an essay to know Life with the veil wholly or considerably withdrawn and recognize it as such. It therefore feels under better auspices, and reviews its feeling.

Note the two aspects of the method in italics ; without this latter aspect Philosophy becomes completely undone.

The case for pure, impartial awareness cannot of course be set at rest so easily. As I have pointed out, the recognition of this marks the last consummation of the method of acentric intuition. A proper appreciation of what we feel as degrees of tone and intensity in our mental life ought to clear the way considerably, but proper appreciation is not readily forthcoming. One of the hottest battles of mental science will have to be fought round this point, and I trust the doctrine of the veil that we have ventured to offer here and elsewhere will be an important factor in the decision of this contest. For the present we shall wait and see. We have found that we cannot answer the question whether the Spiritual Light is veiled or no without being driven to a sort of contradiction. We have tried to save the situation by distinguishing between presentative veil and representative veil, and pointing out that the Light can be imagined as being veiled only in the latter sense : we feel without recognizing it. Voluntary acentric intuition is the method which is calculated gradually to lead to this recognition. Now, if this be our conclusion regarding one aspect of fact-operation, *viz.*, veiling, we may move with greater security to find how the Light is affected by other aspects of fact-operation, *viz.*, presentation and movement. Can we say that the Light of consciousness is presented ? Hardly ; because presentation is an operation which implies both veiling and movement. Something is *not* given, it *comes* to be given : this is the meaning of presentation, as we commonly understand it. Eternal, time-less presentation should, I think, be called by a different name : it is existence and consciousness blown into one. As such, it is no aspect of an operation at all. It becomes identical with the Fact itself. It is clear that presentation as an aspect of operation, implying not only veiling and movement but also Time, cannot be predicated of the Light, nor even of the Fact. It is impossible also to ascribe movement to the Light and the Fact : here lies the fundamental inadequacy of the philosophy of Becoming. This, however, is a point that I have repeatedly urged, so that I need not enlarge upon it in the

present summary. I would hurriedly refer to the parallelism between the three aspects of fact-operation as regards their applicability to the Light. The veil, as we have seen, possesses the Light in review or reflection ; presentation and movement apply similarly to the Light or the Fact when we pass it in review. The feeling that Life is a stream of becoming is more emphatically a thought, an idea, than a feeling ; the concrete, entire, unveiled feeling is too vast and all-absorbing to be made to flow. What is known as flowing is a section, large or small, of the Fact ; and as this section receiving the favour of my regard displaces the Whole in review and becomes accepted as the Fact, the incidents of the section are extended surreptitiously to the Whole which is accordingly *thought* as flowing. The Whole suffers from the vices of its parts. The all-inclusive undefinable Fact neither comes nor becomes ; it simply is. But thought makes dwarfs and machines of us all. The part becomes an usurper, but it brings with it its own laws and accidents.

We have tried to show before the relation in which Time and Space stand to the Fact. We have to enquire now about Causality. The present essay, it should be borne in mind, aims no higher than at being a summary of conclusions on some of the important themes connected with the Science of Fact, and does not generally propose to exhibit the grounds supporting and processes leading to them with anything approaching scientific completeness. Now, can we pertinently enquire about the causality of the Fact ? Is Fact cause or effect in relation to any thing ? Of course it will be idle to seek to resolve this question without first looking into the import of causality itself. Shall we, as before, distinguish between the feeling and the conception of causality ? In making attentive and muscular efforts I am aware of the essence of causality ; it is essentially the consciousness of the Stress of Life overflowing. Overflowing into what ? It should be recalled that Stress operates in different centres of individuality in the Spiritual Stuff. I, for example, am a stress acting in a tolerably permanent centre in the placid ether of awareness in co-relation with other centres, objective or ejective. This is a somewhat technical rendering of the meaning of

individual life, but I hope it will not be found to be very much revolting to our natural belief. By Stress I mean the tendency or impulse to become which vents itself in the stir and commotion of life. Quiescence is, as far as our words will express, the index of being ; it is unmistakeably bound up with the intuition of the *cidākāśa* which I have laid as the very basis and substance of being. It is self-contained, self-satisfied consciousness. When by a supreme effort of intuition I am brought near to this substratum of being, when I come to recognize it almost as I feel it, I feel that the Stress of life is stupefied as it were by a sudden enchantment, and that I *become* this consciousness of self-contained and self-sufficient being. The sea of life has appeared all on a sudden, as it were, on a canvas. I am tempted therefore to connect being with quiescence and not certainly with Stress. How the Stress appears at all in the midst of the unruffled quiescence of being is a problem which I dare not look in the face. It is the fundamental problem of creative energy and causality. There appears on the bosom of being, quiescent and deep, the mysterious stir and commotion which cannot be better described than as will-to-become. We cannot conceive that this appearance is in Time ; neither can we imagine that it is in Space. The Stress or impulse to become is felt in the heart of being—*cidākāśa* ; yet we cannot suppose that being itself tends to become, or that the Stress which is in the Ether determines it : it is a Stress in the Ether of Awareness and not a Stress of the Ether. The Ether always is ; it is *being* as such ; it never *becomes* ; and yet it supports the appearance of becoming. A veritable mystery, is it not ? In the deepest acentric intuition one must stand face to face with this Mystery and Wonder and feel that his logic is too poor and scanty to cover his experience. I have already pointed out that movement or stir of any kind cannot be ascribed to the Light itself which manifests all. The story of becoming or fact-operation which I have outlined in the *Approaches* does not relate to it or the totality of the Fact-Stuff. It is merely an account of the fact-sections that I can discriminate in the unbounded stretch of my existence. The ceaseless forward rush conditioned by the

equally ceaseless backward sweep has not surely carried existence an atom forwards or backwards. If the attitude of existence as a whole be taken as the expression of reality, then the impulse to becoming attributed to existence should have to be regarded as an illusion. The concrete being never becomes ; it is veiled, abstracted, dissected being that is felt and known as becoming. In the Upanishads which record the deepest results obtained by man's acentric intuition, the concrete Being has been styled as Brahman and the Stress—the Will-to-become—which is in it but not of it, has been known as *Māyā*. I will not enlarge upon the relation between the Light and the Stress just now ; the few broad statements that I have just made should be verified by careful intuitive experiment. We need not indeed beg at the door of mysticism to allow us to be introduced to this Light and this Veil ; we discover them in sufficiently recognizable forms in our own ordinary experiences. Ordinary experience gives me the quiescent background of Being-Consciousness-and-Bliss (*Sacchidānanda*) against which the mysterious Stress of Life—the Will-to-become—operates through a multiplicity of correlated centres. Of the two feelings of quiescence and Stress, persistence and movement, I distinctly feel the former as the more fundamental and basic one. However carefully I make my intuition to satisfy Bergson and his following, I inveterately wake in the midst of my dream of the stir, commotion and race of life to feel that I am ever perfectly at rest,—a rest which surely does not spell death and inertia but the deepest quiescence of bliss and the serenest satisfaction of awareness.

The Stress is Tendency-to-Become. As the Stress is in Spiritual stuff, this primordial tendency is no blind force. Experience will warrant the installation of no such blind Force as the energy of Becoming. I directly feel this energy of becoming in attending and striving. It is essentially Will in a rather wide sense. By giving this name to it I do not of course prepare in the least the way for a better understanding ; I do perhaps localize the mystery ; we shall know where to look in for it. If I am pressed to define it, I find I can only go in a circle : Will is the tendency-to-become, impulse-to-overflow in me, that is

to say, in the centre which I am wont to call *me*. Will is not exhausted in a particular centre ; it is not a subjective impulse merely, though it operates through subjective centres like you and me. It is larger and more fundamental than you and me.

The nature of this Will-to-become is inscrutable to me. I cannot identify it with rational Will. The Stress which operates through *me*-centre has manifested undoubtedly as rational Will, as Will directed to the realization of a Good conceived by me ; but this is merely a part, an aspect of its manifestation. Its fuller nature altogether exceeds my conception. I cannot say either that it is rational Power or that it is blind and irrational. Reason and irreason, so-called Good and Evil, which we discern in ourselves and in the world, are streams that flow out of a common Source leaving it shrouded in unshakable mystery. It is not exactly a Power-making for righteousness ; for it surely exceeds the limits of any such characterization. I must not idealize it. Righteousness is actually a part of this world-outburst. I cannot claim it for the whole. A Power that has burst into light and bliss in me and in the countless other centres of the world cannot, on the other hand, be conceived as dark and evil. The pessimistic delineation of the Power is even more illusive than the optimistic. Light and bliss are at any rate fundamental deliverances of my existence : Life I feel as a substratum of awareness and bliss. Darkness and evil are surely born of the ignorance and non-acceptance of this substratum. Hence if we conceive Good as identical with this Light and Bliss, we can with some fairness say that the Power, the underlying *Elan* of Life, is Good. But I can hardly say that this Good is rational in the ordinary ethical sense of the term. The essence of the Power and of Existence for the matter of that is awareness of pure and simple bliss, or rather undifferentiated blessed consciousness. But it is not possible to maintain that the Power is wholly tending to any particular mode of blessed existence or that Existence as a whole is moving to any particular kind of good conceived by us as desirable. Such a tendency or movement is, so far as we can see, only a part of the Stress. The movement to apparent evil and destruction is also, so far as we

can see, an element of the Stress. Good in the ordinary ethical sense of the word is connected with individuality ; the moral philosopher will be loath to search for it in the pure, homogeneous *cidākāśa* itself. It is too subtle and universal a stuff to satisfy an individual's interest of possession and enjoyment. A power conceived on such a model will also not meet the ordinary theistic expectation of a Personality of moral perfection. I cannot offer It as God for official acceptance in the West. But I, as an Indian, can hardly be satisfied without such a God Who, though unbounded Light and Bliss in His essence, cannot be truly identified with any centre of individuality, nor with any stream of evolution, good or evil, constructive or destructive, which I, as a special view-point in His world-manifestation, may happen to discern in the flow of existence. All centres lie in Him and yet I cannot know Him as a Centre ; all streams emanate from Him and yet I cannot limit Him to any one. This however is not the place and occasion to enlarge upon the moral and religious issues involved in the theory of the Stress. I have merely warned against the tendency of too easy-going anthropomorphism so commonly displayed in the interpretation of the deepest messages of life and existence. The divine outburst certainly overflows the little reservoirs of our rationalism and practicalism. It is not a Reality that can be carried about snug and secure in the garments of our toy philosophy. Let us not make too great a noise over our own conceptions of a rational and moral Deity. I have also repeatedly cautioned against too hastily separating the Stress from the Ether, and set them up as entities. Reality or Being as such cannot be at all partitioned, so that I cannot say that the Ether or Light is a reality and that the Stress in it another. Intuition sets its face absolutely against any such dualism. Apart from the Light, the Stress cannot be imagined at all ; what is left over if I take away both existence and manifestation from under the Stress which I know as the world ? Yet curiously existence and manifestation is— I now take them as one— not for me existence and manifestation pure and simple, but one upon which a Stress, an impulse to become, has been laid, I know not how and why. This Veil or crust cannot, for one moment, be contempla-

ted in isolation from Being and Awareness. I have used the word 'curious' in referring to this relation, which suggests that like the parties themselves the relation itself is alogical and unthinkable. A rebuff for the poor human measure again! I cannot even think that the Light and the Veil are but two aspects of one and the same inscrutable Fact. Aspects have passed unchallenged in serious and deep philosophy since the days of Spinoza down to those of Herbert Spencer : the parallelism of thought and extension, mind and matter, has slowly but steadily obtained a footing in sober science. This substitute offered for rank materialism on the one hand and unsubstantial idealism on the other has been acceptable to consumers who desire to evade extremes. But men in the extreme themselves have generally suspected the ill-concealed dualism of this aspect-creed and middle-philosophy. Apart from too readily serviceable physical analogies, what do aspects of one and the same Reality mean or imply really? In saying that A and B are aspects of X, do I or do I not know anything about X itself? If I suggest that A and B do not cause each other, but that they somehow co-exist and correspond, and that beyond this I know absolutely nothing about them, I have merely admitted the fact of co-existence and correspondence without caring to go under the cover of Occasionalism or Pre-established Harmony ; but judge whether I am to be dubbed a dualist or not. If I know X as merely the sum of its aspects, *viz.*, as $A + B$, I have surely not carried the point sensibly farther here than in the foregoing. Here also I merely state the circumstance of co-existence and correspondence. If I conceive X as the ground or cause which appears as A and B, I make A and B subordinate in relation to X, but to what purpose? Is it to make the circumstance of their co-existence and co-operation intelligible? But this is rather the confession that the circumstance is unintelligible to poor human reason. Aspects therefore will bring me either to ill-concealed dualism or to agnosticism simulating as a monistic theory. Nevertheless the cast of thought which requires aspects for its satisfaction is not only normal but necessary in us. We could not give it up even if we would. Somehow we cannot halt at dualism rugged and bare ; we are impelled to push forward

to a unity which we cannot distinctly perceive and yet to the tune of which the deeper chords of our nature unmistakeably respond. This is the impulse towards unification which mysteriously draws together all the tributaries of our rational tendency. We need not grope for the sources of this impulse now ; but the belief in aspects of Reality which we cannot readily part with even though we are reminded of its unsatisfactory probative value, is born of this impulse. I have occasionally spoken of the Light and the Veil as aspects of Reality ; I do not know how else to speak of them. But I do not mean to imply either dualism open or concealed, or even agnosticism in the usual connotation of the term. I cannot understand the relation between Light and Veil of course, but I feel their unity. Analytic thought works wonders ; thus the substance is regarded apart from the attributes, the cause is considered separately from the effect, and the subject and the object are noted aside. In this way the indivisible unity of perception becomes dissected and dressed up in parts ; a circumstance which may deceive the unwary into supposing that the dissected parts are veritable concrete realities by themselves. This operation is part of the magic of the Veil. It is an outcome of the Will-to-become. Reality can commence to *become* in right earnest only when by the magic just alluded to it is made to appear as many, to forget and disavow its essential nature of sameness. Now, to regard the apparently independent many as aspects of the same which has been somehow lost in thought, is only an attempt to accept and avow. This attempt can hardly bring satisfaction to reason, but it is at least one which points to the finding and recognition of a true intuition.

The Stress operates through a particular centre in the Stuff. In fact each individual object in Nature may be regarded as a special disposition of the universal Stress. Take for example a particle in a system of physical configuration. The whole force or the system of forces of the configuration operates through it. It is a special origin or pole in reference to which the whole system of forces can be diagrammatically represented. A different particle is a different pole or origin. The system of forces as a whole may be the same. I am troubled with no

shyness or misgivings to extend this physical illustration to the concrete order of existence. The material configuration only illustrates the law and order which pertains to the Stress in existence. The nature of the forces operating in a given particle cannot be considered without considering the whole system as operating in all the other particles of the configuration ; similarly the special disposition of the Stress in a given centre cannot be considered without taking into account the universe of Fact as a whole ; hence finality is not the fate of human science. Meanwhile, I am a special disposition of the Will-to-become. In me it is disposed in such a way as to become in part at least rational will. As I have confessed, I am not prepared to say that this World-Power is rational as a whole, beyond the partial disposition in me, or other centres similar to me for that matter. I cannot also say that it is irrational. Rational and irrational are measures pertaining to my centralized existence which I feel I cannot extend to the Deity without blasphemy. I shall keep near to the truth to say that rational and irrational, good and evil, joy and sorrow, beautiful and ugly, are lateral streams that have mingled and set off one another by contrast, venting. I know not how or why, the outburst and overflow of the same Power. I do not surely mistake if I call that Power good, beneficent and beautiful : have I not in *these* the expressions, such as I may take in and compute, of the richness of a Life which I know not how to contain within my ideas and fancies ? A power that can appear as moral and tend to the ideal in the individuals need not be unmoral and dead in itself ; a life that overflows as love in you and me need not be an uncaring grinding machine in itself. But I cannot conform the power to any human standards of morality exclusively ; nor can I dare to contain the flood of cosmic life in the cup of human love, divinely sweet though its contents be. Of course the question will remain : Why of the many lateral streams of the divine outburst must I identify myself with one and shun the rest ? Why must I strive after morality, beauty and love and *not* after vice, ugliness and selfish madness for existence and power ? The question thus raised cannot be easily laid to rest ; I shall be

ill-advised to enter into it and pass through it galloping. But I will nevertheless hint at the cloudlands of metaphysics where, I am persuaded, the true answer lies. To thy own Self be true : this is the key to the evolution of an individual centre, in so far at least as it is amenable to its voluntary direction. The universal Stress is so disposed in me that the deeper currents of my being are felt as moving unmistakeably to the ideal of moral, aesthetic and religious perfection. This is the essential disposition of the Will-to-become in me : I cannot mistake in feeling it : I am secretly drawn and moved by this profound under-current in me even while the surface of my life has been broken and deformed by the storm of baser passions, and the frail craft of my interest is violently tossed about by the waves of an insane struggle for existence and possession : I see this shining essence quite as much through a perfect villain like Iago as through a god-saint like Buddha. It is the law of the human centre. The World-Power has become such a *law* in the human centre. Ugliness, moral and spiritual, is only an *accident*, an exception, in the outburst of the Power in the human centre. Man does not know whether it is the law of the Power as a whole ; but let him mind not ; let him only be true to the law of his own being. It is the burden of the divine song stirred up in the fibres of his being ; the law is an aspect of the divine outburst in him ; he cannot therefore really lack divine pledge and guarantee for his human evolution.

In following up the story of the Stress I have walked unawares upon an exceedingly delicate ground. In depicting the outlines of the *Bhāna* or Fact-Stuff I appeared to make short work of the distinction so commonly drawn between subjective and objective orders of existence. The *abhāna* or unmanifested is merely a suggestion and belief of larger vistas of existence contained within the *bhāna* itself ; and since the belief and suggestion are a part of the *bhāna* or Fact-Stuff they cannot really be made to prove an order of existence outside of, or objective to, the Fact-Stuff. The principle that I acted upon was : An immanent operation cannot be trusted as establishing a transcendent fact. This indeed was the theme that I continually harped upon. And

what was the Fact as I portrayed it? I spoke of it of course in terms implying a mysterious awe: it was an unbounded sea of awareness in which modes of feeling tossed about like waves. Still it was undoubtedly the concrete whole of my experience. What is my universe of feeling, without ignorance and reservations?—It is this question which leads straightway to the Fact. It is my Life as revealed in the serenest attempt of acentric intuition. I am of course precluded from regarding this Life as either mine or yours: it cannot be fastened upon any centre of individuality without being vitally compromised in the process. It is not the Life as lived now or then, here or there. It is Life in its concreteness, uncircumscribed vastness. Since it is Feeling, it is actuality and manifestation itself. It is *cidākāśa* in which a Power of Stress has burst forth as the marvel of existence, variously changing and evolving, dealing out its processes apparently in Time and Space, and in accordance with laws. Remember that it is not Feeling as I feel it now or here. A present feeling, a local feeling, or even an individual feeling, is a cross-section of the real, concrete Feeling. If this be the Fact, it cannot obviously be conditioned by the relation of subjectivity and objectivity. There is simply nothing *else* with which it can negotiate. Now, if this is the real character of the Fact, we should take care how we allow it to get mixed up with Fact individualized. The latter is the Fact as I, an individual centre in the Fact itself, feel it. But what is this individual centre in the Fact? It is a particular point of view for regarding the whole, a special origin or pole through which the universal Stress operates. This implies that the whole is not regarded as a whole in a given centre, or at least, it regards the whole differently from another centre. In any case, by postulating the centre or point of view we admit by the back door the common sense distinction between manifested and unmanifested, subjective and objective, against which we had closed our gates. The whole now becomes objective in relation to the centralized life which essays to know and accept it without being completely successful: the vistas of the whole unregarded and unaccepted become an unmanifest reality which has succeeded in making itself only partially manifest in a given

point of view. This circumstance of non-regard or non-acceptance I have called Veiling. It shows that the whole, though ignored from a given point of view, continues to make the actual life of that point or centre. Thus the amoeba is the Fact itself, the unbounded ether of awareness, in which the Will-to-become has so operated that it does not accept its own actuality, but avows itself as a simple pulse of chaotic feeling. Evolution of life means simply the progress of this acceptance of Fact towards greater extensiveness and depth. The non-appearance of the whole in a centre is therefore peculiar ; it is appearance in actuality, but non-appearance in the avowal or acceptance of actuality ; a circumstance that I could not better describe than as veiling. This peculiar kind of non-appearance in the midst of appearance, *abhāna* in the heart of *bhāna*, is a true rendering of our own life of experience ; I have merely extended it to all centres alike, even to such an unpretentious centre as the amoeba.

What then do we mean by the belief and suggestion of the unmanifested in the midst of the manifested ? Is this not belief and suggestion subjective, or pertaining to a special point of view in the universe of Fact ? If so, am I not really reduced to solipsism ? Of course not ; whatever is manifested in and through a special centre cannot be rightly claimed as an exclusive subjective possession, having no title to stray beyond the experience of that centre. The centre is merely a way of acceptance of the whole ; it lives the whole in actually without avowing the circumstance to itself. A belief and suggestion which necessarily and inalienably clings to the experiences of a centre in the Fact-Stuff, must, I think, be considered as a part of the divine out-burst itself of which the centre itself is a part or outlet. I have absolutely no right to give myself preference or precedence over the essential implications of that which I am wont to call my life of experience. I am merely a centre or origin to which the elements or aspects of this life are commonly referred, but on this account I cannot claim them as my own, as subjective in the ordinary sense of the term. Because I am a point of view I am wont to put a subjective or selfish construction upon my experience as a whole ; in speaking

of it I must speak as though it were *my* experience. But in the concreteness of feeling countless centres besides myself undoubtedly exist, the universal Stress overflowing in a way through each, and all included in an impartial ether of feeling which knows no bounds. The belief and suggestion that these other centres are really centres even as I am one, that there may be still other centres and still wider vistas of existence beyond the pale of my distinctly felt and warmly accepted experience ; that, briefly, I am in avowal and acceptance a lesser fact while I am in actuality the greater and the alogical Fact-Stuff itself : is a mode of the deliverance of the Stress itself even as I am one, and therefore it is doing an uncalled for violence to shut up life and existence within the dimensions of a centre on the ground that my subjective belief regarding larger realities are unsubstantial bases for such realities. We are really making too great a fuss about an accident of mental life, *viz.*, reference to an Ego, which deceptive psychology has bolstered up into such magnified and overpowering importance.

I would thus save our natural beliefs and impulses from the appropriation of a too jealous subjectivism. It is the case of one element or aspect of the Stress laying an exclusive title on another element or aspect. The question may be asked : What warrant have we for supposing that these beliefs and impulses have objects, ends or values beyond our own limits ? I will oppose this question by another ; What do we precisely mean by our own limits ? The limits of our own actual experience, we shall of course reply. But this is a reply which I feel I cannot accept in either of the two parts into which it readily breaks up. In the first place, what I am wont to regard as my actual experience is commonly, if not always, a very much restricted section of the actual whole of experience ; I have ignored the mass and have accepted and avowed what is after all an abstraction. Now, If I do not happen to find something in this accepted and avowed portion which I am wont to call *my* experience, it does not prove that it is not to be found in the concrete whole of experience either which has been veiled and ignored. But shall I find it upon making an effort of acen-

tric intuition? Will not my reflection on the concrete whole itself bring it to light? It ought to, if it be at all there. But suppose it does not, am I not sure that it is no part of my actual experience at all? Theoretically this last question must be answered in the affirmative. But practically I may yet entertain doubts: even after an essay of acentric intuition such as I am ordinarily capable of, I am not quite certain that I have accepted and avowed *all* that I actually have been, that I have been able to bring into the light of recognition the vast wonder of my existence. Here, I am afraid, I am verging perilously upon mysticism and occultism, but still I claim the right to avow that I have not consciously exceeded the deliverances of any spiritual life. My spiritual life is indeed a vast wonder to me, **even** in its actuality. I find it impossible to define or circumscribe this vastness. The account that I can possibly give of this life is sure to be an abstract, incomplete account, accepting the life in parts and ignoring it in the whole. The review that I make after trying the best acentric intuition I am capable of exercising, suffers from this inexorable limitation: in spite of its best endeavours mists have lingered about the horizons of life. This is a statement which I am prepared to submit to the ordeal of honest, unprejudiced experiment. Practicalism in life, which unfortunately remains even while we have persuaded ourselves that it is gone, will not have us suspect this limitation, this background of nescience surrounding and sustaining our science. We think that life has been brought to account, that existence has passed into our thought. But this is an illusion which has of course its practical value. The review following an acentric intuition must therefore not be relied too far upon. Moreover, the range and depth of intuition are not absolutely fixed: its possibilities may grow: what has not represented itself in the lime-light of a certain effort of intuition may appear in the dry day-light of another and better effort. But I do not now build upon unproved and unwarranted possibilities of spiritual intuition. The point that I am anxious to urge is that the review or representation following an effort of intuition cannot practically be accepted as a complete account of actual life, so that the

limits of actuality as accepted by that review may not be the actual limits. Review creates limitations where none exist, and draws the existing limits closer together towards the centre of regard. Now, I have maintained in the *Approaches* and I repeat here that actual life is a limitless ocean of awareness in which a Stress of limitless import is bursting, as it were, through countless eddies or centres of becoming. The limits that I set either to Awareness or to the Stress are arbitrary. The realms of the Fact beyond my accepted limits are not indeed subconscious or unconscious : they are possessions, even in me if I may say so, that have been veiled or ignored. Hence when I talk glibly about limits of actual experience, my talk should be valued at its proper worth. Under the inspiration of practicalism I am so prone to self-deception in matters of theoretic feeling and knowing, that I cannot be altogether ill-advised if I infuse a little too much of the spirit of criticism into my ideal reconstructions of life. With this caution in mind let me approach the question which I have set before myself to answer. When I do not find something in the review and representation of life, I must not rush to turn it out of actual existence as such. Possibly it has formed a part of what I call my own experience. But it has been missed perhaps in my stock-taking, not merely in the narrower stock-taking of our common practicalism, but also in the wider outlook of honest intuitive review. On the other hand, if I do find it lying in the accepted zones of my experience, I must not imagine that it cannot lie or refer beyond those zones ; that it must be incidental to that life with which I identify myself ; that nothing else can accept what I have accepted ; that in short, my accepted life is exhaustive of existence. This is solipsism, the philosophy of an insect whirling about in a tiny eddy and deluding itself into the fancy of an ocean dreamer ! It has no real warrant in the actualities of experience. It arises from a false representation of the place and function of a centre in the Fact-Stuff. But to this I will refer presently. Meantime, I have cautioned against falling into the pit of dogmatic positivism about what one does or does not find in his experience. He must of course build provisionally upon his

own findings ; but let him not be dogmatically positive about them. There *may* be more things in the vast wonder of life which we call Experience than our proud philosophy may dream of. But note the *may* also ; we must not dogmatize about these unsuspected actualities either. We can only try again and again to make our intuitive review tally as nearly with Fact as we can. More depth and more light should be our motto.

The Fact therefore should not be identified with individual experience. The latter is the former as it has been largely veiled. The former is the latter from where the veil has been uplifted. I am a lesser fact by ignorance or non-acceptance of the larger Fact : non-acceptance implying that the Fact has become, in my special point of view, obscured or blurred without ceasing to be actual. It is as if I am looking at a beautiful and varied landscape through misty glasses ; it is as if I am looking at the starry heavens at night through an expanse of fleecy clouds. But perhaps I shall be asked to drop metaphors and look the Fact straight in the face. What do we really mean by actuality ? In my individualized experience the Fact has been supposed to be actually given in all its unbounded vastness ; it has been merely ignored. The consequences of this statement are tremendous. The Fact is an infinite universe in Feeling in which countless centres are in stress. From the above statement it will follow that this vast universe of acting and reacting centres is actually given in my individual experience ; I have not simply accepted and avowed this vast possession. But is my actual possession in consciousness or feeling really so vast and tremendous as this ? Can I really make room for the whole universe of countless centres acting and reacting in my actual feeling ? The universe is all-inclusive ; what I am accustomed to regard as the objective world, far and near, living and non-living, is swallowed up in this universe. Now do I live all this stupendous wonder in my own pulse of feeling ? The Fact is this universe, I am the Fact largely disowned ; I am therefore this universe largely disowned. This indeed is the full import of the view that we have taken regarding the larger Fact and the lesser. But can a view, apparently so grotesque and ambitious as this,

be maintained? If by ignorance we could mean the circumstance of something being wholly out of an individual's consciousness or feeling, then this view would be simply restating in somewhat unfamiliar terms the position of common sense. I do not know the whole real universe in which I live and move; my feeling grasps it piecemeal. The growth of my knowledge means that the unknown and the unmanifested is gradually being known and manifested. But here ignorance is equivalent to non-actuality as feeling, non-presentation in consciousness. It does not mean the non-acceptance of something which has been actually given in feeling; the dealing with the manifested *as though* it were unmanifested. It introduces a distinction between given and not-given, and not simply one between given and accepted and given and unaccepted. Our ignorance, on the other hand, introduces a distinction within the stuff of the Given itself; it is the circumstance by which a portion of the Given, without ceasing to be given, is regarded by me as though it were not given at all. Thus the universe, the world of science and common sense, is given while I feel; but I accept and identify myself with only a speck of this felt reality.

But can it be really so? If it were really so, we should be putting too fantastic a construction upon ignorance. Ignorance, however, properly means the circumstance of *ignoring* something which has been actually given or which exists. I have used 'ignorance' in this literal and legitimate sense throughout. Hence I have identified it with the veil. Whatever be my warrant for employing a word in a rather unusual sense, I will ask this: Does Ignorance, taken in the sense of the present essay, correctly represent the actual cast and context of my feeling? When I feel, do I ignore? In the usual sense I ignore of course that which I do not feel. But to take it in our own sense, it must be shown that I ignore in the body or mass of my feeling itself. If to ignore is to be partial to a particular tract or feature of a stretch of feeling to the prejudice of the whole, then it is clear to reflection that I do ignore while I feel: almost always I am partial in the bestowal of my regard on my life's concrete possession. Now this partiality carries with it the circumstance of acceptance

and non-acceptance. I have accepted the feature to which I have been partial and have rejected the rest of my feeling. Here is a distinction in the bosom of the Given itself which no one would perhaps care to deny. But it should be at once noticed that the feature accepted is not the only item that I actually feel ; the so-called rejected features are also felt. This is evident from the fact that the distinction works within the limits of the Given itself. The distinction therefore relates only to grades or tones of feeling. The accepted feature is most prominent in tone and vividness, while the rest are placed in the zones of gradually vanishing intensity. The rejected features are not only sufficiently keenly felt : yet they constitute in their obscure totality the massive background, content or 'fringe' of feeling against which the favoured spot swells out, as it were, into light. When the fact of feeling comes up, as I think, for review, the favoured spot and the outlying vistas are of course treated differently. I think as though my feeling or experience were exhausted in that little favoured spot ; the background and the fringe does not ordinarily come up for representation at all. The circumstance of ignorance, in our own sense of the word, is thus brought out very prominently in the review of feelings. However that may be, will it not be rank occultism to urge that the whole great universe can be snugly put into my feeling, including of course the favoured spot and the blurred background ? When I think I am seeing a particular star only, am I having actually the whole choir of heaven and the furniture of the earth ? Do I feel this *all*, though my feeling may be blurred in respect of everything except the star of my attentive engagement ? This is an extremely improbable suggestion, is it not ? But not an altogether unlikely one, I should say nevertheless. That the individual's experience as a whole cannot be strictly circumscribed, that even this is felt as an unbounded vastness is operating, is a proposition which I have repeatedly brought forward to the perpetual annoyance of my psychological critics. But suppose my critic allows me to indulge for one moment in my intuitive vagaries : let my feeling be a universe which no bounds may contain. Can it now be identified with the universe of fact as it has been described a

moment ago? Can I claim that my universe of feeling is exhaustive of reality and existence? Did I not myself develop a third pole in the constitution of the fact of experience, *viz.*, its co-efficient of suggestions and possibilities? A fact as I possess it in feeling is believed as growing in a solution of possibilities—it is a fact changing and developing. I do not believe it to be a fully furnished universe in which nothing can be wanting. Hence I differentiate an actual fact from a possible one. My fact cannot therefore be induced to swallow up all existence. It is by courtesy that I call it my fact: it is really a stretch of feeling in which the *me* occasionally appears as the liveliest centre of reference. I mean this stretch of feeling when I call it my fact. Nevertheless this stretch of feeling as an actuality cannot be induced to swallow up all existence and set up as *the* universe of Fact. In one way this is undoubtedly an unbounded stretch: I do not positively feel any limits in it, any distinct boundaries where it halts: it *is* a universe. But in another way do I not know it as limited? Is it not a universe within a larger universe, an infinity within a greater infinity, if I may say so? In the *Approaches* I pointed out and explained degrees of infinity; like orders of infinitesimal we have orders of infinitude also. An existence unlimited in one way may be limited in another; thus my fact—the stretch of feeling in which the *me* has appeared as the centre of reference—may be unlimited in the sense that I cannot positively indicate where it ends, that it is given as an ocean of feeling; but it may be limited in the sense that it is but an actual feeling out of an infinite number of possible feelings, that vast though it be it is but an earnest, a foretaste, of the real Fact behind the curtains. Thus manifestation is a passing instalment of the unmanifested, the actual is but an earnest of the potential. This indeed is a belief clinging to the stretch of feeling in which the *me* has appeared; but it is a belief that I cannot possibly put away from me; I must believe in unfulfilled possibilities of knowledge and existence. Now, if my fact should be taken as limited in this inevitable manner, how can I take it as equivalent to the Fact itself? The individualized fact, it must be remembered, has been defined as the all-inclusive Fact itself

which has been veiled as a whole and accepted only in parts : the individual being a relatively permanent point of view for regarding the Fact-Stuff, a measure of acceptance necessarily implying a measure of ignorance. My stretch of feeling is therefore identical with the Fact-Stuff with this difference that it has ignored the latter largely : there are not different stretches of feeling, but only one which, however, appears differently from different points of view.

But is this not really playing fast and loose with essential import of feeling ? A stretch of feeling which has appeared differently in the different centres is not, it will be said, one feeling at all. An objective fact may be believed to remain one and the same though it is felt differently by different minds ; but it is absurd to think that feeling remains one and the same though it appears differently in different minds. A feeling is as it is felt : its appearance or manifestation is its actuality. Quite so, but even feeling may be veiled, ignored or disavowed. Take for example my concrete feeling of the present moment. How really vast it is ! And yet how conveniently small it looks in my partial regard and practical acceptance ! Shall I say that I am the small fragment of feeling to which I happen to be partial ? Though the background and fringe is obscure or even unsuspected, shall I maintain that it is not there at all ? The whole including the favoured spot is the actual feeling for me, though I may not commonly care to avow and claim so much. Of course this distinction is patent between a stretch of feeling which has been accepted as a whole and that which has been accepted only in part ; we may if we like call them different feelings. I would not think for one moment of explaining away this difference. In this way, we may hold, there is an infinite plurality of feelings in the bosom of the Fact-Stuff pertaining not merely to the lives of the countless centres in it but also to the changing life of one and the same centre. But it should be observed that this is a pragmatic way of putting the thing : the infinite number of different feelings gives us merely an infinite number of abstractions. If I ignore the massive continuity of the sea, I have merely an infinity of waves and eddies ; similarly

if I ignore the essential continuity of feeling, I have a plurality of feeling-elements or even perhaps a world of mind-dust. In being partial to a section of feeling I cannot really efface the concrete feeling itself : it is there in a way. Without this setting the particularly regarded section would be but an airy nothing without any local habitation or name. It would still be there were I to accept it as a whole ; there is indeed a difference between the first and the second condition of its presence on the score of which I might take them as different feelings. But the underlying continuity must not be ignored either. The difference between a stretch of feeling ignored and accepted is not a simple difference of kind, like that between a sensation of colour and that of a note or smell. The tree as a whole appears in a way while I am partial to a fruit hanging in it ; it appears in a different way while I have done with the fruit and bestowed my regard on its possessor instead. Surely there is an unmistakable continuity of presentation in the midst of this change of appearances ; it is not as if I have merely passed from a sensation of colour to one of smell. The obscure background and setting is lighted up inducing of course a difference in feeling, but not snapping an essential continuity of presentation about which true intuition, I should think, ought to have misgivings.

Of continuity I noticed several varieties in a preceding work. The absolute continuity of the Fact-Stuff remains beyond the possibility of doubt. The discontinuities of gulfs in the life of experience are apparent rather than real : it is like the view of a few towering peaks where the slopes and the valleys have been shrouded by masses of clouds. Life is essentially a stretch and not a series or configuration. But the continuity of presentation to which I have just alluded is something over and above this. It means that in the midst of flux of feeling an object of presentation fairly stably continues. For example, I am engaged in the perception of a tree before me for some moments ; the perception is undoubtedly a growing picture and not a static, finished product at any time ; nevertheless the perception crystallizes round a tolerably stable nucleus and in constant proportions. It

is this point of fixity and continuity in the midst of the flowing stuff of experience which renders the perceptual process the perception of a definite object. The process, in a fair analysis, will be found to be essentially a process of gradual unveiling, the first glimpse of cognition in relation to an object gives me perhaps a blurred picture of the whole ; it is a massive feeling over which the veil, as the principle contrary to presentation, has been drawn ; the process of the perception means the gradual uplifting of the veil. The uplifting of the veil means of course enhanced richness and vividness of presentation. The process therefore is from most veiling to least, from least presentation to most ; veiling and presentation are respectively the lower and the higher limit of the operation. The operation represents the principle of movement which works in the shape of moving regard differentiating and integrating the given continuum of feeling. Perception thus illustrates the Stress of life in its triangular composition. But I shall study perception more in detail in another place. In the meantime it will be seen how this process essentially involves a sort of continuity other than the absolute continuity of mental life, and also how this continuity presupposes and illustrates the veil. Suppose again I am approaching an object from a considerable distance. At a long distance I have merely a vague, chaotic feeling of the object. Yet this first feeling can hardly be regarded as a bald, featureless mass ; many of the features have already appealed to me perhaps in a very feeble strain : it is like the perception of a music whose notes I am not yet able to surely grasp, like the perception of a hilly landscape whose distinctive features have been blurred without being concealed by a melting and rising fog. As I am nearing the object the features slowly stand out from the misty background ; the process goes on essentially in this line till I have come and stood in front of my object and got an opportunity of narrow inspection. Hence therefore there is a growth of an object round a fairly stable nucleus. May I call this process one of gradual unveiling or increasingly greater and fuller acceptance ? I shall not perhaps be allowed to urge that I actually felt in a chaotic way all that I now feel in narrow

inspection, that the fuller perception is really an unfolding and bringing out of the poorer ; perhaps the picture grows by epigenesis also. But will it be said that it grows by epigenesis alone ? Is a later phase of the perception only an addition to a former phase, and not its bringing out in any way ? Let us for the convenience of description admit for one moment the coming and going pulses of feeling. The first glimpse of the far-off object gives me a pulse of feeling ; a nearer view of the object brings in another which is undoubtedly richer and clearer than the first. But compare the two pulses together. Is the latter an altogether new instalment of feeling ? No ; upon comparing the two I find that the latter largely involves what was in the former and has improved upon it both in clearness and richness of detail. What I barely felt in the first pulse I now feel more clearly ; it may not be quite radical empiricism to seek to explain this curious point of mutual agreement by the analogy of successive inheritance backed up by intelligent guesses in a too readily serviceable brain-dynamics. I will not seek to explain this curious agreement between pulse and pulse upon other than absolutely sure grounds which I cannot persuade myself that I now possess. Bequeathing or inheriting ; the pulses, former and latter, do agree between themselves. Can I possibly render this curious relation in terms of exact thought ? May not the idea of unfolding and unveiling serve me here ? The features that were not sufficiently conscious have become so now ; the blurred whole is merely an insufficiently conscious whole—I will not say, unconscious or sub-conscious. I do not say that all the actual features of the latter pulse were there in the former only in an insufficient tone of presentation ; I am not anxious just now to go in for out and out unfolding to the process of experience. I do say however that many of the features that I clearly know in the latter pulse were given already in the former, though in a less prominent tone of presentation. Many things which I saw vaguely before I see distinctly now, as also many things which I did not see at all before I see now. Epigenesis holds therefore as regards the latter aspect of the operation, but what about the former ? A distinct presentation of a feature is of course not

the same as an indistinct one ; no one holds that it is. By unfolding or unveiling a stretch of feeling changes no doubt, but it also continues in a clear sense. It will be impossible perhaps to express this continuity in logical terms : I cannot decide whether this continuity is or is not a kind of sameness absolutely. When from a far-off presentation of a hill I have moved to a close presentation, I do feel of course that my two presentations are different ; but do I not feel at the same time that this difference is not a difference downright and utter, but a difference over and above essential sameness ? Dwelling on this point I am involuntarily reminded of the continuity of the germplasm ; some living tissue essentially continues through successive representatives of a propagating stock, a view which seeks to place on a tangible and definite physical basis the essential affinities apparently linking together the representatives of a stock. The offspring is not merely a departure from, but an essential carrying out of, the parent : an illustration which if made to apply to the processes of experience will throw us back on the doctrine of inheriting pulses.

It is impossible to come to a final settlement regarding this question without going deeply into the psychology of sameness and difference, persistence and change. A continuum of feeling, vague to begin with, becomes differentiated into distinctness by the incidence of the exploring search-light of attention : how far has the original feeling persisted in the midst of this differentiation ? Can we aptly characterize the work of attention as one of exploration or bringing out ? How far does the original feeling implicitly contain what is explicitly given in the latter feeling ? These are questions that have to be carefully reflected upon ; and as the present essay can hardly seriously enter into these questions at all, its suggestions and conclusions will naturally strike one as superficial. While not pretending to be able to go to the root of the matter now, I have outlined an account of perception which will perhaps be admitted as free from palpable absurdities and glaring unlikelihoods. So far I have merely claimed that elements which are indistinctly felt and timidly accepted in an original continuum of feeling may

rise into tonic distinctness and pointed regard in a later condition of the continuum. I need hardly say that this is a simple statement of fact and no mysticism. Call this process unveiling or differentiation or elaboration or whatever you like : names do not matter at all. It is immaterial also for our present purpose whether something has persisted from the previous condition to the later or the later condition merely involves the previous one without dragging it into itself. The recognition that it does involve the contents of a foregoing condition will do for me. These contents are not merely involved but evolved, enlarged upon. Allow me to call this circumstance unveiling or fuller acceptance. If there were no unlikelihood in James' assuming that a later pulse of thought contains a preceding one by a sort of inheritance, I do not think there would be any absurdity either in supposing that the one *accepts* the other, though of course it would be plainly seen that his inheritance and my acceptance do not express quite the same psychological or physiological operation. I shall not however dwell upon this distinction.

The process of unveiling will now be granted perhaps in substance. By this process, I repeat, a vague and blurred stretch of feeling becomes elaborated, that is to say, more boldly accepted in details. Many of these details again may be taken as given in a manner in the original stretch itself : the total effect of this is certainly compounded of the indistinct presentations of these details ; I say indistinct and not sub-conscious. The details though present were not sufficiently keenly regarded by me, not warmly accepted by me. I may take for example my view of the starry heavens now. Though I am partial to a particular star the whole expanse of the firmament cannot be supposed to be non-existent in my total perception. It is a whole that I have not yet regarded and accepted. The features of the whole, except my favourite star, are not unconsciously given in my total feeling : they *are* indistinct, unregarded elements which surely mingle together their solicitations to produce the total effect of the moment. This kind of presence and coalescence in a continuum of feeling of elements which are not yet regarded and accepted by me, may be called *veiled*

presence. I have used this metaphor of the veil because I am not prepared to regard such presence as unconscious or sub-conscious. I am however ready to admit the latter term, sub-conscious, on the understanding that it may be taken to mean a kind of appearance not sufficiently conscious. The word 'sufficiently' requires of course elucidation. My regard and acceptance are pragmatic or swayed by practical ends. I do not note and accept those degrees of presentation which, though given in consciousness, will not apparently serve my practical ends. Under the exigencies of practical living a habit of regard and acceptance has been selected and preserved and consolidated in me which will allow my regard to be exercised only within certain degrees of presentative intensity. I cannot afford the luxury of nothing and accepting all the tremendous import of my actual feelings. My regard requires to be selectively and unequally exercised. Without partial and selective distribution of regard there is no practical life. The point need not be illustrated. By a process of natural selection my sense-organs have been accustomed to respond and accept objective messages within certain specified limits : stimuli which fall below a certain degree of intensity or rapidity and which go beyond a certain other fail to awaken response. My brain, or rather my organism, refuses to accept such messages. Herein lies the practicalism of my organism, and the whole machinery of feelings. As a centre in the Fact-Stuff in which the Will-to-become is realizing certain practical ends, near or remote, I cannot simply afford to be impartially at home with all the actual, vast possessions of my life. By a process of natural selection a habit has been confirmed in me to accept only within certain ranges of tonic intensity and practically ignore beyond them. Ignorance, however, does not mean total unconsciousness ; it means consciousness of a degree of insistence not sufficiently high for the dominating interest of the moment. Hence I note and accept the star Sirius while the rest of the variedly glorious firmament has sunk so low in tonic intensity that I care not for it at all. Yet it is present in my feeling and has mingled its countless low whispers in the sublime chorus of the heavens :

the star Sirius leads the symphony of course, but it is not surely a voice in a wilderness of creation. The limits within which my regard operates are not altogether fixed however ; they fluctuate. Nevertheless under the necessities of practical living the chords of my consciousness have been attuned so as to thrill in response to only vibrations of certain degrees of intensity. Between acceptance and ignorance again the line of cleavage is not absolute and abrupt : the one phenomenon shades imperceptibly off into the other. So that acceptance, like veiling its opposite, is a variable. Natural selection, as we have suggested, has assigned certain tolerably determinate limits for my regard and acceptance to be commonly exercised within. But these are not absolute boundaries, they may be indefinitely pushed back. Apart from the practical limits of acceptance therefore a question of theoretical limits naturally arises.

Now, what is this theoretical limit of ignorance and acceptance ? That I have ignored in a way many of the elements of the concrete presentation and have accepted only a few is evident enough. The vagueness or obscurity which gathers round the portions ignored is not a homogeneous circumstance throughout : it is a variable. For example, in my review of the sky at the present moment the star Sirius occupies the centre of clear-apprehension, but round it spread zones of presentation of gradually vanishing intensity and vividness. This is about the visual aspect of the presentation ; but the concrete presentation has many aspects besides the visual one ; all these other aspects, we may suppose, have been more or less ignored as I am intently gazing at the star. The concrete presentation is really equivalent to my whole universe of the present moment (even this is a cross section in time of the concrete Fact). But how very poorly engaged do I appear in the midst of this actually given universe ! Now, the question that arises is this : How far may we carry this vagueness and obscurity of presentation without actually sinking into utter unconsciousness ? If utter unconsciousness be taken as the theoretical limit of zero, may we enquire how closely elements of presentation near this limit without however actually reaching it ? As elements of actual presentation, as features of

the given stretch of feeling, they cannot of course go to the limit of evanescence ; they *are* felt however blindly we may ignore them. In fact, ignorance and veiling presuppose as much. An element that is not given at all cannot be ignored ; that it has been ignored shows or implies that it has been given. The answer which, in accordance with my view of life, I must give will be a startling and monstrous proposition : Ignorance and veiling may be carried so far in my universe of feeling as to cover all existence and processes summed up by the term Fact-Stuff. Suppose we conceive for one moment a divine life in which all reality, things and their processes, is exhausted and securely contained : there is absolutely nothing beyond this life. Now, I should claim, even at the risk of falling into mystic absurdity, that I, as an individual, actually live this divine life without however accepting it. This is perhaps stretching the circumstance of ignorance too far, even a thinker mystically predisposed will be constrained to remark. Note that ignorance has *not* been taken to mean utter unconsciousness which, according to our system, is an utopian myth. If I could say that I am unconsciously and potentially what the divine life just portrayed is consciously and actually, I should at once be acquitted of the charge of mystical hyperbolism. But I have chosen to say that I am actually and even consciously all reality and life, but that I am habitually disposed not to accept and avow it. I am not living in knee-deep ignorance ; it is so enormously deep and vast as to enshroud under its veil all being and all becoming. An amoeba lives and ignores all that a Heckel lives and accepts ; an ape is a Darwin unaccepted, a bush-man is a Newton uncared for. An absurdly hyperbolic statement, it will be remarked. But I would rather not care for remarks now. All that I really care for is this : Is the veil proved in our ordinary experiences by the method of radical empiricism ? If so, what is the theoretic limit which the veil may be supposed to approach in the manner of an asymptote ?

There would be no absurdity in claiming so much ignorance and non-acceptance as regards the *cidākāśa* pure and simple. That even in my ordinary experiences the unbounded Ether of Awareness, though undoubtedly given, is ignored, is a claim that

acentric intuition will allow. Thus there should be laid at my doors no charge of mystical insanity were I to claim merely that my consciousness is but the *cidākāśa* unaccepted. I live the whole Ether in actuality, though I would not care to avow so much to myself. But can I reasonably urge this claim as regards the World-Stress which I have conceived as venting itself through countless centres in the bosom of the Fact-Stuff? Do I live actually the whole Stress implied in being and becoming also? The experience of a particular centre involves no doubt a magnitude of stress, even which it may be hard to circumscribe by means of limiting definitions; I, a particular centre, do not commonly accept the whole of this given magnitude; commonly I note and imagine I have only a very small fragment of this living actuality; for example, I say I have the perception of a smell, the thrill of an expectation, or the impulse of a desire; my actual possession in feeling is vastly larger than any of these avowed and accepted fragments. But even were I to accept the magnitude of the stress in my life in its entirety, I should perhaps be precluded from taking it as actually equivalent to the World-Stress itself. Can I reasonably take the stress as operating in the *me*-centre as actually equivalent to the whole Stress implied in being and becoming? I ignore the stress in me in the sense that I have it all and yet disown it, that it is an actual feeling without also being an accepted one; can I claim that I ignore the World-Stress also in the same sense? The World-Stress is not something other than the individual stress; the latter is a smaller circle, so to say, within the former, though even in respect to this small circle I positively fail to discover the bounding line. The accepted and avowed portion of the stress, such as the sensation of a smell or the impulse of a desire, is a still smaller circle within this. I fully appreciate the sense of ignorance and acceptance so far as the relations of these two smaller circles to each other are concerned; but can I legitimately carry ignorance and acceptance precisely in the same sense beyond the larger of the two small circles? Is not this larger circle really the largest one but ignored and unaccepted?

I have presented the same fundamental problem in another

shape. I am afraid I cannot materially help the solution of this problem by bringing in the consideration of mathematical limits of ignorance and acceptance, such as $\text{Lt } P = \infty$, or $\text{Lt } V = 0$. The present summary, however, is not the place for fully discussing these and similar limits and their consequences. Here I have ventured to push the boundaries indefinitely back without first pausing to enquire whether I have the right to meddle with them. In my ordinary experience I admittedly ignore much that I actually feel ; the ignored elements lie confused and obscured. May I not claim that I ignore vastly more than I seem to do, that elements may be worse confounded than I may be wont to suppose, that there may be more things actually given in me which on account of their profounder confusion and obscurity are not suspected at all by my pragmatic regard ordinarily given to exercise itself within very much narrow bounds ? If I once begin to admit within my actual experience things upon such theoretic grounds, I cannot stop till I have made room in me for the whole universe of being and becoming. Can I arbitrarily assign any limits to this circumstance of confusion and obscurity in the presented continuum so as to be able to say that things may be admitted in actual experience which possess a certain *minimum* degree of intensity and vividness and that things which have sunk below this minimum cannot be admitted as factors of actual experience at all ? For example as I am writing at my desk now I am quite innocent of the star Sirius upon which I have lavished so much care previously ; it is apparently no part of my actual experience now at all ; in fact how small a fraction of the infinite wonder of existence and life has burst forth into my actual feeling ! But shall I say the star Sirius, and all the infinite wonder of existence and life for the matter of that, may be actually there in my feeling though in such dark confusion that I do not suspect its presence and influence at all ? By saying this I shall put so great a strain upon actual feeling that it will forthwith cease to be actual ; I shall find myself hurled headlong into a world of unconscious mind-dust, not having the courage of my conviction to aver that reality and stress are profoundly unconscious,

swelling in you and in me into consciousness. The expression 'not sufficiently conscious' may not be conveniently applied to forms of existence and process which are *not* conscious at all. At any rate, untold forms of existence and processes are no conscious at all in *me* ; it will be nothing less than the insanity of mysticism to imagine that they are only not *sufficiently* conscious in me, that the star Sirius for example is only not sufficiently conscious in my actual experience of the present moment. What proof have I that I *do* actually feel it ? On the other hand I have all the proof that I require in the sense that I do *not* feel it : in vain should I search in my vast experience of the present moment for it. Vastness of actual experience cannot be stretched to absurd and impossible dimensions. The real world may be contained and exhausted in an universal consciousness, as Berkeley might think ; the individual consciousness is only a gradual and partial reproduction of this infinite Mind and Reality, so that beyond the pale of individual feelings Reality may exist and become which, therefore, in respect to *this* is unconscious : there is no warrant for supposing that it is contained and exhausted even in the individual feeling though in a manner which makes it not merely uncared for but even unsuspected : that the individual is the universal Mind and Reality *actually but self-ignored* ; that it is the mysterious Veil that divides the Reality into two, setting up the one as universal Consciousness communicating itself gradually and partially into the finite consciousness of the individual. I have stated the commonsense and common idealist view in contrast with the Fact-Theory. It cannot be easy to decide between them. Radical empiricism seems to be arrayed against the latter with all its paraphernalia of up-to-date psychology and criticism of knowledge. It stands apparently on questionable grounds, *viz.*, the circumstance of veiling and acceptance found in common experience but madly stretched to impossible mathematical limits.

The world as we commonly take it is a vast system of forces acting through numberless centres ; the human brain may be regarded as one of such centres ; or smaller groups of centres.

Through every one of such centres the whole system of forces constituting the world must operate ; we cannot really have partial or restricted operation in any one. Some of the forces may be known as operating more directly than others ; but the former cannot actually have a centre left exclusively to themselves. In studying the behaviour of a particular centre we may conveniently note only the former and thus be able to give a dynamical account of it to our satisfaction. But this satisfaction has certainly cost us the sacrifice of the concrete truth. The actual stress venting itself through any centre cannot be thus hedged round without abstraction. The possibility of human science lies however in such abstraction. The living concrete can submit to no finite science. The human brain as a centre co-ordinated in the universal configuration is therefore actually subject to the whole universal stress. The thrill of the most distant star, or the faintest ripples in any corner of the limitless ocean of ether, cannot really fail to influence it. We can take into account only the more direct and palpable influences in our study of the workings of the brain ; but we have vastly ignored. The brain cannot be understood, in fact a dew drop or a particle of sand cannot be understood, until we have taken into our consideration the whole universal stress in the ether filling space. To find an equation of its motion we must analyze this entire universal stress taking the brain as our origin or point of reference. This is a task infinitely exceeding our powers of analysis and computation, so that our science of the brain or of any centre for the matter of that remains more or less an elusive ideal. The brain again by its constitution is an exceedingly unstable system of tensions ; its excitability is far in excess of its adaptability. It is therefore designed to live the universal stress in its vastness more intimately and palpably than other kinds of centres. The whole stress lives through it in a manner in which it does not live in any other centre. Herein lies the greatness of the human brain-- in the vastness of its response and adaptation. These are palpably vast in its life ; in the life of a grain of sand they *are* vast without our suspecting it. But the stress may live as a vast wonder even in the midst of the most unpretentious

particles of matter ; science is slowly waking up to this recognition ; the constitution of an atom is not only a thrilling wonder but one that would induce us to imagine that it is but a universe in miniature. The magnifying glasses have brought to light untold marvels in the make-up of the lowliest things of creation. The whole world therefore is a co-ordinated mass of forces in which no created being can really live the life of a recluse ; the chords of being are attuned to the chorus of the whole moving creation, and no chord in a being, however apparently modestly constituted, can refuse to thrill in response to this flowing chorus. We shall confine ourselves for the present to the case of the human brain. We cannot but think that behind and beyond the direct influences to which its activities are apparently subject, we have an infinitely vast tissue of influences as the background of its life, to which our science may pretend to be blind, but to which it cannot be dead.

We have not yet interpreted the brain in terms of our own conceptions. Nevertheless we need not disturb the fact of correspondence between the phenomena of the brain and those of mind. Perhaps the correspondence is between one order of fact-sections and another. I am loath to regard the brain as a fact complete by itself and the mind as a fact also complete by itself. Possibly they are sections of one living wonder of reality substantialized by the magic wand of the veil. But this we shall see later on. Now, it cannot be seriously disputed that the brain is throbbing with the life of the universe as a whole ; in the world's sphere of correlated activity or energising no hide-bound zone of stimulation for the brain-centre, no definite frontiers of the range of the brain's interaction, can be conceived by us without arbitrary limitation of actuality. The brain as a centre in a correlated system of centres must be susceptible to all influences : we can indeed distinguish between a greater and a less among this infinite tissue of influences holding the brain-centre in its meshes, but we can make no absolute reservations or exclusions ; we cannot say that it is subject to some influences but not to others. This of course is a conclusion that we deduce *a priori* ; it follows from our view regarding the

constitution of the Whole. A part is the whole somehow kept back or concealed ; a centre is the universe somehow ignored. Between the life of the one and that of the other no absolute wall can therefore be set up. It is abundantly clear that we do not lack a *posteriori* basis for our disposal of the whole and the part in this manner ; my own concrete experience is the archetype of this curious disposition of the whole and the part ; I *live* the whole but *take* it as part. Ours therefore is not an attempt to spin a system of philosophy out of *a priori* concepts without reference to actual, incontestable experience. On the contrary, I am not quite sure that I have not rushed to the other extreme of clinging feverishly and inalienably to the yield and cast of actual experience only. However that may be, I cannot deny that the brain's life is really the life of the universe ; that when a molecule of the brain vibrates, the whole universe is active behind it ; that the action of the molecule is really an element of a universal interaction, an aspect of a universal stress. Now, we have granted the fact of correspondence between the activity of the brain and "experience" ; the experience is referred to a particular centre which is a mind or self ; hence equating the life of the brain to the life of the universe, and the experience referred to a self to the life of a brain, I can equate the experience of a self to the life of the universe as a whole. My experience is thus really the universe. I really live the All. I have tried to reach this conclusion through an indirect and uncertain route—the brain ; scientific philosophers never feel so sure as when they can tread upon the brain ; perhaps they are right ; but it is for me not a direct route at least for reaching truth. I never feel sure of foot unless I am directly in touch with experience.

The life of the brain has been equated to that of experience referred to a particular centre. The life of the brain is apparently an aggregate of a vast number of separate activities ; countless feeders and tributaries mingle apparently to make this life. Now, shall we assume that the central experience correlated to this life should likewise be compounded of a vast number of separate elements of feeling each corresponding to

an element of cerebral life? This would indeed fling us unceremoniously into the mind-stuff of Clifford. But perhaps James is nearer the truth than Clifford: the life of the brain, however various the contributions to it may be, is perhaps not an aggregate but a resultant, not a multiplicity but a simple whole; hence we are not reduced to the assumption that experience to keep pace with the brain must likewise be an aggregate of a vast number of elementary feelings; it may be a simple whole corresponding to a massive and entire brain-state. So that while the brain may live the universe in detail, having a response for each stimulus, experience lives or represents it only in integration: it has no elementary, separate feeling to match an elementary, separate nervous shock. James has stood squarely on the unquestionable simplicity of our intuitive life; experience certainly does not come home to us as a composition of elementary notes of feeling; the separate elementary notes are results of detachment and abstraction; thus preception is prior to, and more concrete than so-called elementary sensations. On the other hand, the composite character of the total activity of the brain is also unquestionable. The massive, entire cerebral state rather thinly conceals this composite character. What do we really mean by a resultant, massive activity of the whole when its numberless parts are admittedly acting each by itself and each in correlation to all the rest? Different stimuli affecting different centres or tracts are creating different exciations; countless molecules of living matter are acting and reacting upon one another through countless lines of nervous communication. I cannot deny that all these separate actions and reactions form aspects or elements of a total stress; that the total activity of the brain is a resultant. But neither can I deny that the elements *are* in some way present in the the resultant. The elements cannot be lost in a confusion. The whole has somehow drawn together but not confounded the parts. A resultant motion is compounded of several elementary motions; but compounding is not confounding. I cannot of course say that the elementary motions *are* still separate in their composition; but neither can I say that they are

not separate, individual, in their composition. A Sophist would deny motion altogether ; I would not go so far as that ; motion, in its nature and composition, is unintelligible to me ; it is alogical.

Now, can we say so much about the resulting mental counterpart of the cerebral action ? The whole universal stress is acting through the latter : it is a composition of countless thrills which make the total life of the universe. To say that it is a resultant phenomenon is not to say, as we have just seen, that it is a featureless confusion of these numberless individual thrills ; that however diversely produced it is a unity pure and simple. Shall we also suppose that the whole universal stress lives in the resulting experience ? An experience may not be merely a resulting expression of the universe, merely a massive product in which the numberless elements of the universe do not appear distinctly or individually, but only in general confusion. In this way, all existence, involving both being and becoming, may be given actually in the experience of a centre ; as the cerebral resultant sums up the universal stress in its physical aspect, so the experience of a centre sums up the entire Fact or Reality ; like the former summing up the latter may be *distributive*. I employ this last word to mean a kind of composition or synthesis which, while undoubtedly being a kind of unity, is not a unity resulting from the indistinguishable confusion of the contributory elements : it is a unity appearing through, and not upon the suppression of, plurality. May not the summing up in an individual's experience of all reality be of this distributive nature ? In taking such a view of mental grouping or summing up of existence, I take up perhaps a position intermediate between Clifford and James. That experience does not appear as a composition of distinct elements at all is a proposition which I have doggedly maintained ; nevertheless it can be taken to apparently distinct pieces and thought as though it were a composition. It is not a configuration of distinct atoms of feeling certainly, but it can be represented as such a configuration. No one perhaps would care to deny this. But is it such a configuration actually ? It does not appear as

such ; it can be represented as such ; intuition is against configuration, science is for it. Which shall we credit ? I have of course trusted intuition more than I have trusted representation ; and this principle I am not prepared to throw up now. Experience is a stretch, a continuum ; I am not sure if I can call it a unity. To representation it is also a manifold, a plurality ; and this representation I cannot stifle ; through it a stretch appears as a configuration or a series. I am pledged to intuition, but I have got to accommodate representation somewhere and somehow. I must induce unity and plurality, continuum and configuration to keep the house together. I can do this only through veiling. Representative constructions can be laid and imposed upon intuitive life only through this means. Thus is plurality laid over unity, configuration upon continuum. It is the veil therefore which makes it possible for intuition and representation to live peaceably together, allowing each to cut its figure in the cast of experience and existence. The relation is necessarily alogical. The conception or representation of existence is not necessarily false ; it cannot possess and circumscribe the whole of course, but it may be correct in its own way and so far as it goes.

Conceptual actuality is a mode of actuality. Hence when I represent and think of my experience as though it were a configuration or a series, I am certainly dealing in a kind of actuality distinct though it may be from the actuality of intuitive absorption. I cannot be prevented from conceiving modes of actuality ; even the rope-snake of an illusion is actual in a sense. Hence if I say that experience is an actual summing up of the elements of existence, I need not be misunderstood. If I say also that experience is an alogical whole simply and not a composition at all, I need not be misunderstood either. The two actualities belong to different planes, intuition and representation, and therefore they need not collide and destroy each other. In intuition I actually *feel* alogical entireness, in representation I actually *think* of the composition ; in the latter thought counts, in the former feeling. Hence thought and science revise the decision of feeling ; science fancies

that experience is actually a composition of various elements and that the wholeness given by feeling is but a confusion, possibly a mistake, an illusion. Thus has representation often challenged presentation, science has questioned life. Intellectualism or logicalism in philosophy is this tendency of science to encroach upon life carried to an extreme. Intuitionism or alogicalism is the opposite tendency : it is a persistent clinging to life and its level of actuality to the prejudice of science and her level of actuality. Perhaps it may not be possible to hold the balance even between these two tendencies : life matters much more than science does. Perhaps the actuality of intuition is superior to that of representation ; intuitive actuality is immanent in thought and transcends it. I feel while I think, and I am not sure that the converse of this proposition is necessarily and always true. Besides, the reality of feeling extends beyond the actuality of thought. What I think I necessarily feel also ; thinking is a kind of feeling. But what I am thinking at anytime need not be, and certainly is not, my total feeling at that time. Feeling and thought pull on together through veiling.

In a sense therefore my experience may be taken as the summing up of the elements of existence actually. I think it so. Hence with proper halts both Clifford and James may be safe. They are looking at the Fact from two different points of view. One gives a science of life in conceptual terms, the other gives us life itself. Let there be no confusion of these two points of view. Without cutting into this bye-lane we could not safely pursue our present line of investigation ; we may now return to it. The brain sums up, even perhaps in detail, the whole universal stress in its physical aspect at least. Does experience which is the counterpart of the brain sum up existence, all being and becoming, in some way also ? The question startles us even now ; but we should be able to grapple with it with better prospects of satisfaction. It is granted that experience is a sum of elements under the seal of thought ; we know also that is not a sum exactly under the authority of feeling. The contradictories peacefully abide under the veil. But can experience be taken as

summing up *all* existence as the brain is taken as summing up all stress without drawing upon the philosophy of the unconscious, a resource of ready and perfect help that we have thrown away ?

I am precluded from saying that all existence is exhaustively given in my experience in a potential and sub-conscious condition ; that the history of my experience is the gradual and partial unfolding in consciousness of all this hidden treasure of existence. Sub-conscious and hyper-conscious can mean for me only grades and orders of consciousness itself. These grades are created by the thickening of the veil of life under the exigencies of practicalism. The sub-conscious is consciousness so much veiled and ignored that it is practically equivalent to unconsciousness. Thus elements may be present in consciousness which we *require* to ignore so much that they practically lie *beyond* the pale of consciousness. Indeed what I regard as my consciousness is but a cross-section, a selected zone, of consciousness. My consciousness is not all consciousness. The very epithet 'my' indicates a limitation, a practical ignorance, of the reality, magnitude and richness of consciousness. The difference between central consciousness and all consciousness is a practical one : it is a difference due to ignorance or non-acceptance. All existence and stress are given in consciousness ; but I accept only a part and have been habituated to feel and think that this small part is all that I am conscious of ; of the rest I absolutely know nothing. My tone of acceptance varies even in the small portion of experience that I have hedged round as my possession. This avowed possession which ordinarily passes for my consciousness is not homogeneous as regards the interest that has been engaged or the tone of feeling that has been induced. The tone gradually vanishes from a place of liveliest interest and attention to outlying tracts of semi-attention. It reaches a practical limit beyond which I do not take it as continuing at all ; I feel and think that it has ceased ; I have already reached the pale or limit of my consciousness. This indeed is the limit of *my* consciousness or consciousness that I require to note and accept. But it need not be an absolute limit ; I may be conscious even beyond this practical limit, though it may be

a consciousness so much vague and blurred that it is taken as equivalent to no consciousness. Hence a theoretical limit may well extend beyond a practical limit of feeling. I am not prepared to circumscribe actual feeling and reality within the bounds of our practical acceptance of life. Given a stretch of experience, my acceptance is liveliest at a particular place or feature ; it is gradually waning at other places, until we come to a limit beyond which we do not apparently accept at all. But has consciousness ceased with acceptance ? What I circumscribe as me-consciousness has ceased perhaps, but not feeling as such. I am accustomed to ignore consciousness not merely in its extent but also in its depth or intent : it is my habit to carve a small world of feeling out of infinite actuality. The practical limit of feeling should not be mistaken for the actual limit. I may feel without feeling that I feel : a paradox which turns upon the distinction just drawn between practical feeling and actual feeling. I am not therefore a pragmatist absolutely. The whole universe and reality is actually given in me, though I practically live only a fragment and take my feeling as though it were exhausted in that fragment. This is what I mean when I say that I am but a point of view through which infinite All is bursting out into practical manifestation : the Actual is reproducing itself as the practical : Time and Causality are the forms or instruments of this reproduction. The reproduction I need hardly say is alogical ; I cannot ascertain the *why* nor perhaps adequately the *how* of this process. Is it gradual unveiling ?

But while apparently introducing a distinction between limits, have I not surreptitiously gone over into the realm of the unconscious ? Actual feeling is a fact that cannot surely be played fast and loose with. I actually feel all the vast wonder of existence and yet I do not practically feel it : can this be sane psychology ? This of course is the crux of the whole problem ; and so long as I cannot deal with this crux satisfactorily, I have not materially helped the solution of the problem. I am not feeling and thinking about many things now ; I am apparently quite innocent of them ; yet must I say that I am actually all

these though not practically? An amoeba lives the whole universe actually but not practically? I hasten to admit that actual feeling may be practically equivalent to no feeling, to unconsciousness. Practical feeling and actual do not exclude each other; the former is a type of actual feeling; but it is not the only type. Subliminal feeling is also actual feeling. Thus all the things that I am apparently innocent of are given in me. But how given? Given, actual and manifested have been equated to one another in our essay. Shall I say then that all these unsuspected things are manifested in me? The question thus raised would bring me to a position of absurdity; but I might point out the unfairness of the question itself. The *me* is already a practical bounding or limitation of actuality; hence to search for the whole universe in this bounded area is to search for something which we have already ignored. Surely we cannot expect to discover the universe within the narrowly accepted, pragmatic, individual consciousness. A limitation cannot go beyond itself. To ask—Do I discover all reality in the contents of *my* actual feeling?—is to ask—Do I admit and know what I have shut out and ignored? Centralized life is the contradiction of universal acceptance. The question whether I actually feel the whole universe and reality in me cannot be settled while the matter stands as it does. If I could actually feel (or rather practically feel) the whole universe in me, the distinction between practical feeling and actual feeling would be a distinction without a difference and also the distinction between me and the reality would be wholly gone. So long as the pragmatic standpoint of the *me* continues, its practical feeling is equivalent to its actual feeling, and an actual feeling beyond the limits of what it practically feels is equivalent to no feeling, unconsciousness. If this is really going under the cover of the philosophy of the unconscious, I cannot help it. But I cannot bring myself to give up the distinction between practical feeling and actual, though from the standpoint of an individual centre they are so inveterately equated to each other. I must cling to an actual feeling wider than a practical, though the very limitations of my centralised existence will not allow me to verify this fact

of transcendence. The evolution of mental life really means for me the gradual spreading of the practical over the actual, or the gradual movement of the actual contents of consciousness or elements of stress into the realm of the practical acceptance of life. This is a view that I am unable to make good directly; but it is at any rate more intelligible than either the view of unconscious feelings and ideas or that of the gradual enriching of the Subject by the contributions of an Object perfectly a stranger to the former. But I must not dogmatize.

How then does the individual Fact stand to the Fact-Stuff? It is of course not a relation of equivalence pure and simple. The Fact-Stuff has been conceived in a much deeper key in the present essay than in the preceding work. There it was only the universe of accepted manifestation which, though infinite in dimensions, was scrupulously restricted to what I actually feel or am totally aware of. I could not call *my* experience for obvious reasons, but still it was experience in the ordinary sense of the term. Here also it means experience, and is not certainly stretched beyond awareness or feeling. But experience and awareness are terms that do not bear quite the same meaning here as there. Experience becomes so large a fact that I know as my experience, unbounded though this be, is only a practical restriction of it. What I practically know as my universe is not the actual universe. The serenest effort of acentric intuition such as I am capable of can yield me only a pragmatic, and therefore, carved out universe. My infinite is thus the practical definition of the actual infinite. My Fact-Stuff is thus a cross-section of the real Fact-Stuff: it is a Fact-section. The central reference must be wholly gone before the Real can appear in its colossal proportions and in the splendour of its unalloyed essence. Reference is the germ of practical definition. Practical definition necessarily implies an ignorance or non-acceptance of the Given. Hence I cannot reach out to the Fact without merging and transcending myself. I know the Fact is a contradiction and an absurdity. The Fact is surely a condition of self-less feeling or awareness. This is a condition that can be in some manner

realized in our ordinary intuitions. Intuition grasps the whole, or what we may know as the whole, by scrupulously keeping back the Ego. The swelling out of the Ego-centre in an experience means necessarily a partition and mutilation of that experience. Whenever I find that I have known a fact in its fulness, I find also I have merged the self in that knowledge : it is a feeling of absorption, a matter of living. The self can divide existence and actuality but not possess it ; the self can dissect and scrutinize the feeling but not live it. Wherever the self is prominent and awake, life is shy and retreating ; let the self sink, and life is easy and full. I am expressing the fact in somewhat metaphorical terms, but it is one which is undoubtedly one of the commonest of our experiences and can be readily verified by experiment. Concentration or focussing in a particular zone means of course the attenuation and shrinkage of other zones in a given whole. This principle applies in our ordinary experiences. The bulging out of the Ego as centre of reference, review and reconstruction means such concentration of a particular zone in a given continuum of experience. A stretch of feeling is there ; generally it is innocent of an Ego ; it involves no definite centre of reference and reconstruction. Suppose the Ego is introduced in its midst. Will the actual stretch of feeling remain otherwise the same ? No. The stretch will concentrate in a particular place in a very lively and remarkable manner : this place of lively concentration is that centre of cohesion and reference which we know as the self ; its concrete embodiment may be a zone of cephalic feelings of a peculiar warmth and intimacy pointed out by James. But in any case it introduces a disturbance into the very heart of the given fact in consequence of which many realms of the fact become attenuated and shrunk up, and the elements of the fact are thrown into a readjustment. I appeal to experiment.

The Ego is the principle of the practical definition of life. It is equivalent to practicality. What we loosely call the theoretic interest of the Ego is really and evidently practical interest. The interest to know is quite as practical as the interest to do. Interest is of the essence of practicality. There can be no

interest either in pure knowing or in pure doing, if there be any such thing. Interest is the Ego in actual manifestation. It is analogous to the nucleus of a growing crystal, or that of a living cell, or even that of an atom. It makes a centre in the Fact-Stuff a particular point of view or a particular outlet for the overflow of the universal Stress. Round it and through it the life of a centre, cognitive as well as active, forms. It is the germ-cell of the individualized Fact. These are laconic statements of facts and their relation which can be readily verified, so far as they are capable of strict verification, by appeals to experiment. In a seed or an embryo this interest operates as the undeniable tendency to special development. An immanent idea or good may or may not be supposed as working in and through a seed. But in any case a tendency to special evolution is undeniable in it, and this we call its *interest* or *aptitude*. A philosopher with mechanical predilections need not grumble at the name. I mean no more by interest than he means by tendency. Like the latter it is unintelligible, but is undeniable or indispensable nevertheless. According to our conceptions, it is but the universal Stress or Will-to-become individualizing itself. It is essentially a concentration of existence. Without it existence is flat, purposeless, alogical. By it, it swells out somewhere into liveliness ; bears references, and becomes amenable to rational construction. The interest or tendency-to-individualization, is the sum and substance of the Ego. Ego means this tendency. Without it the Ego is an abstraction, non-entity. The logical Ego, the Subject, is a refinement of this interest. The Subject, the explicit consciousness of I, this refinement, this luxurious budding out is not, as we have seen, an indispensable feature of experience. Very often experience has not budded forth into this refinement and luxury of a Subject. But the substance of the Ego, the interest or tendency to individualization, is given and working there nevertheless. In this sense common experience is never self-less. The tendency just alluded to is operating ceaselessly in life. By it, it becomes special individual life. An amoeba never lives without this tendency, a Darwin never lives without it. But an

amoeba has wholly dispensed with the luxury of the fully awake logical Subject : it knows not itself or its pulses of feeling as you or I do. A Darwin also is generally true to his amoeboid phylogeny : only rarely does man express himself in logical judgments : generally he only lives and experiences without caring for logical analysis. A material particle, an atom of hydrogen, has the indispensable alogical Ego, but not the logical. It is possibly a store of equilibrated energy, a cloud of negative charges of electricity moving round a positive nucleus, but it is what it is by a tendency to individualization. By tendency I mean the reason why it is an atom of hydrogen rather than one of oxygen. This is the hydrogen-Ego. It is this reason or interest which, for example, makes it combine with an atom of chlorine so as to form a molecule of hydrochloric and I have called it reason quite in the mechanical sense ; I do not care to go in just now for the immanent idea, end or good of the pattern of Plato or Hegel striving for its own realization. They may be right or they may be wrong but in any case I have chosen not to stand or fall by them.

Now, in a given experience the Ego may be present either in person or by proxy. When the first is the case we have a logical Subject apprehending an object in relation to itself. In this case the Ego itself or the mass of cephalic feelings of a peculiar warmth and intimacy which is supposed as its concrete embodiment, becomes the centre of concentration and liveliest attention. In the other it is merely the interest or the tendency to individualization which is operative, casting the experience of the moment into a special mould, heightening the tone of a particular zone of the presentation. It is in this way that I have now an experience of the dawn particularly concentrating in the sweet warble of a bird. I am interested in it. It is the main outlet through which the universal Stress is venting itself in me now. Indeed my entire presentation of the present moment is a special, pragmatic universe carved out by my root-interest out of a vaster world of actual being and, I may even add, feeling. The Actual transcends all limitations of Time, Space and Causality it cannot in itself be known as now and

then, here and there, and whence and how. These are practical definitions of the Actual, through which the Actual becomes the practical fact for a centre. It becomes circumscribed and disposed by the tendency to individualization. Hence my universe of the present moment is a practical world the limits of which are practical limits and not actual. The zone of liveliest engagement within this universe is the apex of the curve of this practical world. The practical world is the body of my root-interest. The amoeba's feeling is *its* body. I recognize that this can be no real explanation of individuality, but perhaps it may pass as a specific statement of the case. I have referred to two cases in the birth of the individual Fact, the especially Ego-centric in which the logical Subject has actually bulged out and the apparently selfless experience in which some element other than the Ego occupies the apex of the curve of presentation. The former case is only a refinement of the latter. It should be carefully observed also that the apparently self-less fact is not a really self-less fact. The substance, the germ, of the self—the tendency to individualization—is clearly in evidence in every normal experience. A really self-less fact will be that in which this tendency has dissipated itself. We cannot conceive a condition like this : we cannot conceive inasmuch as we are we.

Hence we are driven to recognize orders of practicalism. My world as such is a practical world created and sustained by what I may call my root-interest or underlying *Elan*. In fact this root-interest is the substance of *me*. It is universally operative. It is operative, as we have seen, in an atom, in a crystal, in a cell and in a mind. Thereby each becomes each. Its operation is, as we have also pointed out, essentially a practical definition of undefinable actuality. Its limits are not thus the limits of actuality. Acceptance is only another name for this practical operation. We may have a small acceptance within the larger. The universe that I practically know is an acceptance ; the element or feature which has risen to liveliest in this universe is acceptance *within* acceptance. As zones or belts of experience spread round the nucleus of liveliest, gradually losing in interest

and tone, I may aptly conceive my universe as a system of concentric universes, one lying within another. My universe is thus a puzzle-box of concentric acceptances. The limit of acceptance can be contracted or extended. My range of acceptance is perhaps wider than the amoeba's. Even my range of acceptance can contract or widen. This consideration of limits of acceptance together with the doctrine of root-interest—which by the bye is no more than a re-statement of the principle of individualization—will perhaps help our understanding of the centralized Fact in relation to the Real. The former is merely an acceptance of actual life and existence. Like acceptance I have taken actual in different senses. Like acceptance actual has different orders. In the ordinary sense actual coincides with the practical : my actual feeling is what I practically feel. In this sense I actually feel but little, though even this little is a universe. It is the Real that I am sufficiently conscious of, sufficient for the purposes of my centralized existence. But actual may be made co-extensive with real, without however going beyond consciousness or feeling. In this sense the infinite tissue of Reality is actual experience. I cannot say of course that it is my experience ; for to introduce the *me* is to make a practical definition of actuality. I cannot conceive it or talk of it, for I cannot go beyond myself in either. I have urged that I actually live all this vast Reality without caring to avow so much to myself. The reference to the first person in this statement may be suffered to remain only through courtesy. It is life and consciousness and actuality and yet it is not my life, consciousness and actuality. Yet the relation between me and beyond-me is a relation pertaining to practical definition and acceptance. I have defined my actuality. I have disposed myself as a vortex or eddy in a vast, placid ocean of being. The vistas lying beyond my own definition are not absolutely unconscious : they are only not conscious sufficiently for the ends of I-ness. But it may be asked : Is this the method of radical empiricism ? Is not this relation between me and beyond-me a belief pure and simple ? If so, the belief is an element of me, and therefore it cannot be stretched to prove a beyond-me : the

individualized fact is the only Fact. This is the position that I took up in my former essay, though even there I was not prepared to concede that the Fact should be properly called *my* Fact. If you give the name *me* to the total experience that I am unreservedly cognisant of, you can call it my Fact ; but then you and all other acting and reacting centres have as good titles to claim it as me ; it is an experience in which a *me* has appeared along with numberless not-*me*'s ; normally the *me* does not press itself into notice even. Briefly, my world there was equivalent to what I call my world of practical definition. I could merge Time and Space and Causality in that world and conceive it as an alogical Fact-Stuff ; but I could not take actuality and feeling in the sense of the present essay. Now, was not that conception of the alogical Fact-Stuff involving the *me* and not-*me* centres, but never dragged beyond the limits of sufficient feeling, a more radically empirical conception than the present view that makes the Fact take unwarrantable proportions beyond the range of sufficiently tonic experience ? We recognized degree of tone or veiling there as we recognize them here ; but we are here pushing the boundaries indefinitely back ; we have not been able to halt at the sufficiently tonic experience. But is this not a wholly unwarrantable step ? Insufficient experience is no experience and no experience may be easily equated to no existence. Hence Fact-Stuff of the former pattern may be the only and the real Fact. We have broken our own rule : an immanent belief has been trusted to found a transcendent universe.

Here also I have allowed myself to think and talk somewhat loosely. I apparently essayed to show that I actually live and feel the whole Reality without accepting it in its entirety, that *I minus* the veil is the all-absorbing Reality itself. The conclusion at which I have been able to arrive is apparently subversive of the original proposition : *I* can never live and feel Reality in its all-ness simply because I am *I*. *I* is an instrument or organ of veiling itself ; hence it is impossible to prove the all-ness of myself keeping the *me*. The distinction thus drawn is important, but I did not mean a contradiction. Egoism is the inevitable drawback of thinking and talking. To bring out any

relation or prove any equation at all I must necessarily be Ego-centric, I must refer to me. Hence when I propose to show the equivalence of me and the Reality I should rather be taken to mean the equivalence of veiled Reality and unveiled. Experience exists in two conditions : accepted and unaccepted. The two together make actual experience and being ; the former alone is centralized or individual experience and being. The relation between a larger Fact and a lesser has been granted by almost all thinkers in various forms ; I give it in my own form ; it is merely a relation of veiling and unveiling, acceptance and non-acceptance. I am merely a *practical* definition of existence. The veil has been conceived in one way in this and in the preceding essay. I intend to study it more fully and systematically later on.

As regards the question as to whether I have really broken my own rule, I may be permitted to briefly observe this. I frankly admit that centralized experience can never bring me to acentric experience. The practical definition of a vaster actual life is after all only a belief and suggestion and as such form a part of the practical definition itself. Hence confined as I am absolutely in the prison of practical definition, how can I possibly reach out to the freer vistas of actuality beyond the walls of my prison ? The case for the *cidākāśa* or the Ether of Awareness presents no difficulty, provided it can be attested by acentric intuition. It is ever unflinchingly actual. It is never really practically defined. The difficulty arises in regard to the universal Stress *believed* as overflowing through me and through countless other centres. How can this universal Stress mightier than what I or any other centre may contain be made good and guaranteed except upon the belief and suggestion implied in my accepted life ? The universe is this universal Stress. I have no desire to minimize the difficulty involved in this case. A belief which is apparently a part of *me* (this being the name for the totality of experience in the ordinary sense of the term, excluding the too insufficient degrees) cannot be stretched to prove a Thing beyond *me*. The different senses of *me* must not be allowed to get confounded together. Metaphysics is chiefly

concerned with the different senses of the terms of our normal life. However that may be, the belief is there ; it is a part of the divine outburst quite as much as the logical *me* is a part. This latter cannot claim the former as *its* own creation, dream or fancy. The belief in a beyond and an objectivity is no fancy with which the Ego can be credited. The Ego like this beyond and an objectivity may be a fancy of a World Magician. The Ego is sometimes there in experience ; the belief in the beyond is perhaps oftener there. We carry out the necessary implications of this belief and draw the colossal features of a World-outburst. The circumstance that *we* do it ought not to be improperly construed ; experience cannot help doing it and we cannot help referring experience to ourselves.

Hence a belief cannot be treated as though it were a mere accident or luxury of our life. Life must bring out its implications. The essential implications of essential beliefs cannot be taken as non-essential appendages of life. This is the philosophy of Realism and substantially it stands on a thoroughly solid rock. What I fundamentally believe should be brought in a line with the fundamental experiences of life. I actually have an experience of the morning ; I cannot help believing that this experience is the overflow through a special outlet of a World-Stress, that it is only a partial communication of an encompassing Beyond. The experience directly served is a feeling while the suggestion of a Beyond is a belief. This is a common sense distinction which may be allowed without challenge ; but nevertheless we shall have to look carefully into the mutual relation of feeling and belief as illustrated in the above case. Is not the distinction between direct feeling and indirect, an intuition and a belief, a pragmatic one ? An idea is an impression in an unmistakeable sense ; a belief is also certainly an intuition. I feel an object of belief as I feel an object of perception ; I feel differently of course ; and this difference being practically important is set up as if it were a difference between feeling and no feeling ; hence I say I do not feel an object of mere belief, *e.g.*, a book lying in the other room, while I actually feel an object of perception, *e.g.*, the paper on which I am writing. I do

not feel the book and the paper in a similar strain : if I did, the basis for a very practical and vital distinction would be wanting. The idea of the book and the percept of the book are both of them direct feelings, elements of actual experience ; the character of indirectness which belongs to the former is superimposed ; it is indirectness over and above directness. The Spirit dreams of indirectness in the midst of inalienable directness. What I believe therefore I also directly feel. But how is belief related to reality ? What do I mean when I draw a line between a correct belief and an incorrect one ? How again is a fundamental belief to be recognized ? The belief in the sear-pent and the belief in the Beyond are both of them beliefs : but is there any mark for distinguishing beliefs of a fundamental character ? Spencer proposed the test of 'the inconceivability of the opposite' which J. S. Mill was not prepared to accept. Can we propose any satisfactory test ? This is a question of first importance bearing closely upon our present investigation, and it behoves us to dwell on it for a little while before passing on to the consideration of Causality which has been so long left aside to make room for the more fundamental problem touching the relation of the Self or Centre and Beyond.

I have no rational philosophy of the Stress to offer, such as will explore the hidden meanings, essences and reasons of things. I can aim no higher than at giving summary statements of things. I cannot for example explain *why* the universal Stress should overflow through centres of individuality ; what is the meaning and purpose of such overflow. I have simply stated the fact that it does overflow through given centres of individuality or rather that the centres are the incidents of its outburst. This is an unquestionable deliverence in me and I have presented it as such. That individuality means a particular point of view or a special mode of practical definition, is really no definition or explanation of individuality. It is simply a re-statement of a fact that I feel or know. Now, belief appears to be a part of the essential connotation of this central life. I cannot, as before, assign the reason of believing or meet the question : Why should a centre believe and disbelieve ? How

does believing follow from the fact of individuality? As a matter of fact I find that it does believe and I can merely try to give a statement of this circumstance. Believing is a practical *equation* of the life of a centre and the life of the Behind and Beyond. Suppose we allow the term Given to be used as implying the former life. Then every act of believing expresses a relation of partial equivalence, explicitly, or implicitly, between this Given and the Behind and Beyond. When I believe myself as an outlet for the overflow of the universal Stress, I make this equation between myself and a part of the Fact: I am a part of the Behind and Beyond. When I disbelieve the rope-snake of my illusion I deny that the section of my Given which I call the rope-snake is part of the Behind and Beyond. I think this principle, simple as it is, can be applied to all cases of believing and disbelieving. But we may be anxious to get behind even this principle. What do we mean by a partial equation? A partial equation means a partial reduction of the difference in potential between the Given and the Fact (I am using these terms differently now). Difference in potential practically means in life a difference in quiescence and assurance. Suppose we grant that there is a level of life where quiescence and assurance (a tone of direct feeling) is absolute; it is the level of no stress, strain or tension in feeling; it is the consciousness of calm, abiding existence. Then every form of centralized life is removed more or less from this level; it involves almost always a feeling of stress, strain or tension; central life *means* such a feeling of strain. I, for example, am distinctly a consciousness of limited, restricted being and activity, of a life under pressure. Broadly this restriction to and pressure upon life may be called its environment. The analogy of a rotating eddy moving down a stream may help us to understand this conception of pressure. The level of quiescent existence is of course not something beyond me; I am pervaded by it; I actually live it. Ultimately it is the Ether of Awareness, the *cidākāśa*; in which I certainly live, move and have my being. What I called the Quiescent Real in the *Approaches*, gradually

and partially reproducing itself through me, may be supposed to be a level of quiescence also, though not absolute perhaps. While never out of touch with this level, I am in a manner removed from this level in pragmatic feeling and thought; this removal means veiling or non-acceptance of actuality. This removal through veiling or ignorance means a difference in level or potential between me and the Fact: it is removal from a state of no pressure to a state of some pressure. The magnitude of the removal may vary of course. I am, for instance, more removed from the level of quiescence in the conceptual process than in the perceptual. The Stress and the potential of the former is therefore greater than that of the latter. This is a statement which can be verified *a posteriori*. Now, belief in a centre is its tendency to reduce the stress and the potential of its experiences to evanescence. It is the return-current of the universal Stress in the direction of its Source or Basis. Stress commonly means action and reaction: it involves therefore action in contrary directions. We may recall the outlines of the story of the Stress as told in our previous essay. The fundamental stress of existence is fatally disposed to return to its Ground: it is a continuous negation in a continuous affirmation. As before, I cannot explain the reason why; I can only describe the manner how. Return in progress, reaction in action, negation in affirmation, undoing in doing, is the essential implication of Stress. All process of becoming and all forms of centralized being imply the synthesis of these apparently contradictory aspects. In exposing this lies the value of Post-Kantian thinking which brought to the fore the principle of contradiction implied in the constitution of things and processes, or at any rate, in our conceptions of them. To believe is to bring nearer together the practice and the actuality of life, in consequence of which what I care for is flung upon what I am. This flinging means the reduction of the potential of my cared-for possessions of life, the equation of knowing and being. When, for example, I believe that a given idea in me is true, I certainly make this operation. Truth has been defined commonly as the correspondence between idea and sensations, actual and possible.

Somehow there yawns a gulf between an idea and an impression. The latter apparently possesses a status to which the former cannot lay claim. This constitutes a difference in potential between them. The former is an experience of greater stress, strain or tension. When I believe it corresponds to an impression, I seek to lower this potential and establish a sort of equation between the two. I do not imagine of course that an idea is an impression but that it is derived from and leading to a definite impression : this is what I mean by correspondence ; it is evident that it involves not direct but functional equation. To imagine that A is derived from B, I refer the former back to the latter ; to believe that A is leading to B, I also refer. I have called such reference return-current ; it is the equation of planes that have been called into separate being by practicalism and veiling. Planes other than, and removed from, the inalienable plane of actual feeling and existence arise because we need them for our own practical ends ; the inalienable becomes alienated through veiling. An idea is as much a section of the Given as an impression ; the Given or the Actual embraces both. Life as we commonly live cannot do with this single plane of inalienable givenness. It requires to fancy that some elements are not given. Hence its problem is to resolve the contradiction, *viz.*, to set up as not-given that which is inalienably given. It has to derive a not-given some-how out of an absolutely given. This impossible task the Veil accomplishes. Through the veil some elements of the given are loosened, as it were, from it, and are taken as belonging to a different plane : thus is the conceptual plane differentiated from the perceptual. But a plane or order taken as removed from another plane or order but really grounded in it or identical with it, has the tendency to equate itself to it. Hence the reference of an idea to a fact. The distinction is immanent in the fact itself ; we take it otherwise ; such taking means a difference of potential and is equivalent to a feeling of tension. But though taken otherwise it presses to be taken fact-wise ; this is the equation of idea and fact ; this is belief.

An airy nothing without a local habitation and a name is a practical non-entity while the emanations of the radium are

practical entities. Apart from reference to all practical ends, a disembodied spirit and the radio-activity are only elements of the Fact, each possessing its own title to exist and become. My root-interest differentiates one kind of existence from another and one kind of becoming from another. I cannot be impartially interested in them. The point will of course be raised whether they possess different kinds of existence because I am differently interested in them, or I am differently interested in them because they possess different kinds of existence. This is a point which it is by no means easy to settle. I am inclined to regard root-interest as the primary fact which lies at the bottom of the difference between kinds or planes of existence to which sections of actual experience are variously referred. The difference vanishes even when the root-interest which is the principle of me and of other co-ordinated centres assumes a certain form. When, for example, I am interested in noting the configuration and the series of experiences merely and not at all concerned with the question of their objective validity or worth, I am certainly impartial between the spirit communications and the radio-emanations. They are all sections of experience and as *such* they exist. When again I am interested in merely assigning things and processes in the cosmic concatenation of causes and effects, I have certainly to make room for both kinds of phenomena. What I take as the spirit communication has followed as an effect the satisfaction of its own proper assemblage of conditions ; it cannot be a link or episode improperly interpolated into the serial history of cosmic life. The radio-emanation is so also. I tried to understand the case in my previous work by introducing the mathematical conception of a Family of Curves. A family essentially means a determination of values. A family of curves corresponds to a family of centres in the Fact-Stuff which constitutes a species or a natural kind. I will not enlarge upon this idea now. I may only note that a particular determination of values represents a particular way of the root-interest's operation. Thus is the disembodied spirit relegated to the family of airy nothings while the radio-activity is assigned a place in the family of realities. The former family does not serve those

interests or ends of a centre which the latter can be made to serve. But when I pull down the barriers of these smaller caste distinctions and accept the large family of subjective process or cosmic process, both the phenomena may be, and are, made to live together as members of the same family. But I must not go into the alluring details of this great subject. When I believe that a ghost exists, I refer or equate it to that family or order of facts which I have been accustomed to regard as the objective order of things : it is the equation of subjective existence to objective, these being practical distinctions introduced into the heart of experience which in itself is neither the one nor the other. It has to be pointed out also that the relative strain or tension of a mere idea as distinguished from that of a fact is a practical one. As a genuine element of the Fact-Stuff the wildest idea or fancy ought to have the same tone of quiescence as the most deeply acknowledged objective truth. I have veiled or been driven to veil this quiescence of the Fact-Stuff. The strain of a fancy, though an actual feeling, is therefore incidental to veiling. When the fancy is believed we have equated the so-called fancy and the so-called fact to each other as regards their tone of quiescence ; we have reduced their potential difference. Believing, thus conceived, is a mode of unveiling. By believing I am constantly re-distributing the members of families.

I need not enter into the question as to whether believing is a mode of willing, or a mode of knowing, or one of feeling. I have tried to indicate what I conceive to be the fundamental nature of believing. The nature has been indicated in several ways, so that there is a possibility of confusion. But the central idea stands out boldly perhaps. Believing is a kind of equating which becomes possible on account of there arising differences as regards plane or potential among different classes of actual experiences under the exigencies of practical living or under a special operation of the root-interest in which the directness and quiescence of certain classes of facts are veiled. Thus I apparently forget that idea or fancy in the mind is also a direct and quiescent fact in an unmistakeable sense. A feeling of indirectness and tension is superimposed concealing, as it were, the inalienable

datum of givenness or actuality beneath. An idea still remains an idea even when it is believed to be true or corresponding to reality. Belief does not transform an idea into an impression, using the terms in their ordinary empirical sense. Belief does not establish an equation between an idea and impression in that literal sense. What we call the object of an idea or fancy is equated or relegated to that family of experiences which we have chosen to call realities. Nevertheless by such equation or relegation the tension of an idea is considerably reduced. Perhaps it would be clearer to introduce the symbols proposed in the *Approaches* to bring out this peculiar transference of the object of an idea or thought from a certain family to a certain other. But I will forbear bringing in the symbols. Believing has no meaning except in relation to an order or family somehow hedged round from the universal Stuff of being. It has no place, at least in the form in which we have presented it, in the bare Given. A part of the Given must be in some manner carved out of the whole and allowed to live a life special to itself, in order that any operation of equating can be at all thought of. A part of the Given must cease to feel that it is given in order that we may possibly refer it back to the Given. The return-current presupposes the overflow. Thus an investigation into the act of believing itself has brought us inevitably to the view of a universal Fact-Stuff in which a mighty Stress is overflowing through a plurality of co-ordinated centres. Believing would be unmeaning without this point of view. Hence I have felt warranted in pushing back the frontiers of my actual life on the strength of believing. Believing may be an immanent act in a centre ; but its necessary implication is that it is *a centre*. I believe myself to be a centre, a special point of view for the presentation of the Given. What I believe I also feel ; I possess therefore the warrant for the larger Fact in feeling. Of course there is a difference between actually and directly feeling and merely believing. It is a practical difference. But even in the face of this difference I maintain that what I fundamentally feel in believing (e.g. my centralized and veiled existence) should be brought in a line with the facts of so-called direct and actual feeling (e.g. the

feeling that I am believing). What I commonly accept as direct feeling is also veiled feeling, though the veil is thin ; it is *my* feeling and therefore a feeling determined and circumscribed by my root-interest ; it is practical feeling. Hence I am not sure whether the distinction between the larger Fact and the lesser, the Fact-Stuff and the centre for its individualisation, can be absolutely maintained. With the dropping of the veil this distinction may have to be dropped also. I am not prepared to cling to the frail craft of individuality in the ocean of Being. In this sense our view may be a dream. So long as I am a point of view, an outlet for divine outburst, I must take this view and have this dream. It is not *my* view or dream in the sense that I may have it or have it not. It is essentially bound up with I-ness. This I-ness is a part of this dream.

The view that I have taken of the nature of the Fact-Stuff in the *Approaches* and also from the door-step of the present investigation, should not be taken as a logical inconsistency of this latest view. This latest idea is an *interpretation* of the surest messages of experience ; the former was only a *reception* of those messages. What do I feel ?— This was my first enquiry. What does my feeling tell me necessarily and fundamentally ?— This is my present enquiry. The accounts need not destroy each other. They possibly differ not in substance and drift but in the way of emphasis. In the first I lay stress on actuality or givenness, meaning by it the whole stretch of feeling that I am unreservedly and sufficiently conscious of. Actuality means manifestation, *bhāna*, and this means an irreducible minimum of sufficient consciousness. I scrupulously cling to it, admitting nothing from outside. This is the first reception of the message of life, the virgin definition of the divine outburst. But I have to ask next— How must I understand this message and divine outburst ? I feel that I-ness is a necessary limitation of being and feeling ; hence what I have so far regarded as my actual and given is only my practical and accepted life. The very circumstance of *me* makes it a practical definition of actuality. This very circumstance drives me out to a Behind and Beyond. This therefore is a fundamental interpretation of feeling ; no logical

understanding, no rationalisation of course, but a mere lighting up of what is dimly but unmistakeably given. I have always stoutly disclaimed solipsism ; but my first position was perilously near it. The new position brings me back to what I feel as tolerably safe realism. But when I compare the reception of the message of life to its interpretation (which means the uplifting of the veil which has to a certain extent concealed the given), I am driven to a third and perhaps last position suggested towards the end of the last paragraph. May not the distinction between the larger Fact and the smaller, the centre and the beyond, be a dream only ? Can these pigmy, though essentially interesting and fruitful, distinctions remain when the central standpoint has been left and the alogical, full, uncompromised Fact has become the standpoint instead ? The reply of the Science of Fact to this question is unsettling to our common interests and natural beliefs. But still the reply has to be given and received. I will not pause for it. One fact, however, stands out prominently and serenely clear in the midst of all this challenging and unsettling of the matter-of-fact constructions of life. The ways of the Stress are inscrutable. But the placid, sparkling background of Spiritual Ether in which the universal Stress lives to our perpetual making and unmaking, understanding or confusing, never suffers. No distinctions can reach and possess it. This at any rate is absolutely clear. It does not delude or elude us as the Stress does apparently. Is it *the* Reality while all else is a dream somehow laid over Reality ? I do not know. I cannot conceive an *else* ; the Ether is Being as such. I do not know if I have been able to indicate the relation between *me* and Being with anything approaching clearness. So much will, however, do for the present. Another question closely connected with this, which indeed has led us into it and whose consideration has been long deferred, should be taken up now *viz.*, Causality.

Fact should not be equated to *me*. Central reference is not a necessary incident in the life of the Fact. Fact can be referred to a centre and as such conceived as *my* Fact. Even this statement is not strictly accurate. What can be referred to a centre

and conceived as mine is not the whole but a section of the Whole. This is the part accepted. If I ask : What is my experience ?— it is clear that I have before my mind's eye those portions of the total Given which I happen to be sufficiently aware of : it is these portions that I regard as my experience. The mystery of central experience is too deep to be fathomed. Even what I feel as my experience is a universe : its boundaries cannot be definitely settled. I generally identify myself of course with a more or less restricted portion of this unbounded possession, but still I distinctly feel that my possession extends beyond the portion of interest and that the outlying zones constitute *my* experience, the fringe and background of what I prominently feel, quite as much as the zone of interest and prominence. Suppose the zone of interest and prominent regard is extended ; I flow over into the outlying vistas. Do I feel that what was *not* mine is becoming mine now ? Do I not take these newly accepted outlying vistas and others lying still beyond them which I have not accepted yet, as constituting my Given ? If so, central reference need not be quite such a partial affair as we were first tempted to think. As I am running after the boundaries of my existence they move and recede like the horizons ; they elude me even as the horizons do. I cannot definitely say that I am only so much and no more ; however much I may possess or become. I feel that I have shut out more possessions and a vaster becoming. Why shall I not call all this, actual possessions and vague possibilities, my experience ? I refuse this title of *me* to the All, here and beyond, because of the arbitrary boundaries which such central reference necessarily sets up and implies ; of course there remains, as we have seen, a vague pointing to stretches of life beyond those boundaries ; but as soon as I am able to pull down these boundaries new ones appear farther off still suggesting as before a beyond ; pull these down and others will forthwith appear ; and so on. The name to be given to the All ought not to imply or suggest any boundaries and practical definitions at all ; *me* is essentially a practical definition, though it is a definition which carries with it an impulse to overflow, to chase its own bounding line, the

horizons of its outlook ; hence the title *me* cannot do. The practical definition of life again uses the forms of Time, Space and Causality ; but life transcends all such limiting categories. Time and Space are as it were two co-ordinate axes diverging from the *me* centre with reference to which we may have an analysis of life. But life is not the synthesis of these elements of reference and analysis. Of course if one should choose nevertheless to call the alogical All by the name *me*, we may allow him to indulge in his own vagary. But no name suggesting a practical definition and analysis of life should be, as a matter of fairness, thrust upon the indefinable and unanalysable Fact.

Another point touching the relation of *me* to the Fact should be noticed while on our way to Causality. The universal Stress is no name suggesting a blind World-Force on the lines of Schopenhauer. It is *not* pledged to be an atheistic principle. The Power that has burst forth into love and knowledge, truth and beauty, in you and me, need not be blind, irrational and cold power merely. The matter is that I cannot *circumscribe* It by my conceptions whether of Good or of Truth or of Beauty. It is vaster than what I think of It, which does not mean that It is *not* what I think of It : It is Love, Good and Beauty. Only I am not permitted to say that It is exhausted in these determinations or others which appear from that individual point of view which we have called *me*. What I take as the world is a part of the Divine outburst. Shall I say that this is transcendence in immanence ? Again the word 'Stress' need not suggest anything gross, material or evil. I have used it in a purely scientific sense to mean the cosmic energy or impulse of becoming. It is that which makes the *cidākāśa*, pure, quiescent and impartial, appear as though it were a many, a moving and striving, a differentiation and evolution. I do not know if the whole affair is a colossal dream, a tremendous hypnotic suggestion. I only feel that I cannot know that the All becomes. But I feel that it is, or rather that it is *is-ness* as such which can be expressed in no judgment. I give no foundations for the popular misgivings about the word 'Stress'. Stress may be Love. Love is at least a part of its overflow. In the present essay, however, I shall not

seriously deal with the ethical and religious bearings of our theory of Fact. Only one word I may say in passing touching the method of Faith and Devotion. To us intuition has been the master-key to the reception and interpretation of life. Understanding and Reason have been relegated to a secondary role : these can neither receive and contain the gift of life nor possess its complete significance, but they are organs or 'tools' of life by which it sets about doing its practical business ; they are methods of practical definition and reconstruction. These latter operations proceed upon what I have elsewhere called the *polarization* of the Fact-Stuff ; hence understanding expresses itself in judgments, in correlations, or polarities. Intuition dispenses with this circumstance of polarization. In intuition no Subject is apprehending an object in relation to itself : there is no logic of intuition. Hence intuition succeeds where understanding fails ; the former succeeds by living, the latter fails by abstracting and dissecting. Now, faith is essentially a method of intuition : it is the laying aside of the tools of life so that they may not interfere with the living of life. Life creates these tools for the purpose of a special kind of living : they help and further it in what is commonly called the struggle for existence. But the special kind of living gradually supersedes living as such ; the average practice of life will not allow us to live the life of a seer and philosopher, a life straining itself to the depths and dimensions of reality. Hence life is dominated by the tools, or their collective expression, the machine. Intuition consolidating into faith is an effort to shake this domination. The tool has enticed life abroad and fettered it down to strange pursuits ; faith would make life a Prometheus Unbound and bring it back to the fulness and repose and easiness of its home. I see therefore salvation not in knowledge and understanding but in faith and perception. The tool need not of course be recklessly thrown away ; by using it with aim and insight we can cut down many a noxious entanglement and pull down many a sturdy barrier in the way of our pilgrimage to Truth. But it must not be held too fast and close to the bosom lest it should prove our own undoing. With this provision I discard the method of

understanding and logical thought in the pursuit of Truth. I cannot forget that reality is alogical and that the perception of Reality is alogical, so that I cannot reach it and live it carrying logic all the way with me : I must leave logic behind, the pilot that has stood in good stead in the leading stage, when the portals of the temple of Truth are at last in sight ; these I must pass through alone, speechless and absorbed. Even I cannot carry the *me* with me ; this will compromise me ; the intuition of Truth is a selfless perception. I will add a few more lines on the method of faith and devotion with a view to show that it requires not a pluralistic, dualistic or a monistic basis at all ; but that its ground and substance is alogicalism : it is not a method of measuring life but one of absorption in it.

I have elsewhere spoken of the oscillation of regard. Commonly experience is neither subjective nor objective ; it shows no centre of reference at all ; it is an alogical Fact-Stuff. When however experience shows the polarity of Subject and Object, my regard, if not too tightly engaged by either pole, oscillates between them. When my regard is warmly engaged by the object, the experience is certainly alogical ; it is not formulated as an act of judgment ; the object is not apprehended as object but simply as a stretch of fact. On the other hand, when it is deeply merged in the Self, the experience is again alogical, not knowing the subject as subject. The subject and object attended to in such experience are elements of Fact that may *possibly* be known as logical poles in a later experience. In the case of oscillation also there is only a shifting of the place of emphasis from one element to another in the stuff and then back again ; these emphasized elements may possibly be known as logical correlatives afterwards. Perhaps there is not complete monopoly of regard by one element at one end of the amplitude of oscillation as suggested in the *Approaches* ; while the one element is accentuated and lighted up the other is attenuated and shaded. Note that I call it element and not pole. An element may possibly become a pole in the *index* of a later pulse of experience. Note the word in *italics* also. An entire experience as felt in intuition is never really partitioned into

poles. The poles do not divide or polarize the entire Given at any moment but only a selected portion of it. When I think I see a star, the narrowness of the range of logical operation is obvious. Even when I think I know a universe, I have hedged round a *part* of the actual universe of experience. Lastly when there is the operation of logical thought correlating one element of experience to another, I must likewise feel that the Whole continues to exceed logic or that the operation is wholly an immanent one which cannot condition Fact itself. Fact has not become *two* by such analysis. It never becomes two. I cannot say also that it—the entire Given—remains *one*. It is never one. It is not a numerical Fact at all. I need not bring in illustrations or suggest experiments to verify these general statements. Our conclusion is that life or the perception of Reality can, does and cannot but, dispense with number-categories. Living is a matter of absorption or immersion. Hence I cannot *live* in the deeper sense, *viz.*, in the sense of feeling and knowing Reality, with understanding. I do not suggest that living the Reality must be blind ; that I can live it only in the dark. It cannot be lived in abstraction and analysis. But abstraction is not the light of the Spirit ; the Spirit is not blind without it. The Spirit can feel and know where it does not reason and understand. Nay, the Spirit cannot reason and understand where it feels and knows in full. To understand is not to grasp the Fact unveiled but the relations of fact-sections in reference to definite practical ends (including of course the ordinary theoretic ends).

Now, it has been hastily assumed, I think, that dualism or pluralism is a necessary basis of faith, devotion and love. To believe, cherish and love we must have *objects* undoubtedly ; but these objects need not be set up as logical poles. We also think what we believe and love, and inasmuch as we think we *make* it a logical object. But such thinking is not essential ; nay, such thinking is a bar to believing and loving in full. Belief and love imply absorption and enjoyment ; hence they are alogical experiences ; we must not thrust upon them the laws and accidents of representation. When I actually love my object I am merged in it, I am one with it ; when I think of my love I have ceased to

love *actually*, and the poles of representation—the lover and the beloved—have appeared. The poles come together and blend into one unspeakable, undefinable enjoyment of bliss when I actually love, I *live* love, if I may say so. Man is *one* with God when he loves Him ; while he is conscious of a duality and distance he is only thinking and talking of his love. Alogicalism and not logicalism, absorption and not duality, therefore, is the essence of Faith and Love. Hence in living the life of Reality I must strive by faith and devotion rather than by science and thought. Philosophy can never make me a seer. I can never enjoy in full by reasoning. Reasoning is a provisional aid which life has evolved out of itself in order to rise above the apparently pulse-life of the lower centres. It must out-grow it. It must kick the ladder off when it has at last reached the higher plane of serene, habitual, deep intuition. An old Plotinus or a recent Schelling was right after all. The 'gun-shot' intuition of Truth is the only perception of Truth. The lover and the pious man need not shudder at the thought of alogicalism. It is not equivalent to blindness, spiritual or sensuous. It is the light and bliss of knowledge in all its concrete depth and vastness. Logicalism is not extensive with knowledge ; knowledge not only does not end where understanding fails but it becomes true, full and intensive. Logical thinking, however useful in its way, abstracts knowing from feeling and willing and thus reduces it to a cold and dull abstraction ; it abstracts within the aspect of knowing itself ; its product is doubly abstract. To know, feel and will is one concrete fact ; we have it in that natural form in alogical experience ; in thinking and philosophising I apparently veil two-thirds of this concrete fact, and a considerable part of even the remaining one-third. Alogicalism also keeps clear of monism stated in the ordinary form. Fact is not one in the ordinary sense ; so that when I love the Fact and live it, I do not literally become *one* with it, as formerly expressed, but both Fact and I—if I may indulge in such pedantry for one moment—become lost in an inexpressible absorption and enjoyment. The rapture in attention and the absorption in love are the normal conditions ; in representing these I distort ; and imagine that I cannot attend

at all unless an object is correlated to me and that I cannot love unless love is split up into two poles, a lover and a beloved. The state of a subject *thinking* that it is attending to an object is not a state of rapt attention at all ; the state of a lover *thinking* that he is loving a person or object is not a state of loving at all. These may be necessary prologues and epilogues of the act, but not certainly the act itself. Hence I do not see any incompatibility between the method of intuition and that of faith and love. Nay, the latter is the carrying out and consummation of the former. The absorption of faith and love is the most perfect kind of intuition and living. It is at the same time the most perfect kind of knowing. Knowing has been commonly identified with rationalizing, and there are reasons for it ; hence knowledge and faith have been supposed to be contraries and love has been painted as blind. But really I do not know till I believe and do not see till I love. I discard therefore Hegel's proud claim for Philosophy ; she can make a man out of an amoeba but she cannot make a God out of a man ; she can point out from a distance the shadowy outlines of the living Wonder, but she cannot play the usherer. I can know and lose myself in God by faith and love, a consummation in which being and knowing unite. What I called *non-polar* knowledge in the rendering of the introductory verses is such blessed absorption in love. The methods leading to this beatific consummation will be studied more particularly in a subsequent volume. I shall be happy if this passing hint and suggestion should reassure the pious heart which our philosophy of alogical Fact-Stuff might have rudely unsettled.

I proceed now to a brief discussion of Causality with which the present summary may be brought to a close. Time and Space, as we have seen, spring out from the same root in the Primary Basis of Reality—the Ether of Awareness. In so far as they are given in the root they are real, universal and eternal. That root is the massiveness or extensiveness of experience. Space is a special cast of this spiritual vastness and so is also Time. This consciousness of vastness I am unable to put away from me. It is given in my acentric intuition. To the Whole

I can never properly apply Space or Time, but the Whole is undoubtedly a stretch, a vastness of feeling. It is because I cannot arbitrarily circumscribe this stretch that I have loath to believe that the *me* is all. A centre has necessarily meant for me a practical definition of this vastness. Shall I now trace Causality to the same root? That all categories of thought must lie lumped together in their first slumber of birth on the bosom of the Mother-Stuff, is a statement that requires to be hardly made. The concatenation of causes and effects, apart from its necessary implication of the temporal order, means a stretch or continuity of substance which is a special cast of the continuity of the Given or Whole. Feeling is never discontinuous as we have seen; this is absolute continuity and is the same as the primary vastness of existence. When we think of a causal series we think of this absolute continuity and primary vastness in a special manner. All fact-sections are not indifferently linked together as causes and effects; while we think that A is the cause of B, we think C and D have nothing to do causally with B. True; but what do we mean when we think that A has caused B? Whatever Hume might think, we think that something, some substance or force or energy or whatever else we call it, has passed from the one to the other, and that there is a special kind of continuity between the two. The cause has continued in some sense in the effect; an effect is the carrying out of the cause. The all important question of course is—What is it that has continued in this operation? It is a question that has to be considered with most painstaking care, and in reaching an answer we may have to be prepared for Humism from which we have tentatively broken off. But if we state continuity in a general and abstract form we need not seriously fear revision even from Humian empiricism. An invariable succession transformed into an objective nexus or connection through the force of subjective association has not surely dispensed with continuity. We do not know whether any substantial ground has continued and persisted in causal operation; nor do we know whether any force or energy has passed from the one side to the other. Whenever we have the one fact we have also the other; having the one we naturally expect the

other ; and this expectation is practically all that we mean when we speak of the one as producing the other. But what is subjective association and expectation based upon it ? We have not cared very much for the common distinction between subjective and objective ; all distinctions are distinctions among fact sections or elements of experience. We have not regarded experience as a subjective fact— the possession of a mind. We do not know anything about mind and matter at all ; they are perhaps fact-sections themselves. The distinction between fact and feeling is to us a pragmatic distinction, not corresponding to any fundamental partition of reality. We therefore do not regard with suspicion Hume's subjective association— it is a fact-section that we certainly do abstract from the concrete Given. We are not also knocked off our position in admitting Force and Energy and objective nexus. These are merely names that we give to certain forms of fact-sections just as 'association' is a name to a particular form of fact-section. Be that as it may, is not subjective association and expectation based on it a form of fact-continuity ? To be associated together is to be brought together in thought ; at least we cannot otherwise think of association ; and to be brought together in thought is to form elements or sections of the same tissue of experience. I will not carry the analysis of association farther, but in any case it is evident that association is meaningless without continuity of a special kind. Hence I may be allowed to conclude that causality like time and space evolves from the same primary root. Without the unfailing intuition of spiritual continuity, causality would be without a basis and support, and therefore a non-entity. Causality is real in so far at least as this basis is concerned : all changes and modes are but waves on the sea of a continuous and unbounded feeling. They appear and disappear in the same unfailing *cidākāśa*, and are therefore grounded on the same substantial basis, and form so far, a connected order of phenomena. This is the material basis of causality. The matter of causality therefore is essentially the same as the matter of time and space. In fact, the matter and ground of the world-order can be nothing else than the *cidākāśa*. Matter and ground in this fundamental sense cannot be parti-

tioned : it is one, or rather it is an alogical whole, all-inclusive and self-sufficient. The wildest dream or the oddest illusion cannot appear without this primary basis. Its matter is the matter of the universe.

But like Time and Space, Causality has a form of its own. Without this form it is pure, indistinguishable, alogical matter and no casual relation. What is this form? Form in a general way is the World-Stress which we have known so far. Without a Stress overflowing, Life and Existence would be pure, impartial and alogical feeling only. Stress is *the* form which gives it a shape, direction and movement. In a general sense also, we can analyse this Stress into Presentation, Movement and Veiling. We have studied these three principles and their correlation in the *Approaches*. The special forms of Time, Space and Causality are the special casts or dispositions of this primary Form laid over the primary Matter. The universal Stress spreads herself in a manner and becomes Space : her being and her spreading are of course the being and vastness of the primary Matter. She lets her flow in a certain manner and becomes Time, though in her flowing the same matter is and continues. She spins herself out as a connected cosmic tissue and becomes Cause, though the basis of her interlinkings is again the unfailing continuous Matter. In Space she mainly presents, in Time she mainly moves and in Causality she mainly veils. I have said 'mainly', because no hide-bound separation of the three elements of the Stress can be thought of. Causation is the perpetual redistribution of the cosmic system, and in such redistribution the old is veiled as the new appears : the new is the reappearance of the old under a veil. The former order apparently disappears to reappear in a different and yet persistent form : the effect is not merely a fact different from the cause, but also, in a sense, a fact the same as the cause. The veil as implied in the causal affair is important and pregnant with deep issues ; but in this essay I merely categorically state the relation without venturing into the alluring yet intricate details. The veil works most markedly in our causal interpretation of the facts. We apparently think that a particular fact is caused by a

particular other fact, forgetting that it is an action behind which the whole cosmic drama must be read in order that it may be at all a concrete event. The meanest event is one without its context and setting in this sublimest wonder of existence. Thus the veil makes an anarchist's bomb the cause of an all-consuming European conflagration. Science is an attempt to pierce through the veil. Thus when a quantity of heat has disappeared, it is veiled or lost in our lay eyes ; but a Joule is not satisfied till he can recognize the apparently lost heat in its new disguise, till he can find out its mechanical equivalent. Sometimes the effect is clear but we cannot recognize it in its causal form : we know the emanations of the radium but can we get behind the emanations and have a peep into the constitution of the atoms whose magazines of equilibrated energy may be shown to be dissipating and going again into a free state ? Sometimes the cause is clear but we cannot recognize it in its disguise as it has passed into its effects. In any case, however, I may connect the causal relation with the veil.

The Fact has been conceived as the unveiled manifestation of centralized existence. The Behind and Beyond has been made after the pattern of the Given or *bhāna*. What is partially accepted in me is fully manifested in the Fact. Hence the *me* is the datum and starting basis for all our intuitive and reflective essays. It could not have been otherwise. The difference between the *bhāna* and the Fact is that between absolute manifestation and relative, between actuality and practical definition of actuality. That which is wholly unmanifested does not exist. Consciousness, manifestation and existence are co-extensive and identical. Relative manifestation is manifestation practically ignored. Hence a certain form or kind of manifestation may mean practically no manifestation, no consciousness and no existence. However that may be, the centre remains as the undeniable specimen of Reality. In any case, I must begin with the centre ; a part of the divine outburst gives us or must give us a foretaste, an inkling of the Whole. It is a necessary point of view from which the Fact may be lived in feeling and thought. Now, in ourselves we know causality

as an outburst : doing is necessarily overflowing ; willing is necessarily the impulse to overflow. The setting-up of an agitation in the motor tracts of the brain—the first act of innervation—is the first material expression of this tendency to overflow. The brain and the mind have not been packed up in water-tight compartments in our conception : they are sections of the Fact which is neither mental nor material in the ordinary senses of the terms, and are elements of the universal Stress ; therefore their interaction or correlation follows as a matter of course. To call them elements of a Stress is to presuppose this correlation. There is a tendency implanted in both these elements, brain and mind, to overflow into each other. Overflow literally means the doing away with a given limitation ; thus a swelling river overflows its banks, an accelerating energy overflows the capacity of the system which has contained it. This idea of the overcoming of a given constraint or limitation is fundamental. Now, according to our view, limitation means only ignorance, veiling or non-acceptance. Being and Becoming are only *thus* limited. Apart from veiling they are ever full and undefinable. I ought to have referred to them in the singular rather than in the plural. Becoming can have no separate *being*. Hence, overcoming of limitation means gradual unveiling and greater acceptance. When the mind-element overflows into the brain-element of the cosmic Stress, it overcomes a limitation to its own being : it attends and wills which means that it possesses and accepts what it apparently did not possess and accept before. Mental activity is essentially this process of fuller and deeper possession and acceptance. An element of a stress is the whole stress limited and repressed by other elements. An element implies such limitation. When I say that A, B and C are the three elements of the stress S, I positively mean such mutual limitation. They are made elements by such mutual limitation. An one-sided, solitary element is an abstraction and means nothing. A purely one-sided pressure for example cannot be conceived. A centre again, for example, is made a centre by the limitations and correlations of other centres ; an individual without a world and

society is an abstraction and non-entity. Hence the mind is *such* a mind only by the limitation and correlation of a brain : not a materialistic proposition really, denying a life after death. I have put '*such*' in italics. At any rate there can be no gainsaying the mutual limitation of mind and brain. Each *partly* makes the other ; for they are not the only elements of the cosmic Stress, the only things to be made and determined by their mutual limitation. In the case of mind and brain too, as generally, mutual limitation means mutual veiling and non-acceptance. The mind fully unveiled and accepted is not merely the brain but all reality itself. It is not the brain and is only a part of reality because it does not completely know itself. It has limited its own being and actuality : it has sacrificed itself.

The conclusions which we have drawn regarding the relation between a centre and the Fact will apply to the relation between an element and the Stress. An element is the Stress regarded from a given point of view. It is like determining the co-ordinates of a given point in space in relation to another fixed point called the origin or pole. Now, the mind is limited, veiled and thereby constituted as such by the brain and, mainly through it, by other elements or centres which we collectively call the world. Mental activity means the pushing back of this limitation and the lifting off of this veil. The limitation and the veil are equated to each other ; and this must not be forgotten in entering into this view-point. The mind is not actually limited by anything : it is the unlimited All. Its limitation as an element is therefore apparent, due to veiling or non-acceptance. It is a practical definition of mentality. It becomes a mind, an element, only through such practical definition. Apart from it, it is neither mind nor brain nor any other individual thing but the unlimited, alogical, undefinable All. Mind's overflow, especially through attention and willing, is to widen its practical limits gradually and make them at last merge and vanish in its unbounded actuality. It is the essay of a tiny whirlpool on the bosom of a vast sea to stretch itself into the dimensions of the sea itself. It is the effort of a glow-worm to increase its timid phosphorescence into the calm, sparkling light of the world itself. Science

is an outcome of such overflow. But Faith and Love can lead to the consummation of this overflow. On account of practical definition, however, the mind is only *an* element of the world-outbrust : there are other elements limiting and constituting it. The impulse to overflow in the sense of the present essay is given in them as it is given in the mind. Overflowing, from our practical point of view, is no monopoly of a given centre. Hence different centres or elements limit one another not only in practical being but in overflowing : they limit one another not only in appearing as distinct centres in the Fact-Stuff, but also in striving to do away with their circumscribed distinctness. They oppose in appearing as well as in disappearing, in being as they are as well as in ceasing to be as such make one concrete condition : we have abstracted in thinking and describing separately. So that not only the mind's individual being but its impulse to overflow its individual boundaries is limited by other centres, the brain included. The brain also possesses the impulse to overflow in consequence of which it is unceasingly inducing feelings and sensations into the mind. Is this overflow a sort of unveiling also ? Is the brain unveiled by such activity ? I answer Yes, but I will not pause to consider this aspect of the question. I have sought to bring out the meaning of overflow in consonance with our own point of view ; I have also suggested how not only specialized being but also overflowing inevitably implies restriction. Overflowing, unveiling and acceptance, must thus be of the nature of a stress or interaction. There is no such thing as absolute overflow. We do not know it the Stress and its overflow exist from the absolute standpoint : *we* feel the Stress in and about us, and also its overflow through and against us. In ourselves we feel it as attending and willing and know it as causality ; may we not know it as a vaster Will bursting in and through and about and against us and call it the World-Causality ? I am a cause in so far as I overflow the limitations of my real being—the brain and other co-ordinated centres constituting the World-system. The Fact is a Cause in so far as it overflows into infinite lines and ways of practical manifestation : my acknowledged life of consciousness being only a

torch lighted from the infinite and unchangeable of the Spiritual Ether and our will being only a current apparently diverted from the world-sweeping overflow of a divine and undefinable Will? Is man and his play-world but a tiny bubble an understandable *Lilā*, blown into being is the unthinkable ecstasy of Divine Outburst and Love? Who will tell us? Reason? To be sure, no. Faith and Love and Self-abnegation? Yes, perhaps.

एका संवित् प्रसन्ना विमलगगनवत्तं न वध्नाति किञ्चि-
 देका माया विशाला विपुलघनघटेवापि सा केन छिन्ना ।
 लग्नेवावृण्वतीयं जनयति निपुणा भानसत्त्वेऽप्यभानं
 कूटस्थां क्षेपयन्तीव नटति रसिका खप्रतो धीरसुप्ता ॥ ७ ॥

या संवित् सैव माया भवति विवरणं मायिनो द्वैधगर्भं
 या शक्तिः सैव वस्तु द्विविधमितिमति भानहानोपलम्भात् ।
 जातृजेयादिभेदानुशय इति यथा सांर्व्वभौमे हि बोधे
 सञ्चिन्मुद्रूपभेदैः स्त्रिविधमिति पुनः कल्पितं ब्रह्मवस्तु ॥ ८ ॥*

* एका शुद्धा संविद् विमलगगतवत्तनोति । सैव चिदाकाशः । अयं
 चिदाकाशो देशकालादिसम्बन्धैर्नैव अवच्छिद्यते । चिदाकाशो हि सर्व्वथा निर्वाधो
 भवति । अम्बरतलसंलग्ना विपुलघनघटेव एका विशाला विश्वमाया तस्मिन् चिदाकाशे
 संलग्ना । सापि न कैः सम्बन्धैरवच्छिद्यते । इयं चिदाकाशमावृण्वती निपुणा
 भानसत्त्वेऽपि अभानं जनयति । आवरणशक्त्या स्वप्रकाशं चैतन्यं अप्रकाशं गमयति
 इव । अस्या बिक्षेपशक्त्या पुनः कूटस्थापि संविद् विक्षिप्तेव प्रतीयते । इदं
 दृष्टान्तेन स्फुटयति । धीरसुप्ता कापि वाला स्वप्रतो रसिका यथा, नटति तथा ।
 स्वप्रनृत्यवत् कूटस्थचैतन्यराशौ गत्यादिप्रत्ययः काल्पनिक एव ॥ ७ ॥

मायाचिदाकाशयोर्वस्तुभेदो न चिन्तनीयः । या संवित् सैव माया ।
 अस्तितामात्ररूपस्य वस्तुतो विभागो नैव भवति । मायिनो मम विवरणं हि द्वैधगर्भं
 भवति । इदं चैतन्यं एषा माया इति वस्तुविभागमूलकं मम विवरणं स्वरूपं न
 कथयति । वस्तुस्वरूपं पुनरवाङ्मनसगोचरमनिर्व्वीच्यम् । एवञ्च या शक्तिः
 सैव वस्तु भवति । द्वेधा मननं हि भानसाकल्ये कियदंशहानात् कियदंशोपादानाच्च
 सम्भवति । हानोपादानघटनैव अनिर्व्वचनीयतत्त्वे द्वेधादिसम्बन्धान् समारोपयति ।
 एवञ्च सांर्व्वभौमे हि भाने जातृजेयादिभेदाध्यासो भवति । इदानीं जातुरेव भानं,
 इदानीञ्च ज्ञेयस्यैव भानमिति अग्रण्डस्य भानस्य अग्रण्डशो ग्रहणं भवति । एवञ्च
 पुनः ब्रह्मवस्तु सञ्चिदानन्दरूपभेदैस्त्रिविधमिति कल्पितं भवति । ब्रह्म सत्, ब्रह्म
 चित्, ब्रह्म आनन्द इति त्रैधा मननं विवरणञ्च ॥ ८ ॥

An Awareness pure and limitless as the Space extends to
 which no limitations of Time, Space and Causality can apply.
 An universal Stress is laid over this Awareness like an unbounded
 stretch of cloud. The Stress veils the nature of the Fact, owing

निर्व्वक्तुं शक्नुयात् कोऽपि सुविमलमति ध्वस्तरागादिदोषो
नादोऽयं विश्वबीजः कथमिति परमे व्योम्नि मौनस्वरूपे ।
ईक्षा सम्पूर्णतत्त्वे कथमपि तनुयाद् भाति कस्मात् प्रपञ्चः
व्यक्तित्वं साव्वभौमे विशति कथमिदं वस्तुकैरिन्द्रजालैः ॥ ९ ॥

सान्द्रानन्दप्रवाहे जगदिदमुदितं बुद्बुदो हीव नीरे
तत्र स्फोटस्य गर्भे वितत इव मरुद्दारुणो लोक एषः ।
शुद्धज्ञानान्तरीक्षे पुनरपि नगरी निर्मिता चेन्द्रजालै-
रज्ञानान्धो हि जीवः पिवति नयनजं वारि तत्र प्रमत्तः ॥ १० ॥*

* नित्यमौनवरूपे परमेव्योम्नि कथं विश्वबीजभूतोऽयं नाद इति न केनापि
निर्व्वक्तुं शक्यते । चिदाकाश एव परमं व्योम । शब्द आकाशगुणः परन्तु
नित्यमौनमेव चिदाकाशस्य स्वरूपलक्षणम् । मौनं तावदवाङ्मनसगोचरता ।
सम्पूर्णतत्त्वे बहुस्यां प्रजायेय इति ईक्षा कथमुत्पद्यते ? अपूर्णस्यैव ईक्षणम् ।
निर्व्विशेषे वस्तुनि कस्मात् पुनः प्रपञ्चो भाति ? साव्वभौमं भानं कथमपि च
व्यक्तित्वेन परिच्छिद्यते ? क एष इन्द्रजालः ? ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वेऽपि अनिर्व्वचनीयत्वं
इत्यत्र जिज्ञासानां विरतिः ॥ ९ ॥

नीरे बुद्बुदो यथा उदेति तथा सान्द्रानन्दप्रवाहरूपचैतन्यराशौ जगदिदमुदितम् ।
आनन्दादेव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । विश्वबुद्बुदगर्भे एषः संसारी दारुणो
मरुवि विततो भवति । केनेन्द्रजालेन आनन्दस्यैव गर्भे निरानन्दसंसारपुरी संरचिता ?
आनन्दात्मकस्य निरानन्दरूपत्वं एव कल्प्यते । विशुद्धज्ञानान्तरीक्षे एकाद्भुता
नगरी इन्द्रजालैर्निर्मिता । तां नगरीं निवसन् अज्ञानान्धः प्रमत्तो जीवः
स्वीयनेत्राम्बु पिवति । शुद्धज्ञानराशौ कथमपि चायं अज्ञानान्धप्रसङ्गः ॥ १० ॥

to which the Fact though ever manifested, looks as though it
were unmanifested. The stress also apparently disturbs the
absolute quiescence of the Fact and makes it apparently change.
A man lulled into peaceful sleep has become the hero of a ball-
room in a dream.

Awareness and Stress are one. I, as a given point of restric-
ted view, regard them as two and separate and so describe them.
In Reality the two aspects unspeakably and unthinkably blend.
Similarly I distinguish between the thing and its attribute or
power ; I hedge round a portion of unbounded experience and
call it *me* beyond which I leave an object and not-*me* ; I refer to

एको मौनो विपन्नो निविडजलतले कल्पयन् शुष्कवेला-
भूमिं पक्षौ सुपर्णौ नभसि च विहरन् मायया पिञ्जरस्थः ।
एको बालो हि मातुर्हृदि मुखशयितः कन्दते निःसहायो
भिभुः सुप्तोऽपि सम्राण्मणिखचितभुजैश्चामरैः सेव्यमानः ॥ ११ ॥

भूम्नो नैव स्वभावादपचितिरपि यत् खण्डिता भाति संवि-
दस्वीकारात् प्रमातुस्तदिति खलु भवेद् वस्तुनः स्वोपलम्भे ।
छिन्ना स्याच्चेतनैषा यदि कथय सुधीः केन सा खण्डिता मे
यद्वाह्यं मन्यसे त्वं तदपि निविशते चेतनो मन्यमानः ॥ १२ ॥

* चिद्रूपनस्वरूपं आनन्दघनस्वरूपञ्च वस्तु । तस्मिन् जाडदुःखादिकल्पना
प्रागुक्तया हानोपादानरीत्यैव भवति । सार्वभौमभानस्य स्वीकारे नास्याः कल्पनाया
अवसरः । भानावयवेषु येषां ग्रहणं तेषां ज्ञानविषयता, अग्रहीतावयवानां तु
भानाङ्गीभूतत्वेऽपि ज्ञाने परिहारो भवति । एवं जायते ज्ञानविषयत्वेऽपि ज्ञाना-
विषयत्वम् । एतद् दृष्टान्तैः निरूप्यते । आनन्दघनस्वरूपे वस्तुनि दुःखवेदनापि
अनया रीत्या संभाव्यते । आनन्दस्य परिच्छेद एव निरानन्दत्वम् । न हि दुःखं
मुखादतिरिक्तं किञ्चित् वस्तु । तद्धि मुखस्य बाधरूपम् । समग्रभानसीकारे
दुःखवेदना न भवति ॥ ११ ॥

एवं हानोपादाननियमेन न हि भूम्नो वस्तुनः स्वभावाद्बिभृशतिर्भवति । संविद्
यदा खण्डिता भाति जाडद्रादवच्छेदेन, तदपि सा वस्तुतः अखण्डिनैव तिष्ठति ।
संविदो वस्तुतः परिच्छेदः नाभ्युपगम्यते । जाड्यं तावत् चिन्मयस्य अचिद्रूपेण
आभासः । तद्रूपस्य अतद्रूपेण आभास एव अस्वीकारः । प्रमातुः स्वानुभवे
अस्वीकारादेव अखण्डचिद्रूपनस्य खण्डशो ग्रहणम् । चेतना अवच्छिन्ना भवितुं नार्हति ।
यदि वस्तुतः सा परिच्छिन्ना स्यात् तर्हि केन सा परिच्छिन्ना इति निर्दिश्यताम् ।
यद्वाह्यं मन्यसे चैतन्यस्य तत् खलु अन्तर्निविशते । कस्यचित् पदार्थस्य
बाह्यत्वमननं चेतनाव्यापारो हि भवति । बाह्यं मन्यमानस्त्वं तत्सम्बन्धे चेतनो
भवसीति चेतनाया वस्तुतः अवच्छेदः अपचयो वा न सम्भवति ॥ १२ ॥

Reality as appearing in three different phases: being, conscious-
ness and bliss. All such distinctions, commonly drawn by us,
presuppose the acceptance and non-acceptance of the Given.

How does the first Word beginning the chorus of creation
break the eternal silence of the Spiritual Ether? By what
miracle does the Silent Wonder speak? Who will unravel this

सीमाकाशस्य लङ्घ्या कथमपि महतः कल्पनाकौशलेन
कालस्यादिं च वान्नं प्रभवति तरितुं कोऽपि चिन्ताबलेन ।
सीमाबुद्धेः प्रसङ्गेऽपि परममहतः स्यात् सतश्चापलाप
एवं भानेऽप्युपेक्षा घटयति सुतरां साधनं सिद्धाभावे ॥ १३ ॥

लोकश्चैतन्यमेवं व्यवहरति पुनः खण्डितं मन्यमानो
ह्यत्रास्ते चात्र नास्तीतर इति जड़तश्चेतनो जीव देही ।
विद्युद्दीप्तिप्रकाशैः शकलमिवतमो व्याप्तुं वद् विश्वगेहं
विश्वप्लाव्यस्ति जाड्यं स्फुरति पुनरिति क्षीणदीप्तिश्चिदेवम् ॥ १४ ॥

नहि महाकाशस्य सीमा कल्पनाकौशलेन लङ्घितुं शक्यते । महाकालस्य आदिं
अन्तं चिन्तया तरितुं न कोऽपि समर्थः । परममहतश्चिदाकाशस्य सीमा बुद्धौ यदा
गृहीता भवति तदा तस्य सतोऽपि अपलापो भवति । भानसाकल्ये प्रमातुरुपेक्षैव
अस्यापलापस्य हेतुः । सर्वस्मिन् अपक्षपाते चिदाकाशः परममहानेव प्रतीयते ।
वस्तुतस्तु तत्र सीमा न सम्भवति यथा महाकाशे यथा वा महाकाले । उपेक्षावशात्
तस्य सीमाग्रहणं सिद्धाभावेऽपि साधनमेव ॥ १३ ॥

एवं उपेक्षावलेनैव अखण्डचिद्घनस्वरूपं वस्तु लौकैः खण्डितं मन्यते तथैव
व्यवहृत्यते च । अयं जीवदेहाभिमानी चेतनो भवति आत्मा ; जडद्रव्येभ्यः स इतरः,
स अत्रास्ति, अत्र नास्ति च, इत्यादि व्यवहारैरात्मनो विभुत्वं अपलप्यते । यथा
विश्वगेहं व्याप्तुं तमः विद्युद्दीप्तिप्रकाशैः क्वचित् कदाचित् खण्डकृतमिव भवति
तथा विश्वप्लाविनि जाड्ये क्षीणदीप्तिश्चेतना क्वचित् कदाचिद् वा खद्योतिकावत्
स्फुरति । जाड्यमेव विश्वस्य सामान्यरूपम् । चैतन्यं तत्र क्वचित् कदाचिद् विशेष-
रूपमेव । विपुलजाड्यराशौ चैतन्यकणिकालेश एव विद्यते । एवं प्रायशो लोका
मन्यन्ते । इदं मननमपि उपेक्षावीजसम्भूतमिति व्यवस्था ॥ १४ ॥

miracle ? How does the Will-to-become appear in the bosom of
perfect Existence ? How does the varied show of the world
become reflected by a pure and homogeneous Light ? By what
miracle again does the unlimited All become individualized as a
centre or abstracted as an aspect ?

In a flood of intense joy the world appears as a bubble in
water. In the womb of that bubble spreads a cheerless, dry
wilderness which we know as the stage of our life's play. Thus
is sorrow a hedging round of infinite joy. In the sky of pure
knowing again a city has been conjured up by an unthinkable

नाभूत् प्राग्जन्मनो मे न च खलु भविता चेतनोऽर्धं प्रयाणाद्
 जीवद्भावेऽपि लुप्ता भवति च चिदियं प्रायशः सुप्तिमोहात् ।
 मूर्च्छायां छिन्नधारा वहति च विरला चिन्नदी वावसादा-
 देवं धीर्मेऽवटे किं शिशुकररचिते सैकतेऽब्धिर्घृतोऽपि ॥ १५ ॥

मम जन्मनः प्राक् चैतन्यं नाभूत्, मम प्रयाणादूर्ध्वं तच्च न भविष्यति इति जीवद्भायामेव चैतन्यप्रकाश एवं मन्यते । जीवद्भावेऽपि चैतन्यं अनियतं तिष्ठति । प्रायशः सुषुप्तिमोहात् तस्य लोपः संघटति तदा तदा जीवः अचेतनः । मूर्च्छायां गभीरावसादे वा चिन्नदी विच्छिन्नधारा वहति । एवं चैतन्यस्य अविच्छिन्नप्रवाहोऽपि न अस्माभिरङ्गीकृतः । इदं मननं तु मम बुद्धौ निहतम् । अनेन वस्तुतत्त्वव्यवस्था नैव स्यात् । शिशुकररचिते विवरे स्वल्पमेव सिन्धुतोयं गृह्यते, नहि तेन महाब्धिः स्वयं घृतोऽपि ॥ १५ ॥

magic. In that dark city the Self is groping as a pitiable wanderer and is moistening his lips with his own tears. By what magic does this darkness of veil and ignorance co-exist in the midst of the ineffable of Reality ?

A fish swimming in the depths of the sea as a moving delight is over-powered by the fancy that it is cast on the dry sands of the beach. A beautifully-feathered bird flying about in the open sky has shut itself in sheer fancy in a cage of imagination. A child lying peacefully asleep on the bosom of its mother dreams of helplessness and cries. A monarch lulled into rest by the fanning hands of beauty finds himself in a dream as a beggar.

The vastness of the Given is never really gone. That consciousness appears as broken is due to the non-acceptance of the Self in the midst of its actual Given. If you say that consciousness is really cut up, tell me by what it is cut up. That which you take as limiting consciousness from outside necessarily lies inside and not outside of consciousness. It is never possible to think or believe anything beyond the pale of consciousness without bringing it within its pale. The pale therefore is only a fictitious and practical definition of consciousness. Are you or are you not *aware* of the so-called unmanifested, unconscious or external ? The unmanifested is only a vague hint given in the manifested itself.

By what dexterity of fancy is it possible to go beyond the

पीनःपुन्येन भावा जनिमपि विलयं संविदीत्थं भजन्ति
धीरां नित्यामुपेक्ष्य व्यपदिशति जनो वृत्तिधर्मांश्च तस्याम् ।
गङ्गावक्षःप्रवाहे द्रुतचलिततरीमाश्रितः कोऽपि लोकः
तीरस्थानीक्षमाणो निखिलतरुवरान् संभ्रमाद् धावमानान् ॥ १६ ॥

एवं भानं ह्युपेक्ष्य व्यवहरति जनोऽप्यन्यथा कः समर्थ-
स्तस्योपादानभूमौ विरमति गलिता सर्वजीवप्रवृत्तिः ।
भानांशे पक्षपाताद् भवति विषयतो हानुमिच्छा चिकीर्षा
भूमार्थं साधयेत् किं पतिरपि सरितां सायकं कुम्भवारि ॥ १७ ॥

चैतन्ये वृत्तयः पीनःपुन्येन जायन्ते विलीयन्ते च । वृत्तीनां जनिविलयाधर्मा-
श्चिदाकाशे व्यपदिश्यन्ते । इयमुपेक्षा कूटस्थनित्यचिदाकाशे गतिस्थित्यादिधर्मा-
नारोपयति । गङ्गावक्षःप्रवाहे द्रुतचलिततरीं आश्रितः कोऽपि द्रष्टा तीरस्थान्
निखिलतरुवरान् स्वयं अचलानपि सम्भ्रमाद् धावमानानीक्षते । अत्रापि दृष्टान्ते
वस्तुसामग्रयोपेक्षैव भ्रमस्य हेतुः । समग्रग्रहणे चिदाकाशस्य कूटस्थत्वं स्थितम् ।
यदा अयं चलिष्पुनरिति मन्यते तदापि स तत्त्वतः कूटस्थ एव । कूटस्थोऽपि चलिष्पुनरिव
प्रतीयते । एवञ्च पूर्णदृष्टौ चिदाकाशस्य नित्यत्वं विभुत्वञ्च स्थितम् । आंशिकदृष्टौ
तस्मिन् गत्यादयः वृत्तिधर्मा उपन्यस्यन्ते । तथोपन्यासे अयं जातः स्थितः मृत
इत्यादिरूपैरस्माभिर्गृह्यते ॥ १६ ॥

एवं भानसाकल्ये उपेक्षैव लोकव्यवहारमूलभूता । तस्मात् अभावे कोऽपि
निपुणो व्यवहारसमर्थो न भवति । तस्य पूर्णापादाने स्थिते सर्वजीवव्यवहारः खलु
विरमति । भानांशे पक्षपातादेव कस्मिंश्चिद् विषये जिहासा कस्मिंश्चिद् वा चिकीर्षा
भवति । सर्वस्मिन्नपक्षपाते न कापि प्रवृत्तिः । भूमा स्वयमेव न किमपि लोक-
प्रयोजनं साधयति । परमविपुले सिन्धौ मम कोऽर्थः । मत्सम्बन्धे कुम्भवारि
सार्थकमेव । अर्थसाधने अवच्छेदानामपेक्षा अस्तेऽत्र । अनवच्छिन्नवस्तुराशी न
कापि प्रवृत्तिः, न च कोऽपि अर्थः, न पुनः किमपि अर्थसाधनम् ॥ १७ ॥

limits of Space itself? Who again, by power of thought, can cross the beginning or the end of Time? The limitless Vast, though ever given, is apparently discarded by the incidence of limiting thought. Thus ignorance of the manifested apparently makes a denial out of an affirmation or an affirmation out of a denial : by it a thing becomes apparently what it is really not.

Thus we practically take consciousness as though it were given piecemeal. The light of consciousness is thus made to

आकाशः किं महान् मे घटयति निखिल श्चार्थिनो लोकधर्मान्
 नावच्छिन्नेन सिद्धिं घटमठभवने जीवयात्रापि कस्य ।
 सर्वस्मिन् संप्लवे वा कथमपि च भजेदम्भसां विश्वदेहे
 मत्स्यण्डीमूर्तिरेषा लवणगृहगता संमृतिं जीवरूपा ॥ १८ ॥

भानासीमत्वमेवं स्थितमपि नियतं छिद्यते चेव वृत्तै-
 र्बस्तूनामर्थसिद्धिः खलु घटति यतो नान्यथा चोपलम्भे ।
 बोधे कः सार्वभौमे व्यवहरति पुमान् कस्य वास्ति प्रवृत्तिः
 शैलप्राचीरमध्ये वहति गिरिनदी धावते नैव सिन्धुः ॥ १९ ॥

अर्थिनो मम लोकधर्मान् नहि निखिलो महान् आकाशः निर्वर्त्ताहयति । यदा
 महाकाशः घटमठभवनादिभिरवच्छिन्नो भवति तदा तेन लोकव्यवहारः सिध्यते, न
 पुनरनवच्छिन्नवस्तुना । एषा जीवरूपा शर्करामयी मूर्तिः लवणमयभवने तिष्ठति ।
 तद् भवनमेव संसाररूपं व्यवहारममष्टिभूतम् । विश्वदेहे सर्वतः अम्भसां संप्लवे कथं
 सा मत्स्यण्डीमूर्तिः लवणगृहेषु संमृतिं ब्रजेत् ? तस्मिन् खलु लवणगृहमपि
 विगलति मूर्तिरपि शर्करामयी विगलति । अतः केन कस्य कुत्र व्यवहारः ?
 अतश्च भानावच्छेद एव सर्वव्यवहारबीजभूतो भवति । पूर्णज्ञाने संसारव्यवहारस्य
 न सम्भावना ॥ १८ ॥

भानासीमत्वं नियतं स्थितमपि वृत्तिभेदैरवच्छिद्यते इव । न हि वस्तुतः
 अवच्छेदस्तस्य सम्भवति । वृत्तिबाहुल्यकल्पनाया एव खण्डशः अवच्छेद एव कल्प्यते ।
 अनेन अवच्छेदेन पदार्थानां अर्थसिद्धिर्भवति । अन्यथा उपलम्भे, पूर्णज्ञाने, सा न
 सम्भवति । सार्वभौमे पूर्णे बोधे कः पुमान् व्यवहरति, कस्य वा प्रवृत्तिरस्ति ?
 गिरिनदी शैलप्राचीराभ्यां सङ्कीर्णं प्रवहति, विपुलः अपरिच्छिन्नः सिन्धुः न हि
 धावते । परिच्छिन्नपदाथसैत्रव गत्यादिसिद्धिर्न पुनरनवच्छिन्नस्य भूमनश्चिदा-
 काशस्य ॥ १९ ॥

dwell in the living bodies as distinct from the inanimate things :
 it is thus taken as existent here and non-existent there. A
 colossal darkness filling the whole universe is torn, as it were, by
 momentary flashes of lightning : thus an unconsciousness, wide as
 the world itself, extends, in which the poorly shining rays of
 consciousness are struggling through, even as feeble phos-
 phorescence of the glow-worm appears and disappears in the
 thickly enshrouding gloom.

Consciousness was not before my birth ; it will not be after

मेधानाञ्च प्रवृत्तिर्भवति नहि पुनः पुष्करं धावमानं
 नावच्छेदातिरिक्ते महति च परमे कल्पनीया प्रवृत्तिः ।
 चित्सिन्धावसीमे स्थितिजनविलयान् बुद्बुदा विश्वरूपा
 गच्छन्त्येवं महाविध न च जनिलयभाक् सुस्थिरः स्वे महिम्नि ॥ २० ॥

होतासौ यज्ञ एष स्थितमपि च हुतं तद् हविश्चैष मन्त्र
 इत्याद्याकारभेदैर्व्यवहरति जनः प्रायशश्चाध्वरेषु ।
 यज्ञो ब्रह्मैव पूर्णं तदपि सवहुतं तद् हविर्होतृमन्त्रा-
 वित्थं विज्ञानवह्नौ हि निखिलहवनं पूर्यते भस्मशेषम् ॥ २१ ॥

अपरश्च दृष्टान्तः । मेधानां हिः गतिर्भवति न च मेघसञ्चारभूमिभूतस्य ।
 महाकाशो न खलु धावते । सर्वावच्छेदातिरिक्ते परमे महति एव प्रवृत्तिः
 नैवानुसन्धेया । असीमे चित्समुद्रे विश्वरूपा बुद्बुदाः स्थितिजनविलयान् गच्छन्ति ।
 न च स्वयं महाविधः स्वे महिम्नि सुस्थिरः जनविलयभाग् भवति, विश्वानामेव
 उदरविलयाद्यवस्था भवन्ति न हि विश्वनाट्यमञ्चरूपस्य चिन्मात्रस्य । चिन्मात्ररूपं
 वस्तु देशकालादिसम्बन्धैरपरिच्छिन्नम् । अत्र विद्यते चात्र नास्ति, इदानीं विद्यते न
 तदानीमिति मननं वस्तुस्वरूपं न स्पृशति । भानांशेषु विषयेष्वेव एतेषां सम्बन्धानां
 अवकाशः । सम्बन्धस्तावदवच्छेदरूपः ॥ २० ॥

असौ यज्ञस्य होता, एषः यज्ञः, इदं हुतं हवनीयं वा स्थितं, एष मन्त्रः,
 इत्यादिभेदैरध्वरेषु व्यवहारो भवति । यज्ञो ब्रह्मैव पूर्णं तदपि हवनीयं तद् हविः
 होता मन्त्रश्च तदपि इत्थं विज्ञानवह्नौ प्रदीप्ते निखिलहवनक्रिया भस्मशेषं यथा तथा
 पूर्यते । निरवच्छिन्नब्रह्मवस्तुनि भेदव्यवहारः न सम्भवति । तस्मिन् प्रदीप्ते स्थिते
 भानहानोपादानलब्धानां होतृमन्त्रादिभेदानां कः अवसरः ? ॥ २१ ॥

my death. Even while I live, consciousness apparently dis-
 appears in profound sleep. In the state of swoon or that of
 extreme nervous exhaustion the stream of consciousness has its
 flow apparently cut off. These are our common ways of
 thinking regarding consciousness. But I ask : Is the sea itself
 contained in the small holes dug out by the hands of childhood
 in the sandy beach ?

Again and again modes of feeling appear and disappear in
 the ether of pure cognition. The placid, eternal ground of
 these modes is ignored, and what pertains to the modes them-
 selves is imposed on the ground which supports them. This is

ऊहे भानस्य धोर्मो भवति तु विकला सीदति त्रासतो गो-
रेकं वानेकमेतन्मम मननमिति व्यर्थतां याति तत्त्वे ।
माया तूहातिगे या जनयति विविधान् वारित नास्तीति तर्कान्
गूढे च ब्रह्मतत्त्वेऽपि किरति कलिलं दुस्तरं वाक्प्रपञ्चम् ॥ २२ ॥

अन्याशक्तिर्हि वल्लेः पृथगपि किरणा भास्कराद् वस्तु धर्मा-
दन्यः सिन्धोश्च वीचि-निवह इति मतिर्भानविश्लेषहेतोः ।
धर्मानां मार्जने किं वद विमलमते शिष्यते धर्मि वस्तु
को वल्लिर्यत्र दाहो दिनमणिरपि को यत्र न स्यान् मरीचिः ॥ २३ ॥

भानस्य चिन्तने मम धीर्विकला भवति, मम वाक् च त्रासात् सीदति, अवाङ्-
मनसगोचरत्वाद् वस्तुतत्त्वस्य । भानमेकं वा अनेकं वेति विकल्पोऽपि वस्तुतत्त्वे
वैयर्थ्यं याति, तस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वात् । ऊहातिगे वस्तुनि या एवं वास्ति नास्तीति
तर्कान् विविधरूपान् जनयति सैव माया । सा पुनः गूढे ब्रह्मतत्त्वेऽपि दुस्तरं गहनं
वाक्प्रपञ्चं किरति । वस्तुतस्तु न हि तत्त्वे तर्कादीनां प्रसरः, न चापि वाक्-
प्रपञ्चानां गतिः । पूर्ववत् परिच्छिन्नतत्त्वे एव धीर्गच्छति तमधिकृत्य गोश्च
प्रवर्तते । अपरिच्छिन्नं वस्तु निजबोधगम्यं अनुभवमात्रम् । बुद्धिवृत्तिभिः वाक्-
प्रवन्धैश्च तत्स्वरूपस्य हानं भवति इव । अतः न खलु तत्त्वं बुद्ध्या गिरावोपलभ्यते ।
बुद्धिस्तावद् हानोपादाननियमशृङ्खलिता । समग्रज्ञाने नास्या अधिकारः ॥ २२ ॥

वल्लेस्तस्य शक्तिरन्या, भास्करात्तस्य किरणः पृथक्, धर्मा वस्तुनः अन्ये,
वीचिनिवहः सिन्धोश्च अन्य इत्यादि कल्पना भानविश्लेषहेतोर्भवति । अविश्लिष्ट-
समग्रभानग्रहणे एव भेदः अप्राप्तः । धर्मसमूहस्य परिमार्जने किं धर्मि वस्तु
अवशिष्यते इति निरूप्यताम् । कोऽपि धर्मो नास्ति धर्मिमात्रं अस्त्येव एवं मनने
धर्मसमूहविसर्जने किं धर्मिमात्रं तिष्ठेत् ? को वल्लिर्यत्र दाहिका शक्तिर्नास्ति,
कः सूर्यो यत्र मरीचिर्न विद्यते इति प्रश्नो निरूप्यताम् । निखिलधर्मपरिहारे का
धर्मिमात्रस्य सत्ता ? ॥ २३ ॥

a mistake. In this way a man seated in a boat moving swiftly
down the Ganges may, looking at the array of trees on her banks,
fancy that the trees, not the river or the boat, are themselves
moving.

Practical living becomes possible only through such ignor-
ance of the concrete : otherwise it is not in one's power to live
his ordinary life. Life's all interests necessarily melt and cease

धर्माणामाश्रयः कः परिणामति गुणो वस्तुनिष्ठोऽपि नित्यं
द्रव्यं त्वास्ते तथैकं कथमिति नियमश्चेत् समष्टिगुणानाम् ।
तेषामन्योन्ययुक्तिः कथमपि च भवेच्छुद्धला वोपलम्भे
ब्रूमस्त्वेषां स्वभावाद् भवति हि नियमो द्रव्यमेकं न नाना ॥ २४ ॥

एवं द्रव्यं सदेकं खलु परममहच्चाश्रयस्तद् गुणानां
चिन्मात्रं मुत्स्वरूपं विपुलजलनिधावाश्रिता वीचिमाला ।
प्रत्येकं नेतिमनत्र घटपटनिवहश्चैव वस्तु स्वतन्त्रं
सच्चिद्भूमिप्रतिष्ठं निखिलमपि जगद् भूमिहीनं खपुष्पम् ॥ २५ ॥

ननु वस्तुनः गुणसमुच्चयमात्रत्वे बहवो दोषा स्यान् इति चेत्, न । किमाश्रयो
धर्मस्तिष्ठति ? वस्तुनिष्ठो गुणः नित्यं परिणामति परन्तु वस्तु तदेव तिष्ठति इति
व्यवहारः कथं यदि वस्तु गुणसमष्टिमात्रं भवेत् ? गुणानां परिवर्तने वस्तुन
एको भावो न खलु सम्भवति । गुणानां अन्योन्यसम्बन्धो वा कुतः जायते । अनुभूयते
एव वस्तुविशेषस्य गुणग्रामेषु परस्परसम्बन्धशुद्धला । इयन्तु कथं भवति यदि वस्तु
गुणसमष्टिमात्रं स्यात् ? इति परिप्रश्ने ब्रूमः गुणानां स्वभावादेव एष नियमः शुद्धला
च । स्वभावातिरिक्त-वस्तुस्वीकारे को लाभः, स्वभावमात्रस्वीकारे का वा हानिः ?
गुणातिरिक्तवस्तुद्वारा नियमो भवतीति सिद्धान्ते नियमः अबुद्ध एव तिष्ठति स्वभावेन
नियम इत्यत्रापि तथा । अतः परस्परशुद्धलितगुणसमूहातिरिक्त-वस्तुविशेषस्वीकारो
गौरवमेव ॥ २४ ॥

इदं द्रव्यमात्रं न निरासयति परन्तु घटघटादीन् द्रव्यविशेषान् । विशिष्टद्रव्य-
स्वीकारे न कोऽपि अनुरोधः । एकं अनिर्वचनीयं यद् वस्तु परममहदस्ति तदेव
निखिलगुणसमष्टिरूपस्य जगत ऐकान्तिक आश्रयः । तच्च चिदानन्दस्वरूपम् । विपुल-
जलनिधौ यद्बद् वीचिमाला आश्रिता तिष्ठति तद्बद् तस्मिन्ननिर्वचनीये वस्तुनि
जगदुपकरणाभूताः निखिला गुणास्तिष्ठन्ति । घटपटनिवहः प्रत्येकं स्वतन्त्रं वस्तु
इति न मन्तव्यम् । बहुवस्तुविशेषस्वीकारे न कापि प्रवला युक्तिः । निखिलमपि
जगत् सच्चिदानन्दभूमौ प्रतिष्ठितम् । यश्च अस्यां भूमौ न विद्यते तत् खपुष्पवत्
अलीकमेव ॥ २५ ॥

if it accepts nothing but the Ground and the All. The desire to have or shun proceeds from such partiality in particular sections of the concrete. What practical ends can the given All serve ? The vast ocean, the lord of the rivers, as a *whole* defies all our practical ends, while the water in a vessel is so practically useful to us.

जातश्चास्ते घटोऽयं विंशति लयमिति ज्ञानमेव प्रमाणं
 सच्चिद्भूमावबेता अपि सकलगुणा जातनाशक्रियाश्च ।
 धर्म्मा नासन् क्रियाश्चेतिनिगमनमपि प्रागभावे घटस्य
 सत्तामात्रं निरस्येन्नहि परममहन् नापि चान्ये ह्यभावाः ॥ २६ ॥
 आसीद् धर्म्मी न धर्म्मा उचितमिति भवेन्नैव सम्बन्धवाधात्
 सम्बन्धातीतमेकं हि परमसदिति ब्रूम आसीदवाच्यम् ।
 तत् सम्बन्धानतीत्यापि भजति धियि मे गीर्षु सम्बन्धकोटिं
 शुद्धं कालं न वाधयं खकुसुममपि तद् वस्तुभिः किं ह्यनेकैः ॥ २७ ॥

अयं घटः सञ्जातः, असौ तिष्ठति, स च लयं विंशति, इति ज्ञानमेव प्रमाणं यत्
 सच्चिद्भूमौ सकलगुणा जन्मनाशादिक्रियाश्च समवेताः । सकलगुणानां जाते एव
 ग्रहाणां सकलक्रियाणां तस्मिन्नेव निर्भरः । ज्ञानभूमिं विना गुणाः कुत्र सन्ति व्यापारा
 वा कुत्र भवन्ति । अतश्च चिन्मात्रस्यैव सर्वगुणक्रियाश्रयरूपत्वम् । घटस्य
 प्रागभावे तस्य धर्म्माः क्रिया वा नासन् इति सिद्धान्तोऽपि घटरूपवस्तुविशेषस्यैव
 सत्तां निरस्येत्, न तु सत्तामात्रं परममहत् । अन्ये ये अत्यन्तान्योन्यादयः
 अभावास्तेऽपि विशेषसत्तां अधिकुर्वन्ति न च परममहत् सत्तामात्रम् । अस्माकं मते
 तु घटपटादीनां वस्तुविशेषाणां स्वातन्त्र्यं न प्राप्तम् । यदा घटादीनां गुणाः क्रियाश्च
 न सन्ति तदा घटादयो विशेषा अपि न सन्ति । सत्तामात्रं तु देशकालादिसम्बन्धैर्न
 परिच्छिद्यते ॥ २६ ॥

धर्म-धर्मिणोः सम्बन्धो नियत एव । धर्माभावेऽपि धर्मी अस्तीत्युक्ते
 सम्बन्धवाधो भवति, धर्मान् विना धर्मिणः कल्पनायोग्यत्वात् । घटपटादीना-
 मुत्पत्तेः प्राक् एकं सम्बन्धातीतं परमसद् वस्तु आसीदित्येव ब्रूमः, तदपि निर्वक्तु-
 मशक्यम् । सम्बन्धातीतमपि तद् बुद्धिव्यापारेषु वाक्येषु च सम्बन्धावगाहित्वेन
 व्यपदिश्यते तच्च शुद्धं कालत्रयावाध्यञ्च वस्तु । खकुसुममपि तस्य विवर्तः । अनेकैः
 स्वनन्त्रैर्वस्तुभिर्न किमपि प्रयोजनम् ॥ २७ ॥

The unbounded sky as a *whole* cannot further any of our ordinary practical ends. When it is bounded as a vessel or as a house it is useful to us. An idol made of gross sugar is placed in a building made of salt : where will it be and its temple when waters flood the whole universe ? The idol is our practical man and its temple is our practical life ; universal flood is the complete acceptance of the Fact itself.

The limitless vastness of the Given ever remains and it

अस्तीत्युक्ते गृहीतं सकलमपि जगद् वास्तवं कल्पितञ्च
 वृक्षोऽस्तीति प्रयोगे ह्यवयवनिवहा आनुगत्येन चाप्ताः ।
 भातीतुक्ते समाप्तं स्फुरति मनसि यद् ज्ञानवृत्तञ्च किञ्चिद्
 भानुर्भातीति वाकेऽ हि किरणपटला वस्तुगत्या गृहीताः ॥ २८ ॥

एका संविद् विशुद्धा भवति किमपरा शक्तिराद्यति तस्या
 जिज्ञासायां प्रसक्ता भवति मम पुनर्वस्तुविश्लेषरीतिः ।
 निर्वाचं नैव तत्त्वं निगमयति न धोस्तत्र सिद्धान्तमेकं
 भेदो वाऽभेद एष प्रकृतिपुरुषयोर्भेदतो वाऽपृथक्त्वम् ॥ २९ ॥

कल्पितं वास्तवञ्च सकलमपि जगदस्तिताया अन्तर्गतं भवति । देवदत्तो
 व्यवहारिकत्वेन अस्ति रज्जुसर्पः प्रातिभासिकत्वेन च अस्ति, इति उभयत्र अस्ति-
 तामात्रस्य समानमानुगत्यम् । वृक्षोऽस्तीति कथित वृक्षावयवसमूहा आनुगत्येन प्राप्ता
 भवन्ति । एकस्य पारमार्थिकस्यैव अस्तितामात्रस्य विश्वराज्यं विवर्त्तो भवति ।
 एवञ्च भातीत्युक्ते मनोवृत्तयः सर्वा आनुगत्येन गृहीता भवन्ति । मनसि वृत्तिस्फूर्ति-
 रेकस्यैव चिन्मात्रस्य प्रकाशः । प्रकाशसामानेऽ प्रकाशविशेषा हि समाप्ताः । भानु-
 र्भातीत्युक्ते किरणपटलानां स्वातन्त्र्येऽपि कथनं निष्प्रयोजनम्, भानोः प्रकाश एव
 किरणपटलानां प्रकाशः ॥ २८ ॥

आद्याशक्तिः किं शुद्धज्ञानादपरा भवति ? किं चिदाकाश एकं तत्त्वं
 महाशक्तिश्च अपरमिति जिज्ञासायामेव मम वस्तुविश्लेषस्वभावः प्रवर्त्तते । मम बुद्धी
 वस्तुनः खण्डशो ग्रहणमेव भवति न साकलेन । एवं खण्डशो ग्रहणमेव जीवबुद्धे-
 नियमः । वस्तुतस्तु तत्त्वं विचारैर्निर्वाचं न भवति । बुद्धिस्तत्र न कमपि एकं
 स्थिरं सिद्धान्तं निगमयति । आद्याशक्तिश्चिदाकाशाद् भिन्ना अभिन्ना वा अथवा
 तयोः सम्बन्धः भेदाभेरूपः ? ॥ २९ ॥

appears as though it were broken by pulses of feeling. The practical definitions and ends of things are served by such appearance ; if the Given were taken in its entirety these definitions and ends would not be there at all. Who can live his ordinary life and pursue his ordinary ends in the consciousness of the All without practical ignorance and abstraction ? The rivulet may rush between her rocky bounds ; but where and how will the limitless sea itself move ?

The clouds move but not the sky itself ; no movement can be thought of in relation to the absolutely Great, which exceeds

निर्व्वक्तुं यन्न शक्यं यदपि वितनुते भानरूपञ्च भूयोऽ-
वच्छेदो यस्य न स्याद् घनमिति कथितं वस्तु तत् सार्व्वभौमम् ।
विश्लिष्यास्योपलम्भे यदिति च विहितं ज्ञेयमेतत् स वोद्धा
कर्त्ता भोक्तेतिरूपैर्बाधहरति च ना प्रत्ययो यत्तदेव ॥ ३० ॥

सा मायाऽज्ञानरूपेव जनयति घनं प्रत्ययं नित्यसिद्ध-
मेवं स्यातां प्रयोगे विषयविषयिणी सर्व्वसम्बन्धभाजौ ।
सम्बन्धश्छेदरूपः स च पुनरवधिर्मायिको भूम्नि नित्येऽ-
तीत्यैवं विद्यते सत् सकलपरिकरान् भोग्यमेतन्न भोक्तृ ॥ ३१ ॥

यत्तत्त्वं निर्व्वक्तुं न शक्यं, यदपि भानरूपेण भूयो वितनुते, यस्यावच्छेदः
सम्बन्धैर् न भवेत्, तत् सार्व्वभौमं वस्तु घनमित्याख्यायते । विश्लिष्टं बुद्धावुपलम्भे
यच्च ज्ञेयमेतत् स वोद्धा कर्त्ता भोक्तेतिप्रकारैः व्यवहर्ह्यते तस्य प्रत्यय इत्याख्या ।
घनस्य न व्यवहारो सम्भवति । विश्लेषरीत्या घनस्य खण्डशोघहणे सति तस्मिन्
व्यवहारः सम्भवति । एवञ्च ज्ञेयं न घनं भवति परन्तु प्रत्ययमात्रम् । वोद्धा
कर्त्ता भोक्तेति सर्व्वे प्रत्ययाः भवन्ति । घने किञ्चिदपि निरूपणं नास्ति प्रत्यये तच्च
सम्भवत्येव । निरूपणं तावदन्योन्यसंपर्कख्यातिः ॥ ३० ॥

ननु स्वतःसिद्धस्य घनस्य प्रत्ययरूपता कथं भवति ? अनिर्व्वचनीयतत्त्वस्य
ज्ञातृज्ञेयादिसम्बन्धावगाहः केन सम्पाद्यते ? इत्यत्र अज्ञानरूपा माया एव जनयतीति
ब्रूमः । अज्ञानेन घनत्वेऽपि त्वघनत्वमुपलभ्यते । एवं सति व्यवहारेषु विषय-
विषयिणी सग्राताम् । एतावेव सर्व्वसम्बन्धभाजौ भवतः । विषयविषयिसम्बन्धे
प्राप्ते हि सकलसम्बन्धानां ज्ञातृज्ञेयादिरूपाणां उपस्थितिः । सम्बन्धस्तावदवच्छेद-
रूपः । नित्यपरमसत्स्वरूपे वस्तुनि स च अवधिः पुनरज्ञानकल्पित एव भवति ।
सद्वस्तु च सकलपरिवारानतीत्य विद्यते । नेदं भोम्यं न च भोक्तृ । इमे च
प्रत्ययौ भवतः ॥ ३१ ॥

all bounds. In the unbounded sea of awareness bubbles, which
are our universes, appear and disappear ; they come and go. But
the sea, satisfied in its own greatness, can neither come nor go,
neither appear nor disappear.

Here is the sacrificer ; here is the object of sacrifice ; and
this is the text and form (incantation) for making the sacrifice.
These distinctions are generally essential in the making of a
sacrifice. But with the consciousness that the sacrifice is no-
thing else than the Fact, that the object, the agent and the instru-

बोधाकाशं स्वजन्ते प्रकृतिबिकृतयस्तत्र मूलं निदान-
 माद्याशक्तिरवाचत्रा प्रकृतिरियमपि प्रत्ययश्चिन्मयी च ।
 तिस्रो धारा भजन्ती पुनरपि विपुला विश्वनिर्माणीलीलो-
 ल्लासादेकाऽहरन्ती क्षिपति किमपरा चान्यया वै जुगुप्सा ॥ ३२ ॥

धाराणां किं पृथक्त्वं पुनरिति विषये नैव भेदोऽस्ति बाच्य-
 मेकस्या बोधसिद्धौ विहितमपरयोः साहचर्य्यं हि नित्यम् ।
 भावास्तत्राह्नियन्ते कथय किमचले वस्तुनीति प्रदीपे
 यस्मिन्नाहार एवं स्तिमितमिव हि तत् क्षिप्तमेवाहृतञ्च ॥ ३३ ॥

उपादानरूपा प्रकृतिः परिणामरूपा विकृतयश्च चिदाकाशे अध्यस्तास्तिष्ठन्ति ।
 उपादानपरिणामानां मूलीभूतं निदानं अनिर्व्वचनीया आद्याशक्तिः सा चिन्मयी इयं
 उपादानभूता प्रकृतिर्भवति परिणामभूतः प्रत्ययश्च भवति । तस्यामुभययोरेव
 मूलमनुसन्धेयम् । विश्वनिर्माणीलीलोल्लासात् सा विपुला आद्याशक्तिः तिस्रो धाराः
 भजन्ती विराजमाना । एकया आहारः अन्यया विक्षेपणं अपरया पुनरावरणं
 भवति । एवञ्च महाशक्ते स्त्रेधा प्रवृत्तिः ॥ ३२ ॥

धाराणां प्रागुक्तानां पृथक्त्वं किं भवति इति प्रश्ने नैव ऐकान्तिको भेदोऽस्तीति
 वाच्यम् । अपरयोः सङ्गतिं विना एकस्या बोधोऽपि न सम्भवति । एका अपरे
 अपेक्षते । वस्तुनि अचले निर्व्विकारे च सति किं तत्र भावा आह्नियन्ते ?
 कस्मिंश्चिद् वस्तुनि गुणानामाहारस्तस्य परिवर्त्तनं खलु अपेक्षते । एवं यस्मिन्
 भावानां आहारो भवति तच्च स्तिमितमिव स्यात् । तस्मिन् स्वभावे दीप्यमाने सति
 न किञ्चित् परिवर्त्तनं तत्र सम्भवति । परिवर्त्तनेन एकस्य वस्तुनः अस्तगमन
 अपरस्य च उदयो भवति । वस्तु तावद् गुणसमष्टिरूपम् । यच्च आहतं तद्
 विक्षिप्तमुपनीतं वा भवति ॥ ३३ ॥

ment are also the same, all distinctions, so essential to practice,
 are consumed and reduced to ashes as it were by the fire of
 consummation. The sacrifice is the symbol of practical living.

In thinking of the Concrete my understanding is puzzled ;
 my voice is silenced into awe. As regards the concrete itself,
 all my musings as to whether it is one or many, and so on, are
 reduced to impotence. It is the Veil which casts on the un-
 thinkable Fact itself such doubts and thoughts as to its existence
 or non-existence ; and covers the unsoundable depths of the
 nature of the Fact with such inextricable paralogisms and

ज्ञानेऽस्माकं घटोऽयं स्तिमितमिव भवेद् भानमेतत्तु विश्व-
 मायातो बोधवृत्तं घट इति विहिते किञ्चिदस्ति प्रयातम् ।
 द्रव्ये द्रष्टा निमग्नः स्वयमपि च हरेद् द्रव्यमेवं स्ववद्धः
 ख्यातावख्यातिरेवं गमयति सुतरां दुस्तरां कां जुगुप्साम् ॥ ३४ ॥
 तिस्रो धारा वहन्ती जनयति विविधान् माञ्च युष्मांश्च सर्वान्
 भानच्छेदादहन्ताऽपि पुनरनियता नैकजीवोऽत एव ।
 सिन्धावावर्त्तरूपा भवति ममताऽव्याप्तिरेवं समस्ते
 नैक्यं वास्याप्यनैक्यं कथयितुमुचितं नापि जीवत्वमस्य ॥ ३५ ॥

यदा घटोऽयमिति अस्माकं ज्ञानं भवति तदा विश्वं भानं स्तिमितमबगुणित-
 मिव भवेत् । इदन्तु निजप्रत्ययगम्यम् । घटो बोधवृत्तमायात इति विहिते किञ्चिद्
 वस्तु बोधात् प्रयातमित्यपि गृह्यते । ज्ञाने कस्य उदयो हि पूर्वस्यास्तगमन-
 मपेक्षते । द्रष्टा यदा दृश्ये गाढमभिनविशते तदा स्थितमपि स्वं नोपलभते ।
 दृश्याभिनवेशे द्रष्टारामविस्मृतिः । एवञ्च आत्मन्यभिनवेशे द्रव्यस्य स्थितस्यापि
 अवगुण्ठनं भवति । इयमेव ख्यातावपि अख्यातिः । अनया च विश्वशक्तिप्रवाहे एका
 दुस्तरा जुगुप्सरूपा धारा निर्व्वचनीया भवति । इत्थं तिसृणां धाराणां अन्यान्यापेक्षा
 प्रदर्शिता ॥ ३४ ॥

सा विश्वशक्तिस्तिसृभिर्धाराभिः प्रवहन्ती माञ्च युष्मांश्च विविधान् सर्वान्
 जनयति । ननु भानसाकल्यग्रहणे एकजीववादः प्रसजेत इति चेत्, न । भान-
 स्यावच्छेदादेव अहन्ता, अहमस्मीति बोधः सम्भवति । नहि भानं निखिलमहमिति-
 पदवाच्यम् । भाने अहन्ता पुनरपि नियता न दृश्यते । कदाचिदेव भानमहन्ताव-
 च्छिन्नं भवति । अतएव जीवो न एकः किन्तु बहवः । विपुले सिन्धौ आवर्त्तवत्
 अपरिच्छिन्नविश्वशक्तिप्रवाहे ममता कदाचिद् दृश्यते । सिन्धौ आवर्त्तवच्च समस्ते
 तत्त्वे नास्याः व्याप्तिः । एवं भानस्य जीवत्वं निरस्तम् । ऐक्यं अनैक्यञ्च एवं
 भाने निरसनीयम् । न तावत् भानमेकं नाप्यनेकं परन्तु अनिर्व्वचनीयम् ॥ ३५ ॥

antinomies of verbiage.

The power of the fire is distinct from it ; the glow of the sun is distinct from him ; the waves of the sea are distinct from the sea : these conceptions are due to the abstraction of the concrete. Tell me what remains over when all the so-called attributes are taken away from the substance ; what the fire is apart from its light and heat ; what the sun is apart from his splendour.

अस्मीत्युक्ते गृहीतं न हि परममहत् किन्तु बस्त्वंशमात्रं
संस्कारैर्नीयमानो व्यवहरति यथा प्रत्ययोऽस्मिन्तथैव ।
त्वं वाहं बौध इत्थं ग्रहणमपि मया नित्यसम्पूर्णतत्त्वेऽ-
वच्छेदं कर्मसूत्रैर्घटयति कमपि ब्रह्ममूढो हि जीवः ॥ ३६ ॥

स्वप्नो मे सर्वमेतन् मनसि वितनुते विश्वराज्यं विशालं
देशो वा काल एष प्रकृतिविकृतयः शेरते स्वप्नगर्भे ।
संसारो जीवसंघः पुनरपि विविधा ब्रह्मवैवर्त्तचिन्ते-
त्येवं चित्सिन्धुलग्ने सतनुपरिसरे बुद्बुदे कीटस्वप्नः ॥ ३७ ॥

एतदेव स्फुटयति । अस्मीत्युक्ते परममहत् न खलु गृहीतं भवति, किन्तु तस्यांशमात्रम् । अहन्ता तत्त्वपरिच्छेदरूपा । किम्भूतोऽयं परिच्छेदः ? संस्कारैर्नीयमानेन जीवेन व्यवहारानुरूपाः प्रत्यया गृह्यन्ते नहि जीवबुद्धौ सर्वथा तत्त्वस्य प्रत्ययो भवति । परन्तु व्यवहारानुरोधेन हि जीवप्रत्यया निर्मम्यन्ते । यस्य यद्विधाः संस्कारास्तस्य तद्विधाः प्रत्यया भवन्ति । नित्यपरिपूर्णतत्त्वे त्वं वा अहं वा एष वा इत्थं मया ग्रहणं तत्तत्प्रकारकं अवच्छेदं घटयति । अत्रापि संस्कारपरिचालितं कर्मभूतमेव कारणम् । ब्रह्मबिस्मृतिरेव जीवत्वम् ॥ ३६ ॥

ननु एतत् सर्वं मदीयस्वप्नकल्पितम् । विशालं विश्वराज्यं मनस्येव वितनुते मनसो बाह्यं किमपि न भवति । देशकालौ मनोगर्भस्थितावेव । प्रकृतिः विकृतयश्च सर्वाः स्वप्नगर्भे शेरते । अयं जीवसंघः इयं संसृतिः, पुनरपि विचित्रा ब्रह्मवैवर्त्तचिन्ता एवमेव स्वप्नगर्भे तिष्ठन्ति । भानं तावदेको विराट्स्वप्नः । इति चेत्, न । चित्सिन्धुसंलग्ने तनुपरिसरे बुद्बुदे विहरतः कीटस्य स्वप्नवत् एष स्वप्नः । न हि चित्सिन्धुः स्वयं स्वप्नसम्भूतः । यथा च विक्षेपावरणशक्त्या बुद्बुदो जीवप्रत्यरूपो जायते न सापि स्वप्नसम्भूतेति निश्चयः ॥ ३७ ॥

If you ask : What is the support of the attributes ? An attributes in a thing is changing but the thing is taken to be the same : how is this if the thing is nothing more than the aggregate of its attributes ? What gives mutual connections to the attributes of a thing ? Why is there such an order of attributes and their relations in our apprehensions of things ? Do not all these presuppose a ground and a nucleus ? I reply : They need not ; attributes may co-inhere and correlate by themselves ; the assumption of a ground does not render the matter at all intelligible. Substance is one (or alogical) and not many.

संज्ञा भाने न लब्धा परिमितिरुदधौ वाम्बरे वेव काले
 स्वारूप्यं लक्षणोयं न भवति महतो लक्षणं वै तटस्थम् ।
 बुद्ध्या वाचा च लक्षणं यदपि भवति मे तन्न भानं तु पूर्णं
 बुद्धिर्मे वाधरूपा निगडमपि च वाङ् नैव धृष्यं हि ताभ्याम् ॥ ३८ ॥
 जीवो ब्रह्मेति वाक्ये कथितमकथितं लक्षणं जीव बीजं
 वेति प्राप्ते विचारो निगमयति पुनस्तत्र सिद्धान्तमेकम् ।
 जीवत्वं नैव तत्त्वं भवति निरवधिर्जीव एव प्रबोधे
 मुञ्चन्नेवं हि पाशान् स्वमपि च विरहाल्लक्षणानाञ्च तत्त्वम् ॥ ३९ ॥

ननु भानस्य का संज्ञा भवेत् ? यथा महोदधेरम्बरस्य वा कालस्य वा परिमितिर्न लब्धा तथा भानस्यापि न । न किमप्यस्य स्वरूपलक्षणं विद्यते । एकत्वविपुलत्वादिकञ्च लक्षणं तटस्थमेव । बुद्ध्या वाचा च यत् किञ्चिल्लक्षणोयं भवति तन्न पूर्णं भानम् । बुद्धिस्तावद्वाधरूपा । निर्वाधतत्त्वे न तस्या अवकाशः । यच्च देशेन कालेन कार्यकारणसम्बन्धेन वा अवच्छिन्नं तदेव बुद्धिलभ्यं भवेत् । वागपि शृङ्खलरूपा भवति । अत्राङ्गमनसगोचरं तु वस्तु ॥ ३८ ॥

जीवो ब्रह्मेति प्रसङ्गे किं जीवत्वस्य लक्षणमिति तच्च लक्षणं जीवब्रह्मणो-स्तादात्म्यं वाधयति न वेति प्राप्ते विचार एकं सिद्धान्तं निगमयति । जीवत्वं न तत्त्वं भवति तस्य व्यवहारिकावच्छेदरूपत्वात् । तत्त्वमेव पारमार्थिकं तत्र न कोऽप्यवच्छेदः । चिदाभासो हि जीवश्चिदाकाशो ब्रह्म । तयोर्विम्बप्रतिविस्वरूपयोर्ब्रह्मजीवयोः सम्बन्धो वेदान्तेषु श्रुतो भवति । प्रतिविम्बाद् विस्वस्य यो भेदः स एवोपाधिः । प्रबोधे जीवो निरवधिर्भवति । प्रबोधस्तु मायावरणोन्मोचनात् खरूपख्यातिः । तस्मिन् जीवः सर्वान् पाशान् स्वयन्तावच्छेदञ्च मुञ्चन्नितरव्यावर्तकलक्षणानां विरहात्तत्त्वमेव भवति ॥ ३९ ॥

Thus the ground is one ; it is absolutely vast ; it supports the attributes as the shoreless sea supports the waves tossing on it. Its nature is pure consciousness and bliss. This thing and that thing need not be taken as a separate substance or ground. The whole universe is grounded on consciousness and being ; or rather being-consciousness-bliss appears as the universe. Anything not thus grounded is a non-entity.

The very known fact this thing is or *disappears* shows all attributes and processes must be grounded in feeling-being. The thought or belief that its attributes were not before its appearance

याद्याशक्तिः प्रसूते निखिलमपि जगज् जाड्यचैतन्यभिन्नं
 यस्याः स्निग्धप्रवाहे स्फुटितकिसलयो भान्ति कल्याणवृक्षाः ।
 शुद्धो भक्तिप्रसादः सुललितमधुरं प्रेम यस्या विलासः
 सा किं जाड्यस्वरूपा प्रकृतिरियमचिद् भानकल्याणगर्भा ॥ ४० ॥

दिव्ये वृक्षे हि जातं गरलमधुमयं भोग्यमेवञ्च नाना
 ज्योतिर्ध्वान्तञ्च विश्वे प्रकृतिपरिणतौ पौर्णमासी तमिस्रा ।
 स्निग्धा पृथ्वी प्रसन्ना भवति जलमुचो वारिसेकैरिदानीं
 शीर्णतियुग्मा च भानोः खरकरनिकरैर्धूलिपूर्णा कदाचित् ॥ ४१ ॥

या आद्याशक्तिः जाड्यचैतन्यभिन्नं निखिलं जगत् प्रसूते ; यस्याः स्निग्धप्रवाहे कल्याणवृक्षाः फलमुकुलकुसुमैः शोभन्ते ; शुद्धा भक्तिः ललितमधुरञ्च प्रेम यस्या विलासो भवति ; सा किं जडा अथवा चिन्मयी ? ज्ञानकल्याणधर्मा यस्या गर्भे निहिता वर्द्धन्ते सा किं जाड्यस्वरूपा प्रकृतिः स्यात् ? नितान्तं किं कार्य्येभ्यः कारणं भिन्नम् ? कारणधर्माः कार्य्येषु किं न संक्रामन्ति ? ज्ञानकल्याणगुणा यस्या प्रवाहे समुत्पद्यन्ते सा किं स्वयं विपरीतधर्मेर्लक्षिता स्यात् ? जगन्निदाने जाड्यमकल्याणमयत्वेन प्रसक्तं भवति, किं स्यादस्य सङ्गतिरित्येव जिज्ञासा ॥ ४० ॥

विश्ववृक्षे भोग्यरूपाणि यानि फलानि जातानि तानि गरलमयानि मधुमयानि च भवन्ति । विश्वे पुनः ज्योतिर्ध्वान्तञ्च उभे दृश्येते । प्रकृतिपरिणामे कदाचित् पौर्णमासी चन्द्रकोज्ज्वला कदाचित्वा अमावस्यायां गाढतिमिरावगुण्ठिता रजनी । कदाचित् जगच्चक्रविवर्तनाद् वर्षासु आगतासु नवजलधरवारिसेकैर्धरित्री स्निग्धा प्रसन्ना च भवति । एतद् विश्वशक्तेः कस्याणरूपत्वम् । कदाचित् पुनः निदाघे प्रखरमार्तण्डमयूखसमूहैः शीर्णा उग्रा पृथ्वी धूलिपूर्णा भवति । एषा तु विश्वशक्तेर-कल्याणमूर्तिः ॥ ४१ ॥

can disprove not pure being or consciousness as such but only individual and pragmatic existence of a thing before its birth. What we practically take as existence is particular existence and not is-ness as such. Other kinds of non-existence are also practical and individual non-existence.

It should not be said of course that the substance existed where there were no attributes, for substance and attribute are correlatives and we cannot have the one without the other. But we say that an absolute reality beyond all determinations (which we cannot call a substance) and undefinable existed.

वैषम्ये वैपरीतेषु च सति कथमहं त्वेकधा चिन्तयामि
 धर्माः कल्याणरूपा इति पुनरितरे नासते मूलशक्तौ ।
 नावच्छेत्तुं समर्थो भवति गुणचयश्चाशुभस्तां शुभो वा
 धर्माधर्मौ प्रवृत्तौ तत अपि न हि तामामृतः स्वीयभावैः ॥ ४२ ॥
 धर्मा न स्युनिरस्ता अपि तु गुणचया मूलशक्तेः प्रवाहाः
 कल्याणी सापि घोरा जगति च निहिता नात्र विश्वैरियता ।
 चिद्रूपा सापि मूढा निखिलगुणमयी नावधिस्तत्र धर्मै-
 र्वुद्धाऽऽशक्या ग्रहीतुं प्रकृतिरपि परा कूपवद्धः किमग्निः ॥ ४३ ॥

एवं जगति गुणानां वैषम्यं सर्वथा दृष्टं, कदाचिद् वा तेषामन्योन्यवैपरीत्यमपि ।
 एवञ्च सति कथमहं एकधैव चिन्तयामि ? कल्याणरूपा धर्मा पव मूलशक्तौ
 तिष्ठन्ति न तु अकल्याणरूपा इतरे इत्यभ्युपगमः कथं सम्भवति ? किं तर्हि मूलशक्तौ
 कल्याणगुणा अपि अकल्याणगुणान् निवार्यन्ते ? अत्रैवं मीमांसा, शुभाशुभागुण-
 समूहेनसिद्धा अवच्छेदः सम्पाद्यते इति । सा तु अनिर्बन्धनीया शुभाशुभागुण-
 समूहबीजरूपा । धर्माधर्मौ ततः प्रवृत्तावपि नहि तां स्वीयभावैरामृतः ।
 नहि तस्यैः पुण्यरूपत्वेन इयता, न चाप्यपुण्यरूपत्वेन ॥ ४२ ॥

न हि अनेन मूलशक्तौ धर्माणां निराशो भवति । अपितु सर्वे एव गुणाः
 शुभांशुभरूपास्तस्यैः प्रवाहे ओतप्रोतास्तिष्ठन्ति । सा कल्याणी अपि घोरा । जगति
 सा निहिता, परन्तु न हि तस्यैः स्तस्मिन् समाप्तिरियता वा । विश्वव्यापिनी अपि सा
 विश्वातिगा । एवं सा चिद्रूपापि मूढा, निखिलगुणमयी अपि गुणैर्नावच्छिन्ना ।
 एतच्च तत्त्वं परमप्रकृतिस्वरूपसम्बन्धि बुद्ध्या ग्रहीतुमशक्यमेव । अपि किं महाग्निः
 कूपवद्धो भवेत् ? ॥ ४३ ॥

That unconditioned being apparently enters into relations from the point of view of my understanding and speech. It is pure and above Time ; it appears even as the flower blooming in the void (an illusion). There is no need for many such beings.

Is-ness contains within it the whole universe both true and imagined. To say that the tree exists is to say by implication that the sum of its limbs also exists. Manifestation includes whatever particular experiences appear in the mind. To say that the sun shines is to say necessarily that his luminous rays exist in or make that shine. Hence is-ness and manifestation remain as the ground of the world.

व्युत्थाने विश्वरूपा विगलितविषया चिन्मयी सा समाधौ
 साकारा बिन्दुभावेऽपि तु निरवयवा नादभावेऽप्रमेया ।
 जीवोऽस्या बिन्दुभावो निरवधिरचलो नादभावस्तु बोधो
 नादत्वं बिन्दुभावाद् गमयति किमतो ध्यानतो मोक्षसिद्धिः ॥ ४४ ॥

बिन्दुत्वं बन्ध एवं भवति सुखघनं हर्षशोकादिभिन्नं
 दृष्टेरान्धस्य भेदस्तिमिरकिरणयोरिच्छद्घने स्वप्रकाशे ।
 बन्धोऽनिर्व्विच्य एवाग्रहणमपि सति खयातिसत्त्वेऽपलापो
 मोक्षो बिन्दुत्वनाशे परमनिरवधिः सच्चिदानन्दभावः ॥ ४५ ॥

सा आद्याशक्तिर्जीवव्यवहारदशायां विश्वरूपा प्रवहति । एवञ्च असग्रा ज्ञानं व्युत्थानम् । निर्व्विकल्पे समाधौ तु सा प्रविगलितविषयविशेषा चिन्मयी भवति । एकत्र तसग्रा विषयरूपता अन्यत्र तु चिद्रूपतेति । एवञ्च नादसग्रा केन्द्रीभावे सा परिच्छिन्नस्वरूपा साकारा, घनभावे तु अपरिच्छिन्नत्वान् निरवयवा अप्रमेया च । घनभावस्तु नादभावः । बिन्दुभावे स प्रवाहः केन्द्रोपलक्षितः । असग्रा बिन्दुभावो हि जीवत्वम् । नादभावस्तु निरवधिरचलश्च बोध एव । किञ्च पुनः बिन्दुरूपं जीवभावात् नादरूपं ब्रह्मभावं गमयति ? ध्यानमिति । ध्यानं तावदपरिच्छिन्ना-परोक्षानुभूतिरूपम् । अनेन हि मोक्षसिद्धिः ॥ ४४ ॥

बिन्दुत्वमेव जीवस्य वन्धनम् । केन्द्रत्वेनोपलक्षितत्वात् सुखघनस्वरूपं तत्त्वं हर्षशोकादिभिर्बहुधा भिद्यते इव । नादभावे नित्यमेव सुखघनरूपत्वम् । उपलक्षण-भेद-भेदव्यवहारग्रन्थिः । एवं चोपलक्षणात् स्वप्रकाशे चिद्घने आन्ध्यस्य दृष्टेर्भेद-स्तिमिरकिरणयोर्ज्ञानाज्ञानरूपयोश्च भेदो भवति । बन्धस्वरूपमपि अनिर्व्विच्यम् । भावेऽपि अग्रहणं खयातिसत्त्वेऽपि अपवादो वा इत्येव बन्धस्य उपलक्षणस्य वा तटस्थलक्षणम् । वन्धापनये मोक्षः, स च परमनिरवधिः सच्चिदानन्दभावः ॥ ४५ ॥

If I ask : Is the Ether of Awareness *one* principle, and is the Universal Stress *another*?— I fall into the vice of abstracting from the concrete. The Fact is inscrutable ; understanding can lead to no one sure conclusion regarding it. Are the aspects of awareness and stress different, or are they one ? Or is this a relation of one-ness in difference ?

But though inscrutable it is not unknowable ; the Fact in its essence is manifestation or awareness as such. If we take it in its vast, unbounded concreteness, it may be called *Ghana* or Fact-Stuff. If however we dissect it in living and break it up

निर्बीजो यो समाधिः परमशिवमयो निर्विकल्पश्च तस्मात्
 शुद्धं रागात्मकं किं मधुरघनरसं प्रेमभिन्नं भवेत् ।
 भेदो न प्रेमभावे रस इति रसभृग् रागचिन्ता न रागो
 नो देशो नैव कालो भवति रसमये भोग्यमन्यच्च भोक्तुः ॥ ४६ ॥

परमशिवमयो यो निर्बीजो निर्विकल्पो वा समाधिस्तत्र शुद्धज्ञानमेव वस्तु ।
 तस्मात् किं नु शुद्धं रागात्मकं मधुरघनरसं प्रेम भिन्नं भवेत् ? प्रेमरसनिमग्नः
 समाधिमग्नात् किं भिद्यते ? रागभावस्तु समाधिरेव । रागभावो रागचिन्ताया
 अनग्नो भवति । भेदमूलका हि रागचिन्ता । रागभावे सर्वथा भेदापगमो भवति ।
 रसभृग् रस एव भवति । रसमये तस्मिन् देशो वा कालो वा न विद्यते । तस्मिन्
 भोग्यं भोक्तुर्न अन्यत् । निरवच्छिन्नरसमयत्वमेव रागभावः । एवं न तस्य
 ज्ञानसमाधेः वस्तुतः पृथक्त्वमिति ॥ ४६ ॥

into such poles as Object and Subject, Doer and Enjoyer, and so on, through practical interests, it may be called *Pratyaya* or Fact-Section or Polarized Fact or Pragmatic Fact.

It is the Veil of Ignorance which apparently makes the Fact-
 Stuff (*Ghana*), though ever given, a sectional and pragmatic fact. Hence there arises practically the distinction of Subject and Object which is the basis of all relations. A relation is a determination. The eternally given All is however not limited by it really but only apparently. The Real therefore exists transcending all appendages ; it is neither the thing enjoyed nor the enjoyer— neither the thing lived nor the liver, but Life itself.

The primordial Cause and its effects are laid over the Ether of Awareness. What is the root of this twofold manifestation ? It is the universal Stress which appears both as the stuff and its differentiations, and which is at the same time awareness also. The Stress overflows into three main currents, each vast in itself : these represent the creative impulse of divine ecstasy. One presents, another moves and the last veils.

Are the three currents of the outburst distinct and separate ? To this I must reply that there is no real separateness. In the understanding of one the other two must necessarily be presupposed. So long as a thing is quiescently and unflinchingly given nothing can be presented ; hence presentation in a thing implies its change and movement ; it also implies its veiling.

When we know a particular star the whole given universe of Fact becomes veiled. A star has been presented in knowledge means that something else has gone out of it. Similarly when seer is deeply merged in the sight he is veiled himself ; when again the seer is warmly engaged in himself, the sight is veiled. All this goes to show the working of an inscrutable Veil which means ignorance or non-acceptance of what is given.

Overflowing into these three currents the World-Stress produces you, me and all. The Fact is determined practically when it is referred to a *me*-centre. Such reference again is not constant. Hence the Fact cannot be identified with and restricted to the *me*. The *me* is like an eddy in a vast sea ; so that it does not cover the sea itself. We cannot say either that the Fact is one or that it is many ; nor can we say that it is individual.

When I say "I am" I accept not the unbounded Fact itself but only a section of it : such knowledge is a practical definition of the Fact. The root-impulses working in an individual centre determine the nature of such practical definition ; hence a centre accepts according to its peculiar constitution. When I accept this as myself, that as yourself, and so on, I define the ever-full Given by practical interests. Hence the individual is but the Fact ignored and unaccepted.

Shall I regard all this as *my* dream ? Shall I suppose that the wide universe is given only in my imagination ? Time, Space, Cause and its Effects, do all these lie in the womb of this colossal dream ? The world-process, the world of living things, all the thought of varied world-evolution, do all these lie in the same womb ? Verily, it is the dream of an insect living in a bubble blown on the bosom of the ocean of awariness !

No definition can be offered of the Given : it fails even as all measurements fail in the shoreless sea, in the unbounded Space and Time. The conception that we form of the Fact is pragmatically rather than actually correct. Whatever is capable of being defined by thought and speech must be a section only of the Fact. Thought is essentially a limitation ; speech is necessarily a fetter. The Fact is not compromised by either.

Is the Individual the Fact ? In this question we must

ascertain whether it is to be taken with or without its mark or principle of individuality. Here reflection must lead to only one answer. Individuality is not Fact-ness. When the individual in acentric intuition becomes itself unbounded, casts off its limitations and even itself, it is the Fact, because it has ceased to be an individual.

That universal Stress who overflows as the world varied as conscious and unconscious ; in whose genial flood the Tree of Good blossoms forth into virgin leaves ; the placid peace of Devotion and the tender sweetness of Love are parts of whose divine outburst ; can she in herself be only the dead unconsciousness of a blind Nature, though she contains in her womb both Light and Good ?

Fruits of enjoyment, both sweet and bitter, are produced variously in the World-plant. Light and shade mingle as it were in the universe. The revolving wheel of cosmic process brings sometimes a sweet moonlit night, and sometimes a night over which a thick veil of darkness has been drawn. Sometimes the earth is soothed and moistened by the rains, and sometimes she is dry and shrunk up and dust-covered by the scorching rays of the sun.

The attributes and states are always various ; they are often contrary too. How then shall I portray the universal Stress in a single colour ? How can I say that *good* attributes alone possess that Stress and not the evil ones ? The fact appears to be that good and evil forms, light and darkness, though both started by the universal overflow cannot determine the Power in their respective way. We cannot say that the Power is good and not evil, nor that it is evil and not good.

Attributes need not be excluded wholly from the Power. All are elements of its universal overflow. It is good as well as terrific. It is immanent in the cosmic process and yet is not exhausted by it. It is conscious as well as unconscious (these being practical distinctions). It possesses all attributes and yet is not limited by them. An well cannot contain the sea itself ; even so our understanding cannot contain the truth about the primordial World-Power.

In ordinary pragmatic experience it appears as the varied world ; in profound, non-polar meditation all varieties of forms and names have blended into one homogeneous awareness. When referred to a centre or point of view, it becomes the individual ; as such it has a form and a name. Without such reference or definition it is formless and limitless. The individual soul is its centralised manifestation. The reality is limitless, quiescent and pure feeling. The salvation of the individual is its merging in the Reality in acentric life.

Such central reference is the restriction of individuality. By such restriction that which is pure bliss differentiated into joy and sorrow. This relativity follows from the restriction. Similarly pure, self-luminous feeling becomes varied as blindness and seeing, as darkness and light. In itself this limitation is undefinable ; though we may conceive it as non-acceptance of actuality or ignorance of the given. The emancipation of the individual is its restoration to the state of actuality, *viz.*, limitless condition of being, consciousness and bliss.

Acentric intuition, which is non-polar and absolutely beatific, is not something distinct from the trance of pure, actual and sweetly blissful love. The thought of love is not the absorption of actual love. The former presupposes duality, the latter does not. In the latter the enjoyer becomes enjoyment, the lover love. The poles of Space, Time and of enjoyment and enjoyer, are lost in the absorption of actual loving which is a condition of undefinable bliss. Knowledge and Love may therefore meet.

APPENDIX

English Rendering of the Sanskrit Verses (on pages 393, 401, 447 and 448) written by the author.

1. That which is gone is not in me ; that which is not come is also not in me. Whatever is entirely and directly given in experience and as such is intuited by me ; whatever is a self-sufficient fact and is as such beyond the power of doubt ; whatever is the basis of all evidence and the totality of intuitive experience ; may be called *Bhāna* (in a preliminary sense).

2. It involves both Time and Space but it lives not itself according to those categories. Is the Given conditioned by Time and Space? Is it here or there, now or then? These practical questions are pointless. If it be asked : How then does the ocean of experience extend beyond all limitations of Time and Space, and so on? I answer, it is alogical. Questions of origin and dissolution are also irrelevant to it.

3. There is one infinitely great Space clear and yet covered by a pale cast of clouds. There is one ocean of undefinable vastness which is varied and broken apparently into a multitude of waves. There is one light filling the universe from which are given off, as it were, various pulses of radiation. Even thus there spreads one *Bhāna* involving various elements of experience.

4. The sky is limitless and yet apparently it has horizons to hedge it round. The sea is unbounded and yet apparently it is contained within circular boundaries. The universal light again becomes apparently differentiated into shades of light and darkness. Similarly by practical acceptance or non-acceptance the *Bhāna* becomes, as it were, defined and attenuated.

5. Why should I be partial to a particular star in my review of the heavens at night? Why should a particular flower out of a host appeal to me while I am looking at a tree in bloom? During the rains it is sometimes the voice of the clouds and sometimes the flutter of the wings of a white crane against the

sombre sky that strikes me most. In this way in an experience we discriminate elements of livelier interest and attention from those less regarded.

6. Is the *Bhāna* cause or effect? Such a question should not be raised. The Ether of Awareness in which elements of experience appear and disappear like fleeting clouds is beyond such questions : it is neither cause nor effect. Our ordinary alternative ways of thinking such as— Is it produced or not? Is it existent or non-existent? and so on— cannot lead to any definite conclusion in regard to this. Can an illusion picturing to us the magnificence of a paradise in the sky prove anything actually regarding the sky itself?

STATE CENTRAL
56-A, B 1 1 1
Calcutta-700 650

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books of Pamphlets

English

- 1.A. India : Her Cult and Education. Series I, 1912
B. Series II : The Approaches to Truth, 1914
C. Series III : The Patent Wonder 1915, 1973
2. Introduction of Vedanta Philosophy, 1928
3. Recent Past of Receding Present, 1947
4. Mean You, 1956
5. Malli-Bithika, 1958
6. Fundamental of Vedanta Philosophy, 1961
7. Science and Sadhana, 1962, Enlarged Edn. 1966
8. Sadhana for Self-Realisation, 1963
9. The Metaphysics of Physics, 1964
10. Unto me Dedicate (including Sanskrit and Bengali verses), 1964
11. Sri Aurobindo, 1970
12. Sri Aurobindo, Namaste, 1970
13. Japasutram, 1971
14. The Fundamental Unity of Human Races and Cultures, 1972
15. The World at Power (Mahamaya)
16. The Yantam

Bengali

1. Itihas O Abhibyakti, 1929
2. Ferar Pathe, 1931
3. Chalar Pathe, 1940
4. Sri Sri Kalika Shorosi, 1949
5. Japasutram : 1-6 Parts, 1950, 1951, 1953, 1956, 1958, 1959

6. Nibasah Saranam Suhrit, 1956
7. Asrame Saraswati Puja, 1966
8. Ma Prapannartihara, 1967
9. Ved O Bijnan, 1967
10. Tapovaner Bani, 1967
11. Shyamal O Dhumal, 1968
12. Puran O Bijnan, 1969
13. Hindushaḍdarshan, 1971
14. Asram, 1972
15. Vichitra Sloka-Manjari I, 1972
16. Havanadhyatma Rahasyam, 1973
17. Advaitadvaita Dasakam, 1975
18. Vichitra Sloka-Manjari II, 1976
19. Samkalan, 1977
20. Akas O Ether
21. Bharater Marmabani
22. Bharater Svadhinata O Sri Aurobinder Abirbhava

Sanskrit

1. Tantra Sammelan : Varanasi, 1965

